



Óglaigh
na hÉireann
DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

Defence Forces Review 2014



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PREFACE

Together we must learn how to compose difference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.

Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War) 1835

One of the many privileges associated with the appointment of Officer in Charge of the Defence Forces Public Relations Branch is to be involved in the production of the Defence Forces Review and once again it is my pleasure to present our publication for 2014. The Review receives the “key to the door” this year as it celebrates its twenty first birthday and we are delighted that this academic compilation continues to provide a real and vibrant forum for research in the Defence Forces. The broad range of material covered within this year’s publication is testament to the complex environment within which the Defence Community operates. The informed and detailed analysis provided by both military and civilian contributors plays no small part in preparing the Defence Forces to meet the diverse challenges of today’s defence and security environment, both at home and abroad. The Review offers an interesting blend of contemporary defence environment analysis, historical research, social media debate, regional studies and legal issues. Overall the publication hopes to provide an insight into the type of relevant research currently conducted both within and outside the Defence Forces.

I would like to compliment all our contributors who selflessly committed valuable time and effort towards the completion of their academic labours of love. The quality of their literary rigours ensures that the Defence Forces Review continues to attract positive responses from diverse domestic and global audiences. May I also take this opportunity to thank the Review’s Editor, Comdt Neil Nolan, on his skilful collation of contemporary and thought-provoking articles. This is also the occasion to express my sincere gratitude to Comdt Dave O’Neill (who retires after several years of close association with the Review) and his staff in the Defence Forces Printing Press as well as Capt Declan Barrett and his Staff in the Defence Forces Information Office for their excellent efforts in ensuring that the 2014 Review is presented efficiently to our readers. Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Branch at info@military.ie or online at <http://www.military.ie/info-centre/publications/defence-forces-review>

Michael P. Dawson
Lieutenant Colonel
Officer in Charge Defence Forces Public Relations Branch

*The material contained in these
articles are the views of the authors
and do not purport to represent the
official views of the Defence Forces.*

EDITOR'S NOTE

This year's *Defence Forces Review* features a diverse and absorbing range of articles addressing a wide variety of issues of interest to the Defence Community. The subject matter traverses the globe in terms of scope, and addresses topics in the Land, Air, Maritime and Cyber domains. This edition contains contributions from members of the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps, as well as civilian experts and academics, offering a variety of perspectives which will inform, challenge, and above all engage the reader.

2014 marks the centenary of the outbreak of “*the great seminal catastrophe*”¹ of the twentieth century, the Great War – a war in which tens of thousands of Irish citizens fought and died. With that in mind, this edition of the Review opens with three articles on the subject. In the first of these articles, Lt Col Brendan O'Shea and CQMS Gerry White examine the build up to the War, including the complex web of treaties and agreements which had been negotiated prior to the outbreak, and the assassination in Sarajevo which was to prove the trigger for hostilities. Comdt David Foley follows with the results of an extensive piece of research into the known missing Irish of the First World War, which are tabulated on a county by county basis, and offer a fascinating insight into the nature and extent of Irish involvement in the conflict. In the final article on the subject, Dr Myles Dungan explores the music of the Great War as it relates to Ireland. In addition to the iconic and commercially successful war-songs such as *It's a long way to Tipperary*, the article examines the un-recorded and irreverent soldiers' songs composed in the trenches, as well as the anti-enlistment songs which live on in the Irish folk tradition.

Delving deeper into Irish Military History, we publish the winning article of the 2013 *Military Heritage Annual Award*, which was written by Matthew McGinty, and compares and contrasts the personalities of Hugh O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell and their impact on the military tactics employed during the Nine Years War. Comdt Seán Murphy draws the historical section to a close with an investigation into the benefits of the study of Military History for the professional development of members of the Defence Forces.

The second section of the Review contains a collection of articles which fall under the general category of Defence and International Security. In the first of two legal articles, Capt John F Quinn conducts an analysis of the UN Security Council Resolution governing the intervention of the International Community in Libya in 2011, and assesses its implications for the UN and International Crisis Management mechanisms. This is followed by an evaluation by Cdr Pat Burke of the implications of a 2013 UK Supreme Court Judgement for the application of law in contemporary armed conflict. Eoin McDonnell then conducts an examination of China's increasing role as a multilateral security actor and assesses how this engagement is likely to evolve, while Cdt John Mahon traces the development of Non-State Military Actors and considers their effect on conflict stabilisation.

Turning to the maritime domain, Capt Paul Amoroso examines the utility of Naval Gun Shells and proposes a number of technical improvements which could be made to

¹ Kennan, G. F. (1981) *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 3.

enhance their employment in modern naval operations. This is followed by an appraisal of the concept of enhanced Loran by Lt (NS) Paul Hegarty, who advocates its introduction as a back-up to Global Positioning Systems. Looking to the air, Lt Col Rory O'Connor uses the Falklands War as a case study in his examination of the role of Air Power in the strategic outcome of a conflict, contrasting operations in the South Atlantic with previous conflicts in the Middle East.

The final section of the Review contains a series of articles concerning Command and Leadership. Comdt (Retd) David Clarke begins with an examination of the barriers which discourage the exercising of Authentic Leadership in the Defence Forces, highlighting the tension which exists between authenticity and organisational culture, while Comdt Johnny Whittaker switches the focus from the leader to the follower, proposing the inclusion of followership in Defence Forces Leadership doctrine. In the first of two articles to feature the influential Prussian theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, Comdt Gareth Prendergast and Major Stefan Lindelauf compare and contrast his key theories with those of another seminal military thinker, Antoine Henri Jomini. The article illustrates the complementary nature of their respective concepts and indicates their continued relevance in professional military education.

The subject of social media has featured in the Review for the past two years, and this edition continues the debate concerning the efficacy and utility of this ubiquitous technology in a military context. Using the lens of Clausewitz's trinitarian concept of war, Lt Col Mark Hearn examines the impact of social media on contemporary conflict and its resolution, highlighting the challenges presented at the international, state and individual levels. Staying with conflict resolution, Brendan Anglin brings the Review to a close with an evaluation of the integrative and distributive styles of negotiation and their application to conflict negotiations.

Abstracts of the dissertations completed by the students of the 70th Senior Command and Staff Course as part of the MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies (MA LMDS) follow the main body of the Review. Their inclusion offers a snapshot of the breadth of research currently being undertaken on career courses within the Defence Forces. To view any of the research papers listed, please contact the Defence Forces Library at info@military.ie.

The Review concludes with a short biography of each of the authors, whose contributions have given this edition its own unique character in contributing to the intellectual capital of the wider Defence Community. For that we extend our gratitude.

Finally, in this centenary year, we remember those Irish men and women who lost their lives in the Great War, in particular those for whom there is 'no known grave.'

Neil Nolan
Commandant

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'Countdown to Catastrophe' The Origins of the Great War

ABSTRACT

On the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War this paper examines the origins of the conflict, the multitude of treaties and agreements put in place specifically to prevent a pan-European conflict, and the series of events which unravelled the entire international system. The role and responsibility of Kaiser Wilhelm and his Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, are explored, as is the sequence of events which culminated in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. The paper concludes by identifying the unique proposal made by John Redmond in the House of Commons on 3 August 1914 when he advocated collaboration between the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Irish Volunteers in order to defend Ireland, and the manner in which Britain was ultimately left with little option other than to declare war on Germany.

Fifty years were spent in the process of making Europe explosive. Five days were enough to detonate it.

Sir Basil Liddell Hart.¹

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated in Sarajevo, setting off a chain of events that resulted in the outbreak of the First World War. The historian Max Hastings observed correctly that "rather than providing an authentic cause for the First World War, this murder was exploited to justify unleashing forces already in play."² Accordingly, the root cause of the conflict is to be found not in Sarajevo, but rather in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 when France lost the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the newly created German Reich.³ For over forty years after the end of that war, a statue in Paris representing Strasbourg, the capital of Alsace, was draped in black cloth and the desire to recover these territories remained uppermost in the minds of many of France's political and military leaders.

In Germany however, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the architect and first chancellor (1871-1890) of the new German Reich, was determined to prevent a further outbreak of war and spent much of his time in office negotiating a series of treaties and alliances that were directed towards maintaining the balance of power in Europe.⁴ In 1878 he played the role of regional 'honest broker' at the Congress of Berlin, which was convened to

¹ Liddell Hart, H.B. (1972) *History of the First World War*, London: Pan Books, p. 1.

² Hastings, M. (2013) *Catastrophe – Europe goes to war in 1914*, London: William Collins, p. xxvii.

³ The term 'Reich' was used to denote 'Empire.' In the 20th century German nationalists considered the Holy Roman Empire to be the first Reich, and the unified German state established in 1871 to be the second Reich. The German Empire was dissolved at the end of the Great War and when Adolf Hitler assumed power in 1933 he proclaimed a new state known as the 'Third Reich.'

⁴ Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck (01 April 1815 – 30 July 1898) was a Prussian aristocrat and German statesman. As *Ministerpräsident* (Prime Minister) of Prussia from 1862–1890, he oversaw the unification of Germany. In 1867 he became Chancellor of the North German Confederation. When the German Reich was formed in 1871, he became its first chancellor and held that office until 1890.

reorganize the Balkans in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.⁵ The following year he forged the 'Dual Alliance' with Austria-Hungary in which both empires pledged to aid each other in the event of an attack by Russia. Then in 1881 he masterminded the 'Three Emperor's League' (Dreikaiserbund) between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia in which the latter two agreed to act in concert with Germany in all matters pertaining to the Balkans. To complicate matters further, the following year he constructed the 'Triple Alliance' – a military alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in which each member promised mutual support in the event of an attack by any two other great powers, or in the case of Germany and Italy, an attack by France alone. This alliance also insured the Hapsburg Empire against an Italian attack in the event of war with Russia. Then, in 1888 Bismarck entered into a secret bi-lateral agreement with Russia known as the 'Reinsurance Treaty' which committed both countries to remain neutral should one or the other become involved in a war with a third party. This neutrality, however, would not apply should Germany attack France or Russia attack Austria-Hungary.

Nevertheless, in spite of Bismarck's efforts, this complicated diplomatic jig-saw soon began to unravel when Wilhelm II was proclaimed Kaiser on 17 June 1888.⁶ An inexperienced monarch, but an enthusiastic militarist, Wilhelm embarked on a series of policies which would ultimately prove disastrous for Germany and Europe. In 1890 he dismissed Bismarck and ordered the new Chancellor, Count Georg Leo von Caprivi, not to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. This resulted in Russia entering into a military convention with the French Republic in 1894 whereby both countries agreed to mobilise their forces in the event of mobilisation by any member of the Triple Alliance.⁷

The Kaiser also set about transforming his empire into a 'world power' by acquiring new overseas colonies, and by the end of the century, Germany had secured over one million square miles and 14 million colonial subjects in South-West Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons, Tanganyika, and the Pacific Islands. In order to protect his new empire, Wilhelm believed it was essential to build a strong navy and he gave this task to Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who in 1897 was appointed Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office. That same year the First Navy Law was introduced in the Reichstag authorizing the construction of nineteen battleships and eight armored cruisers.⁸ When this legislation was passed the following year, it was interpreted by Britain as a direct challenge to her maritime supremacy and placed the former allies on a clear collision course.

For her part France viewed this outbreak of Anglo-German rivalry as an opportunity to strengthen her own ties with Britain, and on 08 April 1904 both countries reached an understanding known as the 'Entente Cordial' in which each acknowledged their respective spheres of influence in Africa, Thailand and the Pacific. The 'Entente' was strengthened by what became known as the 'First Moroccan Crisis' which occurred

⁵ The Russo-Turkish War of 1878 was initiated by Russia with the aim of recovering territory it had lost in the Crimean War; re-establishing itself in the Black Sea and wrenching the Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire. The war and the Treaty of Berlin resulted in independence for Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and the re-establishment of the Bulgarian state.

⁶ Wilhelm II was born in Berlin on 15 June 1888. He was the son of Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia and his wife Victoria, Princess of Prussia (daughter of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom). He was Queen Victoria's first grandchild. As the son of the Crown Prince of Prussia, Wilhelm (from 1861) became the second in the line of succession to the throne of Prussia, and also, after 1871, to that of the German Reich, which according to its constitution was ruled by the Prussian King.

⁷ Georg Leo Graf von Caprivi de Caprera de Montecuccoli (1831- 1899) was a German general and statesman, who succeeded Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor of the German Empire in March 1890 and served in that office until October 1894.

⁸ Willmott, H.P. (2009) *World War I*, New York: Dorling Kindersley Publishing, p. 21.

between March 1905 and May 1906 over the status of Morocco. On 31 March the Kaiser visited Tangier and, during a conference with representatives of Sultan Abdelaziz, he declared that he had come to support the sovereignty of Morocco. His remarks were seen a direct challenge to French influence in the country and almost resulted in war between France and Germany. Although the crisis was ultimately resolved by peaceful means it led to a strengthening of relations between France and Britain and also worsened their combined relations with Germany. The following year (1907) Russia joined the pact between Britain and France making it the 'Triple Alliance.' From the perspective of the Kaiser and others within the German High Command, their country was now encircled by potential adversaries.⁹

From this time onwards, Field Marshal Sir John French, in his capacities as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and later as Chief of the General Staff, regarded a general war in Europe as a certainty and the British and French General Staffs began to have secret consultations on the matter.¹⁰ In fact, on a visit to German cavalry manoeuvres in August 1911, Kaiser Wilhelm actually taunted French when he said "the sword of Germany is sharp; and if you oppose Germany you will find how sharp it is." Then, as the British delegation was preparing to leave, the Kaiser summoned French a second time and presented him with a framed photograph of himself. "This is your arch-enemy," he remarked semi-jocularly. "This is your disturber of the peace in Europe."¹¹ This situation was compounded by the fact that the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, was of like mind with his leader and had, since 1906, been modifying German war plans which envisaged a massive sweep into northern France before then turning attention towards Russia.¹² In any event, and notwithstanding the Kaiser's bravado and von Moltke's aspirations, the multitude of treaties and alliances remained in place and were successful in maintaining a fragile European peace. However, the one area which remained problematic and continued to be a potential flashpoint was the Balkans.

In 1876 the Russo-Turkish War had erupted when Russia, and its ally Serbia, came to the aid of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in their rebellion against Ottoman rule. The Russians attacked through Bulgaria and by January 1878 had advanced as far as the gates of Istanbul. The subsequent Treaty of San Stefano, concluded in March of that year, freed Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro from Ottoman rule, gave autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and made Bulgaria an autonomous principality under Russian protection. Britain and Austria-Hungary were alarmed by the terms of this treaty however, and they availed of the Congress of Berlin to restrict Russia's gains. Under the terms of Treaty of Berlin, which was concluded at the end of the Congress on 13 July 1878, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro would all remain independent; Austria-Hungary would take over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Britain would occupy Cyprus; a smaller Bulgaria would be created under Ottoman suzerainty; and Russia would take control of a much reduced area of Ottoman territory. But these arrangements ultimately satisfied no-one and only served to increase tension in the region. While Serbia had theoretically gained independence, the fact that it was a

⁹ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁰ French, J. (1919) 1914, London: Constable & 7 Co., p. 1.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 14.

¹² Hastings (2013) op cit, p. 26.

land-locked state continued to make it dependent on Austria-Hungary. In 1881 a secret treaty was signed between Serbia and Austria-Hungary whereby in return for recognition of the Serb Kingdom, Belgrade would renounce all claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina with its large Serbian population; refuse to allow any foreign forces on its soil; and forfeit the right to negotiate a political treaty with any other state without Austro-Hungarian approval. Four years later these undertakings were tested to the limit when Serbia declared war on Bulgaria after its annexation of Rumelia, and after some intense fighting, the Bulgarian army soon got the upper hand. It was only after Vienna intervened on behalf of the Serbs that both sides agreed to stand down their forces and return to the pre-war status quo.

After this conflict, an uneasy peace settled upon the Balkans – but this was not destined to last. In 1908, Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in an eruption of overt Serb nationalism, the most extreme manifestation of which was the formation of a semi-military organisation called Narodna Odbrana (National Defence). The purpose of this organisation was to recruit volunteers to 'protect' the annexed territory, but within twelve months Serbia was forced to recognise the annexation and Narodna Odbrana was driven underground. However, militant Serb nationalism re-emerged on 03 March 1911 when a group of army officers, who had previously led a military coup in 1903 in which the pro-Austrian Obrenovich Dynasty was overthrown and King Alexander and Queen Draga were murdered, formed a highly secret organisation called Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death)¹³ which also became known as 'The Black Hand.'¹⁴

The aim this time was to establish a 'Union of all Serbs in Greater Serbia' – an area which included Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia – and, as an indication of their intent, the symbols of their organisation included a skull, crossbones, knife, bomb and poison. The first president was Colonel Ilija Radivojevic (one of those who had participated in the murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903), but the driving force was another 1903 veteran, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff.¹⁵

Before long the Black Hand was cultivating relationships with revolutionaries in 'occupied Serb lands' across the Balkans and links were quickly established with Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), one of whose members was Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb from Grahovo village in eastern Bosnia.¹⁶ Born in 1894, Princip was a fanatical Serb nationalist who, at seventeen years of age, had gone to the grave of Bogdan Zerajic, (a twenty-four year old fellow Serb nationalist who had committed suicide after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 15 June 1910) and sworn an oath to avenge his death.¹⁷ In March 1914, Princip felt he was ready to fulfil that promise, and as luck would have it an opportunity was close at hand.

13 Dedijer, V. (1966) *The Road to Sarajevo*, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 371.

14 On 3 March 1911, the seven founding members of *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt* met in an apartment on Bosnia Street in Belgrade and formed the Black Hand Secret Society. These included Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, the chief of the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff, Major Voja Tankosic and Milan Ciganovic. Their objective was the creation through violence of a Greater Serbia. Their stated aim was: "To realize the national ideal, the unification of all Serbs." Dragutin Dimitrijevic, became the group's leader. By 1914 there were approximately 2,500 members of the Black Hand composed of junior army officers, lawyers, journalists and university professors. Of this number, approximately 30 lived and worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 Glenny, M. (1999) *The Balkans*, London: Granta Books, p. 299.

16 *Mlada Bosna* was formed in 1908 as a broad movement of intellectual activity against Austro-Hungary and was composed predominantly of young Serb students. Its leader, Vladimir Gacinovic, became a member of the Black Hand in 1911. He was the only Young Bosnian to do so.

17 Glenny (1999) op cit, p. 302.

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and Inspector-General of its armed forces, was scheduled to visit manoeuvres conducted by the 15th and 16th Army Corps in the vicinity of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of June.¹⁸ Upon discovery of this information, Princip met in Belgrade with two fellow Serb nationalists, Nedeljko Cabrinovic and Trifko Grabez, and together they decided to assassinate the Archduke. Grabez then approached the Black Hand through his own contacts and, after some discussion, Colonel Dimitrijvic agreed to supply four Browning revolvers and six bombs to the Mlada Bosna conspirators.¹⁹ After a farewell dinner on 28 May 1914, the three men left Belgrade for Sarajevo where they were joined by fellow conspirators Vaso Cubrilovic, Svijetko Popovic, Muhamed Mehemedbasic, and a number of other supporters.

Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Sophie arrived in Sarajevo on 25 June and spent two days attending army manoeuvres as planned. Sunday, 28 June was Vidovda - the Serbian national day on which they commemorated the defeat of Prince Lazar by the Ottoman Turks in an epic battle fought on the Field of the Blackbirds in Kosovo in 1389. On that day, the Archduke was scheduled to open a new State Museum, have lunch with the governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina and visit the local army barracks in the city.²⁰ This was the day Princip and his fellow conspirators decided to strike and, armed with the bombs and revolvers, they took up positions on Appel Quay along the route to the Town Hall where the Archduke was due to receive an official welcome from Sarajevo's civic and religious dignitaries.

After attending Mass in the Hotel Bosna, Franz Ferdinand and his wife left for the Town Hall, travelling in the third vehicle in a convoy of five cars. By now Mehemedbasic had lost his nerve and left his position along the route, but at approximately 10.10am, as the convoy neared the Cumurja bridge, Cabrinovic threw a bomb which hit the rear of the Archduke's car, bounced into the street, and exploded under the rear wheel of the fourth vehicle, wounding two of its occupants and slightly injuring about twenty spectators. Cabrinovic then swallowed a phial of cyanide and jumped over the quayside into the Miljacka River as the police began to arrest large numbers of bystanders. In the midst of all this chaos, the first two cars in the convoy continued on their way, oblivious to what was taking place behind them. Franz Ferdinand, however, ordered his driver to stop and sent an officer back to investigate the explosion. Some minutes later he too continued on to the Town Hall where, in the course of his speech, he expressed his outrage at the attempt on his life. Shortly afterwards, Cabrinovic was captured as he emerged from the river and, watching him being taken away by the police, Cubrilovic and Popovic panicked and also fled the scene, leaving Grabez and Princip isolated and out of contact with each other on the quay.²¹ After a further period had elapsed, Grabez too lost his nerve and fled the scene, leaving Princip on his own. Assuming that the Archduke would now leave the city by a

¹⁸ Franz Ferdinand was the nephew of Franz Joseph, the eighty-four year old emperor of Austria-Hungary, and had become his heir through a series of mishaps. Franz-Joseph's first heir, his younger brother, the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico, had been overthrown and executed in 1867. Franz Joseph's son, Crown Prince Rudolf, had died in 1889; and the next in line, Archduke Karl Rudolf, the emperor's second youngest brother and father of Franz Ferdinand, had died in May 1896 during a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

¹⁹ Glenny (1999) op cit, p. 302.

²⁰ The Battle of Kosovo was fought in 1389 on St Vitus' Day, 15 June, between Serb, Bosnian, and Albanian forces and the Ottoman Empire, in Kosovo Field, about five kilometers northwest of modern-day Pristina.

²¹ Gavril Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifun Grabez, Muhamed Mehemedbasic, Vaso Cubrilovic, Cvjetko Popovic and Veljko Cubrilovic were the main conspirators. They were supported by Lazar Djukic, Danilo Ilic, Nedo Kerovic, Mihajlo Jovanovic, Jakov Milovic, Mitar Kerovic, Ivo Kranjcevic, Branko Zagorac, Marko Perin, and Cvijan Stjepanovic.

different route and under tightened security, Princip believed that all opportunities for completing his mission were lost and decided to go to Moritz Schiller's cafe on Franz Josef Street for something to eat.

In the meantime back at the Town Hall, the Archduke decided to go to the hospital and visit the victims of Cabrinovic's attack. In order to avoid the city centre, General Oskar Potiorek, the Military Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, instructed that the royal car should travel straight along Appel Quay to Sarajevo Hospital. However, Potiorek forgot to inform the driver, Leopold Loyka, about this decision and on the way, Loyka took a right turn onto Franz Josef Street. Realizing his mistake, he then began to reverse the car back to the quay but as he did so, the engine stalled and the gears locked. Princip could hardly believe his luck when he saw this through the café window. He immediately ran out into the street and, at a distance of about five feet, fired two shots into the car. Franz Ferdinand was hit in the neck and Sophie in the abdomen. The bullet that hit the Archduke severed his jugular vein and lodged in his spine while the Duchess had been critically wounded in her right side. The royal couple were immediately rushed to the hospital but Sophie died en route and Franz Ferdinand was pronounced dead at 11.15am.²² Just before being apprehended by the police, Princip also swallowed a phial of cyanide, but it too failed to work and only succeeded in making him violently sick.

It was nothing short of a miracle that the assassination had succeeded, given the inexperience and disorganisation of the conspirators. However, this violent act, carried out in the name of Serb nationalism, was destined to have far reaching effects which neither Princip nor any of his colleagues could possibly have foreseen. The countdown to catastrophe had begun, and the convoluted system of international treaties and alliances so painfully constructed to maintain peace in Europe, was about to plunge the continent into war.

In the aftermath of the assassination, the major powers of Europe became engulfed in what subsequently became known as the 'July Crisis.' Austria-Hungary was determined to exact revenge on Serbia for its part in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and to reduce the power of its troublesome neighbour. On 6 July the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, sent a telegram to the German Ambassador in Vienna stating that the Kaiser would "faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship."²³ The telegram effectively offered Austria-Hungary a 'blank cheque' in terms of German support for whatever action it chose to take in punishing Serbia. Armed with this assurance, it delivered an ultimatum to Serbia at 6.00pm on Friday, 24 July which, among other things, gave the government in Belgrade forty-eight hours to accept full responsibility for the assassination and permit police from Vienna to conduct the criminal investigation.

Serbia's reply, delivered two days later, went a considerable distance towards meeting these demands and recommended referring the entire incident to the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the other Great Powers for adjudication if Vienna so wished. That

²² Report of the District Court in Sarajevo.

²³ Duffy, M. (2009) 'Primary Documents - Germany's Blank Cheque to Austria-Hungary', 6 July 1914 [online] available: www.firstworldwar.com/source/blankcheque.html, [accessed 24 June 2014].

same day, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, proposed that ambassadors from England, France, Italy, and Germany should meet in an effort to prevent the outbreak of war. Germany, however, declined to accept this offer and in Vienna, a decision to go to war had already been taken.

When it received Serbia's reply, Austria-Hungary promptly severed diplomatic relations with that country.²⁴ Alarmed at these events, Russia immediately declared that it would act to protect Serbian sovereignty, but this declaration failed to deter Austria-Hungary, and at noon on 28 July 1914 war was declared on Serbia.

The crisis deepened the following day when the Russian government ordered a mobilisation of its forces on the Austrian border. When the German government became aware of this development, it informed Russia that even a partial mobilisation of her forces would lead to war with Germany. In London meanwhile, the British government watched events unfolding on the continent and sent a message to Berlin stating that it would not stand aside in all circumstances. The Kaiser, however, was anxious to keep Britain out of the war and during a meeting of his military council held at Potsdam that same day, he instructed his chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, to inform the British government that if Britain remained neutral, then Germany would not annex any French territory.²⁵ Wilhelm II and his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, had also begun to exchange a series of telegrams in which each would urge the other to use their influence to stop the conflict spreading.²⁶ However, while this diplomatic manoeuvring was taking place, the Austro-Hungarian army had gone on the offensive, and that afternoon its artillery began bombarding Belgrade.

The slide towards war continued the next day (31 July) when both Austria and Russia announced a general mobilisation and the German government declared that there was an 'imminent danger of war.' In London, the British government was still considering its own position and, in attempt to stop the conflict spreading, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, sent a despatch to both Paris and Berlin seeking assurances that Belgian neutrality would be respected by both countries in the event of war. The French reply stated that they were "resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise."²⁷ The German government, however, declined to reply on the basis that to do so would run the risk of disclosing their war plans.²⁸ They had in fact already decided their next move, and later that night, Germany informed Russia that unless it ceased all military action,

24 Duffy, M. (2009) 'Minutes: Ministerial Council of State, Vienna, 07 July 1914' (Count Berchtold, Imperial Foreign Minister Presiding), [online], available: www.firstworldwar.com/source/austriancouncilmeeting.htm [accessed 24 June 2014].

25 Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856 – 1921) was a German politician and statesman who served as Chancellor of the German Empire from 1909 to 1917.

26 These telegrams (which subsequently became known as the 'Willy-Nicky Correspondence') were the first in a series of telegrams sent between the two monarchs in the days preceding the outbreak of the war.

27 UK Parliament Reports 1803-2005 Vol. 65, 'Speech by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on 03 August 1914', [online], available: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-d-grey>, [accessed 24 June 2014].

28 Ibid. Referring to the query sent to Germany during his speech in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey stated: "From the German Government the reply was: 'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.' Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of the plan of campaign."

Germany would also mobilise her forces. They also sent a message to Paris informing the French government of their intentions towards Russia and demanding to know within eighteen hours if France would remain neutral – and if that were the case to temporarily cede the great forts at Toul and Verdun to Germany as an insurance bond. The French government, however, refused to be dictated to and Prime Minister René Viviani replied that France would act in accordance with its own interests.²⁹

On the following day (01 August) the countdown to catastrophe entered its final stages. At noon the German ultimatum to Russia expired without a reply being received in Berlin, and at 3.40pm the French government ordered its forces to mobilise. Finally, at 7.10pm, Germany declared war on Russia and later that night the Kaiser addressed a cheering crowd from the balcony of the Royal Palace in Berlin and declared “Let your hearts beat for God, and your fists on the enemy.”³⁰

German military strategy at the outbreak of the war was based on the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ (adopted in 1905) which was aimed at avoiding a war on two fronts.³¹ The plan called for Germany to concentrate her troops on the west and inflict a rapid defeat on France by marching through neutral Luxembourg and Belgium and encircling Paris. Once France had surrendered, its forces could then be rushed to the east by rail to confront the Russians before they had time to complete their mobilization. Early the following morning (02 August) the German Army began to execute the plan, and units crossed the border into Luxembourg. German troops also invaded Poland and a Russian force entered East Prussia. At seven o’clock that evening, Germany sent the Belgian government a note stating that their troops would have to enter Belgian territory in anticipation of a French attack. The note also stated that Belgium should not resist the German invasion and demanded a reply within twelve hours.

The British government was now growing increasingly concerned at the possibility of a German naval attack against France in the North Sea or English Channel. Such a development would effectively give Germany control of those seas because the French fleet was then concentrated in the Mediterranean. That afternoon, Sir Edward Grey gave the following note to the French ambassador:

I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place.³²

29 Jean Raphaël Adrien René Viviani (1863 – 1925) was a French socialist politician of the Third Republic, who served as Prime Minister of France for the first year of the Great War.

30 Willmott, (2009) op cit, p. 29.

31 Warner, P. (1998) *World War One*, London: Arms and Armour Press, p. 48. The plan provided for the invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. After Schlieffen’s retirement in 1906, the plan was modified by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, who dropped the invasion of the Netherlands.

32 Ibid, p. 48.

Early the following morning (03 August), the Belgian government informed the German ambassador in Brussels that it was “firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights” and the Belgian King, Albert I, sent the following appeal to King George V of Britain:

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.³³

In Britain the main focus of the British Government during the month of July had been on the possibility of civil war erupting in Ireland over the issue of Home Rule. In recent months the Irish Volunteers and Ulster Volunteer Force had both smuggled large quantities of arms into the country and the possibility of war increased with each passing day. The government only turned its attention to events in the Balkans towards the end of the month when the crisis deepened and the clouds of war gathered over Europe.

On 3 August the British government ordered its forces to mobilise, and that afternoon, the House of Commons met in London to hear a statement by Sir Edward Grey on the crisis. In the course of his statement Grey declared that while Britain had no strict military treaty obligations towards France or Russia under the terms of the Triple Entente (which he described merely as a ‘diplomatic group’), it did have an obligation to defend the neutrality of Belgium under the terms of the 1839 Treaty of London which guaranteed that country's independence.³⁴ Towards the end of his speech, Grey turned his attention to Ireland and said:

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland – and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad – does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account.³⁵

John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, addressed the House after Grey spoke. In the course of his speech he said:

There are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulsterman in the North. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will

³³ UK Parliament Reports 1803-2005 Vol. 65, op cit. The message from King Albert referred to the assurances sought by Britain and given by Bismarck regarding Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War.

³⁴ The Treaty of London 1839, which recognised and guaranteed Belgium's independence as a sovereign state, was signed by Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia.

³⁵ UK Parliament Reports 1803-2005 Vol. 65, op cit.

be good, not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? ... [W]hile Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war; while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, still, if the dire necessity is forced upon this country, we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the North, we would ourselves defend the coasts of our country.³⁶

The possibility of Britain entering the war in support of Belgium failed to deter Germany, and on the following morning (04 August), German troops commenced their march on Paris by violating Belgian neutrality and pouring across the border. When informed of this, the British government sent an ultimatum to Germany stating that unless it received assurances regarding Belgian independence and neutrality by 11.00pm, it would be forced to act.³⁷ When the assurances sought from Germany failed to materialise, Great Britain declared war on Germany. This decision was not taken easily and, rather than support the declaration, two members of the British government - John Morley, President of the Board of Trade, and John Burns, Lord President of the Council, chose to resign their office.

Earlier that evening, as Britain stood on the brink of war, Sir Edward Grey stood by a window at the Foreign Office and watched the lamps being lit on Saint James's Park. He turned to a colleague and remarked "the lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."³⁸ Grey was correct. One by one the lamps were being extinguished all over Europe. In the course of the next four years the world would witness one of the most cataclysmic conflicts of the 20th Century, which would eventually lead to the loss of millions of lives and shape the world we live in today. The countdown to catastrophe was now complete.

36 Library Ireland (2014) 'John E. Redmond Speech at the Declaration of War 3 August 1914', [online], available: www.libraryireland.com/articles/RedmondIrishOratory/index.php, [accessed 24 June 2014].

37 Simkins, P., Jukes, G. and Hickey, M. (2003) *The First World War*, London: Osprey, p. 34.

38 Thompson, D. (1965) *Europe Since Napoleon*, London, Pelican, p. 544.

The Missing Irish of the First World War: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?

ABSTRACT

Thomas Kettle M.P. was one of the key leaders at the inaugural meeting of Oglagh na hEireann in the Rotunda Rink on 25th November 1913. In 1916, while serving as a Lieutenant in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Thomas Kettle was killed at the Battle of Ginchy and having 'no known grave,' is commemorated along with thousands of other Irish men on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing. Recent research by the author has focused on the scale and extent of those Irish who were killed during the First World War and who also having 'no known grave,' can be identified as the Missing Irish. By first re-examining the statistics for all of the Irish killed and then explaining the cause of their unknown burial, this research explores the wealth and breadth of information available from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission database. Delving into this data it has now been realised that 7,646 Irish, including four women, are commemorated on forty-four memorials to the missing in twenty-one countries. Comprehensive analysis further revises and reveals information about the range of units in which they served and the battles and events in which they were killed; including over 500 civilians serving in the Mercantile Marine who perished in Irish waters. This research offers entirely new perspectives on the Irish contribution to the First World War.

In the trenches death is random, illogical, devoid of principle. One is shot not on sight, but on blindness, out of sight...¹

Thomas Kettle

One of our Politicians is Missing

On the afternoon of 9th September 1916 during the 16th Division attack on the German entrenchments at the French village of Ginchy,² "[l]eading his company of the 9th Royal Dublin Fusiliers Tom Kettle, poet, barrister and former nationalist MP was killed."³ Of the original founding members of Oglagh na hEireann at that seminal Rotunda Rink meeting on 25th November 1913, The O'Rahilly had been fatally wounded in action on Moore Street on 29th April 1916, Pádraig Pearse was executed in Kilmainham Jail on 3rd May 1916 and Thomas (Tom) Kettle was killed in action on a Somme battlefield. Visitors to Glasnevin Cemetery and Arbour Hill in Dublin are familiar with the final resting places of

¹ Lyons, J.B. (1983) *The Enigma of Tom Kettle Dublin: Irish Nationalist, Essayist, Poet and British Soldier 1880 -1916*, Dublin: Glendale Press, p.p. 240-241.

² The battle of Ginchy was part of the first battle of the Somme (1 July – 18 November 1916). It was launched in advance of the main September offensive (battle of Fiers-Courcelette), to push the British front line nearer to the main German defences, which ran to the north of the village. Commonwealth War Graves Commission, *The Battle of the Somme* [online], available: <http://www.cwgc.org/somme/content.asp?menuid=26&id=26&menuname=Ginchy&menu=main> [accessed 02 April 2014].

³ Dungan, M. (1995) *Irish Voices from the Great War*, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, p. 145.

the fallen of Easter 1916. Lieutenant Thomas Kettle has no known grave however. He, alongside 414 soldiers of the 16th (Irish) Division, killed during that infamous battle on the Western Front, is commemorated on Pier 16 C of the Thiepval Memorial.

The Thiepval Memorial commemorates only those 72,338 officers and men of the United Kingdom and South African forces who died in the Somme sector before 20th March 1918. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) database contains details on 1,059,735 fatalities of the First World War. Among this incredible number of dead there are 187,152 unidentified Commonwealth burials from the First World War.⁴ “The simple truth is that people die in war, and in the Great War their number was legion.”⁵ A detailed and comprehensive research project utilising the Commonwealth War Graves Commission database now reveals that the total figure for the identified Missing Irish is confirmed at 7,646 (including four women). Although this recent research further predicted, by calculating the probability of Irish included in the incomplete records, that there are almost 13,400 Missing Irish in total (including those missing from Irish regiments whose records of Next of Kin and Home Address are still unavailable); the focus of this paper is confined to the 7,646 identified Missing Irish, men and women who have no known grave, or were lost or buried at sea. Their names are to be found on a total of forty-four memorials to the missing, located in twenty one countries ranging from the United Kingdom to distant Myanmar. Interestingly, there are two memorials in Ireland; one in Grangegorman Military Cemetery in Dublin and the recently unveiled panel in Cork Military Cemetery. These memorials to the unknown graves in Cork Military Cemetery provide an insight into the First World War narrative which prevailed in Ireland, and merits consideration for future research. At the actual time of burial, the graves were known however, and therefore they are not included in this particular study.

Discovery

The Missing Irish have been absent not alone from Irish history but also from Irish consciousness. Within the community of nations planning to commemorate the centenary events of the First World War, Ireland has already taken the lead with the Decade of Centenaries launched in 2012. There is now an opportunity for the Missing Irish of the First World War to contribute again, albeit from their unknown graves, to enriching our understanding and appreciation of the extent of the Irish contribution to the First World War through the commemorative events which are planned, as well as those yet to be considered because “[t]he fact that Ireland was deeply involved in the war is of fundamental importance to an understanding of its own place in European and international history.”⁶ The focus of this paper is to present the previously unknown figures for the Missing Irish, at county level, in order to further the recognition of the extent and the importance of the role of the Irish in the First World War.

4 Commonwealth War Graves Commission (2013) ‘Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report 2013’, available: <http://www.cwgc.org/learning-and-resources/publications/annual-report.aspx>, [accessed 02 April 2014], p. 43.

5 Winter, J. (2010) *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History* (11th edn.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 78.

6 Home, J. (ed.) (2008) *Our War: Ireland and the Great War*, Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, p. ix.

Lost in Time

In *The Forgotten Soldiers* Terence Denman suggests that:

Guillemont and Ginchy were the graveyards of the original 'Irish Brigade'. Many of the idealistic nationalists who had joined up in the first months of the war would never return to Ireland. The 16th Division's part in the Battle of the Somme is remembered by few in Ireland.⁷

The absence of Ginchy from the teaching of Irish military history is all the more poignant on considering the observations of Father William Doyle, Chaplain of the 9th Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers:

The wild rush of our Irish lads swept the Germans away like chaff. The first line went clean through the village and out the other side, and were it not for the officers, acting under order, would certainly be in Berlin by this time.⁸

Father Doyle was later killed at the Battle of Ypres on 16th August 1917 and he is commemorated on the Memorial to the Missing at Tynecot Cemetery outside the Belgian town of Passchendaele. Johnstone suggests that "[f]or overlong those gallant Irishmen of all creeds, affiliations and class, who writ large their country's name in the years 1914-1918, have been written out of history."⁹ This has been the prevailing view of historians and academics. "It is now unthinkable that a general history of Ireland would fail to devote a significant section to the Great War and to its effect on the momentous events of 1914-1922."¹⁰ Tom Kettle's prophetic words of May 1916 have resonated for almost a century – "These men will go down in history as heroes and martyrs and I will go down – if I go down at all- as a bloody British officer."¹¹

Retrieving the Facts

Much has been written about the Irish involvement in the First World War but unfortunately "The lack of statistical data in relation to Irish enlistment and casualties is the most frustrating thing for anyone attempting a serious study of the part played by Irishmen in the conflict."¹² At the outbreak of the war, it is estimated that there were 58,000 Irish regulars and reservists in the British Armed Forces, and during the course of the war a further 144,000 enlisted as volunteers.¹³ The vast majority served in the eighteen Irish units in the British Army; ten had their regimental depots in Ireland while the remainder were based in England (see Table 1). Following the outbreak of the war, additional units known as 'service' battalions were formed as part of the New Armies authorised by the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener. A total of seventy-two battalions were raised within the Irish regiments. These units in turn were formed into a number of new divisions which constituted the basis of the two 'New Armies' successfully raised by Lord Kitchener. From an Irish perspective, the primary focus is on the 10th and 16th

7 Denman, T. (2008) *Ireland's Unknown Soldiers. The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War*, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, p. 102.

8 O'Rahilly, A. (2010) *Father William Doyle*, S.J. London: Lightning Source UK, p. 349.

9 Johnstone, T. (1992) *Orange Green and Khaki – The Story of the Irish Regiments in the Great War*, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, p. 428.

10 Gregory, A. and Pasetta, S. (2002) *Ireland and the Great War 'A War to Unite Us all?'*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 1.

11 Lyons (1983) *op cit*, p.p. 292-3.

12 Harris, H. (1968) *The Irish Regiments in the First World War*, (3rd edn.), Cork: Mercier Press, p. 26

13 Fitzpatrick, D. (1996) 'Militarism in Ireland 1900-1922', Bartlett, T. and Jeffrey, K. (eds.) *A Military History of Ireland*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.p. 379 – 406.

'Irish' Divisions and the 36th 'Ulster' Division: "These three divisions fought with great distinction in battlefields throughout Europe and the Middle East."¹⁴ Additionally, the research into the Missing Irish reveals that while there are 5,383 members of the Irish Regiments classified as missing, there are a further 2,263 missing Irish born men and women who served in the full spectrum of British and Commonwealth units. This data underscores the fact that Irish contribution to the war effort was extensive in all theatres.

Casualties of Circumstance

The CWGC database has complete records (most importantly the 'Additional Information' of next of kin address) for 7,646 Irish Missing. The extent of the Irish Missing deserves consideration within the context of total casualties throughout the war and in key battles. While the Irish National War Memorial Committee may have identified a total of 49,435 Irish fatalities from the Great War during its research in 1921, it is Casey who comes closest to accurately identifying the true number of Irish dead (with a known Irish birthplace) of 30, 216.¹⁵ Casey explains how an examination of Ireland's memorial records 1914-1918 shows that the committee of the Irish National War Memorial "had maintained a superficial and haphazard approach to their job of compiling the list of Ireland's war dead."¹⁶ His monumental investigation involved researching the 667,000 names in *Soldiers died*, part by part, and extracting the Irish-born dead on a county basis. He does acknowledge that "...[t]he information given in *Soldiers died* is sometimes not very accurate and is obviously based on the information volunteered by the recruit on enlistment."¹⁷ An interesting finding by Casey is that the principal Irish infantry regiments accounted for 21,166 Irish killed; 71.07% of the total figure.¹⁸ The research into the Irish Missing supports the proportionality of the total killed. As revealed in Table 4, the conduct of the key battles predisposed the majority of casualties to unknown graves: "That was the nature of the Killing Machine of the Great War – random and brutal."¹⁹

Lost on the Battlefield

The ebb and flow of the battles meant that "By the time of the great battles of attrition 1916-1917 mass graves were dug in advance of major offensives. ...[t]hose who died in the midst of fiercely protracted fighting could lie and rot for months or years before being buried."²⁰ Winter cites the example of Gallipoli where "[f]or much of the period the heat was so intense and the bodies quickly putrefied and stank. Burial parties simply dumped the bodies into collective graves without retrieving identification tags."²¹ At Ginchy on the afternoon of 9th September 1916, the 7th Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment were the divisional reserve. As the regimental history records:

The Battalion arrived in the vicinity of Carnoy about 6 a.m. on 10th September and the first thing done was to send a messenger to 4th Grenadier Guards asking them to collect our dead. It had been utterly impossible for us to do

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 68.

¹⁵ Casey, P. (1997) 'Irish casualties in the First World War', *The Irish Sword – The Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland*, Vol XX, Athlone: Alfa Print, p.p. 192 -206.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 193.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 194.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 194.

¹⁹ Dungan, M. (1997) *They Shall Grow Not Old, Irish Soldiers and the Great War*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, p. 60.

²⁰ Dyer, G. (1994) *The Missing of the Somme*, London: Penguin Books, p. 12.

²¹ Winter (2010) op cit, p. 36.

this ourselves for the first time in the history of the Battalion and it is thought the last. Thus ended the share of the 7th Leinster Regiment in the battles under the generic name of the Somme 1916. The share had been a noble one, worthy of a battalion of veterans. The Battalion was now reduced to 15 officers and 289 other ranks.²²

This rare insight into the nature and conduct of the battle bares the stark reality that the burial of dead comrades was problematic. Moving through Guillemont on 8th September “Emmet Dalton recalled that he was with Tom [Kettle] when he advanced to the position that night, “and the stench of the dead that covered our road was so awful that we both used foot powder on our faces.”²³ Fennelly recounts an advance that James Fitzmaurice²⁴ was involved in to recapture similar ground during early 1917 where “[t]he fallen of old battles [1916] were now mere skeletons, shrouded in their tunics and battle-order webbing equipment. Their rusted rifles and bayonets lay on the ground beside each set of gruesome remains.”²⁵

The Lost and Found

The obvious danger of the battlefield is captured in the story of Private Tom O'Donnell, from Tullow, Co. Carlow, who, serving with 50th Battalion of the Australian Infantry Force, was killed at the Battle of Passchendale on 28th September 1917. His friend, Private Syd Robinson, was unable to provide much consolation to O' Donnell's mother regarding her concern about her son's grave, when he wrote that “the people who look after the graves will be able to do nothing for you now, as the portion of the battlefield that we held at the time of poor Tom's death is now in enemy hands.”²⁶ Ironically, Private Tom O'Donnell was later buried and today has a known grave at Aeroplane Cemetery near Zonnebeke, but Private Syd Robinson, a Londoner, was killed on 16th April 1918 during the German Spring Offensive on the Somme, and he is commemorated on the Villers Bretonneux Memorial to the Missing. There is also a sad irony in the story of Captain Robert Maxwell Pike of the Royal Flying Corps, who was killed on 9th August 1915. His bi-plane came down behind enemy lines and “The Germans buried him with full military honours in a nearby churchyard but during the course of the war his grave was lost and today he is commemorated on the Arras Flying Services Memorial in France.”²⁷ The circumstances of all their deaths and final resting places are varied and diverse, but the singular fact is that the relatively untold story of the missing unearths previously unexplored dimensions to the First World War.

Bringing it Back Home

In comprehending the circumstances within which so many fatalities were further lost to the status of having no known grave, it is important to appreciate the scale of these tragic

22 Whitton, F.E. Lt Col (1923) *The History of the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) Part II The Great War and The Disbandment of the Regiment*, London: Gale & Polden Ltd., p. 318.

23 Mc Donagh, M. (2012) *The Irish on the Somme*, London: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, p. 188.

24 Colonel James Fitzmaurice of the Irish Air Corps was an Acting Sergeant with 7th Bn Queens Royal (West Surrey) Regiment until he took a commission with the 8th (Irish) Bn, Kings Liverpool Regiment in June 1917. He served as a pilot in the Royal Air Force in 1918 and is best known for his role in the Bremen Transatlantic Flight in 1928.

25 Fennelly, T. (1997) *Fitz-and the Famous Flight*, Portlaoise: Arderin Publishing Ltd., pp. 53-54.

26 Dungan (1997) op cit, p. 102.

27 Pendergast, J. (2011) 'The Royal Flying Corps', O'Shea, B. and White, G. (eds.) *A Great Sacrifice –Cork men who died in the Great War*, Cork: Echo Publications, p. 68.

circumstances. However, the scale of the complete number of missing is formidable. The manipulation of the data from the CWGC database facilitates boundless options for expositions, but in this instance, the research into the Missing Irish merely illustrates a comparative analysis of:

- The full range of units, both Irish regiments of the British Army and other Commonwealth Forces in which the Irish served. The data confirms that while Irish service was predominately in Irish regiments of the British Army, it was not confined to just the British Army.
- The breadth of service across the theatres of the First World War; foreign locations of significance and importance to Irish history.
- The key dates on which the Irish incurred the largest casualties; dates meriting consideration for centenary commemorations.
- The localised information on the Missing Irish which has been compiled on a county by county basis, facilitating access to more specific and targeted information and increasing the possibilities for further research.

Table 1: The figures for the Missing Irish in the Irish Regiments of the British Army

	Associated Regiment for Recruitment	4 th Dragoon Guards (Royal Irish)	5 th (Royal Irish) Lancers	6 th (Inniskilling) Dragoons	8 th (Kings Royal Irish) Hussars	South Irish Horse	North Irish Horse	Irish Guards	Royal Irish Regiment (RIRegt)	Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (RIF)	Royal Irish Rifles (RIR)	Royal Irish Fusiliers (RIrishF)	Connaught Rangers (CR)	Leinster Regiment (LR)	Royal Munster Fusiliers (RMF)	Royal Dublin Fusiliers (RDF)	Northumberland Fusiliers (24 th , 25 th , 26 th , 27 th Bn) *	King's Liverpool Regiment (1/8 th and 2/8 th Bn)	London Regiment (1/18 th and 2/18 th Bn)	
LEINSTER		1	-	1	3	2	-	157	162	86	155	100	95	158	57	583	-	5	-	1565
Carlow	RDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	5	2	3	1	4	3	32	-	-	-	60
Dublin	RDF	-	-	-	3	-	-	49	32	48	112	48	47	46	20	401	-	-	-	806
Kildare	RDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	5	5	3	3	4	5	9	44	-	-	-	85
Kilkenny	RIRegt	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	42	2	-	1	3	6	4	5	-	1	-	75
Laois	LR	-	-	1	-	-	-	13	4	2	-	3	6	10	3	6	-	-	-	48
Longford	LR	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	3	3	2	12	1	1	-	-	-	28
Louth	RIrishF	-	-	-	-	2	-	6	3	6	16	23	2	11	2	15	-	3	-	89
Meath	LR	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	1	4	2	4	2	12	-	10	-	-	-	49
Offaly	LR	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	5	5	7	1	7	28	2	6	-	1	-	73
Westmeath	LR	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	3	3	2	3	18	23	2	11	-	-	-	75
Wexford	RIRegt	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	53	1	8	3	2	-	5	18	-	-	-	107
Wicklow	RIRegt	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	6	5	-	5	1	1	6	34	-	-	-	70
ULSTER		3	1	2	-	-	5	70	47	789	1085	409	22	10	44	77	2	-	1	2567
Antrim	RIR	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	38	243	22	2	2	6	3	-	-	-	325
Armagh	RIR	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	9	46	157	1	-	2	3	-	-	-	223
Belfast	RIR	1	-	1	-	-	2	17	12	197	514	94	5	4	7	22	-	-	-	876
Cavan	RIrishF	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	8	16	48	2	-	2	4	-	-	-	86
Derry	RIF	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	16	194	25	10	3	1	9	7	-	-	-	272
Donegal	RIF	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2	87	3	9	2	-	8	7	-	-	1	127
Down	RIR	2	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	30	225	27	2	1	2	8	2	-	-	310
Fermanagh	RIF	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	80	5	10	-	1	1	11	-	-	-	113
Monaghan	RIrishF	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	7	3	24	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	47
Tyrone	RIF	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	10	139	5	8	4	1	7	9	-	-	-	188

Table 1 (contd): The figures for the Missing Irish in the Irish Regiments of the British Army

	Associated Regiment for Recruitment	4 th Dragoon Guards (Royal Irish)	5 th (Royal Irish) Lancers	6 th (Inniskilling) Dragoons	8 th (Kings Royal Irish) Hussars	South Irish Horse	North Irish Horse	Irish Guards	Royal Irish Regiment (RIRegt)	Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (RIF)	Royal Irish Rifles (RIR)	Royal Irish Fusiliers (RIRishF)	Connaught Rangers (CR)	Leinster Regiment (LR)	Royal Munster Fusiliers (RMF)	Royal Dublin Fusiliers (RDF)	Northumberland Fusiliers (24 th , 25 th , 26 th , 27 th Bn)	King's Liverpool Regiment (1/8 th and 2/8 th Bn)	London Regiment (1/18 th and 2/18 th Bn)	TOTAL
MUNSTER		-	1	1	2	-	-	89	180	15	42	21	45	75	381	60	-	3	1	916
Clare	RMF	-	1	-	-	-	-	11	2	-	2	2	2	5	44	5	-	-	-	74
Cork	RMF	-	-	-	1	-	-	27	27	4	22	10	24	33	182	23	-	3	-	356
Kerry	RMF	-	-	-	1	-	-	9	5	2	4	-	4	3	49	2	-	-	-	79
Limerick	RMF	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	14	4	5	-	5	6	86	6	-	-	-	138
Tipperary	RIRegt	-	-	1	-	-	-	22	78	3	2	5	8	23	9	19	-	-	1	171
Waterford	RIRegt	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	54	2	7	4	2	5	11	5	-	-	-	98
CONNAUGHT		-	-	-	-	1	-	62	14	16	15	21	139	18	16	29	2	0	1	334
Galway	CR	-	-	-	-	1	-	12	3	1	3	3	55	10	5	9	-	-	-	102
Leitrim	CR	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	4	2	3	11	-	1	3	-	-	-	30
Mayo	CR	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	4	5	2	7	39	2	3	8	1	-	-	90
Roscommon	CR	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	2	3	5	17	2	1	4	-	-	-	45
Sligo	CR	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	5	4	5	3	17	4	6	5	1	-	1	67
IRELAND **		-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
National Total		4	2	4	5	3	5	379	403	906	1297	551	301	261	498	749	4	8	3	5383

Notes –
 * The 24th – 27th Bns Northumberland Fusiliers are more commonly known as the Tyneside Irish Battalions
 ** The row IRELAND captures information for those Missing for whom the only address given is simply IRELAND

Service in Foreign Lands

While the exact resting place of the Missing Irish is unknown, the location of the memorials indicates the general area in which they were killed. Their origins are equally as important to our understanding and this recent research has identified the added dimension of aligning the county of origin with the units in which they served. Unfortunately, while it is acknowledged that Irish did serve in the United States (US) Armed Forces in the latter stages of the war, there is not, as yet, a US database with detailed information on the origins or nationality of the First World War missing who served in the forces of the United States of America.

Table 2: The figures for the Missing Irish in British and Commonwealth Units

	English Regiments	Welsh Regiments	Scottish Regiments	Other British Units	Navy Units	Mercantile Marine	RFC/RAF *	Australian Units	Canadian Units	Indian Units	New Zealand Units	South African Units	TOTAL
LEINSTER	127	9	21	119	102	178	7	27	34	5	7	2	638
Carlow	4	-	-	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	15
Dublin	66	4	10	54	44	85	1	13	17	4	4	-	302
Kildare	6	-	4	1	3	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	19
Kilkenny	5	2	-	8	1	4	-	3	3	-	-	-	26
Laois	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	5	-	1	-	10
Longford	3	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	7
Louth	11	-	-	5	9	37	2	-	2	-	-	-	66
Meath	4	-	-	6	3	4	-	2	2	-	-	-	21
Offaly	5	-	-	3	2	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	14
Westmeath	9	-	-	3	2	2	-	2	1	-	-	-	19
Wexford	5	2	1	5	31	23	1	3	1	-	1	1	74
Wicklow	7	1	4	23	7	20	-	2	-	1	-	1	66
ULSTER	86	2	126	143	76	170	4	43	129	1	19	4	803
Antrim	9	-	18	18	14	37	1	4	17	-	4	1	123
Armagh	9	-	11	5	1	10	-	1	9	-	-	-	46
Belfast	37	-	32	53	36	54	3	8	31	-	3	1	258
Cavan	2	1	7	4	2	7	-	1	11	-	1	-	36
Derry	7	-	9	15	4	11	-	9	17	1	2	-	75
Donegal	-	1	15	11	2	9	-	3	9	-	1	-	51
Down	14	-	17	24	11	31	-	10	11	-	4	1	123
Fermanagh	-	-	5	9	3	3	-	1	3	-	-	-	24
Monaghan	1	-	2	1	1	4	-	3	7	-	1	1	21
Tyrone	7	-	10	3	2	4	-	3	14	-	3	-	46
MUNSTER	69	15	7	67	244	168	4	19	25	2	8	2	630
Clare	4	1	1	6	6	5	1	3	-	-	2	1	30
Cork	25	8	5	29	178	70	1	4	9	2	1	-	332
Kerry	7	1	-	6	7	3	-	4	5	-	1	-	34
Limerick	8	-	-	10	19	12	-	3	2	-	3	-	57
Tipperary	19	1	1	12	5	4	-	2	8	-	-	-	52
Waterford	6	4	-	4	29	74	2	3	1	-	1	1	125
CONNAUGHT	59	4	19	31	18	28	1	6	5	-	4	1	176
Galway	12	1	3	9	5	10	1	1	2	-	3	1	48
Leitrim	6	-	5	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	18
Mayo	24	2	7	10	6	12	-	2	2	-	-	-	65
Roscommon	13	1	2	2	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	23
Sligo	4	-	2	5	4	5	-	1	1	-	-	-	22
IRELAND **	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	7	-	-	1	1	15
National Total	341	30	173	361	440	549	16	102	193	8	39	10	2263
NOTES –													
* RFC/RAF – Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force													
** The row IRELAND captures information for those Missing for whom the only address given is simply IRELAND													

The statistics for the Missing Irish, as illustrated in Table 1, confirm that recruitment within counties remained true to the local regiments. Notwithstanding this, it is important to recognise that every county was represented in each of the regiments, with some obvious biases apparent in the Ulster regiments. Another anomaly worthy of future research is the success of the Irish Guards, despite not having a defined recruitment area, in recruiting extensively throughout Ireland. It is also important to recognise, from Table 2, the extent of Irish service in Commonwealth units, particularly in the ANZAC²⁸ units. Focusing on the missing soldiers from Ulster, the service with Scottish and Canadian units is considerable, reflecting traditional emigration patterns. The losses incurred by the units of the 36th Ulster Division are noticeable without focusing exclusively on the comparative provincial statistics.

Table 3: The figures for the Missing Irish on 12 of the largest memorials to the Missing

Memorial		THIEPVAIL	MININ GATE	BASRA	TOWER HILL	TYNEGOT	ARRAS	PLYMOUTH	HELLES	LOOS	POZIERS	LE TOURET	PLOEGSTREET
Location		France	Belgium	Iraq	UK	Belgium	France	UK	Turkey	France	France	France	Belgium
	Total	72348	54628	40714	36007	34998	34847	23245	20933	20648	14673	13455	11430
LEINSTER	2204												
Carlow	75	13	23	1	-	7	4	-	3	3	5	2	2
Dublin	1108	146	270	14	81	61	38	35	130	66	66	51	33
Kildare	104	17	23	-	3	8	2	3	11	9	9	4	3
Kilkenny	101	28	29	-	4	7		1	6	5	3	7	1
Laois	58	5	18	-	-	7	2	-	-	4	4	7	1
Longford	35	4	10	-	-	4	2	-	4	-	3	-	2
Louth	155	18	28	2	34	8	4	7	14	11	5	-	7
Offaly	87	10	26	1	2	5	2	2	5	2	5	2	11
Meath	70	10	11	-	4	9	5	3	3	5	3	2	3
Westmeath	94	12	27	3	2	7	3	1	5	4	6	3	9
Wexford	181	19	41	1	23	5	7	28	9	3	5	18	2
Wicklow	136	25	17	3	20	12	5	7	10	7	7	6	1
ULSTER	3370												
Antrim	443	157	51	3	31	58	6	17	19	7	24	16	12
Armagh	269	82	51	2	9	50	11	2	12	7	7	3	10
Belfast	1134	276	148	2	49	114	20	38	103	25	83	83	60
Cavan	122	23	40	-	7	14	3	2	5	5	4	3	3
Derry	347	106	33	1	10	31	6	5	37	8	41	20	7
Donegal	178	49	16	1	6	17	8	4	13	9	11	9	8
Down	433	154	59	1	27	47	10	11	14	11	24	17	16
Fermanagh	137	36	21	1	3	11	3	-	18	6	10	11	5
Monaghan	68	13	7	-	4	8	3	1	5	3	5	4	2
Tyrone	234	59	26	1	5	23	3	3	19	9	21	24	10
MUNSTER	1546												
Clare	104	12	13	-	4	8	3	7	16	4	7	10	6
Cork	688	55	70	11	69	25	11	175	75	27	30	65	23
Kerry	113	17	18	3	2	9	2	7	11	6	9	14	2
Limerick	195	22	19	2	12	7	3	19	32	13	9	32	5
Tipperary	223	33	48	1	2	17	11	7	10	5	26	24	11
Waterford	223	20	24	1	72	7	1	29	10	9	3	26	2
CONNAUGHT	510												
Galway	150	14	33	9	10	11	2	5	14	4	6	7	8
Leitrim	48	14	12	1	-	5	2	-	2	3	1	-	-
Mayo	155	28	27	9	12	10	6	7	7	10	5	9	3
Roscommon	68	9	13	1	1	3	4	2	7	4	3	4	1
Sligo	89	13	10	4	4	9	6	4	7	2	4	5	8
Total	6730	1499	1262	79	521	624	207	441	645	305	463	497	286

²⁸ Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

In Foreign Fields the Poppies Grow

It is not within the remit of this article to provide the statistics on all forty-four memorials to the Missing on which the Irish are commemorated. It is necessary to reproduce the information on the principal memorials in order to demonstrate that the commemoration of the Irish is not exclusive to the Thiepval and Menin Gate (Ypres) Memorials. Further analysis must be completed on the range and magnitude of the Missing Irish in the twenty one countries where they are commemorated. By way of example, through comprehensive analysis it can be demonstrated that not alone are there 175 Cork sailors on the Plymouth Naval Memorial, but that 61 of them were killed at the Battle of Jutland.

Table 4: The date each year on which each county suffered the largest number of Missing

	1914		1915		1916		1917		1918	
LEINSTER										
Carlow	27 Aug	3	24 May	3	-	-	-	-	21 Mar	3
Dublin	9 Nov	9	24 May	48	1 July	27	16 Aug	27	21 Mar	46
Kildare	-	-	24 May	6	27 Apr	4	10 Nov	3	21 Mar	8
Kilkenny	19 Oct	6	24 Apr	3	14 July	6	16 Aug	3	21 Mar	2
							16 Dec	3		
Laois	1 Nov	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Longford	20 Oct	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 Oct	3
Louth	-	-	7 May	8	27 Apr	5	31 July	6	14 Oct	13
Meath	-	-	-	-	9 Sept	3	16 Aug	4	-	-
Offaly	20 Oct	3	14 Feb	3	9 Sept	3	31 July	3	21 Mar	3
Westmeath	20 Oct	4	26 Apr	4	9 Sept	3	16 Aug	4	21 Mar	3
Wexford	19 Oct	12	24 May	7	15 Sept	4	9 Oct	3	-	-
Wicklow	1 Nov	3	24 Apr	4	27 Apr	5	16 Aug	8	21 Mar	6
ULSTER										
Antrim	01 Nov	3	9 May	9	1 July	116	16 Aug	37	21 Mar	8
Armagh	-	-	25 Apr	12	1 July	63	16 Aug	36	22 Mar	3
Belfast	27 Oct	16	16 May	29	1 July	157	16 Aug	60	21 Mar	39
Cavan	-	-	14 Mar	8	1 July	9	16 Aug	8	-	-
Derry	20 Oct	4	16 May	15	1 July	68	16 Aug	19	21 Mar	11
Donegal	-	-	16 May	7	1 July	29	16 Aug	12	21 Mar	5
Down	1 Nov	6	9 May	7	1 July	109	16 Aug	26	21 Mar	10
Fermanagh	1 Nov	3	16 May	8	1 July	26	16 Aug	10	21 Mar	5
Monaghan	-	-	13 May	3	1 July	7	16 Aug	4	21 Mar	3
Tyrone	21 Oct	3	16 May	22	1 July	37	16 Aug	14	21 Mar	10
MUNSTER										
Clare	1 Nov	4	9 May	7	-	-	15 Aug	3	22 Mar	4
Cork	1 Nov	15	9 May	34	31 May	65	10 Nov	13	21 Mar	18
Kerry	1 Nov	3	9 May	10	31 May	4	10 Nov	4	22 Mar	4
Limerick	21 Dec	5	9 May	15	9 Sept	4	31 Jul	3	21 Mar	7
Tipperary	19 Oct	12	9 May	6	14 July	5	9 Oct	5	21 Mar	24
					19 Sept	5				
					26 Sept	5				
Waterford	19 Oct	15	13 May	8	31 May	4	18 Dec	23	21 Mar	4
					9 Sept	4				
CONNAUGHT										
Galway	6 Nov	5	7 Dec	6	21 Jan	5	2 Aug	3	21 Mar	4
							9 Oct	3		
Leitrim	-	-	-	-	9 Sept	3	-	-	-	-
Mayo	-	-	7 May	10	9 Sept	9	16 Aug	5	-	-
Roscommon	-	-	26 Apr	3	12 Oct	3	-	-	21 Mar	3
									30 Mar	3
Sligo	-	-	7 Dec	4	-	-	16 Aug	3	21 Mar	4

NOTE – This Table only includes dates on which the number of Missing recorded is greater than the figure of 2.

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The Battlefields in Time

The Thiepval Memorial is the largest memorial to the missing in the world, and therefore it is proper that the greatest number of Missing Irish are commemorated here. As Table 3 reveals, the Irish contribution to all theatres of the war is extensive. The figures for the Plymouth Naval Memorial are a reminder of the Irish naval tradition, while the magnitude of those civilians who served in the Mercantile Marine is affirmed by the names on the Tower Hill Memorial in London. The information in Table 4 indicates the dates for each year of the war on which each county suffered the largest number of missing, thereby illustrating that the casualties were constant, with losses peaking during the key engagements. Cognisant of the dispersion of recruitment as already mentioned, the reality is that in every county, families were continually being affected by all of the key events of the First World War.

The 1st of July traditionally marks the initial day of the first Battles of the Somme. As illustrated in Table 4 above, focusing on the missing Irish soldiers, it is this date and battle which is testimony to the greatest loss on any one day of the First World War, particularly within the Ulster counties. However, Table 4 is also a lens which reveals that there are many other key dates of significance to Irish commemoration:

- 19th and 20th October 1914 – The Battle of Le Pilly, which decimated the 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment.
- 1st November 1914 – The sinking of HMS Monmouth at the naval Battle of Coronel, off the coast of Chile.
- 22nd April to 25th May 1915 – The Second Battle of Ypres.
- 25th April 1915 – The Gallipoli Landings.
- 7th May 1915 – The Sinking of the Lusitania off the Old Head of Kinsale.
- 9th May 1915 – The Battle of Aubers Ridge.
- 31st May 1916 – The Battle of Jutland.
- 14th July 1916 – The Battle of Bazentin Ridge (The Battles of the Somme).
- 9th Sept 1916 – The Battle of Ginchy (The Battles of the Somme).
- 15th Sept 1916 – The Battle of Flers-Courcelette (The Battles of the Somme).
- 31st July 1917 – The first day of the Third Battle of Ypres.
- 16th August 1917 – The Battle of Langemarck (Third Battle of Ypres).
- 18th December 1917 – The Sinking of SS Coningbeg in the Irish Sea.
- 21st March 1918 – The first day of the German Spring Offensive – Operation Michael.
- 14th October 1918 – The sinking of SS Dundalk in the Irish Sea.

The naval dimension is omnipresent in the statistics and deserves attention in the planning of centenary commemorations. The extent to which Irish involvement in the battles of the First World War impacted on each and every county establishes the imperative to commemorate far more than just the first day of the Battles of the Somme. The data affords us an opportunity to enhance our awareness and appreciation of the scale and impact of the Irish contribution to the events of the First World War, and to commemorate this sacrifice in a manner which befits the significance of their endeavours.

Conclusion

The records of Lieutenant Thomas Kettle contribute a personal dimension to the narrative of the Missing Irish of the First World War; and there is so much potential in all of the thousands of individual stories to be discovered. To simply focus at unit level, the wealth of information that can be gleaned about the Missing Irish from the CWGC database provides a unique insight into the geographical range of their theatres of war as well as the full breadth of British and Commonwealth units in which the Irish served. The option of localising this new knowledge on a county by county basis brings closer to home the realities of the impact of the First World War on every parish. The basic scrutiny of the memorials to the missing, on which 7,646 Irish are commemorated, reveals the depth of Irish involvement in the war; with the sacrifice of Irish women and seafarers of the Mercantile Marine also finally deserving recognition. As the country embarks on the centenary commemorative events, the combination of these fresh perspectives forms an important dimension in furthering our understanding and appreciation of the service and sacrifice of a generation of Irish men and women because "...[t]hose who resorted to arms did so with real conviction and some justification – but in the end the only appropriate reaction is to remember them, to write about them and to mourn them."²⁹ In the aptly titled *Our War*, John Horne reminds us "[n]ot only did Irishmen from all backgrounds fight and die in greater numbers than in any other conflict in the country's past, but Ireland's modern political shape to a great extent derives from it."³⁰ In his acceptance speech for the honour of Freeman of Cork City on 24th April 2014, President Michael D Higgins urged Ireland to properly commemorate all of its soldiers who died in the First World War. "It is important we recognise the suffering and loss of those terrible years, which includes the carnage of World War I."³¹ Pier and Face 16 C of the Thiepval Memorial is an appropriate starting point for that journey, both practically and figuratively, as it is here that we can commemorate Thomas Kettle. This Nationalist politician, poet, essayist and soldier, whose final resting place is 'known only unto God', is a most fitting primary reference point for all Irish men and women who served in the First World War.

Here's to you, men I never met,
Yet hope to meet behind the veil,
Thronged on some starry parapet,
That looks down upon Innisfail,
And sees the confluence of dreams
That clashed together in our night,
One river, born from many streams,
Roll in one blaze of blinding light.
- George Russell^{32 33}

²⁹ Gregory and Paseta (2002) op cit, p. 6.

³⁰ Horne (2008) op cit, p. 3.

³¹ The Irish Independent (2014) 'It's time we honoured the dead of Great War – President', *The Irish Independent*, 25 April 2014, available: <http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/its-time-we-honoured-the-dead-of-great-war-president-30216720.html> [accessed 26 April 2014].

³² George Russell wrote the poem *To the Memory of Some I knew Who are Dead and Who Loved Ireland* (1917), also known as *Salutation* written about Thomas Mac Donagh and Thomas Kettle. (Kirberd, 1996).

³³ Kirberd, D. (1996) *Inventing Ireland The Literature of the Modern Nation*, (2nd edition) London: Vintage, p. 65.

Ireland and the Music of the Great War

ABSTRACT

The Great War is almost as well known for its music as for its poetry. The recorded music of the 1914-18 tended to be supportive of the war effort and subtly or blatantly propagandistic. The songs composed in the trenches, however, were entirely different. They were subversive and caustic. There are many examples of the former which relate to Ireland. These attempt to co-opt or 'conscript' Ireland into the war effort. This type of material, which includes popular songs like 'Somewhere in France, Dear Mother' virtually disappeared after the 1916 Rising. Songs about the war written in Ireland between 1914-18 tended to be nationalist anti-conscription songs. These could not be recorded or published because of the stringency of the Defence of the Realm Act.

The Great War is renowned for a number of things. Its poetry, the utter carnage it unleashed, and the impact it had on the political landscape of Ireland and of Europe as a whole.

And then there was the music produced during the conflict. This rather neatly divides in two, the recorded and the unrecorded.

The former tended to be breezy and upbeat. It suggested that while war was a bit of a bore at times, it was in the hands of cheeky chappies who were happy to pack up their troubles and sing as they marched (to Tipperary). No one died in the 'war-songs' that were recorded between 1914 and 1918. While many of the tunes were memorable and enduring they amounted to little more than morale-boosting propaganda.

Then there were the songs that never quite made it to the desks of music publishers. They were composed by the men who had already enlisted and who lived (or died) to regret their decisions. These 'trench' songs spoke of fear, boredom, hunger, discomfort and rotten leadership. But they did so with a mordant black humour. The tunes were also memorable because they were mostly stolen. Scatological humour would be put into verse and sung to the music of a well-known vaudeville ditty, a hymn or even one of the recorded songs written to encourage the troops and keep up the spirits on the home front.

The former would have been played and listened to, one imagines with lessening enthusiasm as the war advanced, in thousands of Irish homes. The latter would have been unfamiliar on the 'home front' but, though not particularly Irish, would have been sung by the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, the Inniskillings and other Irish regiments in the trenches of Picardy and Flanders.

While the music industry got on with making pots of money from the Great War by writing songs loved by the generals, the politicians and wishful-thinkers everywhere, the ordinary soldiers, sick of being portrayed, in impossibly bubbly songs, as tourists with weapons, had their own 'take' on what war was really like. Their songs, mostly written to well-known tunes, were about bullets, shells, death, misery, Germans, incompetent officers, lice, and Generals who seemed to want to kill them. They were utterly unsentimental, irreverent and short – as they were transmitted only by word of mouth.

Songs like *I don't want to be a soldier* are typical.

I don't want to be a soldier,
I don't want to go to war,
I'd rather stay at home,
Around the streets to roam,
And live on the earnings of a ... lady typist.
I don't want a bayonet in my belly,
I don't want my bollocks shot away,
I'd rather stay in England,
In merry, merry England,
And fornicate my bleeding life away.

While Irish units may well have been responsible for the composition of some of the irreverent 'trench' songs of the Great War, no specific insubordinate creativity can be ascribed to Irish battalions. Some martial and celebratory songs are, however, associated with Irish units from the period prior to the 1914-18 war. *The Connaught Rangers*, for example, a ponderous glorification of the West of Ireland regiment, was composed by Lt Charles Martin who served with the Connaughts from 1888-93.¹ The more commercial *What Do You Think of the Irish Now?* was written after the Boer war in honour of the Dublin Fusiliers by musical hall composers Albert Hall and Harry Castling.² Written for entertainer Pat Rafferty, the song included the words 'You used to call us traitors / Because of agitators / But you can't call us traitors now.'³

Not long prior to the commencement of the Gallipoli campaign what was described as 'a new patriotic song,' *The Fighting Fusiliers*, was dedicated to the Royal Munster Fusiliers. Announcing that the song was on sale 'at the establishment in Dublin, Cork and Limerick of Messrs. Pigott at sixpence' *the Weekly Irish Times* of 17 April 1915 added ...

Happily described as the war song of the Munsters, [it] has been very favourably received where it has been sung in Dublin and Munster towns. The melody is easy, the compass suits every voice, and there is no reason why the song should not attain a large measure of the popularity that fell to "Tipperary."⁴

1 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zla_v-7uEXs [accessed 19 February 2014].

2 <http://discover.odai.yale.edu/ycd/Record/3778213/Description#tabnav> [accessed February 2014].

3 Barfe, L. (2008) *Turned out Nice: The Story of British Light Entertainment*, London: Atlantic Books, p. 17.

4 *Weekly Irish Times*, 17 April 1915. My thanks to Turtle Bunbury for bringing this to my attention.

Clearly it didn't. The song had an exclusively martial purpose which virtually guaranteed that it would fade from Irish popular memory with some rapidity after the creation of the Irish Free State and the dissolution of the regiment. The opening verse of the song is, literally, a call to arms.

Come pass the call 'round Munster.
Let the notes ring loud and clear.
We want the merchant and the squire,
The peasant and the Peer.
For we mean to whip those Germans,
So away with your paltry affairs
And come join that grand Battalion
Called the Munster Fusiliers

The song went on to maintain, in typical fashion, that the Kaiser 'feared to face the bayonets of the Munster Fusiliers' and, to whet the appetites of potential recruits, described the depredations of the invading German armies on Belgium.

The cruel sights that meet your eyes,
Would make your blood run cold,
To see the ruined convents
And the Holy nuns in tears.
"By God on high avenge or die",
Cried the Munster Fusiliers.⁵

An antidote to overt propaganda exercises like *The Fighting Fusiliers* was another Munster song called *Salonika*. There is an identifiable Irish folk tradition of the anti-recruitment song. The best examples are *Arthur McBride* and *Johnny I Hardly Knew You*. Two songs written during the Great War, *Salonika* and *The Recruiting Sergeant* were major additions to the canon.

The former was 'collected' by the Irish traditional singer Jimmy Crowley in Cork in the 1980s from Helena Ronayne, grandmother of Mick Murphy, a member of Crowley's band Stoker's Lodge.⁶ It is actually intended to be sung by a woman. The protagonist's husband is serving in the Salonika campaign. She has been delivered of a red-headed child who, we are led to suspect, is not that of her husband. She divides the men of Cork into the 'soldiers' who are serving in units like the Munster Fusiliers and 'slackers' who chose to remain at home. She appears to have little time for the 'slackers':

Now when the war is over
What will the slackers do
They'll be all around the soldiers
For the loan of a bob or two

⁵ <http://www.historyireland.com/20th-century-contemporary-history/the-royal-munster-fusiliers/> [accessed 19 February 2014].

⁶ Sleeve notes from Stoker's Lodge album *The Boys of Fair Hill*.

But her distaste is illusory, because she immediately goes on to observe that ...

When the war is over
What will the soldiers do
They'll be walking around with a leg-and-a-half
And the slackers will have two

She concludes her narrative with a prophetic comment, a pre-echo⁷ of the 'sickeningly self-satisfied'⁸ sentiment expressed by Canon Charles O'Neill in *The Foggy Dew* (1919) – 'twas better to die neath an Irish sky than at Suvla or Sed-el-Barr' – when she advises:

And never marry a soldier
A sailor or a Marine
But keep your eye on the Sinn Fein boy
With his yellow, white and green

It has been suggested that the song is a 'back and forth' narrative,⁹ with each alternate verse being sung by a woman in receipt of a separation allowance – nicknamed a 'Separa' in Cork – and another woman of Republican persuasion. While there is some internal evidence that this might be the case the run of verses as handed down does not strictly conform to this template. It is more likely that later verses were added, especially the reference to Sinn Fein, after the war.

The very insistent chorus was, up to recently, represented in written form as ...

So right away, so right away,
So right away Salonika,
Right away me soldier boy.

However, Crowley has discovered that while the first verse of the song refers to Salonika, the theatre of war, all the subsequent references are to a Cork man nicknamed 'Salonika' because of the frequency with which he wrote to members of the Munster Fusiliers stationed there on behalf of their wives and sweethearts, who were unable to do so themselves. So the correct written version of the song should actually read ...

So write away. So write away.
So write away, Salonika,
Write away me soldier boy.

Whereas *Salonika* is a 'cautionary' anti-enlistment tune which functions as such in its recognition of the reality of potentially debilitating war injuries, Seamus O'Farrell's *The Recruiting Sergeant* is a more overt anti-recruitment song which would, presumably, have been banned under the Defence of the Realm Act had anyone seen fit to publish or record it when it was written in 1915.¹⁰

⁷ This is speculation on my part. It is not possible to date *Salonika*. It may well have been written post-war with the benefit of hindsight.

⁸ Wills, C. (2009) *Dublin 1916*, London: Profile Books, p. 129.

⁹ <http://mudcat.org/thread.cfm?threadid=5460> [accessed 05 February 2014].

¹⁰ It was recorded and performed by Dominic Behan in the 1960s.

Seamus O'Farrell (1886-1973), a journalist, was a Dublin man. He assisted with the formation of the Irish Transport & General Workers' Union and was also a committed nationalist activist. He later worked on the staff of the *Irish Independent* and then the *Irish Press*. He went on to edit the *Longford Leader* and the *Leinster Leader*.¹¹ In the song the protagonist meets a recruiting sergeant who tries to persuade him to enlist; the King is in need of men and 'A life in Flanders for you then would be a fine vacation O.' To which the potential recruit responds:

"That may be so," says I to him, "but tell me sergeant dearie O,
If I had a pack stuck upon me back, do you think I'd look fine and cheery O?
You'd make me train and drill until they had me one of French's O.
It may be warm in Flanders but it's draughty in the trenches O."¹²

The sergeant responds with the spurious information that the sandbags are piled so high in the trenches that all potential draughts are excluded. The sensible young Irishman is unconvinced and finally reveals his true political colours when he tells the NCO:

"Come rain or hail or wind or snow, we're not going out to Flanders O.
There's fighting in Dublin to be done, let your Sergeants and your Commanders go.
Let Englishmen for England fight, 'tis just about time they started O."
I wished the Sergeant a very good night and there and then departed O.

Though neither song was written by serving soldiers in the trenches they are as darkly subversive and, in the case of *Salonika* at least, as scatological as anything that came from the *samizdat* musical production line on the western front.

Although there are no examples of conformist Irish-written Great War songs of the type being churned out by the British music industry on disc (waxing), cylinder (waning) and sheet music (holding its own), Ireland, or mythical Irish characters, formed a part of that musical sub-genre. Numerous songs of the 1914-18 period, which exploited the patriotism and jingoism of the public, referred to the involvement of Irish soldiers in the British armed forces. Most conformed to the stereotype of the impulsive, hard-drinking, physically aggressive 'stage' Irishman of popular mythology. However, the most familiar 'Irish' song of the war *It's a long way to Tipperary* is something of an exception, insofar as it was written prior to the conflict and is a song about emigration.

Tipperary was written in 1912 by the music-hall performer Jack Judge in Stalybridge near Manchester, apparently, in order to win a five-shilling wager. Judge was a Birmingham-born music hall performer and song-writer of Mayo ancestry. According to his own account he was due to perform in the Grand Theatre in Stalybridge when he was challenged to write a new song overnight and perform it the following day. This feat he duly accomplished, winning him the bet that had been struck with two seal trainers on the same bill.¹³

¹¹ Coincidentally his mother was a cleaner in Dublin Castle and was one of the last people to see the Irish Crown Jewels intact before they were stolen in 1907.

¹² The tune is that of a song well-known at the time called *The Peeler and the Goat*.

¹³ There is ample scope for doubt about Judge's account. A less charitable version is that he reworked a song his mother used to sing to him called *It's a Long Way to Connemara*. Members of his family claim to have been aware of *Tipperary* before 1912. http://www.turtlebunbury.com/history/history_heroes/hist_hero_jack_judge.html [accessed 19 February 2014].

Judge went on to co-credit his neighbour, the wheelchair-bound song-writer Harry Williams, with the writing of *Tipperary* and a number of his other compositions. Williams had assisted Judge, who could not read music, in notating many of the songs he wrote as a young man.

The song might have been more ephemeral but for the intervention of the famed music hall and recording artist Florrie Forde and the Connaught Rangers. Forde heard of the song, liked it, recorded it and helped popularise it. It achieved its apotheosis, however, when it was recorded in 1914 by the celebrated Irish lyric tenor John McCormack after another event had elevated it into popular consciousness. By December 1914 it had sold more than 2 million copies in Britain and 3 million in the USA.

The reason for the impressive and lucrative sales figures tune was that *Tipperary* was taken up as a marching song by the Connaught Rangers – apparently some members of the regiment had seen Judge perform it at the Queen's Theatre in Dublin – and was sung by one of their regular battalions as they marched through Boulogne in August 1914 on their way to the front as part of the first British Expeditionary Force. As they marched and sang the Connaughts were observed by a *Daily Mail* journalist George Curnock, who was unfamiliar with the song but who cited it in his description for the paper. It was quickly taken up by other units and became the song most associated with the 1914-18 period. So linked did *Tipperary* become to the Great War that it was played at the 1927 dedication of the Menin Gate memorial. A version of the song is featured in the carillon of the Church of St. Nicholas in Mesen in Belgium, a short distance from the Messines battlefield where the 16th and 36th Divisions fought side by side on 7 June 1917.¹⁴

The military service of Irish soldiers was also acknowledged – perhaps even appropriated – in other songs of the war. In *Belgium put the Kibosh on the Kaiser*, recorded in October 1914 by the music-hall singer Mark Sheridan,¹⁵ the stubborn and crucial resistance of 'plucky little Belgium' to the German invasion of August 1914 is celebrated. The chorus, while hailing the courage of the Belgian Army, also anticipates rapid successes for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that failed to materialise.

Belgium put the kibosh on the Kaiser;
Europe took the stick and made him sore;
On his throne it hurts to sit,
And when John Bull starts to hit,
He will never sit upon it any more.

Later the song speculates that the Kaiser may have been encouraged in his ambitions by the expectation that Britain would remain aloof from the conflict in order to concentrate on its own difficulties with unionist and nationalist paramilitary forces in Ireland.¹⁶ It also acknowledges the role of Irish regular army units in the BEF.

¹⁴ http://www.turtlebunbury.com/history/history_heroes/hist_hero_jack_judge.html [accessed 19 February 2014].

¹⁵ His best-known recording was *I do like to be beside the seaside* (1909).

¹⁶ A notion recently reinforced by the research of Jerome aan de Wiel of University College, Cork in an article "1914: The Forgotten Irish Crisis in the July Crisis" (my thanks to Dr. aan de Wiel for a preview of the article).

Whilst Ireland seemed unsettled,
'Ah' said he 'I'll settle John',
But he didn't know the Irish
Like he knew them later on.

Similarly, in another 1914 song recorded by the baritone Tommy Marlow, *When Tommy comes marching home* – to the tune of *When Johnny comes marching home again* – one of the verses is devoted to 'When Paddy comes marching home.' Jack Judge's *They sang God Save the King*, also released in October 1914 in a version by Florrie Forde concerns a battalion in barracks 'the night before the war'. 'English, Irish Scots and Welsh were there among the throng' sings Forde, when a 'soldier boy started a chorus song.' What happens next is that representatives of all four countries pledge their allegiance to the King in the conflict that beckons. Judge shows either his complete lack of a sense of irony or an abject ignorance of Irish history – odd given his family background – by having an Irish soldier sing the chorus of 'God save Ireland.' The song was, essentially, a Fenian 'hymn' written by T.D. Sullivan in 1868 in response to the executions of the IRB members Allen, Larkin and O'Brien for the killing of Sergeant Brett in Manchester.

The music industry having, as it were, melodically insinuated Ireland into the conflict by the end of 1914, subsequent 'inclusions' tended to revert to the stereotypical. Songs devoted to Irish involvement in the war from 1915 onwards were populated by characters named Pat, Paddy, or Mick who mostly hailed from the, by now, best known Irish county, Tipperary.

One of the most buoyant tunes of the early period of the war was *Are we downhearted* recorded in 1914 by Arthur Boyton. Here Pat Malone of the Irish Fusiliers, who is 'fighting on the continong', [*sic*] rises to sing a song about 'our gallant fighting men.' The chorus begins with the question 'are we downhearted' to which the response is a raucous 'No.' Pat ascribes this *joie de vivre* to the fact that 'Brittania rules the waves.' Ireland, as represented by the archetypal Pat Malone, is, by implication, being defended by said Brittania and is fully complicit and compliant in all her stratagems and exertions.¹⁷

Patrick Malone becomes Paddy Maloney in *Paddy Maloney's airplane* written by Jack Judge in 1915. Judge also wrote a song entitled *Michael O'Leary VC* about one of Ireland's first Victoria Cross winners of the Great War. O'Leary was used extensively as a recruiting agent after his award and Judge's song is in keeping with that role.¹⁸ In Judge's airborne fantasy, however, Paddy Maloney, from Tipperary 'studied for 40 days and forty nights ... then made an Irish aeroplane that's going to win the war.' The aircraft was intended to take on German zeppelins and 'bomb Berlin ... when they see Paddy Maloney's aeroplane the foe will go insane.' The comic song is reminiscent of and probably influenced by the work of the Irish entertainer Percy French, who would have been playing the British music hall circuit at the same time as Judge. Once again an

¹⁷ Lyrics from 'Oh It's a Lovely War' CD, Vol.2, Disc 1, CD41 – 003/1.

¹⁸ Both songs – on which Harry Williams is co-credited – were written on the basis of a contract with music publisher Bert Feldman who also exploited the 'Oirish' song with the subsequent release of versions of *When Irish Eyes are Smiling* and *It Takes an Irish Heart to Sing an Irish Song*. (http://www.turtlebunbury.com/history/history_heroes/hist_hero_jack_judge.html).

element of loyalty to the British cause is invoked in the humorous line 'while Britannia rules the waves Maloney rules the skies [in his] corrugated iron-plated wonderful machine.'¹⁹

Also written in 1915 was the sentimental tune *Somewhere in France Dear Mother*, sung by Stanley Kirkby, the hugely popular English baritone. Kirkby had recorded a version of *It's a long way to Tipperary* and would later popularise a song about volunteer nurses entitled *The Rose of No Man's Land*. In *Somewhere in France Dear Mother* an unnamed young Irish soldier, inevitably from Tipperary, sits down to write a postcard to his mother. Aware that, should he reveal his location the card will be censored, he tells her that he is 'somewhere in France' and is 'still alive and well.' He expresses the hope that the next time he writes to her he will be 'somewhere in Germany.' Unless he anticipated becoming a prisoner of war it was a forlorn hope given the position of the front lines in 1915 and the total stasis of the conflict. His mother receives the letter from her 'fighting boy from Tipperary ... in the old cabin' and dries her eyes as she reads his optimistic sentiments.²⁰ The date of the song's composition is significant. It is highly unlikely that the image of the heroic young Irish soldier and his steadfast mother would have been acceptable to British audiences after the Easter Rising of 1916.

One of the few commercial songs with any Irish element released after the rebellion in Dublin was the somewhat bizarre *Sergeant Solomon Isaacstein*, a novelty song written by frequent collaborators R.P. Weston and Bert Lee. Isaacstein's sole Irish connection is that he's 'the only Jewish Scotsman in the Irish Fusiliers.'

A fictional Dublin Fusilier, Mick Maloney, makes an appearance in the 1917 song *Plum and Apple* recorded by Fred Hilton. The song is about the almost mythical antipathy of the serving British soldier to the monotonous ration of 4 ounces per week (reduced to 3 ounces in 1916) of plum and apple jam. The chorus playfully suggests that the tins should be used by the artillery to bombard the German trenches. Were that to happen 'we'd be in Berlin today.' The final verse features the inevitable Sgt Maloney, who has been wounded in France – one of the few acknowledgements by the music industry of the health and safety implications of serving on the Western front. Maloney is lying in a hospital in London and a rather overbearing lady is questioning him about his injuries. She asks him:

What brought you here Maloney,
Was it poison gas she cried?
Or was it shells? but with a wink
Maloney then replied,
No it was plum and apple,
Plum and apple
Jam for breakfast jam for tea
But we never get a bit of strawberry.²¹

¹⁹ Lyrics from 'Oh It's a Lovely War' CD, Vol.3, Disc 1, CD41 – 006.

²⁰ Lyrics from 'Oh It's a Lovely War' CD, Vol.2, Disc 2, CD41 – 003/1.

²¹ Lyrics from 'Oh It's a Lovely War' CD, Vol.4, Disc 1, CD41 – 011.

But when it comes to the foremost Irish influence on the music of the Great War it was not songs – subversive or conformist – but a singer who stands out, however ambiguous he may himself have been about the conflict and the role he was expected to adopt.

The tenor John McCormack, was thirty years of age when hostilities began, but already was an international star. He was equally renowned for his work in the classical and popular repertoires of the day. His recording of a popular song was, in essence, an *imprimatur* – an appropriate phrase for someone who later became a Papal Count – and a virtual guarantee of commercial success for the writers of the song.

McCormack recorded three of the ‘definitive’ tunes of the 1914-18 period, two of which, *It's a long way to Tipperary*, and *There's a long long trail*, were actually written before the outbreak of war but became popular with troops on the Western Front and are indelibly associated with the conflict. The third, *Keep the home fires burning* was very consciously written by Ivor Novello (music) and Lena Gilbert Ford (lyrics) as a song designed to boost morale on the ‘home front.’²²

McCormack, however, did not record versions of some of the more obviously belligerent songs of the 1914-18 period. He was no stranger to this type of tune in an Irish nationalist context having recorded the 1798 rebel song, *The Wearing of the Green* twice (in 1904 and 1912). McCormack's support for the war effort was a function of his increasing Americanisation. The tenor spent the duration of the war in the USA, applying to become an American citizen in 1914. The process was not completed until 1919. While in the USA he toured regularly and became extremely wealthy in the process. Although he was contractually obliged to spend much of his working life in America the Irishman's perceived ‘desertion’ was resented by many in Britain. His case was not dissimilar to that of Charlie Chaplin, whose failure to enlist in the British war effort was resented and became the subject of some scorn in the song *The Moon Shines Bright on Charlie Chaplin*.

McCormack's recording of *It's a long way to Tipperary* in November 1914 – which might be viewed as an example of patriotic war fervour – can equally be seen in an entirely different light. The recording, made in New York (with Victor/HMV) had a certain logic to it aside altogether from any association with the Great War. The song was increasingly popular in Britain and more familiar to US audiences than it would have been at the time of its composition in 1912. It also had all the characteristics of a sub-genre of American popular songwriting, the ‘quasi-Irish’ song. These were written by composers associated with ‘Tin Pan Alley’, home of the New York music industry. To this day many are assumed to have been Irish. In fact they afford a heavily romanticized version of Ireland and were popular with music hall audiences in American cities with significant Irish populations. The best examples of this type of song are *When Irish Eyes Are Smiling* (recorded by McCormack in 1916) with lyrics by Chauncey Olcott and George Graff Jr. and music by Ernest Ball, and *Mother Machree*, also written by Ball and Olcott and recorded by McCormack in 1911. By recording *It's a long way to Tipperary* McCormack was

²² Although he loathed the song and its sentiments, and snubbed Novello on their first meeting, the most famous of the poetic critics of the Great War, Siegfried Sassoon, ended up having a brief romantic relationship with the Welsh composer. (*Guardian*, 15 March 2014).

both acknowledging its place in his concert repertoire and continuing his practice of legitimising songs about Ireland which had their origins outside the country. His recording of *Tipperary* was certainly not made in response to any American impetus to support the British war effort. Sentiment in the USA at the time was profoundly anti-war, especially within the Irish-American community from which McCormack drew much support.

Equally his recordings of *Keep the Home Fires Burning*²³ and *There's a Long Long Trail* – on 7 June 1917 in Camden, New Jersey – had a particular logic. In April 1917 Woodrow Wilson had brought the USA into the war and patriotic sentiment had altered radically. The American recorded music industry would, as had its British counterpart, quickly get behind the US war effort with songs like George M. Cohan's *Over there* and *Goodbye Broadway, Hello France* (C. Francis Reisner, Benny Davis, Billy Baskette). McCormack chose to register his support of the American war effort by recording two less obviously aggressive 'off the shelf' songs already popular in Europe at the time.²⁴ Subsequently McCormack performed concerts in aid of the American Red Cross and sang at numerous War Bond rallies as his contribution to the war effort.

Although his name is indelibly associated with the recording of two of the best-known songs of the war it is unlikely that McCormack's talent and reputation was truly 'conscripted' until American entry into the conflict. A hint of McCormack's real attitude to the European hostilities comes across in L.A.G. Strong's biography of the singer. During the war HMV/Victor asked McCormack to record a version of *Onward Christian Soldiers* but the deeply religious tenor subverted the record company's intentions and 'turned the Evangelical war-cry into a Catholic hymn.' The company never released the recording.²⁵

Immediately after the war McCormack faced considerable hostility in Australia and Britain. This was connected to his successful application for American citizenship. According to Strong 'this was regarded by many people as an act of desertion, and he heard himself denounced both here [Britain] and throughout the British Empire as a renegade, whose only motive had been to escape military service.'²⁶ This sentiment, of which McCormack had been aware during the war, was not even dissipated by his very public refusal to claim exemption from military service in the US – he was used by the government in his capacity as an entertainer rather than in uniform – and the receipt of the award of Chevalier of the Legion d'Honneur from the French government.²⁷

Although current (largely British) scholarship advances the notion of the Great War as a just and necessary conflict designed to curb growing German militarism, most popular perceptions of the conflict, for good or ill, chime more with Paul Fussell's reading of the conflict in *The Great War and Modern Memory* than with that of historians like Brian Bond or Gary Sheffield. The suggestion, or complaint, that artists, particularly poets, have come to dominate perceptions of the war, is undoubtedly valid. Whether their representation of the conflict as an obscene waste of human life is equally valid is not

23 McQuaile, B. (2011) *March Away my Brothers: Irish Soldiers and Their Music in the Great War*, Dublin: Londubh Books, pp. 19-20.

24 <http://www.mccormacksociety.co.uk/Mccormack/McCormack's%20Recordings/McCormack%20Victor-HMV%20Acoustics.htm> [accessed 05 February 2014].

25 Strong, L.A.G. (1941) *John McCormack, the Story of a Singer*, New York: Macmillan, p. 199.

26 Ibid, p. 207.

27 Ibid, p. 211.

a subject for discussion in this volume. However, it has ensured that latter-day artists continue to search for meaning in the Great War and to make some sense of the conflict. The Scottish-Australian singer songwriter Eric Bogle is the most obvious example with his trilogy of World War One songs, *The Band Played Waltzing Matilda*, *The Green Fields of France* and *All the Fine Young Men*.²⁸ British rock star P.J. Harvey, as recently as 2011 addressed memory of the Great War (and other conflicts) in her album *Let England Shake*.

Irish performers too continue to grapple with the conflict. In the early 1980s the former showband musicians and songwriters, Daire Doyle and Michael Swan wrote what has been described as the Irish counterpart of *The Band Played Waltzing Matilda* a song entitled *Gallipoli*. This was later recorded by the folk group The Fureys. In this song a mother and father wave goodbye to their nineteen-year old son as he sails off 'to Gallipoli to die.' In one verse the sentiments articulated in *The Foggy Dew* get another airing with the father/narrator expressing a starkly nationalist point of view.

You fought for the wrong country, you fought for the wrong cause
And your ma often said that it was Ireland's great loss
All those fine young men who marched to foreign shores to fight the war
When the greatest war of all was at home

In 2002 Tracey McRory, Richard Laird and the late Sam Starret recorded an album of songs entitled *Boys of the Island*, which explored the Irish relationship to the Great War. The opening song, the haunting *John Condon* deals with the young Waterford soldier erroneously believed, at fourteen, to have been the youngest British serviceman to have died in the war.²⁹ Laird and McRory continue to seek inspiration from the Great War and in 2013 wrote and recorded the soundtrack to a short film on the Derry VAD nurse, Laura Gailey, who died in 1917. McRory has also written an instrumental piece *In My Darkest Hour*, a tribute to World War I chaplains which was performed at a Passchendaele commemoration ceremony in November 2013.³⁰

And so it goes on.

²⁸ The latter title also refers to conflicts other than the Great War. *The Green Fields of France* is also known as *No Man's Land*.

²⁹ The 1911 census shows that Condon, of Wheelbarrow Lane in Waterford, was already 15 years old in that year. http://www.census.nationalarchives.ie/pages/1911/Waterford/Waterford_Urban_No_1/Wheelbarrow_Lane/669850/.

³⁰ <http://www.derryjournal.com/what-s-on/arts-culture/tracey-to-perform-new-wwi-chaplains-passchendaele-tribute-1-5662773> [accessed 05 February 2014].

The Personalities of Hugh O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell and Their Effect on Military Tactics During the Nine Years War

ABSTRACT

The Elizabethan government's attempt to end the power of the local Irish lord and traditional way of life of Gaelic Ireland was met with fierce resistance by the Irish lords. This resistance was known as the Nine Years War (1594-1603). The Irish were led by the second Earl of Tyrone, Hugh O'Neill, and Red Hugh O'Donnell. This paper examines the temperaments of both men, and explores the manner in which their personalities influenced their chosen military tactics. O'Donnell was more aggressive, preferring a forceful military solution; while O'Neill was cautious and more inclined to use a less violent and hazardous course of action, such as negotiating with the English or besieging an enemy. These contrasting outlooks led to arguments between the two men, as O'Donnell sought to attack while O'Neill would urge restraint.

Ulster was the last bastion of Gaelic Ireland, but by the end of the sixteenth century, it was under threat from the Tudor government which was determined to extinguish Gaelic Ireland's hold on Ulster and anglicise the region. The Irish chieftains were unwilling to give up their rule and traditional way of life in Ulster, so they turned to rebellion. This rebellion was known as the Nine Years War, and took place from 1594 to 1603, ending in defeat for the Irish. They may have been defeated, but the Irish represented a serious threat to the Tudor government's authority not only in Ulster, but also in the rest of Ireland, as the rebellion that started in Ulster spread to all corners of Ireland. As the uprising spread, a nation-wide Gaelic confederacy emerged to confront the English. The leaders of this Gaelic confederacy were the second Earl of Tyrone, Hugh O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell. Under the leadership of these two men, the Irish confederacy was able to secure a number of notable and impressive victories over the crown forces. Yet these men had contrasting personalities which led to disputes between them, particularly with regard to military tactics. This paper seeks to examine the differing personalities of O'Donnell and O'Neill and to evaluate the effect their opposing dispositions had on their military strategy by contrasting O'Donnell's forceful approach and O'Neill's more cautious manner of executing the rebellion.

An investigation into the character of the two leaders requires that their respective backgrounds be examined to begin with, as these backgrounds shaped their dispositions. O'Neill ruled over the O'Neill lordship, which encompassed modern Tyrone, most of Armagh and parts of southern Derry.¹ While O'Neill's strength was located in the heart of Ulster, he was actually brought up in the Pale because he was fostered by Giles Hovenden, an English planter, after his father was killed in 1558 when O'Neill was only eight. Being exiled from Ulster for nearly ten years, and brought up among the English of the Pale, led the lord deputy, Sir Henry Sidney, to believe that O'Neill could be trusted to serve the government and remain a loyal servant to the Queen if returned to Ulster. Therefore in 1568, Sidney established O'Neill in Oneilland, in county Armagh, hoping that his establishment in the O'Neill lordship would divide it and confine the dangerous threat of Turlough Luineach O'Neill, (who had the title of the O'Neill, which was the title of the leader of the O'Neill lordship) to north of the River Blackwater. The support from the government continued after Sidney's tenure as lord deputy, and O'Neill used the military and financial aid his state backing afforded him to expand his authority in Ulster and loosen Turlough's hold on the lordship. His growing authority was recognised by the government in 1587 when they made him the second Earl of Tyrone.² O'Neill's early interactions with the English were therefore mostly positive, and he could see that there were benefits to cooperating with them. He also saw the consequences of rebelling against the English when he helped put down the Desmond Rebellion.³ The brutality that was used to subdue the rebellion can be seen in the writings of the famous English poet Edmund Spenser, when he described the aftermath of the English government's use of a scorched earth policy:

In those late wars in Munster; for notwithstanding that the same was a most rich and plentiful country, full of corn and cattle, that you would have thought they could have been able to stand long, yet ere one year and a half they were brought to such wretchedness, as that any stony heart would have rued the same. Out of every corner of the wood and glens they came creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them; they looked anatomies [of] death, they spoke like ghosts, crying out of their graves;⁴

The Chief Baron of the Exchequer, Sir Lucas Dillon, certainly thought that witnessing how the English dealt with disloyalty affected O'Neill, and would result in his remaining loyal to the Queen.⁵ Dillon was incorrect in asserting that it would prevent O'Neill from rebelling, but it probably did contribute to his hesitation in breaking out in open rebellion, and to the cautious approach he adopted during the war, including negotiating with the English. After 1587, the government began to fear O'Neill's growing power, and therefore, instead of helping him, they attempted to hinder his ambitions in Ulster, largely unsuccessfully. One reason for their failure was the fact that O'Neill had been busy developing

¹ Morgan, H. (2005) 'Gaelic Lordship and Tudor Conquest: Tir Eoghain, 1541-1603', *History Ireland*, 13(5), p. 38.

² McGinty, M. (2013) *The Development and Dynamics of the Relationship between Hugh O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell*, M.A. Thesis, NUI Galway, pp. 15-20.

³ Finnegan, M. (2001) *Tyrone's rebellion: Hugh O'Neill and the outbreak of the Nine Years War in Ulster*, M.A. Thesis, NUI Galway, p. 19.

⁴ Greenlaw, E., Osgood, C.G., Padelford, F.M. and Heffner, R. (eds) (1949) *The Works of Edmund Spenser*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, p.158.

⁵ *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Ireland, of the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth, (1860-1912)* (CSPI), 24 Volumes, Hamilton, H.C., Atkinson, E.G. and Mahaffy, R.P. (eds) , London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, Vol. III, p. 280.

connections and alliances with the Irish of Ulster. The most important of these alliances was his marriage alliance with the O'Donnells. With the help of Red Hugh O'Donnell, his son-in-law and ruler of the Tír Chonaill lordship (which roughly encompassed modern Donegal), O'Neill was able to finally eliminate Turlough's power in Ulster in 1593. Two years later, when Turlough died, O'Neill officially acquired the title of the O'Neill.

Red Hugh O'Donnell's early experiences with the English government were the polar opposite of O'Neill's, and had a profound effect on his attitude towards the English. In 1587, the then fifteen year old O'Donnell was kidnapped by the English because the lord deputy, Sir John Perrot, was concerned about O'Donnell becoming ruler of Tír Chonaill and allying with Hugh O'Neill, who at this stage had betrothed his daughter to O'Donnell.⁶ The experience of being held in Dublin castle radicalised O'Donnell, as he was exposed to other Irish prisoners who told him of the suffering they endured at the hands of the English government. English and Irish sources point to these interactions with fellow Irish prisoners as having had a substantial influence on O'Donnell and contributing to his having a strong anti-English stance.⁷ Lughaidh Ó'Cléirigh states that during peace talks with the English during the Nine Years War, O'Donnell was very wary of making peace because he did not trust the English. This mistrust arose because:

he had been listening [to stories about the English] ... during the four years and three months he was in prison in Dublin; and that was the tale he remembered best from the captives cast into prison along with him, and he said that the promises of the English were always vain and deceitful, and that by false promises they had stolen their patrimony from the Irish of the province of Leinster and the province of Munster....the English will tell lies now, and they will attack you when they find you unprepared.⁸

An English contemporary, Captain Thomas Lee, also noted the dangerous effect O'Donnell's confinement with his fellow Irish, coupled with his relative youth (which arguably made him somewhat impressionable) could have. Lee stated that "he being young... and kept still amongst those who were ever notorious traitors against your majesty having no other counsel or advice, or company, but theirs, what good come to this young man and his education among such."⁹ O'Donnell escaped in January 1591, but was quickly recaptured. The following year he successfully escaped and returned to Tír Chonaill, but he returned to a troubled place which had experienced much repression in his absence. While he was imprisoned, Tír Chonaill had been subjected to raids and pillaging by the new lord deputy, Sir William Fitzwilliam, and numerous other English Captains, most notably Captain Humphrey Willis.¹⁰ O'Donnell's experiences help to explain his uncompromising nature and hostility towards the English. A number of English observers at the time noted his antagonistic temperament, for example, one English official described O'Donnell as the firebrand of all the rebels, while another official appointed to

6 *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable Marquis of Salisbury: preserved by Hatfield House, Hertfordshire*, (1889) 24 volumes, London: Her Majesty's stationary Office, Vol II, pp. 285-6; O'Donovan, J. (ed) (1990) *Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland: From the earliest times to the year 1616*, Dublin: De Búrca Rare, pp. 1659-61.

7 McGinty, (2013) op cit, pp. 19-28.

8 O'Cléirigh, L. (1948) *The Life of Aodh Ruadh O'Domhnaill*, Walsh, P. (ed), Dublin: Irish Texts Society, pp. 128-9.

9 Lee, T. (1772) 'A Brief Declaration of the Government of Ireland', *Desiderata curiosa Hibernica*, Dublin, pp. 96-97.

10 McGinty, (2013) op cit, pp. 25-6.

a commission in early 1596 to participate in peace talks with the Irish also remarked on O'Donnell's insolence. The same two observers also noticed O'Donnell's arrogance and pride.¹¹ These personality traits, coupled with his fractious relations with the English in his youth, help to explain O'Donnell's more aggressive military style during the war.

The two leaders therefore, had contrasting dispositions. O'Neill was cautious and measured, while O'Donnell was impetuous and belligerent. These differing temperaments meant that they often held different opinions about how best to proceed militarily. An example of this occurred shortly after O'Donnell's escape from prison. While O'Donnell was in prison Captain Humphrey Willis, the sheriff of Donegal, along with his 200 men, set up camp at the monastery in Donegal Town and proceeded to ransack southern Tír Chonaill, causing many to flee to the mountains.¹² One contemporary, Captain Thomas Lee was disgusted by the vile acts of Willis and claimed that Willis and the "rascals and scum" that accompanied him did "rob and spoil that people, ravished their wives and daughters, and made havock of all."¹³ O'Donnell made the expulsion of Willis from the monastery his first order of business when he returned to Tír Chonaill from captivity. He gathered up his forces and went to confront Willis. Instead of attacking him, O'Donnell gave Willis an ultimatum. He told him that he and his men would be allowed to leave the monastery unmolested as long as they left behind the plunder they had taken from the people of Tír Chonaill. The English accepted the offer and departed the monastery.¹⁴ It would appear that O'Donnell could show restraint and could seek a more diplomatic solution to the problem of English encroachment on his lordship, but if Captain Lee is to be believed, the tactful decision to let Willis depart unharmed was not O'Donnell's doing. Lee stated that it was as a result of O'Neill's intervention that Captain Willis and his men were able to escape unharmed, because otherwise they would have all "been put to the sword."¹⁵ This would indicate that it was O'Neill who persuaded O'Donnell to allow the English to leave unscathed, because left to his own devices, O'Donnell would have killed them all.¹⁶ This conveys the two diverse temperaments of the men.

O'Neill urged further restraint when he travelled to Tír Chonaill and convinced O'Donnell to journey to Dundalk and submit.¹⁷ It is likely that O'Neill's rationale for convincing O'Donnell to submit was to increase his reputation as a loyal servant of the Queen and strengthen O'Donnell's position as leader of the O'Donnell lordship. O'Donnell had many rivals who sought his position as ruler, and if he proved to be problematic for the English government, they could simply lend their support to one of these rivals in the hope that they could oust Red Hugh as leader of Tír Chonaill. By submitting, Red Hugh received state recognition of his position as the ruler of Tír Chonaill. This acknowledgement by the government denied the other contenders for the leadership of Tír Chonaill, like Niall Garbh O'Donnell, government backing. This, in conjunction with O'Donnell's ruthless campaign against his competitors, convinced them to fall in line behind him.¹⁸

11 CSPI (1860-1912) op cit, Vol. V, p. 465, Vol. VI, p. 275.

12 McGettigan, D. (2005) *Red Hugh O'Donnell and the Nine Years War*, Dublin: Four Courts, p. 47.

13 Lee (1772) op cit, p. 106.

14 O'Cléirigh (1948) op cit, pp. 33-7.

15 Lee (1772) op cit, p. 106.

16 Ibid, p.106.

17 CSPI (1860-1912) op cit, Vol. IV p. 568.

18 Morgan, H. (2002) 'The Real Red Hugh' in Ó Riain, P. (ed) *Beatha Aodha Ruaidh: The Life of Red Hugh O'Donnell; Historical and Literary Contexts*, London: Irish Texts Society, p. 8.

This employment of less violent and risky tactics, frequently involving subterfuge by O'Neill instead of O'Donnell's preferred use of arms approach, was a feature of the war, especially during the beginning. The spark that ignited the war was the introduction of Captain Humphrey Willis as sheriff of Fermanagh in the spring of 1593. The chief of Fermanagh was Hugh Maguire who had succeeded his father as the Maguire in 1589. Like O'Donnell, Maguire was a son-in-law of O'Neill. Willis, in concert with Captain George Bingham, plundered Maguire's lordship. At this stage of the conflict there is some debate about O'Neill's involvement with the embryonic Gaelic confederacy which was emerging with the aim of defending their lands by force. It could be argued that O'Neill was at the head of the confederacy, directing the movements of the rebels and using other Irish leaders to fight a proxy war. An alternative theory is that O'Neill could not control his Irish allies and he wanted to prevent a war with the English.¹⁹ Whether O'Neill was behind the scenes orchestrating the activities of the rebels or attempting to avert a rebellion is not important. What is important is that both hypotheses concerning O'Neill's involvement show that he was circumspect about breaking out in open rebellion. He did not openly rebel until 1595, by which stage the war had been raging for about a year. O'Neill even fought with government forces against Maguire in late 1593 at the Battle of Galloon Ford, in order to save his image as a loyal servant to the Queen (which was fading fast as he was being accused of being in league with the insurgent Maguire).²⁰ O'Donnell had no such qualms about personally joining Maguire in his efforts to defend Gaelic Ulster from the English government's attempts to impose their authority on the region. O'Donnell was intent on openly assisting Maguire in 1593, but in the end he did not as his army were not as prepared as he would have liked. More importantly, he refrained from openly attacking the government's forces and withdrew because O'Neill had commanded him to do so.²¹ O'Neill's desire for O'Donnell not to be associated with Maguire's revolt, and to keep intact some semblance of loyalty to the Queen, is in contrast to O'Donnell wish to confront the English, further reinforcing the theory that the two leaders had different mind-sets when it came to choosing the best way to proceed. O'Donnell did in fact openly revolt in 1594, about a year before O'Neill, and this would indicate that he did not have the patience of O'Neill.

O'Donnell did not always yield to O'Neill's more careful approach, and there were arguments between the two men. One such quarrel occurred following a meeting between O'Neill and the Earl of Essex. Essex had been sent to Ireland with 17,300 troops in 1599 to put down the rebellion, which was now nationwide. Essex sent his army south to suppress the rebels in Munster and Leinster instead of sending his army against O'Donnell and O'Neill. This accomplished little, except gain him some castles and submissions from rebels, but it exhausted his troops.²² He eventually turned his attention to Ulster and O'Neill, but instead of attacking O'Neill, he had a parley with him and the two agreed to a truce. O'Donnell was furious with O'Neill because they had allied themselves with the Spanish and had promised them that they would not conclude a peace treaty without consent from the Spanish king. O'Donnell then showed his more

19 McGinty (2013) op cit, pp. 29-44.

20 *Calendar of Carew Manuscript Vol III*, Brewer, J.S. and Bullen, W.B. (eds), London: Longman, Green, Reader & Dyer pp .97-8.

21 O'Cléirigh (1948) op cit, p. 67.

22 Lennon, C. (2005) *Sixteenth Century Ireland*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, pp.295-304; Ellis, S. (1998) *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors*, London: Longman, pp. 339-350.

belligerent nature by demanding that he be permitted to go to Connacht, but Tyrone forbid him from doing this because of the cessation. During their argument, O'Donnell also admitted that the only reason he had not burned the entire Pale up to Dublin was because O'Neill had dissuaded him. O'Neill prohibited O'Donnell from burning the Pale because he predicted that if he did so, the "spoiled men of the English Pale would devour our country by begging and otherwise."²³ It was not the first time O'Donnell had criticised O'Neill for agreeing to a cessation with the English instead of continuing to use force. In December 1597 O'Donnell sent a letter to O'Neill, criticising him for agreeing to a cessation, pointing out that the rebels were strong in Leinster, Connaught was obedient to him and in Ulster they had not sustained any great damage. O'Donnell then informed Tyrone that he would break the cessation, although he never did.²⁴ O'Donnell's eagerness to break the cessation and raid and burn the Pale, in comparison to O'Neill's objections because of the potential consequences and his truces with the English, clearly exemplifies the contrasting personalities and military preferences of the two men. The disagreements are also indicative of a struggle between them to pursue their preferred strategy.

On the two occasions previously mentioned, O'Neill was able to rein in his ally as O'Donnell did reluctantly observe the cessations that O'Neill had agreed to. This, along with O'Donnell's admission that it was O'Neill that prevented him from burning the Pale, obviously shows that O'Neill's more careful mind-set had won out, but this was not always the case. Occasionally, it was O'Donnell's bellicose attitude which proved more influential in determining the strategy of the Irish. The most famous example of O'Donnell being able to overrule O'Neill's cautiousness and employ a more forceful course of action occurred at the Battle of Kinsale. A Spanish invasion force numbering 3,400 under Don Juan del Águila landed at Kinsale in September 1601 with the aim of supporting their Irish allies. The Spanish were quickly besieged by lord deputy Mountjoy and his force of 7,000. O'Neill and O'Donnell responded by marching the length of the country to support their allies. They set up a blockade preventing the English from receiving provisions overland and preventing their horses from grazing.²⁵ Mountjoy's secretary, Fynes Moryson, was present at the battle and painted a grim picture of the English predicament and the devastation that desertion and disease was causing them. He noted that the winter weather was so bad that English sentinels were dropping dead at their posts, and that so many were deserting that there was a proclamation stating that anyone who left the camp without permission would be executed. It was not only the soldiers that were suffering, but their horses as well. There were desperate pleas from the English for 2,000 pounds of oats to be urgently sent to them because "without which undoubtedly our horses will be starved."²⁶

It would seem that to defeat the English, the Irish could simply wait and allow the harsh winter weather to take its toll on the English forces, but the Irish faced a quandary. Don Jean del Águila had been sending letters to O'Neill and O'Donnell, urging them to assault

²³ CSPI (1860-1912) op cit Vol VIII p.159.

²⁴ CSPI (1860-1912) op cit Vol.VI p. 487.

²⁵ McGettigan (2005) op cit, pp. 103-4.

²⁶ Moryson, F. (1617) *An Itinerary Vol. III*, London, pp. 66-7.

the English who, he assured them, were few and weakened by the harsh conditions.²⁷ The Irish annalists claim that these letters from the Spanish had a profound effect on O'Donnell. They say he "was oppressed at heart and ashamed to hear the complaint and distress of the Spaniards without relieving them from the difficulty in which they were, even if his death or destruction, or the loss of his people, should result from it."²⁸ This would indicate that O'Donnell's prideful, aggressive and impetuous nature got the better of him, but O'Neill still urged caution and at an Irish war council he thought that they should:

not relax the siege which they had laid upon the English till they [the English] should die of hunger, as many of them had died already and they would give up their noblest into their mercy and protection at last, and that he did not wish to gratify his enemies, for they were better pleased to fight for their lives and to be killed immediately than to die of plague and hunger.²⁹

However O'Neill's pleas for restraint fell on deaf ears and the Irish decided to support O'Donnell's plan to attack the English forces, but the Irish were decisively beaten. Some historians doubt that there was a disagreement between O'Neill and O'Donnell over tactics. Military historian G.A. Hayes-McCoy doubted the stories of a discord between O'Donnell and O'Neill.³⁰ Hiram Morgan also expressed doubts and states that no English or Spanish source mentions a disagreement between the two men.³¹ The only evidence for the dispute comes from O'Sullivan Beare and Lughaidh Ó Cléirigh's accounts of the battle.³² Historians John McGurk, J.J. Silke, Darren McGettigan and Cyril Falls all take O'Sullivan Beare and Ó Cléirigh's accounts of the disagreement to be true.³³ Furthermore, it would not have been the first time O'Donnell induced O'Neill to abandon a siege in favour of a full frontal assault. In 1598, O'Neill was besieging the Blackwater Fort in Armagh, and O'Donnell arrived to assist O'Neill. Yet again O'Donnell believed a full frontal assault was the best option and convinced O'Neill to attempt to storm the fort. As happened in Kinsale, the Irish failed in their attack, losing over one hundred men in the assault, and so O'Neill reverted to his original plan of trying to starve the fort's defenders into submission.³⁴

This evidence would suggest that O'Donnell's military capability was very limited, as he often relied on simply attacking his enemy. Such an assertion would be unfair to O'Donnell however. His condemnations of O'Neill's actions at the Battle of Moyry Pass in October 1600 demonstrate that he could devise a more complex plan. The battle occurred because O'Neill was endeavouring to halt lord deputy Mountjoy's attempt to penetrate Armagh and establish a garrison.

²⁷ Ibid, p.73.

²⁸ O'Donovan (1990) op cit, p. 2283.

²⁹ Ó Cléirigh (1948) op cit, pp. 329-31.

³⁰ Hayes-McCoy, G. A. (1980) *Irish Battles*, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

³¹ Morgan, H. (2004) 'Disaster at Kinsale', in Morgan, H. (ed) *The Battle of Kinsale*, Bray: Wordwell, p.126; Hayes-McCoy (1980) op cit, p. 159-60.

³² O'Sullivan Beare, P. (1970) *Ireland Under Elizabeth*, Byrne, M. (ed), Port Washington: Kennikat Press, p. 146; Ó Cléirigh (1948) op cit, pp. 329-31

³³ McGettigan (2005) op cit, pp. 103-4; Falls, C. (1955) *Mountjoy, Elizabethan General*, London: Odhams, p.179; Silke, J.J. (1970) *Kinsale; the Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars*, Liverpool: Liverpool UP, p. 142; McGurk, J. (2002) 'The Kinsale Campaign Siege, Battle and Rout', *Seanchas Ard Mhacha*, 19(1), pp. 64-5.

³⁴ O'Sullivan Beare (1970) op cit, p. 103.

O'Neill had several skirmishes with Mountjoy's forces but O'Donnell wrote to him and reprimanded him for these skirmishes with government troops. O'Donnell considered that such skirmishes with Mountjoy wasted munitions and provisions and resulted in the loss of good men without anything really being gained. O'Donnell then demonstrates that he did have some ability to design a strategy that did not simply involve launching an offensive. He informed O'Neill that it would have been better if he had not engaged Mountjoy when he marched through Moyry Pass and that it would have been preferable to attack him when he was deeper in enemy territory, as Mountjoy's forces would be further away from reinforcements, provisions and a safe place to retire. O'Donnell then points out to O'Neill that this strategy, coupled with the bad weather, would have made Mountjoy and his troops easier to defeat. O'Donnell ends his advice to Tyrone by telling him that after the English had established their garrison and left some of their men there it would have been simpler to harass them on their return home.³⁵ O'Donnell's strategy for dealing with Mountjoy would have required patience, as Tyrone would have had to allow his opponents to march unimpeded into his territory and wait until the factors that O'Donnell had highlighted had taken their toll on the English troops prior to attacking them.

This alone is not enough evidence to dismiss the perception of O'Donnell as being impetuous and impatient, because the examples of him acting rashly still outweigh the examples of him exercising patience. Nevertheless, it does show that he was not completely devoid of the patience O'Neill had demonstrated at Kinsale and at the start of the war. The fact that O'Donnell could devise a strategy that needed more thought than simply deciding to engage the English, would suggest that his preference for launching an offensive at Kinsale and Blackwater fort was not a result of his inability to formulate a plan that was more complex than a full frontal assault, rather it was more likely down to his pugnacious and prideful nature. Sometimes O'Donnell's bellicosity was exactly what was needed. One such occasion occurred in 1594. Government troops were attempting to resupply the besieged troops at Enniskillen, and the prospect of a relief column victualling Enniskillen castle was troubling O'Donnell. At this point O'Neill was still not in open rebellion, and was trying to maintain his façade as an obedient subject of the Queen, but O'Donnell wrote to him and stated that "he must consider" O'Neill "his enemy, unless he came to his aid in such a pinch."³⁶ O'Neill responded by sending reinforcements under his brother Cormack McBarron O'Neill, and the combined forces of Cormack and Hugh Maguire defeated the relief column, killing 56 English soldiers in a battle known as the battle of the 'Ford of the Biscuits' because of the biscuits left behind by the English.³⁷ O'Neill's loyalty was already being called into question, so his involvement in the battle certainly ran the risk of his being associated with the rebels. His association did indeed result in English intelligence reports connecting him to the battle and the Gaelic confederacy, but without O'Donnell's demand to take this risk and send aid, the relief column may have made it to Enniskillen.³⁸ Consequently, it can be argued that on this occasion, O'Donnell's more combative approach resulted in a more favourable outcome for the confederacy than O'Neill's preferred course of action, which was to withhold his troops.

35 CSPI (1860-1912) op cit, Vol. IX p.521.

36 O'Sullivan Beare (1970) op cit, p.79.

37 Lennon, C. (2005) *Sixteenth-century Ireland The incomplete conquest*, Dublin: Gill and McMillan, p.291-5; Ellis, S.G. (1998) *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447-1603*, London: Longman, pp. 334-338.

38 CSPI (1860-1912) op cit, Vol. V p.279.

It has been shown that the two leaders of the Gaelic confederacy had very different personalities. O'Neill was cautious and patient, while O'Donnell was more impulsive and eager to fight. Their personalities and opinions regarding how best to prosecute the rebellion would have been profoundly shaped by their backgrounds. O'Neill had been brought up in the Pale and had received much assistance from the government in his early years. It was as a result of this state help that he was able to secure and expand his power in Ulster. O'Donnell on the other hand was imprisoned by the English government at the age of fifteen, and while imprisoned, Tír Chonaill had been plundered and subjected to repression by government officials. These different mind-sets and backgrounds heavily influenced the manner in which each of them behaved during the war, and the strategy they chose to pursue. O'Donnell was more uncompromising and aggressive towards the English and often preferred a military solution, while O'Neill, aware of the benefits of cooperating with the English and the punishment for rebelling, was more cautious and more amenable to negotiation. Their dissimilar personalities and approaches to war often led to clashes over tactics, as was the case at Kinsale, when they argued about whether they should attack precipitately or continue besieging the English. O'Donnell's bellicosity was both detrimental and beneficial. At Kinsale it proved disastrous, yet at the battle of the Ford of the Biscuits his more aggressive nature proved a more effective tactic than O'Neill's caution.

What is the Benefit of the Study of Military History to the Defence Forces?

ABSTRACT

As Ireland's 'Decade of Commemoration' (2013-2023) proceeds, with a wide variety of activities taking place to commemorate a range of historical events from 100 years ago, this paper considers the benefit to the Defence Forces (DF) of the study of military history. Drawn from the author's MA dissertation,¹ the paper reflects on the fact that, despite the lack of any formal DF policy on the subject, military history appears on many important career courses in the organisation. The paper includes a consideration of history and its utility, before examining the uses and value of military history. The role of military history within the United States (US) Army is evaluated and compared to the application of the subject in the DF. The benefits to the DF of the study of military history are proposed, and a number of recommendations are made regarding the potential role of the subject in the organisation.

Introduction

The DF has no clear policy concerning the place or role of military history in the organisation, nor does it have a manual to direct the use of military history in its institutions. Yet military history, in some shape or form, is part of certain induction training and of many career courses in the DF. Why is military history included in DF training and education, and why are scarce resources devoted to it when there is no stated reason or direction given for this inclusion? Consideration of this situation leads one to question the benefit of the study of military history to the DF. In contemplating this question, a number of subsidiary questions arise: What is history? What is military history? What is the DF approach to military history? How does the DF method compare to that of other modern militaries?

This paper considers some of the key works in the available literature in order to gain perspective on what history is and what the possible utility of military history may be. The attitude in the US Army to military history is examined and compared to the DF approach to the subject. It should be noted that due to a lack of DF documentation, the research focusing on the DF is conducted largely by interview. This work is undertaken to reveal if there is in fact any benefit to military personnel or military institutions in the study of military history, and if so what that benefit is.

¹ MA in Military History and Strategy from the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM).

History and its Utility

There are a variety of perspectives on what constitutes history. Although a detailed discussion of the academic debates on the subject are beyond the scope of this work, it is suggested that we must remember that our understanding of past events is constantly evolving and open to reinterpretation, and we must guard against the influence of modern attitudes or circumstances which might pollute our interpretation of historical events. Consequently, modern historians should adopt an academically rigorous approach to any sources they examine, and understand that even their selection of sources will influence their own product. They must understand that their interpretation is what gives their work value. The literature indicates that historians must understand how the subject is challenged in order to fully appreciate the value of academic history - that is, gaining an understanding of past events and how the current situation came to be.

E.H. Carr wrote that the function of the historian is to master and understand the past as “the key to the understanding of the present,”² and that this understanding might enhance insight of the future.³ Tosh more cautiously reflects on the possible uses of history and identifies the human desire to learn from past mistakes and to perhaps unearth a guide for future conduct. However, he explains that such an approach to the use of history completely disregards the importance of historical context and makes “the citing of precedents from the distant past a fruitless enterprise.”⁴ Tosh explains that the skills developed through the rigorous study of history can enhance the individual's intellectual faculties.⁵ It is proposed that there is value in the evidential approach to the study of history and that it may aid a better understanding of past events, enhance understanding the present and suggest a number of possible future outcomes, but it cannot either predict events or detail how they will unfold. A benefit of the application of academic rigour to the study of history is the intellectual development of the individual and the development of skills that are transferable to a variety of fields where research, reflection and problem solving skills are required.

Military History

To answer the title question it is essential to consider what military history is. There are a variety of attitudes to the subject - how it is produced, for whom and for what purpose. When Professor Sir Michael Howard reflected upon the subject, he advised historians to remain conscious of the unique nature of every historical event, and to be aware that the historical material that is studied is not “what happened in the past, but what historians say happened in the past.”⁶ The researcher must proceed cognisant of why the history was written and for whom. Howard considered the utilitarian attitude of military officers to military history and how this influences their approach to the subject. This can result in mythmaking and other abuses. To aid the study of the subject, Howard gave three general rules for the student of war: study in width, study in depth, and study in context.⁷ Later Howard outlined how the concept of studying ‘war and society’ has evolved because of

² Carr, E.H., (1961), *What is history?* London: MacMillan, p. 26.

³ Ibid, p. 177.

⁴ Tosh, J. and Lang, S. (2006) *The pursuit of history* (4th ed.), Harlow: Routledge, p. 38.

⁵ Tosh, J. (2008) *Why history matters?* Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, p. ix and p. 143.

⁶ Howard, M. (1962) ‘The use and abuse of military history’ in *Royal United Service Institute*, no.107 (Feb 1962) available: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_06/iss_2/CAJ_vol6.2_06_e.pdf [accessed 03 Nov 2011], p. 6.

⁷ Ibid, p. 8.

the enormous impact that war has had on society. Consequently, it must be understood that simply studying military history, without including the social and political context of events, would be somewhat one-dimensional.

The literature suggests that the contemporary understanding of military history has evolved to encompass war and society studies, which includes specialities such as gender, race and cultural issues in addition to economic and political matters. This view certainly provides the width, depth and context to the study of military history that Howard recommended. However, it also appears that there is a growing danger of individuals describing themselves as military historians when they might never have read about any military combat activities or war in detail during their studies. This would lead to a diminution of the core value of the subject: attempting to understand the key elements of actual warfare or military operations.

When Howard reviewed the evolution of the concept of military history, he reflected on the difficulties encountered by those with an interest in the area.⁸ He explained the possible reasons why the idea of military history as a subject may be so easily dismissed by other historians. Firstly, military history has often been equated with 'operational history,' which is regularly written by military officers with the simple goal of improving the performance of soldiers in future engagements. Within this concept, military history, possibly more than any other branch of history, appears to have often been written with a deliberately didactic purpose. Howard suggested that the study of past wars provides the only pool of information which may assist military leaders in learning how to perform in a crisis and how to prepare for actual operations. However, he also cited Clausewitz when warning of the dangers of 'school solutions' which may prescribe answers to problems rather than educating the minds of military commanders and enabling them to develop their own original solution to a unique situation.⁹

The second area of difficulty with military history for many historians and other academics, as identified by Howard, is its perceived parochialism. He suggested that military history has often been written to create and/or embellish national myths and also to make military service and warfare seem more palatable. This he called 'nursery history.'¹⁰ However, military history remains important, even to the disinterested, because very few societies have existed entirely without conflict.¹¹

Speller and Tuck emphasise that it is essential for military personnel to understand warfare "particularly given the historical correlation between ignorance and military incompetence."¹² When considering the possible utility of military history, they warn of the dangers of a reliance on doctrine and principles, citing Corbett: "nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become the substitute for judgement."¹³

⁸ Howard, M. (2006) 'Military history and the history of war' in Murray, W. and Hart S. R. (eds), *The past as prologue: The importance of history to the military profession*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 13.

⁹ Ibid, p. 13.

¹⁰ Howard, M. (1983) 'The use and abuse of military history,' in idem, *The causes of wars and other essays*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 189.

¹¹ Howard (2006) op cit, p. 16.

¹² Jordan, D., Kiras, J. D., Lonsdale, D. J., Speller, I., Tuck, C. and Walton, C. D. (2008) *Understanding modern warfare*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

¹³ Corbett, J. (1972) *Some principles of maritime strategy*, London: Conway Maritime Press, p. 169.

The literature suggests that there is utility for the military in the use of military history. History can assist in the development of identity and morale in young soldiers, it can be used to prepare personnel for the realities of military operations or war and it can, when rigorously pursued, provide opportunities for critical thinking for leaders in order to enhance their mental faculties. However, difficulties may arise when history is misused or even abused by military officers in decision making positions. In that context, it is of value to consider the attitudes of the military to military history.

Military History and the Military

According to Polybius “the study of history is in the truest sense an education and a training for political [and military] life.”¹⁴ Murray suggests that there can be serious implications for military forces that commence military operations without having first considered the relevant available military history.¹⁵ When he considers some of the challenges with the study of history he observes that “useful history is also difficult history.”¹⁶ This may lead to a desire for easy interpretations of past events and the development of simple tools in the form of given lessons to be learned being provided. However, “there are no simple easy solutions to be found in the study of history”¹⁷ but the belief that these lessons exist can be dangerous. Academic rigour will enable the student to approach research with a healthy scepticism. When Murray considers the utility of military history to the military professional, he concurs with a number of Howard’s ideas. He concludes that “anyone who wishes to understand the profession of arms must study history.”¹⁸

Military officers appear to be generally aware of the utility to be gained from the study of military history described earlier. However, many officers don’t actually apply themselves rigorously to the subject, yet they may still attempt to benefit from the support of historical evidence for a particular theory or proposition by short-circuiting the process. This can be evidenced with the abuse of historical precedent – attempting to use lessons from the past as directions for future action and reliance on maxims or principles without even understanding their origins.

Lt Gen John Kiszely, Director of the U.K. Defence Academy (2005-2008), reflects on the difficulties western armies face when trying to learn about counterinsurgency and the role military history has in solving this issue. He identifies problems with learning in modern armies including a “tendency to forego [the] serious study of history and theory.”¹⁹ Kiszely emphasises the value of academic rigour when he explains that military training is for predictable events “but for the unpredictable, education is required.”²⁰ He describes how studying a broad range of subjects can develop the mind and how “underpinning all of [this] is the study of history ... [which should be studied as Howard advises] ... in width, in depth and in context.”²¹ Maj Gen Paul K. Van Riper of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) concurs with many of the ideas of Howard. He outlines the value of the subject “as the ‘laboratory’ for the professional soldier ... the intellectual training and discipline it

¹⁴ Murray et al (2006) op cit, p. 80.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 79.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 83.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 84.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 87.

¹⁹ Kiszely, J. (2007), ‘Learning about counterinsurgency’, *Military Review*, lxxvii, no. 2, March–April, p. 9.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 10.

²¹ Ibid, p. 11.

provides ... [understanding] professional concepts ... [it] instils in [the officer] the values of the institution he serves.”²² However Van Riper also cautions that a little knowledge of a subject can be dangerous and that “If an officer is determined to find ‘lessons’ from the past he will contrive the facts until he does so.”²³

Military History and the US Army

Gen Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when Chief of Staff, US Army, stated: “To understand our profession we must understand its history. To be articulate and at senior level to provide strategic advice to civilian leaders, we must understand our history ... Strategic leaders must know our history.”²⁴ This quotation suggests the thoroughly utilitarian approach of the US Army to the study and application of military history. At almost all levels of the US Army, a clear understanding of the role of military history in the organisation has been developed.

In the vision and intent statement for the US Army’s *Military History and Heritage Program* (MHHP) (2012) it states “every soldier is the MHHP’s primary constituency”²⁵ and emphasises that the MHHP can, amongst other things:

[assist in]... turning citizens into soldiers and soldiers into leaders ... Enable leader development through ... instruction in military history and heritage ... Sustain lifelong learning through professional development in military history and heritage [and] support recruiting and retention and maintain morale and *esprit de corps*.²⁶

This whole process has individual American soldiers at its heart, informing them that they are more than just individuals, but part of an ongoing continuum.

Military history is very well established and supported in the US Army. The various available policy documents, manuals and directives make clear the role of every individual and element in the effort to promote, develop and use military history and heritage for the betterment of the US Army and those who serve in it. It is a supremely utilitarian approach to an academic pursuit.

Military History and the DF

Irish Military History

In order to build an understanding of the DF relationship with military history the consideration of material which focuses specifically on Irish military history is necessary. Until relatively recent times there has been a paucity of academic publishing concerning Irish military history, other than that associated with violent nationalism. This was probably exemplified by the writings of G.A. Hayes-McCoy who published *The Irish at War* (1964)

²² Van Riper, P.K., (1994) ‘The use of military history in the professional education of officers’ in *Marine Corps Gazette*, February, p. 50.

²³ Ibid, p. 51.

²⁴ Cited by Prof James Willbanks, General of the Army George C. Marshall Chair of Military History and Director of the Department of Military History, C.G.S.C., US Army, in a lecture titled ‘Military history in the US Army’, delivered to the DF Senior Command and Staff Course (SCSC) in the Command & Staff (C&S) School (24 Oct 2012).

²⁵ Cone, R.W., (2012), *Commanding General’s vision and intent statement for the TRADOC Military History and Heritage Program (MHHP)*, Dept of the Army, p. 1. TRADOC is the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command with responsibility for the development, conduct and support of training and education in the U.S. Army.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 2.

and *Irish Battles: a Military History of Ireland* (1969).²⁷ A point of interest in these works is that they are largely concerned with battles against the English, and with events that occurred in Ireland. No mention is made of the extensive service of Irish soldiers, over hundreds of years, in a variety of foreign theatres.

Perhaps the first major work to challenge this pattern was *A Military History of Ireland* (1996). In this work, Tom Bartlett reflects on perceptions of Irish military history and questions the significance of different ideas. Bartlett comments on Hayes-McCoy's work and suggests that his "perception of Irish military history solely in terms of 'nationalist' soldiering, whether at home or abroad, is much too restrictive."²⁸ To understand Irish military history, Bartlett suggests that while no coherent agreed Irish military tradition exists, the "notion of a broad Irish military tradition ... has proved serviceable in seeking to make sense of the history of this island."²⁹

The Irish Volunteers (I.V.)³⁰ were formed in 1913 as part of the series of events which ultimately resulted in the birth of the Irish Free State. The first major task for the new Free State Army was to fight and win the Irish Civil War (1922–3). Following this conflict the Army, later the DF, settled into a pattern of performing a wide variety of tasks for the government as a conventional military force. O'Halpin describes how these tasks included acting "as a badge of statehood, as a focus for national loyalty, as an armed bulwark against the republican movement, and as visible proof that the post-Treaty I.R.A. were not the sole heirs to the Irish physical force tradition."³¹ The revolutionary experience of many of the young Irish State's leaders shaped their perceptions of the DF and of defence issues generally "physical force was essentially a political device ... not an instrument of deterrence of external aggression or a means of enhancing Irish influence in the outside world."³² It is suggested as helpful to reflect on these issues when considering military history in the DF.

When reflecting on historical events, it becomes clear that commemoration and remembrance have often been embroiled in controversy, with the result that much Irish military service has been effectively forgotten.³³ DF participation in commemorative events such as those associated with the visit of Britain's Queen Elizabeth II in 2011 are a source of national pride, but they also demonstrate that military history is more than just an academic pursuit for military forces. The literature suggests that there has been a significant evolution in attitudes towards Irish military history since the 1960s. It is proposed that the study of aspects of Irish military history has been a somewhat difficult endeavour until relatively recent times. If there is a reluctance in Irish society to deal with the full spectrum of Irish military history, then it is suggested that this may well affect attitudes in the DF towards military history generally and Irish military history particularly.

²⁷ Hayes-McCoy, G.A. (1964) *The Irish at war*, Cork: Mercier Press and (1969) *Irish battles: a military history of Ireland*, London: Appletree Press.

²⁸ Bartlett, T. And Jeffery, K. (eds) (1996) *A military history of Ireland*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 2.

³⁰ Irish Volunteers means *Óglaigh na hÉireann* in Irish which is the official title of the Defence Forces of Ireland

³¹ O'Halpin, E. (1999), *Defending Ireland: the Irish State and its enemies since 1922*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 351.

³² Ibid., p. 351.

³³ Hanley, B. (ed.) (2004) *A guide to Irish military heritage*, Dublin: Maynooth Research Guides for Local History, p. 2.

The Utility of Military History in the DF

Currently there is no definition of what military history means to the DF and no DF policy concerning the subject. However, through the conduct of a series of interviews with a number of DF officers, an overview of the understanding of military history amongst the officers of the DF emerges. While some officers may consider military history to be simply a chore associated with career courses, others identified certain benefits. These include how the study of past military campaigns and operations can assist in preparing for future operations and that the study of past military leaders can aid the understanding and development of officers' leadership skills and capabilities. There is also a belief that as an academic subject, its study will develop the student's academic ability for rigour in investigation and critical analysis to determine plausible solutions for a range of problems. Finally, military history was identified as helping officers to understand why the DF is the way it is today. Similar to the US Army approach, the attitude of DF officers to the use of military history is an almost totally utilitarian one – if there is no identifiably practical reason for including a subject, then it would be difficult to get it included in DF training and education programmes. Yet this reason is not identified or expressed in any DF document.

Interviews with academics closely associated with the subject in the DF clarified a number of issues. Organisationally, it seems that the DF are essentially following models that were set down in the 19th century by other armies in their military academies when it comes to the application of military history. Military history has been identified as a useful hand tool to explore the understanding of leadership and military decision making. However, DF officers sometimes attempt to use military history without having a clear understanding of why it is on a syllabus and the best way to apply the subject. Nevertheless, this situation has improved in recent years, particularly with the support of professional historians from the National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM).

A common theme to emerge from interviewees was their reflection on the positive impact that interested officers can have on the delivery of military history instruction. However, there is a wide variety of approaches to military history instruction and this influences subsequent results. This situation is probably related to the lack of a DF policy on military history. Currently, there is an inconsistency between the three major schools of the DF's Military College in the application of military history as a subject. The research suggests that military history has a very limited role in the Command & Staff School, and that it has greater prominence in the Cadet School, while on the Infantry School's Junior Command and Staff Course, it is very well integrated into the training and is recognised as an important part of the education and development of the student officers.

Military history appears to be almost solely the preserve of officer training and education in the DF, with very limited time or consideration given to the idea of delivering military history instruction to enlisted personnel, either on courses or in units. A brief survey of key DF training documentation reveals that Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in the DF will probably only receive a handful of lectures and presentations relating to the history of the DF or Irish military heritage during their career. The opportunity for DF enlisted personnel to receive instruction or education about military history is extremely limited

unless an enthusiastic officer undertakes to organise some activity. This approach is very different to that adopted by the US Army.

Potential for Military History in the DF

Military history in the DF appears to be almost completely associated with the education of officers on career courses. There appears to be an understanding about the role and objectives of military history in this type of forum, yet it is not articulated formally. A number of interviewees described how military history can be used to aid the transition from civilian citizen to citizen soldier, and to identify the norms and principles that separate the members of the DF from civil society. The intellectual benefits to the individual and how this can expand the intellectual culture and add to the intellectual capital of the DF were also proposed by interviewees. The development of the intellectual culture of the DF can lead to a deeper understanding of the evolution of DF doctrine and procedures which can assist efforts to improve DF performance. Ignorance of history, and particularly military history, amongst military leaders will leave them ill-informed as to how and why the current situation and current DF doctrine came to be. In such circumstances, there is a danger of military leaders offering civilian authorities incomplete or incorrect military advice due to a lack of awareness of the context of the situation. It was recognised by interviewees that leaders need to take the time to reflect and to develop their faculties so that they can act as good servants in strengthening the organization so that it is best positioned to meet the national interest for the benefit of society and the state.

Conclusion

There is a variety of attitudes to history and military history. On the basis of the evidence it seems clear that history is a subject that can provide benefit to the student through the adoption of a scientific method of inquiry. The elements that must be considered in order to bring clarity to an appreciation of historical events must be understood. These include the need for critical thinking and the interrogation of sources. Military history is a somewhat controversial subject for a variety of reasons, from Howard's 'nursery history' to Clausewitzian school solutions. In order to understand the military approach to history one must realise that a utilitarian perspective is central to the military outlook. The research shows that the rigorous academic study of history is perceived as benefitting military students in two ways: firstly, through developing their mental faculties in order to deal with the complexity of operations, and secondly, by giving personnel an opportunity to study and think about how actual military operations are conducted, about soldiers in war and about the norms and values of military society. The study of military history in the military benefits not only the individual soldier but, through developing identity, morale and leadership capabilities, it is seen to benefit the organisation.

The consideration of how military history is used in the US Army revealed how an organisation with immense resources in comparison to the DF, still places a major emphasis on military history. There is a clear understanding of the value of military history and heritage to all members of the organisation from the most junior ranks to the senior leadership. In contrast to the US Army, the DF has no policy or guidance in this area. Military history is studied in the schools of the DF Military College, but it is studied differently in each location. The level of professionalism and enthusiasm brought to the

subject by the officer responsible for its delivery is often a matter of chance. However, this situation is improving with the involvement of professional historians. Currently there is an uneven application of military history in the DF with mixed results amongst officers and very limited opportunities for enlisted personnel. It appears that the lack of a policy concerning history in the DF is a central reason for these circumstances. Yet, despite the issues that are identified with military history instruction, the subject still figures in some shape or form in almost all officer training.

In order for the DF to take advantage of the potential benefits of the study of military history, it is suggested that the development of a DF policy for military history is required. Such a measure would immediately enable the coordination of the currently somewhat disparate approaches to military history within the organisation. It should outline clear objectives and responsibilities for the officers tasked with the delivery of the subject within the military education system. It should also assist in the organisation of the scarce resources that are currently devoted to the subject. Furthermore, a DF policy should consider military history for enlisted personnel and the units of the DF.

The potential benefits for the DF in the rigorous study of military history by its personnel apply in different ways to different members of the organisation. These range from the new inductee gaining a sense of unit identity and morale, to the senior leader whose intellectual faculties are developed in preparation for command responsibility in the extremely complex environment of modern Peace Support Operations (PSO). It is suggested that the DF take measures in order to be in a position to fully exploit these possible benefits.

Operation Unified Protector: The Right Way to Ruin Intervention?

ABSTRACT

The seven month long NATO-led coalition's intervention in Libya in 2011, known as Operation Unified Protector (OUP), has starkly divided opinion as the Arab awakening has continued to confound analysts and the international community has struggled to take concerted action in Syria. A more assertive Russia has, since 2011, cited Libya as a breach of international legal norms, while the NATO alliance has hailed it as a major success. This article examines the legal arguments in relation to OUP's mandate and discusses the Russian criticism which has persisted and has again been raised during the crisis in the Ukraine. If one accepts that NATO and its allies were justified in intervening in Libya, one must also accept that the conduct of the campaign and the use of force in Libya by the coalition became a sore point for their fellow UN member states, in particular Russia. The Libyan intervention was an important step in the development of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), but R2P is by no means an established norm in International Law.

At midnight tonight, a successful chapter in NATO's history is coming to an end. But, you have already started writing a new chapter in the history of Libya. A new Libya based on freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and reconciliation.

NATO Sec Gen Fogh Rasmussen at a press conference in Libya
on 31 Oct 2011 the final day of Operation Unified Protector.

Introduction

In March 2011 a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led coalition conducted a seven month long military operation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973.¹ *Operation Unified Protector* (OUP) was supported by a broad coalition which included a commitment from regional powers in the Mediterranean and Europe as well as the Middle East. While many in NATO and the West claimed that the Libyan intervention was not only a highly successful example of authorised use of force, but a model for future humanitarian interventions,² not everyone was so enthusiastic. There has been notable criticism from Russia and China in particular, both permanent members of the Security Council (P5).

¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, UN DOC: UN S/RES/1973 (2011).

² Dallder I. H. and Stavridis, J. G. (2012) 'NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention', *Foreign Affairs*, 91, p. 2; Granville, L. (2012) 'Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent', *International Studies Perspectives*, p. 1; Williams, P.R. and Popken, C. (2011) 'Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A Moment of Legal & Moral Clarity', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 44, p. 226.

This paper seeks to examine to what extent OUP and the interpretation of UNSCR 1973 has influenced the UN's system of collective security. It also seeks to explain the Russian narrative on OUP and advocate a way forward that protects the UN Charter whilst addressing concerns of members in a constructive and peaceful way. While OUP succeeded in its aims, the Libyan intervention has had unforeseen consequences for the UN Security Council and has caused a downward spiral in relations between member states, as evidenced by the Security Council's treatment of the war in Syria and recent events in Ukraine. Central to the debate, which has continued since OUP began, is the adoption of the wording "take all necessary measures" for the "protection of civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" in UNSCR 1973.³ This wording was adopted for two key reasons; firstly there was regional consent to use force against the Libyan regime and secondly, Ghaddafi had made a number of public and explicit threats to kill civilians in Benghazi and other opposition strongholds.

Before examining OUP and how its UN mandate was interpreted, it is necessary to outline the development of the conflict in Libya as well as some of the key legal provisions and state practice that concern the use of force in international law.

Development of the Conflict in Libya

Col Muammar Ghaddafi⁴ ruled the Jamahiriya of Libya since he took power by coup d'état in 1969 from the post-colonial monarchy under King Idris. Ghaddafi, who was heavily influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism, created an autocratic system of government that he claimed was 'rule by the masses.' Instead, Libya was centrally controlled by Ghaddafi and his family through revolutionary committees. Throughout the 1980s, Libya was linked with international terrorism and was accused of supporting Islamic Fundamentalists in other countries.⁵ Libya's links to the 'le belle' bombing of a German discotheque in 1986 and the 1988 Lockerbie bombing led to UN sanctions.⁶ It wasn't until 2003, when Ghaddafi renounced support for terrorism and handed over Lockerbie suspects, that sanctions were lifted.⁷

Following the success of opposition movements in neighbouring Tunisia, large scale protests against the Ghaddafi regime began in the eastern cities of Ajdabiya and Benghazi. These developments in Libya were part of a wider regional event, now known as the 'Arab Spring'.⁸ Protests began in earnest on 17 February 2011 when large crowds took to the streets in Benghazi on the fifth anniversary of a popular uprising in the city that was forcefully crushed by Ghaddafi. The protests spread from Benghazi and Tobruk in the East, to Misrata, the Nafusa Mountains and the capital Tripoli.⁹

3 UN S/RES/1973 (2011) Para. 4.

4 Hereinafter 'Ghaddafi.' Numerous spellings and romanisations of his Arabic name abound, e.g. Qadaffi, Gadaffi, Gaddafi, Khaddafi etc.

5 UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia, LIBYA: 'One Sided Violence' [online], available: <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=95®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#> [accessed 23 Feb 2013]; Payandeh, M. (2011) 'The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya' *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 52, pp. 355, 372.

6 Lockerbie Case (1998) 94 ILR 478.

7 Shaw, M. (2008) *International Law 6th Edn*, London: Cambridge University Press, p. 1245; UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia 'LIBYA: One Sided Violence' op cit.

8 For a background and timeline of the Arab Spring see Uppsala Conflict Data Program 'The Arab Spring' [online], available: <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/info/chronologic%20timeline%20arabian%20spring.pdf/> [accessed 07 Apr 14].

9 Payandeh (2011) op cit, p. 355; It is submitted that by now the human rights abuses and crimes of the Ghaddafi regime are incontrovertible. See generally: UN Human Rights Council (1 June 2011) 'Report of the international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of International Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya', A/HRC/17/44 [online], available: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4df74f402.html> [accessed 1 Mar 2013]; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (22 November 2011) Para. 19.

On 22 February 2011 Ghaddafi made a speech in which he threatened to purge the country of the opposition house by house and room by room until Libya had been 'purified.' In his address, he accused western influence of drugging the milk of the youth of Libya, but most significantly, he appealed to his followers to give no quarter to the opposition who he described as 'rats.'¹⁰ This violent tirade provided clear and undeniable evidence of Ghaddafi's intentions and gave an alarming insight into an autocrat at the full extension of his megalomania. This speech marked a watershed in the Security Council's treatment of the situation in Libya. The international community was spurred into action by Ghaddafi's statements and continued use of heavy weapons, aircraft and lethal force against the civilian population. What followed were two separate UNSCRs that condemned the violence in Libya and attempted to pressure Ghaddafi and his security forces into de-escalating the conflict and establishing talks or dialogue.

The Use of Force under Chapter VII

The Security Council justified intervention in Libya because it constituted a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter, and it authorised member states to use 'all necessary means' in enforcing its mandate under UNSCR 1973. Use of force in international relations is explicitly prohibited in the UN Charter, Article 2.4 which states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."¹¹

This clear and unambiguous prohibition has, in the lifetime of the United Nations, contributed greatly to reducing inter-state conflict. The Charter provides for the use of force in self-defence and for collective enforcement under Chapter VII, the most powerful Charter provision available to the Security Council. However the UN standing army envisioned in Article 45 and Article 46, complete with a military staff, never materialised. This Blue Helmet permanent force, composed of soldiers from the UN member states was never established as the US, in Korea for example, felt they were better placed to play a leading role using their own structures. As Shaw points out, the UN in approaching collective security and the use of Chapter VII "demonstrates how flexibility and textual interpretation have prevented the system from failing completely."¹²

The Cold War period of UN involvement and intervention in peace and security was largely peacekeeping, where host nation consent and impartiality are essential requirements.¹³ Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a marked increase in the use of Chapter VII by the Security Council.¹⁴ Indeed the only notable pre-1990 enforcement resolution was UNSCR 83 (1950) which was passed without the Russian delegation and authorised the intervention in the Korean War.¹⁵ A new departure was signalled in the UNSCRs that preceded the coalition invasion of Iraq in 1991. UNSCR 678 (1990) authorised the member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement previous resolutions

¹⁰ Aljazeera (2011) 'Defiant Gaddafi vows to fight on', 23 February, available: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html> [accessed 26 Feb 2013].

¹¹ Charter of the United Nations (1946) Art. 2.4.

¹² Shaw (2008) op cit, p. 1236.

¹³ Chesterman, S. (2001) *Just War or Just Peace?* London: Oxford University Press, p. 119; Shaw (2008) op cit, pp. 1124-113; Payandeh (2011) op cit, pp. 355, 401. Payandeh poses the question: '*UN Peacemaker or warrior?*'

¹⁴ Chesterman (2001) op cit, p. 237, shows 24 UNSCRs under Chapter VII up to 1989 and 166 Chapter VII UNSCRs after 1989.

¹⁵ UN S/RES 83 (1950).

against the invasion of Kuwait.¹⁶ *Operation Desert Storm* was successful in its aim of liberating Kuwait but the subsequent massacres in Northern Iraq and the protracted sanctions and diplomatic battles against the Saddam Hussein regime seemed to indicate that the coalition had not gone far enough.

Further interventions followed with limited success, as was the case in Rwanda where Western member states in particular failed to support the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) based in Kigali.¹⁷ Events in Rwanda and the Balkans, particularly the Srebrenica massacre, exposed the UN and peacekeeping doctrine to fierce criticism and a period of introspection.¹⁸ By the end of the 20th century, it was generally held that the massacre of civilians or the systematic abuse of human rights was unacceptable behaviour by states. Nevertheless, sovereignty, as explicitly protected in the UN Charter, was for many incontrovertible.¹⁹ The primacy of state sovereignty was clearly stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case:

...adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and cultural system of a State. The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system.²⁰

There was considerable support amongst UN member states for reform to take account of modern developments. The Canadian Government sponsored Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the legal concept of the 'Responsibility to Protect' or R2P.²¹ In 2005 the Outcome Document of the UN World Forum stated that each member state had the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing and that the UN, through the Security Council, should take collective action where peaceful means prove to be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations.²²

While the Outcome document was adopted by the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council has not adopted R2P through its pronouncements or actions, many states feeling that it is a step too far to allow use of force in these cases as a matter of course. Admittedly, the Security Council has included the words "all necessary measures" when sanctioning the protection of civilians by member states. However this cannot be used to infer or imply that R2P is an established *jus cogens* norm, i.e. principle of International Law. A reading of the UNSCRs of the last 25 years shows that the use

16 UN S/RES 678 (1990).

17 Somalia Op Restore Hope, UN S/RES 794 (1992); Rwanda UN S/RES 929 (1994); Dallaire, R. (2003) *Shake Hands with the Devil*, London: Random House.

18 Hilpold, P. (2012) 'Intervening in the Name of Humanity: R2P and the Power of Ideas', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 17, p. 49; Dallaire (2003) op cit; Brahimi Report (21 Aug 2000) UN DOC A/55/305.

19 Charter of the United Nations (1946) Art. 2.1.

20 *Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua* (Nicaragua v USA) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, Para 263.

21 Hehir, A. (2012) *The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Hilpold (2012) op cit, pp. 49, 67.

22 UN 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (25 October 2005) UN A/RES/60/1.

of the Security Council's powers has widened considerably, yet as can be seen from the reactions to the crises in Darfur and Syria, the Council has not always been consistent in the application of such powers.²³

The events in Libya in the spring of 2011 presented the international community with a clear case for intervention. Nevertheless, the scope of the intervention would prove controversial, and the wide mandate afforded to the coalition would have a serious effect on future decisions of the UN Security Council.

UNSCR 1973 and its Interpretation

On 26 February, four days after Ghaddafi's television address, the UN Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1970, which demanded an immediate end to the violence in Libya and that Libya respect its obligations under human rights law and international humanitarian law. The resolution also referred the matter to the International Criminal Court, and imposed sanctions, travel bans and asset freezes on the Ghaddafi regime.²⁴

Ghaddafi's reputation internationally and his legitimacy as leader were quickly being eroded; in part due to his own pronouncements, but also due to mounting pressure from major regional organisations. On 10 March, France recognised the newly formed National Transitional Council (NTC), a group of opposition activists and Ghaddafi regime defectors. The European Council soon followed, declaring the NTC the legitimate 'political interlocutor'.²⁵

The role of regional organisations was to be a key factor in the UN Security Council's decision to use force against Libya. The African Union²⁶, the League of Arab States²⁷, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)²⁸ and the European Union²⁹ all joined in condemnation of the violence in Libya. The importance of the Arab League's appeal to the Security Council was explicitly mentioned in UNSCR 1970 and 1973.³⁰

On 17 March, UNSCR 1973 was adopted by the Security Council. It gave a wide mandate to a NATO-led coalition to enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and further authorised the member states as follows:

Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures,

²³ Chesterman (2001) op cit, pp. 86-7, 235; Gray, C. (2004) *International Law and the Use of Force* (2nd Edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 334-41.

²⁴ UN S/RES 1970 (2011).

²⁵ European Council Declaration No. 7/11 of 11 March 2011, Para 8.

²⁶ African Union (2011) 'The African Union Deeply Concerned about the Situation in Libya', *African Union Press statement*, 23 Feb, available: <http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/AU%20deeply%20concerned%20about%20the%20situation%20in%20Libya.pdf> [accessed 20 Feb 2013].

²⁷ Cited in UNSCR 1973 UN S/RES 1973 (2011); Leiby, R. and Mansour, M. (2011) 'Arab League asks UN for No-Fly Zone over Libya' *The Washington Post*, 12 March, available: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-12/world/35208628_1_arab-league-gaddafi-moussa [accessed 28 Feb 2013].

²⁸ Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (2011) 'OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the Excessive Use of Force against Civilians in the Libyan Jamahiriya', *OIC Press Statement*, 22 Feb, available: http://www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=4947&x_key=Libya [accessed 14 Feb 2012].

²⁹ European Council Declaration No. 7/11 of 11 March 2011, Para 8.

³⁰ UN S/RES 1970, UN S/RES 1973 (2011)

notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.³¹

Ten members of the Security Council voted in favour of UNSCR 1973, while five members abstained. The resolution was submitted to the Security Council by France, the UK, the USA and crucially, an Arab League member, Lebanon. It is also worth noting that the resolution was supported by the three members of the council from the African Union.³² Those supporting the resolution were keen to emphasise respect for Libyan sovereignty and territorial integrity.³³

There were clear and unambiguous calls from members of the Security Council for Ghaddafi to step down. Germany, who abstained, stated that Ghaddafi's time was over and that he must relinquish power immediately. Lebanese representative, Mr. Salam, spoke of the authorities in Libya having "lost all legitimacy."³⁴ However UNSCR 1973 does not contain an explicit demand for Ghaddafi to step down as leader, nor is there any reference to regime change in either resolution.

Russia, China, Germany, India and Brazil abstained. Russia, in its statement after the vote, outlined its concerns. It objected to the broad scope of the resolution and pointed to the fact that a number of questions posed by Russia were not answered by the resolution or by the members submitting the draft resolution. Of particular concern to the Russian delegation were the limits on the use of force and what the rules of engagement would be. The Russian representative concluded by stating that the responsibility for humanitarian and security destabilisation caused by excessive use of force by member states would be borne by those participating in the intervention.³⁵

China, in its statements, reiterated the Russian reservations concerning the detail of the resolution but also emphasised the importance of the Arab League and their role in calling for action. It was clear in stating that the calls from the Arab League, African Union and the votes of the African members of the council created special circumstances to permit the passing of the resolution. Therefore, they abstained and declined to use their veto powers.³⁶

Two days after the passing of UNSCR 1973, France and the US began airstrikes and cruise missile strikes on targets in Libya and in particular in areas threatened by Libyan forces close to Benghazi.³⁷ Shortly thereafter, NATO agreed to take command of the operation and *Operation Unified Protector* was established. Fourteen members of the alliance participated in OUP, but there were some notable exceptions, such as Germany who, as mentioned above, abstained from the UNSCR 1973 vote.³⁸

31 UN S/RES 1973 (2011) Para 8.

32 UN Security Council 6498th Meeting on Situation in Libya (17 March 2011) UN S/PV.6498, p. 3.

33 Ibid, Lebanon's Representative at p. 4, China and South Africa's Representative at p.10.

34 Ibid, p. 4.

35 Ibid, p.8.

36 Ibid, p.10.

37 Al Jazeera (2011) 'Airstrikes Begin on Libyan Targets', 19 March, available: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/20111319175243968135.html> [accessed 28 Feb 2013].

38 NATO (2011) 'NATO Secretary General's Statement on Libya no-fly zone', 24 March, available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71763.htm [accessed 02 Mar 2013].

It was agreed at a conference in London, chaired by the UK foreign secretary William Hague, and attended by the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the EU and NATO, that Ghaddafi had lost legitimacy as leader of Libya and should be held accountable for his actions. It was also agreed that executive political direction for NATO operations would be provided by the North Atlantic Council meeting alongside its coalition partners, which included European non-NATO member Sweden and Gulf/Middle East states including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.³⁹

From an examination of the text of the resolution, and the meeting that approved its adoption by the Security Council, there were a number of clearly mandated actions permitted in relation to Libya. The resolution authorised the member states to use all necessary means to enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace for the sole purpose of protecting civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. The resolution further forbade a foreign occupation force of any kind.⁴⁰ The members of the council clearly required the use of force against the Ghaddafi regime to be restricted to an air campaign, combined with the naval blockade and arms embargo.

Considering the statements of the council it is also clear that Ghaddafi had completely lost legitimacy as the sovereign leader of the Arab Jamahiriya of Libya. The Arab League and EU, the two large adjoining regional organisations had, by this stage, recognised the NTC and condemned Ghaddafi in the strongest possible terms. Can it then be said that UNSCR 1973 implied the removal of Ghaddafi and his regime? The request for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate human rights violations in Libya, and the issuing of warrants in June 2011 following the referral by the Security Council, made the prospect of the Ghaddafi regime remaining in power completely untenable.⁴¹ State practice in previous Chapter VII enforcement actions shows that regime change may be the explicit aim as in Haiti⁴² or it may follow from the conduct of the intervention.⁴³

Payandeh points out that the prohibition on intervention in domestic matters does not apply to measures under Chapter VII.⁴⁴ He concludes that whilst the mandate was not exceeded by OUP and none of the measures taken were ultra vires, the policy considerations and implications of OUP may weigh more heavily in the future. He argues that the lack of distinction between a pro-democratic and humanitarian intervention resulted in OUP being left open to criticism from some observers, and ultimately to lose legitimacy. He also makes the point that Western states had been aware of Libyan abuses of human rights and international law for decades, yet refrained from action for economic and political reasons.⁴⁵

39 London Conference on Libya (2011) 'Chair's Statement', 29 March, available: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110329_London-Conference-Libya.pdf [accessed 20 Feb 2013].

40 UN S/RES 1973 (2011) Para 4.

41 International Criminal Court (2011) 'Pre-Trial Chamber I issues three warrants of arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdulla Al-Senussi', press release 27 June, ICC - 01/11 *Situation in Libya*, available: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/Pages/situation%20index.aspx [accessed 23 Feb 2013].

42 UN S/RES 940 (1994).

43 Regime change became a major issue during the post 9/11 'War on Terror', particularly considering the UK and USA's different stances on the matter. See Gray (2004) op cit, pp. 231-4.

44 Payandeh (2011) op cit pp. 355, 394.

45 Ibid, pp. 355, 396-7.

Lehman, in his study of the how far the phrase 'all necessary means' goes with regard to the use of force under UNSCR 1973, concludes that the intervention was warranted and justified in light of the human rights abuses and heinous acts of the Ghaddafi regime, but he argues that the attacks on civilians were curtailed considerably from March 2011, and yet the campaign persisted in scale and intensity.⁴⁶

It is submitted that OUP's targeting of Ghaddafi, his facilities and security forces was proportionate to the aim of protecting civilians in Libya. To allow Ghaddafi to regain his support, lost territory and power over Libya would almost certainly have led to a massacre of civilians in the areas Ghaddafi perceived as hostile. It is conceded however, that Payendah and Lehman's point that the Libyan intervention has done more harm than good to the development of responsibility to protect within the UN system of collective security, may prove correct, as matters relating to Syria would seem to suggest.⁴⁷

Having outlined the principle catalysts for intervention, i.e. the Ghaddafi speech and regional support, as well as the interpretation of the UNSCR 1973 mandate, it is necessary to consider the Russian perspective on OUP. Russia abstained on the Libyan intervention, but has since been more assertive on the issue of interventions, and has been highly critical of OUP.

The Russian Narrative

As outlined above, during the course of the Security Council debate on resolution 1973, the Russian representative articulated his country's objections to the wording of the resolution. The fact that the resolution was passed in the first place surprised many, as a Russian veto had been expected by observers. What may have influenced the Russian position was the domestic transition beginning to take shape. President Medvedev was about to make way for the return of Vladimir Putin. The foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov and Medvedev had followed a conciliatory line with the US and had actively engaged in what President Obama had called his 'reset' of relations with Russia. Agreement had been reached on nuclear arms reduction, sanctions against Iran as well as a ground supply route to US forces in Afghanistan. This significant thaw in relations was brought to an abrupt halt following the commencement of OUP in Libya.

In Susan Glasser's profile of Foreign Minister Lavrov, she calls UNSCR 1973 the high water mark of the reset.⁴⁸ Since then, Russia has claimed that they were hoodwinked by the West into allowing the establishment of a no-fly zone. Glasser notes that, to this day, the US administration has failed to agree on the circumstances that motivated Russia to abstain from the vote. Some claim minister Lavrov was caught between two chiefs, Medvedev and Putin, while others maintain that he had been overruled and that Russia abstained in good faith in order to facilitate improving relations with the US and the EU.⁴⁹ Jeremy Bowen, the BBC's Middle East correspondent, in his account of the Arab Spring, quotes an unnamed Western diplomat as being surprised that the Russian

⁴⁶ Lehmann, J. M. (2012) 'All Necessary Means to Protect Civilians: What the Interventions in Libya Says about the Relationship between the Jus in Bello and the Jus ad Bellum,' *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 17(1), p. 145. Lehman describes OUP's rejection of ceasefires, demands for regime change, provision of weapons and advisors to rebels as "highly problematic."

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Glasser, S. (2013) 'Minister No, Sergei Lavrov and the blunt logic of Russian power,' *Foreign Policy*, p.61.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 52.

delegation had allowed the inclusion of the term 'all necessary measures.' The diplomat added ruefully that they would have settled for a far more watered down mandate.⁵⁰

Russia has persistently objected to the wide remit given in the resolution and questioned why there were no rules of engagement. On a state visit to Denmark, Vladimir Putin, then Russian Prime Minister, criticised what he viewed as excessive use of force by OUP as well as the targeting of the Ghaddafi regime.⁵¹ In discussing interventions in Africa and Syria, Russia has frequently cited Libya as an example of 'Western aggression and hawkishness'.⁵² The crisis in the Ukraine has allowed Russia to voice their objections once again. The Russian narrative of OUP would seem to suggest that the West (spurred on by the US) tricked Russia into approving a no-fly zone in Libya with supposedly noble humanitarian intentions, but as soon as the resolution passed, the coalition sided with the rebels and sought to oust Ghaddafi.⁵³

In his speech to the Russian Duma following the disputed Crimean referendum in March 2014, President Putin outlined a number of arguments for Russia's intervention. Much of his speech dealt with the historical ties between Russia, Crimea and Ukraine. He spoke of what he described as the plundering and historical injustices imposed on Russia following the collapse of the USSR. Quite remarkably, he referred to Kosovo as establishing a legal precedent for his actions. In this address, which is probably his most explicitly critical speech on foreign relations with the West, he openly criticised what he called Western "primitive, blatant cynicism."⁵⁴

With regard to Libya, he prefaced his remarks by stating that the events in Ukraine were a reflection of years of key international institutions weakening and degrading, and Western countries, led by the US, favouring the 'rule of the gun' over international law. He then drew a comparison between the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and pointed to an alleged continuation of the trend in Libya where "they ... frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone they started bombing it too."

The open and explicit demands for regime change and the targeting of Ghaddafi's compounds and command facilities drew criticism from Russia and in particular Vladimir Putin.⁵⁵ The argument that regime change was not within the mandate of UNSCR 1973 would appear to be one of interpretation, but Putin's statements in relation to the weakening of international law are a matter of some concern.

OUP's Influence on International Law and Future Interventions

The Security Council has continued to play an active role in encouraging peace and security, for example in Mali, where some argued that conflict in Libya had aided armed elements from the North in threatening the capital. The roles of regional organisations

50 Bowen, J. (2013) *The Arab Uprisings, The People want the Fall of the Regime*, London: Simon & Schuster.

51 Gryanski, G. (2011) 'Putin: Libya Coalition has no Right to Kill Gaddafi', *Reuters*, 26 April, available: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-russia-putin-libya-idUSTRE73P4L920110426> [accessed 02 Mar 2013].

52 UN Security Council 6952nd Meeting on Situation in Mali (25 Apr 2013) UN S/PV.6952 p.1 para.13.

53 See generally Russia Today (2014) 'Putin: Crimea similar to Kosovo, West is rewriting its own rulebook', 18 March, available: <http://rt.com/news/putin-address-parliament-crimea-562/> [accessed 03 Apr 14].

54 Ibid.

55 Gryanski (2011) op cit.

such as the AU and ECOWAS were explicitly referred to in the resolutions authorising Chapter VII action in Mali,⁵⁶ and the forming of a UN mission (AFISMA)⁵⁷ was authorised to support the government in reasserting sovereignty over the North of the country. This mission was later replaced by the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which sought to establish a safe and secure environment in Mali.⁵⁸ In the Security Council meeting that adopted UNSCR 2100, the Russian representative supported the resolution in the vote, but warned that there was a slide towards over stretching peacekeeping mandates:

We are disturbed by the growing shift towards the military aspects of United Nations peacekeeping. What was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice, with unpredictable and unclear consequences for the security of United Nations personnel and their international legal status.⁵⁹

The ramifications of Libya and OUP have been felt by the population of Syria in particular, where a civil war has continued since 2011. The meeting of the UN Security Council on 19 July 2012 was presented with a draft resolution under Chapter VII which sought to impose Chapter VII sanctions on Syria. The resolution was rejected by the Russian and Chinese veto, with Russia citing objections to the text of the resolution. The speeches given at this meeting probably best demonstrate the low ebb of relations between Russia and China and the US, Germany and the UK.⁶⁰ On 22nd February 2014 the Security Council finally adopted a resolution on the situation in Syria condemning the humanitarian situation, having failed on three previous occasions, and called on all sides to the conflict to end the violence.⁶¹ It would appear however, when one looks at the situation currently, whatever has been done thus far, has failed spectacularly in stopping the violence or coming any closer to a negotiated settlement.

So what can be deduced from UNSCR 1973 and the UN sanctioned Chapter VII measures taken against Libya? Whilst some have argued that the intervention in Libya marks a brave new dawn for humanitarian intervention and R2P⁶² most have taken a more pragmatic approach and viewed the key circumstances as quite unique. As Aidan Hehir notes, Libya may be an aberration unlikely to be repeated.⁶³ The tackling of cases such as Libya on a case-by-case basis by the P5 using their national interests as their guide will no doubt continue. While many gallons of ink have been spilled in supporting R2P as a developing idea in International Law, it is in no way to the fore when the Security Council meets to discuss action. National interests and geopolitical considerations continue

⁵⁶ UN S/RES 2056, UN S/RES 2071 (2012); Al Arabiya (2011) 'French Army Begins Operations in Mali', 11 January, available: <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/11/259938.html> [accessed 3 Mar 2013]; BBC News (2013) 'MALI Profile', 29 January 2013, available: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881370> [accessed 24 February 2013]; What followed was further chaos and sanctions were shown to have little effect on groups in the North that had links to Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) amongst others. Kidnappings, violence against women and children and massive internal displacement of the civilian population forced further action by the Security Council and the passing of UNSCR 2085 under Chapter VII, importantly, by request of the Malian Government.

⁵⁷ African-led International Support Mission in Mali, UN S/RES 2085 (2012).

⁵⁸ UN S/RES 2100 (2013).

⁵⁹ UN Security Council 6952nd Meeting on Situation in Mali (25 Apr 2013) UN S/PV.6952.

⁶⁰ UN Security Council 6810th Meeting on Situation in the Middle East (19 July 2012) UN S/PV.6810; UN S/2012/77 (Vetoed Resolution); Al Jazeera, (2011) 'China and Russia Veto UN Sanctions on Syria', 05 October, available: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/10/2011104223132792190.html> [accessed 28 Feb 2013].

⁶¹ UN S/RES 2139 (2014).

⁶² Williams and Popken (2011) *op cit*, pp. 226, 249-50; Dalder and Stavridis (2012) *op cit*, p. 2.

⁶³ Hehir (2012) *op cit*, pp. 12-20.

to take priority and member states are reluctant to positively endorse a widening of the Security Council's powers by formally adopting R2P, particularly if it affects state sovereignty. The UN still holds the UN Charter above all other sources of International Law. As Chesterman states emphatically "there is, in short, minimal state practice and virtually no *opinio juris* that supports a general right of humanitarian intervention."⁶⁴ The use of force under Chapter VII is still justified using Art 39 of the UN Charter when a threat to international peace and security is declared. Such a declaration is made by the Security Council. As Hehir notes, the tragic inevitability of the international response to intra-state conflict persists post-Libya. Indeed the moral implications of this selective engagement in the internal conflicts of sovereign countries have only contributed to criticism of the major powers, the P5 and the UN system in general.⁶⁵

Clearly however, the pressure on members of the Security Council has increased. In the example of Libya, the calls from the Arab League and OIC proved particularly persuasive, and much of the language at the time seemed couched in R2P phraseology. It would not be unreasonable to state that the concept of R2P has become a persuasive doctrine, though admittedly not secured in treaty law, the most formal declaration in the UN being the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which can be at best persuasive, rather than binding.⁶⁶

Intervention is by no means ruined, but the Libyan intervention may perhaps represent a high water mark and hold UN member states to a higher standard in the future. What has not helped the advocates of R2P is the difficult transition that Libya has experienced since 2011. Whilst UNSCR 1973 and OUP succeeded in their aims of protecting civilian areas, Libya has had a difficult transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Justice and security institutions have struggled to gain legitimacy, armed groups still control large areas throughout the country and the situation in Benghazi and Eastern Libya threatens the oil export revenue lifeline for the Libyan economy. However, 2014 promises to be an important year with a constituent assembly and referendum expected, which will hopefully lead to free elections and a stable government. The EU, NATO, UNSMIL, the Arab League and OIC continue to play a vital role in encouraging democratic institutions and assisting Libyans in creating a modern democratic state.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Operation Unified Protector has undoubtedly had a huge effect on the Use of Force by the UN. It is, without doubt, an important step in the development of R2P and humanitarian intervention. However, it has not created a new legal precedent or developed an additional tool for the eradication of the kind of impunity that has allowed states to violate human rights norms and commit genocide. State sovereignty is still protected by the UN Charter and in the judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice. The Security Council has continued to use force based on a UN Charter written in the 1940s, where interstate conflict was the greatest fear of the member states.

⁶⁴ Chesterman (2001) *op cit*, p. 235.

⁶⁵ "The intervention in Libya is morally problematic because the NATO-led coalition has failed to act in response to similar situations in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen." - Pattison, J. (2011) 'The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya', *Ethics and International Affairs* 25(3), pp. 271, 276.

⁶⁶ UN 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (25 October 2005) UN DOC A/RES/60/1.

⁶⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (26 Feb 2014) UN DOC S/2014/131.

Having looked at the development of the situation in Libya prior to OUP, previous use of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council and how the coalition interpreted the UNSCR 1973 mandate, the importance of OUP, and in particular the degrees of force used by the coalition, will prove even more significant as the Security Council attempts to maintain international peace and security in the future. The disagreement between the P5 members of the council is indicative of a growing tension between non-interference in the affairs of sovereign countries and R2P.

Ghaddafi's statements on his TV station, *Al-Jamahiriyah*, his flagrant disregard for Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and International Law were key to his downfall. He was remarkably open and transparent in his abuse of his own citizens, and this led not only to condemnation from the major regional organisations, but crucially to calls for action by the Security Council. This regional support for action may provide the best explanation as to why Libya was the only state to experience such intervention during the various protests and conflicts that have occurred in the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011.

There needs to be a clear restatement of the principles of state sovereignty and non intervention in a state's affairs, in particular, where that state is actively engaged in the killing of civilians, human rights abuses and genocide. As the UN Charter approaches its 70th year, UN members recognise the need for reform. The rise of developing countries and so-called middle powers has increased pressure on the Security Council to act in a forceful manner where international human rights norms are violated. Tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO can only serve to weaken and divide the Security Council. As the 100 year anniversary of the start of World War I passes, it is worth remembering the great cost that war brought to all parts of the world from 1914 until 1945. To its credit the United Nations has managed, for the most part, to prevent major inter-state conflict on the scale seen in the first half of the 20th Century. Having said that, the Charter and the UN were never designed to tackle the complex multi-faceted internal conflicts that proliferate in the 21st Century. For many, the UN can be a soft target for criticism, but its positive impact on international relations cannot be denied. It was formed on the basis of consensus, and surely its future will be based on consensus too.

The Legal Erosion of Fighting Power – The Fog of Law

ABSTRACT

*The debate on the expanding application of human rights law on the modern battlefield, and accountability in matters of defence, continues apace after the recent UK Supreme Court decision in *Smith & Others v Ministry of Defence*. Critics of the decision claim that legal action is now being utilised as a means of paralysing the armed forces through legal process, and that the battlefield has become obscured by the fog of law. However, closer examination of the *Smith* decision reveals a large degree of scaremongering by its critics concerning the application of law in contemporary armed conflict. Tensions are clearly evident within the developing relationship between the boundaries of human rights law and the law of armed conflict and their impact on aspects of military decision making. Nonetheless, attempting to obscure such tensions as opposed to subjecting them closer examination is akin to limiting accountability beyond the battlefield and is clearly a retrograde step. As recent enquires such as *Baha Mousa* has taught us; the maintenance of standards of both justice and law in conflict requires litigation and inquiry. The application of the very laws that critics of the *Smith* decision seek to limit brings the clarity that the contemporary Commander requires.*

It is of paramount importance that the work that the armed forces do in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation if things should go wrong.¹

Lord Hope, former Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the UK

Introduction

The last twelve months have witnessed an increasing examination of the legal framework that applies to British armed forces personnel on overseas military operations. The focus of such examination has spread from alleged human rights violations to duty of care claims brought by the families of deceased British armed forces personnel for actions conducted on the battlefield. In May 2013 the High Court ordered hundreds of inquest-style public hearings to investigate the alleged unlawful killings and mistreatment of civilians by British forces in Iraq.² Accusations of mistreatment of civilians have lingered and the public hearings represent the latest development in over a decade of legal proceedings.³ Amid concerns about the growing number of civil cases being brought against the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Philip Hammond, the Secretary of State for Defence stated “the government is prepared to introduce new legislation to protect the

¹ *Smith and Others v The Ministry of Defence* [2013] UKSC 41, para 100.

² *R (on the application of Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin).

³ Munroe, D. (2013) “Mistreatment” under scrutiny, *New Law Journal*, 163 (7562).

army from the encroachment of civil litigation on the battlefield.”⁴ Hammond expanded that the armed forces could be exempted from human rights laws because their implementation is hampering operations. A recent report found that the MoD has faced 5,827 claims since 2012, with litigation costing the Ministry over £36m a year.⁵ There is concern that the growing influence of human rights law is eroding the balance between protecting individuals and serving military effectiveness and consequently hampering military operations.

The Supreme Court ruled in *Smith* in June 2013 that two British servicemen killed in Iraq were within the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) at the time of their deaths.⁶ The *Smith* decision overturned a previous ruling that members of the British armed forces deployed abroad were not within the UK’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR, and thus not protected by the Convention.⁷ The consequences of the decision have been criticised by Tugendhat and Croft who argue that “this level of ‘judicial mission creep’ is effectively creating the legal erosion of British fighting power.”⁸ In July 2013 the House of Commons Defence Committee, concerned by the potential impact of the *Smith* decision and the ever increasing march of human rights law announced that an inquiry would be conducted into the armed forces and the legal framework for future operations. The inquiry is to cover inter alia the legal protections and obligations applying to armed forces personnel when deployed; the effects of the developing concepts of ‘lawfare’ and ‘universal jurisdiction’ and what changes might be necessary to the current legal framework. In October 2013, the UK Policy Exchange think tank published a report which argued that “Britain’s armed forces are under threat from a sustained legal assault which could paralyse the effectiveness of the military.”⁹ The contention of the co-authors, both of whom have considerable operational and legal experience, is that “legal mission creep, namely the application of laws originally designed for domestic civilian cases to military operations overseas has changed the way the armed forces can act.”¹⁰ While a key aspect of their report is that the armed forces neither should be, nor are, above or exempt from the law they question whether it is appropriate for the civilian standards of human rights and duty of care to apply to the military during combat operations given the unique circumstances under which they operate.¹¹ While the Secretary of State for Defence welcomed the report, Martyn Day, a lawyer whose firm has represented some of the claimants against the Government, dismissed the publication as “an entirely biased report, which seems to have been written with the full cooperation of the MoD.”¹²

This paper seeks to analyse the background to the *Smith* decision to highlight the growing influence of international human rights law on the battlefield. The very nature of contemporary conflict means that it has become inevitable that human rights law will

4 Swinford, S. (2014) ‘Armed Forces could be given immunity from Human Rights Law’, *The Telegraph*, 17 March.

5 Ibid.

6 *Smith and Others v The Ministry of Defence* [2013] UKSC 41.

7 *R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2010] UKSC 29. Both cases involved parties called Smith who died in Iraq, however they are two distinct cases.

8 Tugendhat, T. and Croft, L. (2013) *The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power*, London: Policy Exchange, p. 15.

9 Ibid, p. 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Guardian (2013), ‘Military at Risk of Paralysis From Human Rights Cases, Think-Tank Argues’, *The Guardian*, 18 October.

continue to play an increasing role in addition to the law of armed conflict. The commander will be better served by having a closer understanding of the developing relationship between the boundaries of human rights law and the law of armed conflict rather than fearing their application to the military decision making process.

The Covenant between State and Serviceperson

The impact of law on the battlefield is nothing new: “for over 200 years wars have been governed by the laws of war and national legislation.”¹³ Professor Forster expands by pointing to an international and domestic legal framework which governs the armed forces. This he claims is built on five interconnected principles that create the unique relationship between the state and the armed forces.¹⁴ Firstly, the government set out the ‘bargain’ between the armed forces and the state; decisions about the legality of going to war were never previously contested. Secondly, the unique circumstances or covenant in which armed forces personnel found themselves through being tasked by the state to take lives and risk their own required special legal treatment – principles such as combat and Crown immunity. Combat immunity stemmed from a common law doctrine that sought to exclude civil liability for negligence and deliberate damage to property or person committed by the armed forces during combat operations. The concept was endorsed in *Mulcahy v MoD* which established that there was no duty on the defendants in battle conditions to maintain a safe system of work.¹⁵ The third principle is the presumption that “citizens voluntarily joining the armed forces accepted some restrictions on their human rights.”¹⁶ His fourth principle was that there was an acceptance by both the armed forces and the Government that “the distinct obligations and responsibilities of the armed forces necessitated an essentially separate military judicial system.”¹⁷ Lastly Forster argues that “there was tacit acquiescence from families and supporters that they had no [...] ability to challenge the decisions of the MoD.”¹⁸

What is of primary concern for Forster with the *Smith* decision is the application of laws originally designed for domestic civilian cases to military operations overseas. Lord Mance’s dissenting judgement in *Smith* stated “the approach taken...will in my view make extensive litigation almost inevitable after, as well as quite possibly during and even before, any active service operations undertaken by the British Army. It is likely to lead to the judicialisation of war.”¹⁹ Forster maintains that there has already been a process of ‘juridification’ of the British armed forces. The creeping legal interest is partially a result of the repeal in 1987 of Crown Immunity which allowed Service personnel to pursue actions in tort against the Crown. The impact of such legislation and subsequent judicial findings has resulted in the extension of the domestic law of negligence to combat operations where heretofore civilian norms of duty of care were not considered applicable. For Tugendhat and Croft “the main weapon used in the legal challenge against the MoD in the UK is the ECHR.”²⁰ Forster explains that a particular consequence of the effect of the ECHR is that the Courts have become the principal arena for the determination of key

¹³ Forster, A. (2012) ‘British Judicial Engagement and the Juridification of the Armed Forces’, *International Affairs*, 88 (2), p. 283.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 284.

¹⁵ *Mulcahy v The Ministry of Defence* [1996] QB 732.

¹⁶ Forster (2012) *op cit*, p. 285.

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ *Smith and Others v The Ministry of Defence* [2013] UKSC 41, para 150.

²⁰ Tugendhat and Croft (2013) *op cit*, p. 17.

aspects of the conduct of war through judgments about the extent of the obligations of the state extraterritorially under the ECHR.²¹ Forster points to a number of political and social changes that have contributed to the reshaping of the traditional relationship between the state and the armed forces. He cites the change in social attitude being based on the perception that recent military deployments have been “wars of choice rather than wars of national survival.”²² Forster expands how families and service personnel have increasingly sought to use the legal process to hold the government to account in domestic courts for the conduct of war. He believes that this is now manifest in how inquests into the deaths of service personnel overseas have become “an arena in which families could contest the cause of death of loved ones, using the powers of the Coroners’ Courts to demand the MoD release information to families on the circumstances and cause of death.”²³ Forster also identifies that British governments are now more willing to review previous governments’ use of military force (citing the Saville Inquiry and also the Chilcot Inquiry into the UK’s involvement in Iraq).²⁴ In conclusion, Forster views the outcome as a shift from a system of self-regulation and hierarchy to a rights-based system, and argues that rights-based systems are “inherently unstable, because it is almost impossible to bring all the rights possessed by the all parties involved into alignment.”²⁵

The pattern of recent legal challenges to the British armed forces can be broadly divided into two categories: the armed forces’ treatment of civilians and the armed forces’ treatment of their own personnel. There have been a number of judgments concerning the application of the ECHR to foreign nationals who have been killed or detained by British service personnel deployed on operations outside the UK. Article 1 of the ECHR requires parties to the Convention to secure within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms as defined and set out in the ECHR. Therefore the extent of parties’ jurisdiction and the extent to which the ECHR applies extraterritorially are very important legal questions. The Policy Exchange Report argues that the original understanding of extraterritorial application was set out in *Bankovic* when the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that “only in exceptional circumstances would acts performed outside a state’s own territory constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1.”²⁶ This is to ignore earlier decisions of the ECtHR which dealt with the extraterritorial issue and which negate the argument that the application of the ECHR to military operations is novel and represents legal mission creep.²⁷

Moreover, more recent cases have further refined this area of law. The families of six Iraqi civilians who died in Basra in 2003 brought legal action against the MoD in *Al Skeini* claiming that the British authorities had failed to conduct adequate investigations into the deaths of their relatives.²⁸ Of the six dead Iraqis, four had been shot by British troops on patrol; the fifth was a bystander killed in the course of an exchange of fire between British troops and Iraqi gunmen; and the sixth, Baha Mousa, died in custody at a UK military base. The then Secretary of State for Defence denied any liability and hence did

21 Forster (2012) op cit, p. 288.

22 Ibid, p. 292.

23 Ibid, p. 293.

24 Ibid, pp. 289–90.

25 Ibid, p. 299.

26 *Bankovic v Belgium* [2001] 11 BHRC 435, Para 67.

27 *Cyprus v Turkey* [1978] Appl No 8077/77 & *Loizidou v Turkey* [1989] Appl No 153118/89.

28 *R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2004] All ER (D) 197 (Dec).

not order an independent inquiry into the deaths. An appeal for judicial review led the High Court to firstly decide whether Article 1 of the ECHR applied and then whether the Secretary of State had failed in his procedural duty under the Convention to investigate possible breaches by British troops of Article 2 (the right to life) and, in the case of Baha Mousa, Article 3 (the prohibition of torture) of the ECHR. The High Court ruled that Iraq was not within the regional sphere of the ECHR and the lack of jurisdiction accordingly precluded the complaints of the first five claimants. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2005 and the House of Lords in 2007.²⁹ However, the High Court ruled that the death of Baha Mousa while in the custody of British forces in Iraq did come within the scope of the ECHR. Accordingly there had been a breach of the obligation arising under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to carry out a proper investigation.³⁰ The Law Lords unanimously held that the obligation to secure the Convention rights would arise only where a contracting state had such effective control over an area as to enable it to provide the full package of rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 1 of the Convention. They ruled that the British presence in Iraq at that time fell far short of such control due to the ongoing insurgency. On appeal, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR disagreed. Noting that one of the exceptional circumstances in which the ECHR would apply extraterritorially was when a state bound by the ECHR exercised public powers on the territory of another state, the Grand Chamber ruled that the UK “assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government in particular responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq.”³¹ By extension, it followed that the UK exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations and that there was therefore a jurisdictional nexus between the UK and the Iraqis who had been killed. The ECtHR also held that the UK had failed to carry out an adequate investigation under Article 2 into the deaths of five of the Iraqis.

Further legal claims followed regarding the format that inquiries into deaths and allegations of abuse should take in order to comply with the requirements of the ECHR. In response the UK Government established an Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) in 2010 to investigate allegations of abuse of Iraq citizens by British service personnel. The reporting chain within IHAT included members of the Royal Military Police (RMP) and this led to complaints of institutional bias. In November 2011 the Court of Appeal ruled that “the practical independence of IHAT [was], at least as a matter of reasonable perception, substantially compromised”, because the RMP had been involved in detentions in Iraq.³² The High Court decided that in relation to cases where deaths had occurred, IHAT was “not sufficient to meet the requirements under Article 2 of the ECHR for investigating the circumstances of those deaths.”³³ To deal with the shortcoming the Court ruled that inquest-style inquiries should be conducted into each of the deaths. The Court also recommended the possibility of using the same methodology for the more serious cases of alleged abuse. This has resulted in an estimated number of almost 160 deaths to be investigated and almost 800 cases involving allegations of mistreatment.

29 *R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2005] EWCA Civ 1609 and [2007] UKHL 26.

30 *R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), para. 344.

31 *Al Skeini and others v United Kingdom* [2011] ECHR 55721/07, para 131.

32 *R (on the application of Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2011] EWCA Civ 1334, para 38.

33 *R (on the application of Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence* (No 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin), para 109.

To date the *Baha Mousa* inquiry has cost an estimated £25 million with an estimated cost of £17 million for the ongoing *Al Sweady* inquiry.³⁴ Tugendhat and Croft point out the anomaly that the ECtHR decision creates, whereby “an Iraqi citizen in Iraq can be guaranteed certain rights when detained by British forces, such as the Right to Life though after release or in the custody of other authorities, no such rights would be guaranteed.”³⁵ However there is no escaping the argument that the estimated £25m spent on the *Baha Mousa* inquiry could have easily been avoided if the soldiers present had been trained in and observed the ban on the five interrogation techniques actually prohibited by the UK government as far back as 1972. To my mind there is no clearer example of the need for observance of human rights law by the military than *Baha Mousa*’s case which involved a civilian being beaten to death during an interrogation and the ensuing discredit and mistrust attached to the military.

Tugendhat and Croft describe detention as a tool for the armed forces which may sometimes be their ‘least bad choice’ in order to protect themselves, their allies, or the local population. They state that detention is already well regulated in international humanitarian law and that human rights law is not applicable. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the lower courts in *Al Jedda* that the UK was authorised by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) to exercise powers of detention “where it was necessary for imperative reasons of security in Iraq.”³⁶ *Al-Jedda* had been arrested on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist group and detained in a British detention centre in Basra. He took an action to challenge his indefinite detention without trial. The House of Lords ruled that the obligations contained in the UNSCRs prevailed over the obligations imposed by Article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty and security). This ruling was because of the wording of Article 103 of the UN Charter which provides that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement that their obligations under the Charter shall prevail. On appeal to the ECtHR the Grand Chamber found unanimously that *Al-Jedda* fell within the UK’s jurisdiction, and by sixteen votes to one that the UK had violated his rights under Article 5(1) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber’s decision was that while the UNSCR authorised the UK to detain prisoners, but did not oblige it to do so, Article 103 of the UN Charter was not engaged as per the finding of the House of Lords.³⁷ Milanovic welcomed the ECtHR’s ruling in *Al-Jedda* as “an incredibly important development.”³⁸ The ECtHR’s expectation that the Security Council should use clear and explicit language if it intended states to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations under international human rights law would, according to Milanovic, go a long way in providing a meaningful human rights check on the Security Council. Tugendhat and Croft argue that the ECtHR judgment in *Al-Jedda*, which gives detainees rights under the ECHR, has significant implications for the drafting of future UNSCRs, the conduct of future detention operations and also for compensation claims against the UK. They explain that the MoD is currently dealing with 375 claims of abuse by Iraqi nationals, many of which are for compensation for unlawful detention. In such cases,

34 *R (on the application of Al Sweady & Others) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2009] EWHC 2387.

35 Tugendhat and Croft (2013) op cit, p. 15.

36 *R (on the Application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence* [2007] UKHL 58.

37 *Al-Jedda v United Kingdom* [2011] ECHR 27021/08.

38 Milanovic, M. (2011) ‘European Court Decides *Al Skeini* and *Al Jedda*’, *EJIL: Talk!* (blog of the European Journal of International Law), 7 July 2011.

compensation has ranged from £1,500 to £115,000. The argument is made that the uncertainty created for other state parties to the ECHR means that in future, detention, which can be critical to operational success, may be discounted as an option.³⁹

Recent case law has also focussed on the extent to which ECHR rights apply to British service personnel deployed outside the UK. The Supreme Court ruled on three cases relating to the deaths and serious injuries of British soldiers in June 2013.⁴⁰ The first case (the 'Challenger claims') arose from a friendly fire incident, in which one soldier was killed and two were injured. The claimants alleged that the MoD had failed to properly equip the Challenger tanks involved with battlefield awareness systems and had failed to give soldiers adequate tank-recognition training. The second case (the 'Snatch Land Rover claims') arose from the deaths of two soldiers who were killed by the detonation of improvised explosive devices (IED) level with the 'Snatch' Land Rovers in which they were travelling. Relatives of the two men claimed that the MoD breached the implied positive obligation in Article 2 of the ECHR. This alleged breach was a failure to take preventive measures to protect life in light of the real and immediate risk to the life of soldiers required to patrol an area with a significant IED threat in such relatively lightly armoured vehicles. The third case (the 'Ellis negligence claim') claimed negligence in the MoD's military equipment procurement policy. The MoD argued that the 'Snatch' Land Rover claims should be struck out because at the time of their deaths, the two servicemen were not within the jurisdiction of the UK for the purposes of the ECHR. Accordingly they were not owed a duty at the time of their deaths under Article 2 (the right to life). The MoD argued that the 'Challenger claims' and the 'Ellis' negligence claim should both be struck out on the principle of combat immunity. The Supreme Court issued one judgment covering the three sets of claims, which for convenience are referred to as the judgment in *Smith*. In the 'Snatch' Land Rover case the Supreme Court following the reasoning of the ECtHR in *Al Skeini* held unanimously that the two soldiers were within the UK's jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR at the time of their deaths. The Court considered the question of whether, and to what extent, Article 2 (the right to life) of the ECHR imposes positive obligations on a government to prevent the deaths of its own soldiers in active operations against the enemy. The majority view was that "the court must avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which are unrealistic and disproportionate."⁴¹ However, in some circumstances the Court held that it would be reasonable to expect the individual to be afforded the protection of Article 2. Permission was given for the 'Snatch' Land Rover Article 2 claim to be brought to trial. However Lord Hope (with whom the majority agreed) cautioned that it was "far from clear that the claimants would be able to show the UK had breached its obligation under Article 2 to take preventative operational measures."⁴² The majority view of the Supreme Court with regard to the 'Challenger' and 'Ellis' negligence claims was that the doctrine of combat immunity should be construed narrowly and should not be extended beyond its established scope to the planning of and preparation for active operations against

39 Tugendhat and Croft (2013) op cit, p. 43.

40 *Smith and others (Appellants) v The Ministry of Defence (Respondent), Ellis (Respondent) v The Ministry of Defence (Appellant) and Allbutt and others (Respondents) v The Ministry of Defence (Appellant)*, [2013] UKSC 41.

41 [2013] UKSC 41, para 76.

42 Ibid, para 81.

the enemy. The majority held that these claims should not be struck out on the ground of combat immunity and these claims will also proceed to trial.

Lord Hope reflected on the need for the courts to balance the individual rights of members of the armed forces with the public interest of the continued effective operation of the military: "The sad fact is that, while members of the armed forces on active service can be given some measure of protection against death and injury, the nature of the job they do means that this can never be complete [...] the law will always attach importance to the protection of life and physical safety. But it is of paramount importance that the work that the armed services do in the national interest should not be impeded by having to prepare for or conduct active operations against the enemy under the threat of litigation if things should go wrong."⁴³ Robert Weir QC, who represented the 'Snatch' Land Rover claimants, welcomed the decision that soldiers could rely on the ECHR wherever they were. This rectified the previous anomalous distinction "that a soldier lost his Convention rights the moment he stepped off a military base," and the logical inconsistency after *A/Skeini* that "a soldier could bring a civilian within the jurisdiction of the UK without himself falling within the jurisdiction."⁴⁴ The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) also welcomed the decision: "the ruling provided a reasonable balance between the operational needs of our armed forces and the rights of those serving in our armed forces to be protected in the same way as we expect them to protect the rights of civilians abroad."⁴⁵ In their disagreement with the ruling, Tugendhat and Croft describe *Smith* as "the apogee of judicial encroachment extending a civilian understanding of duty of care and rights guaranteed by the ECHR to servicemen and women in combat."⁴⁶ Aurel Sari rejects their approach that the application of civilian laws to the military is inappropriate and should be restricted. Whereas Tugendhat and Croft argue in favour of applying international humanitarian law and not human rights law to military operations, in Sari's view "it is a mistake to assume that international humanitarian law is always better suited as a regulatory framework for deployed operations because it may not be applicable in post-conflict environments or non-international armed conflict."⁴⁷ Sari cautions against the seemingly innate fear that militaries appear to have towards human rights law and explains that nothing about the nature of international human rights law makes it inherently unsuitable for the military. Sari reminds the reader that ironically many overseas deployments of the armed forces are motivated and publicly justified in the name of humanity and upholding the rule of law. It is also telling that breaches of human rights law have been dealt with more expeditiously than those under international humanitarian law doctrine of command responsibility.

Conclusion

Tugendhat and Croft's contention that litigation now represents the continuation of war by other means is tantamount to scaremongering. Their assertion that international humanitarian law and international human rights law are two neatly distinct legal regimes

⁴³ Ibid, para 150.

⁴⁴ Weir, R. (2013) 'In Combat', *New Law Journal*, 163 (7567).

⁴⁵ EHRC (2013), 'Commission Welcomes Supreme Court Ruling on Armed Forces and Human Rights Protection', *EHRC Press Release*, 19 June 2013.

⁴⁶ Tugendhat and Croft (2013) op cit, p. 28.

⁴⁷ Sari, A. (2013) 'Better Get a Lawyer: Are Legal Constraints Defeating Britain's Armed Forces on the Battlefield?', *EJIL: Talk!*, 25 October 2013.

is misplaced as is their contention that the former is *lex specialis* that displaces the latter in time of armed conflict. The devil really is in the detail in these matters and they have neatly ignored the International Court of Justice ruling that “the protection offered by human rights law conventions does not cease in time of armed conflict.”⁴⁸ Human rights law and international humanitarian law complement each other. For instance, human rights law provides guidance on detention in non-international armed conflict where international humanitarian law treaties fail to do so. It is readily apparent that the prospect of any retreat from the recent impact of international human rights law on the laws of armed conflict is highly unlikely. The concept of the extra territoriality of human rights law is now well enshrined by the ECtHR and there is little to be gained by seeking to deny its existence and claim it is obscured in the smokescreen that is the fog of law. When faced by obscurity of any type the solution is to pierce the veil that masks the desired clarity. If this new found clarity imposed by the onward march of human rights law means that Commanders will ensure their troops are trained to prevent similar actions that led to the death of Baha Mousa then such a march should be applauded. To try to exempt the military from human rights law as proposed by Tugendhat and Croft does the military no credit and undermines the ethical values enshrined in armed forces. Seeking to derogate from law that can protect both the civilian and the serviceperson is not a reasoned defence. Rather, it might be wiser to consider that the recent Court rulings have sought to provide a reasonable balance between the military necessity of armed forces and the rights of servicepersons to be protected in the same way as they are expected to protect the rights of civilians in conflict. The *Smith* hearings and the effect of the Courts’ findings on military operations will be observed with great interest by militaries on both sides of the Irish Sea. While this area of law continues to evolve it will be more prudent to seek to understand and implement rather than to irrationally fear it.

⁴⁸ Advisory Opinion on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004), *ICJ Rep* 136, Paras 107-113.

Friends From Afar? China's Growing Role as a Multilateral Security Actor

ABSTRACT

As the world's second largest economy, and aiming to double its 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 2030, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an economic power is well recognised. This growing prominence in global trade and financial affairs has, by necessity, increased China's stake in a stable international security environment. Indeed, despite only joining the United Nations (UN) in 1971, and providing troops to a UN mission for the first time in 2004, China is today the largest contributor of military personnel to peacekeeping operations (PKOs) from among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations, both under the flag of the UN and through other mechanisms, on land and by sea, highlights China's growing commitment to international stability. This paper examines the factors driving China's international security engagement, and how the PRC has transitioned from a nation that was once suspicious of the UN, to its current position as a leading provider of security and stability. It also considers how the nation's involvement in the maintenance of global stability is likely to develop in the future, and whether the horizons of China's security efforts will expand as its international interests increase.

有朋自远方来，不亦乐乎？

To have friends come from afar is happiness, is it not?¹

-Confucius

Introduction

For over 25 years, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and by extension its international security policy, has been defined by touchstone concepts that aim to establish Chinese goals in the international realm as being fundamentally different from other actors such as the United States and the European Union. The experience of the 'century of humiliation', from 1842 to 1949, when China had to battle against the predations of foreign colonial powers, has led China to claim to eschew the pursuit of hegemony, either regionally or globally. This has directly fed into the policy of 'non-interference', whereby China has undertaken not to meddle in the internal affairs of other states. Finally the concept of China's 'peaceful development' (和平发展, *heping fazhan*), whereby China will develop as a leading power without resorting to the use of force, has been used to try to assuage those who fear that China's growing economic clout might be backed up by proportionate military power.

¹ Confucius. *The Analects*, Chapter 1, Verse 1.

However, how realistic is it for a state to expect to rise to a leading position in the international community without an accompanying increase in security responsibilities? China has significantly increased its defence spending over the last three decades, and in 2011 spent an estimated US\$143 billion on defence, second only to the United States. China's defence budget has increased by 170% in real terms since 2002.² China is now facing a security paradox: although some voices have expressed concern over China's growing military capabilities, others have accused the nation of being a "security freeloader."³ Pressures, both internal and external, are growing on the nation's leadership to increase China's visibility as a global security actor, particularly in the realm of multi-lateral peacekeeping operations (PKOs). For the most part, China's greater involvement in global security issues has taken place on land under the flag of the United Nations (UN); however, China has also played a greater role in cooperating with the EU and NATO in a number of naval missions. At the same time, China is increasing its capability to protect and rescue its own citizens while they are abroad. This paper will examine China's experience to date of multilateral security missions, the factors driving China's increasing engagement as a global security actor, and consider the likely directions such involvement will take in future. Has China been successful in portraying itself as a "friend from afar" for those struggling to find security?

China and UN Peacekeeping - the Historical Context

It is important to remember that the relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the UN only began in 1971, when the PRC took over the Chinese seat at the UN (and consequently the UN Security Council) at the expense of Taiwan (which styled itself the Republic of China). Prior to this, relations between the Beijing government and the UN had been difficult, with Chinese 'volunteers' clashing with UN forces during the Korean War. In 1965, then Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, declared that "China need not take part in (the) United Nations," claiming the organisation was merely a front for diplomatic deal-making between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴

Even after joining the UN, China remained opposed to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and refused to contribute financially to these missions. In part, this was due to China's traditional opposition to intervention, and in part due to a sense of solidarity with what was then termed "the Third World", given that China felt such nations were subject to PKOs that were politically-targeted by the competing superpowers.⁵ Indeed, China's mixed feelings towards the UN at this time saw the country abstain or simply not participate in most of the Security Council votes during this period, with the primary exceptions being those referring to Taiwan.⁶

Under a Blue Flag

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping to the position of "paramount leader" (党和国家最高领导人, Dǎng hé guójiā zuìgāo lǐngdǎorén) from 1978, China underwent an expansion in its foreign policy horizons, voting in favour of the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Cyprus in 1981. This was followed by

² Guardian (2012) 'Military spending: how much does the military cost each country, listed', *The Guardian*, 17 April.

³ Ford, P. (2014) 'China ups military spend by 12 percent. Are the gloves coming off?', *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 March.

⁴ Peking Review no.3 (1965) pp. 11-12.

⁵ Zhongying, P. (2005) 'China's changing attitude to UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (1), p. 88.

⁶ International Crisis Group (2009) 'China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping', *Asia Report* No. 166, 17 April, p. 4.

China contributing to UN peacekeeping expenses from 1982, and the deployment of a fact-finding mission to study PKOs in the Middle East.⁷

November 1988 saw China assume membership of the UN General Assembly's Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations.⁸ This was followed in 1989 by China's first participation in a civilian UN mission with the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group; and in 1990 by the dispatch of military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East.⁹

China's participation in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was a watershed moment in the development of the nation's role in peacekeeping, with Chinese police officers, carrying light arms, deployed as part of the executive police mission. This was followed up by further police missions from 2001 to 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Haiti. With a large number of well-trained police officers, China is in a unique position to deploy in support of these missions, and has developed a niche role for the large-scale support of police missions.¹⁰

From 2004, China began deploying members of the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army (中国人民解放军, Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn, PLA) in an operational capacity. Initially, these deployments were limited to non-combat troops such as military observers, medical personnel and engineers. Significantly, although providing non-combat troops constricted the scope of China's involvement with UN missions, it also allowed China to address key capability gaps in such missions in a manner that not all contributing countries could.

However, a shift in this policy of deploying unarmed troops was signalled in 2012, when the PLA dispatched fifty infantry personnel to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). On that occasion, the armed PLA elements were tasked with providing force protection to only the Chinese troops in theatre. This was followed by the deployment in late 2013 of the Chinese component of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and by the end of January 2014 the PLA had nearly 400 troops deployed to Mali.¹¹ Crucially, this mission included infantry units, reportedly two platoons, deployed to provide support and protection to the overall mission, and not only to the Chinese elements.

China has provided around 20,000 troops for UN duty over the years, more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.¹² As we have seen, there has been a ramping up of China's involvement in land-based multilateral peacekeeping missions under the UN flag, from initially refusing to actively participate, to providing specialist non-combat troops, followed by providing combat troops to protect China's own forces, and finally resulting in the provision of PLA infantry as an integral part of a UN mission. China is now deliberately expanding its involvement with UN missions and in 2013

⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

⁸ Xinhua (2003) 'China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions', *Xinhua*, 2 April.

⁹ International Crisis Group (2009) op cit, p. 5.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 6.

¹¹ Xinhua (2014) 'First Chinese peacekeeping force to Mali deployed in place', *Xinhua*, 27 January.

¹² Murray, C. (2013) 'China to Deploy "Security Force" to UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mali', *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder*, 9 July, p. 2.

China had 1,650 soldiers deployed on PKOs.¹³ During this period, Chinese troops have served alongside their Irish counterparts on a number of missions, including the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Chinese participation in MINUSMA has also overlapped with Irish participation in the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali.

China as a Security Provider - The Naval Dimension

China's growing commitment to international stability is not only limited to land operations however. China's navy, the People's Liberation Army Navy (中国人民解放军海军, Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Hǎijūn, PLAN) has also contributed ships to anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, operating alongside the EU's Operation ATALANTA and NATO's Operation OCEAN SHIELD, most recently under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 2125 (2013).¹⁴ These deployments represent the first time that the Chinese navy was deployed on operations beyond China's immediate strategic environs, and was testament to the PLAN's increasing operational capabilities, particularly in relation to logistics and resupply. Since its first deployment in 2008, China has dispatched 16 patrols to the Gulf of Aden, and from 2012, piracy off the coast of Somalia has been in steady decline.¹⁵

More recently, China has provided escort vessels for the ongoing operation to remove and dispose of the chemical weapons stockpiled by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, operating in close cooperation with the navies of the United States, Russia and a wide range of European nations. Given the Chinese navy's existing presence in the relatively nearby Gulf of Aden, as well as the experience it gained while operating escort missions for container traffic in that region, China was in a position to support the mission - an important first for the nation's military.¹⁶

China's commitment to such missions highlights the nation's increasing recognition that the provision of naval security extends beyond issues of national defence, and regularly requires the cooperation of multiple states in order to achieve a common goal. Even in China's immediate, and sometimes tense, strategic environs, the appeal of multilateral approaches to naval security questions is becoming clearer. The most notable example of this is China's contribution to security along the Mekong River system, where it has established a system of coordinated river patrols with Laos, Thailand and Burma, which escort commercial traffic to ward off the threat posed by criminal elements in the border area.¹⁷

Why Does China Contribute?

The benefits to China of contributing to international peacekeeping are diverse, but it is important to note that China's involvement in multi-lateral peacekeeping enhances the nation's soft power capability, while simultaneously bolstering its capabilities in the realm of hard power. China's contribution to such missions also provides political benefits at home, while reaping diplomatic rewards abroad. It is these factors that provide the impetus for China's increasingly firm commitment to such missions.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2125 (2013) Security Council 7061st Meeting (AM), 18 November, available: <https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11177.doc.htm> [accessed 23 April 2014].

¹⁵ Erickson, A.S. and Strange, A.M. (2013) 'Piracy's Next Frontier: A Role for China in Gulf of Guinea Security?' *The National Interest*, 10 December.

¹⁶ Tiezzi, S. (2013) 'Chinese Navy's Role in Syrian Chemical Weapon Disposal', *The Diplomat*, December.

¹⁷ Storey, I. (2012) 'Mekong River Patrols in Full Swing but Challenges Remain', *China Brief*, XXII (4), 21 February.

Highlighting the Benefits of a Rising China

Primarily, China's involvement with multilateral security operations is a concrete step designed to signify to other states that China is a responsible actor that accords with international law. China can uniquely portray itself as a major power with no historical baggage in Africa and the Middle East, capable of playing the role of neutral peacekeeper in a wide variety of disputes.

This image offers China the opportunity to simultaneously create goodwill among those nations in need of stability support - often in regions which are strategically important to China. At the same time, it helps address those international critics who claim that China is a security 'freeloader', while also underlining to those states who view China's increasing military capabilities in a negative light that, in fact, these assets can be used in a manner that is broadly accepted as positive. Lastly, all of these goals are achieved without China violating its own policy of 'non-interference'. Given that the UN missions in which China participates are deployed at the invitation of a sovereign state, Chinese involvement does not constitute 'interference' in that state's internal affairs.

As an example, it is notable that over the nearly six years that the PLAN has been operating in the Gulf of Aden, it has used the opportunity of this western deployment for its vessels to visit over thirty ports throughout Africa, the Middle East and Europe. These visits had no operational purpose, but were merely courtesy calls designed to highlight China's role as a responsible security actor and to highlight to partners in these regions the important part China is playing in the fight against piracy.¹⁸ This is a concrete example of China reaping soft-power benefits from its involvement in a multilateral security operation.

Promoting Multilateral Approaches

The end of the Cold War presented China with what it perceived as an unpalatable global picture, with the United States as the sole superpower, and with all the indications that a unipolar global political order was likely to develop. This was reinforced by NATO's bombing campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1999. As a bulwark against this trend, China has sought to encourage multilateral approaches to security questions, and the development of a multipolar world. This goal has been reflected in the steady refinement of Chinese foreign policy over the course of the 1990's and the first decade of the 21st Century. Starting with the New Security Concept, released in 1998, China has stressed the importance of international cooperation in achieving security goals.¹⁹ This policy was later developed and subsumed into the key Chinese foreign policy concept of China's 'peaceful rise' (和平崛起, héping juéqǐ).²⁰ From 2005 this concept was further refined as the policy of 'peaceful development' (和平发展, héping fazhan).²¹

These developments have resulted in the stated aim of China's foreign policy being to encourage the development of an international environment that is both accepting of China's development as a major international actor and, at least beyond China's immediate

18 Erickson, A. and Strange, A. (2013) 'No Substitute for Experience – Chinese Antipiracy Missions in the Gulf of Aden', *China Maritime Studies*, Number 10, November.

19 Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations (2002) *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, 6 August.

20 International Crisis Group (2009) op cit, p. 11.

21 Office of the State Council (2005) White Paper, 'China's Peaceful Development Road', *Information*, 22 December.

environs, where the primary powers in such a system eschew unilateral uses of force. During a press conference in March 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, noted:

In particular, we will advance and protect the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and make the international order more just and reasonable. We will take an active part in international and regional affairs, put forward more Chinese proposals and play a bigger role in helping to resolve all kinds of global challenges and regional hotspot issues.²²

Multilateral PKOs not only provide an acceptable face to China's growing global profile, but also strengthen the role of multilateral organisations in finding solutions to global challenges, while reducing the likelihood of any one power taking a unilateral stance on a given issue. They thus provide an ideal route for China to pursue one of its primary foreign policy goals.

Improving Operational Capacities

Beyond the positive soft-power effects, Chinese involvement in multilateral peacekeeping missions brings with it a number of operational benefits for the PLA. China's military has not engaged in large-scale external operations since the 1979 border war with Vietnam, apart from sporadic maritime conflicts with the same opponent in the 1980's. Consequently, there are real concerns among senior ranks of the PLA as to how quickly the Chinese military could adapt to sustained overseas operations. Similarly, tactics and equipment that work in training in China have not yet been tested in operational conditions. Multilateral operations offer the opportunity for both the PLA and the PLAN to test their operational capacity, procedures and assets under real-life conditions. And while a UN mission or anti-piracy patrol may not offer the same combat risks as open conflict, the logistical challenges, operating so far from China, can on occasion be greater. As such, the PLA has recognised that these multilateral missions provide rare opportunities for Chinese forces to practise long-range deployments.²³

Protection of Chinese Citizens Abroad

It is notable that, apart from multilateral missions, the other occasions that have seen the PLA deployed into foreign theatres have involved the rescue or recovery of Chinese citizens abroad. In 2011, China deployed the guided missile frigate Xuzhou and four airlift aircraft to help evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya as the civil war in that country increased in tempo. More recently, we can see China's considerable contribution to the search for Malaysian Airlines flight MH370, which comprised naval vessels, aircraft and satellites. Even China's cooperation in security provision along the Mekong river was spurred by the murder of thirteen Chinese sailors by hijackers.²⁴

These incidents are concrete proof of the growing importance attached by China to protecting and supporting its citizens abroad, a priority that has been stressed by both Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Speaking at a press conference

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2014) 'Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press', 8 March, available: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1135385.shtml> [accessed 01 April 2014].

²³ Murray (2013) *op cit.* p. 3.

²⁴ Storey (2012) *op cit.*

in March 2014, Foreign Minister Wang announced that China would be strengthening its services to Chinese citizens abroad, particularly in relation to emergency response.²⁵ Similarly, while presenting his work report to the National People's Congress in March 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stated that China would "fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and business overseas."²⁶ Both of these statements reflect the growing expectation among Chinese citizens that their government will protect them and their interests in foreign countries.

To further this goal, China needs the operational capacity and experience to mount rescue, salvage, evacuation, and police missions. Again, the logistical and command experience required for such operations can be acquired on multilateral peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, as more Chinese citizens travel abroad to work, and as Chinese companies increase their global trade footprint, China itself has an increased stake in global stability. Where once China contained the bulk of its security activity to its immediate neighbourhood, there is now a pressing need for the nation to take a keener interest in the global security situation. This is particularly the case in Africa, where China has developed considerable commercial interests, and where there are an estimated one million Chinese citizens.²⁷ Given this fact, it is unsurprising that China is eager to take part in PKOs that help to stabilise the region.

How is China's Role as an International Security Actor Likely to Develop?

China is likely to seek to continue to strengthen multilateral approaches to crisis resolution and to peacekeeping operations, and may continue to deepen its involvement with PKOs. This may see an increase in the number of combat troops supplied for UN missions, further cementing the expansion of China's focus from traditional niche capabilities, such as engineering and medical units, towards the provision of more general units that will provide the backbone of future UN missions. Given China's desire to enshrine the multilateral agenda at the heart of global crisis response, and to discourage global unilateral action by major powers, there are clear foreign policy benefits for China in continuing to pursue this path.

In this context China might build on its existing experience of multilateral missions, perhaps deploying on a greater scale or at greater distances than it currently does. As an example, there is a growing international recognition that piracy is becoming an increasing problem in the Gulf of Guinea, on the west coast of Africa. With 58 attacks reported in the region in 2012, piracy has been on the rise in these waters, just as it appears that the problem has been brought under control in the Gulf of Aden.²⁸ As early as October 2011, the UN was calling for states in the region to develop a framework for actively combating the threat posed by piracy.²⁹

²⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2014) op cit.

²⁶ Chunshan, M. (2014) '5 Foreign Policy Takeaways From Li Keqiang's Work Report', *The Diplomat*, 10 March.

²⁷ Economist (2013) 'More than minerals', *The Economist*, 23 March, available: <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdone-more> [accessed 23rd of April 2014].

²⁸ International Chamber of Commerce (2013) 'Piracy falls in 2012, but seas off East and West Africa remain dangerous, says IMB', 16 January, available: <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb> [accessed 23 April 2014].

²⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2018 (2011).

Chinese involvement in the region would hinge on a number of developments, most importantly a formalized legal framework for the involvement of external actors, most likely through the instrument of a UN Security Council Resolution. Should Chinese material interests, which are still growing in the region, be directly threatened, this would also act as an impetus for Chinese involvement. Notably however, in October 2011 Wang Min, China's then-Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, called on the international community to assist states in the region to tackle piracy.³⁰ In August 2013, a PLAN officer also stated that China is considering options for cooperating with nations in the region.³¹

Such a mission could provide an ideal opportunity for China to achieve new milestones in multilateral security cooperation. China could replicate its deployment to the Gulf of Aden, dispatching another “Far Seas” mission from the PLAN. This could incorporate maritime police elements from China's new coastguard, or members of the People's Armed Police (中国人民武装警察部队, *Zhōngguó Rénmín Wǔzhūang Jǐngchá Bùduì*), China's gendarmerie. Such a mission, should it come to pass, would provide even further opportunities for diplomatic engagement, as the considerably greater distance at which the PLAN would be operating would require China to work closely with regional partners. Such a mission would also provide China with the opportunity to engage with existing EU efforts to support counter-piracy in the area.³²

In future there is also the potential for China's push for improved operational capacities to intersect with its efforts to portray itself as a responsible rising power. After the Philippines suffered significant casualties resulting from Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013, China was criticised for the delay with which it offered aid to the Philippines government, and in particular, the slow pace at which China deployed its dedicated hospital ship, *Peace Ark*.³³ China's response contrasts with the role played by the United States in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami that affected a number of nations in South East Asia.³⁴ One of the tools that allowed the United States to respond so successfully in that crisis was the ready availability of its aircraft carriers in the region.

China's new aircraft carrier, *Liaoning*, is still undergoing sea trials, and is not yet operational. However, when either it or the two further aircraft carriers that China is currently planning to acquire enter service, they could prove useful in the event of natural disasters, particularly in the waters around Asia. Alternatively, China already operates three (and is planning to acquire three more) Type 071 Yuzhao class amphibious landing docks which could similarly prove key in humanitarian response missions. The benefits of using such military assets in this context are manifold – not only does it afford the crews of such PLAN vessels the opportunity to deploy under operational conditions, most likely in the context of a multinational mission, but it also allows ‘hard’ Chinese military capabilities to be seen in a ‘soft’ power light. This would provide a measure of comfort for those regional partners who are currently uneasy at the steady increase in China's military capabilities.

30 People's Daily (2011) ‘China urges int'l community to assist in fighting piracy in Gulf of Guinea’, *People's Daily*, 20 October.

31 Erickson and Strange (2013) op cit.

32 Ibid.

33 Medcalf, R. (2014) ‘China Throws Away a Chance to Lead’, *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 November.

34 Ballen, K. (2006) ‘War on terror needs more humanitarian efforts’, *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 March.

Conclusion

China is proving to be an increasingly willing actor in the field of global security. From initially hesitant steps, born from a suspicion of multilateral fora such as the United Nations, China has gradually deepened its commitment to multilateral efforts to ensure peace globally. From early deployments of non-combat troops, to the deployment of a protection force for these non-combat troops, China has now reached a position where it feels comfortable in the deployment of infantry soldiers as an integral part of a UN mission. At sea, the PLAN involvement in operations in the Gulf of Aden represents a new standard in long-range deployment for the force, and anti-piracy offers a tangible way for China to continue to contribute to international security in future.

This gradual escalation in China's commitment to international security is driven in large part by the benefits China derives from a multipolar world. Coupled with this, Chinese citizens, venturing abroad in increasing numbers for business and leisure, expect a safe and secure international environment in which to travel and invest. The global community expects China to play a role befitting a major power in solving the security challenges of the modern world, and multilateral missions provide a rare opportunity for the Chinese military to work under operational conditions with partners from other states. Engagement with multilateral security missions has provided positive results for China, allowing them to address all of these issues simultaneously. For this reason, such engagement appears likely not only to continue into the future, but also to increase in scope and scale as the years progress, as China continues to seek to portray itself as a global friend to those in need of stability.

The Evolution of Non-State Military Actors from the Cold War Era to the Contemporary Age

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to examine how private, non-state military actors have evolved from the Cold War era through to the contemporary age, with an emphasis on the relationship between them and the security of the state in which they were, or are, present. During the Cold War era, these actors usually took the form of ad hoc mercenary units which were formed for a specific purpose or as a reaction to a particular situation, and were often disbanded as abruptly as they were formed. However, since the end of the Cold War and the large scale demilitarisation which occurred in the years following its conclusion, these non-state actors have evolved into something more complex. This paper documents and explains this metamorphosis from the very beginning to the present day. Furthermore, as popular opinion would tend to attach negative connotations to the presence of private military contractors or mercenaries, their effect on conflict is assessed in an effort to ascertain whether their contribution has been a stabilising or a detrimental influence.

Introduction

The majority of people in today's world, through reading the paper or watching the news, have a reasonable idea of what a mercenary is. Ask the average person and they will probably tell you that a mercenary is someone who participates in a conflict, not for political or ideological purposes, but for personal monetary gain. Many people's image of the mercenary is shaped by the characters played by actors such as Sir Roger Moore or Richard Harris in such films as *The Man Who Would Be King* and *The Wild Geese*. However, as is often the case, the reality is generally less glamorous and more mundane. The days of swashbuckling mercenaries are gone, and have been replaced by an altogether more unromantic entity- the Private Military Company, or PMC.

These private military companies are keen to distance themselves from the marauding units of mercenaries which had their heyday in the African decolonisation period of the nineteen fifties and sixties. They have a distinctly corporate nature, and are, for the most part, very sophisticated and extremely well organised. They operate in the free market, and it is possible to purchase shares in some of the largest corporations. Keen to distance themselves from the unsavoury connotations associated with their predecessors, they frequently place a huge emphasis on good public relations, often hiring the services of professional PR firms or, in the case of some of the larger PMCs, developing their

own PR department. For this reason, although like any other corporation they are profit-driven, many modern day PMCs have a policy of only participating in conflicts where legitimate national interests are under attack, and will not simply provide their services to the highest bidder, regardless of what their aims are.

Therefore, it can be said that PMCs are hired primarily by states, which raises concerns in relation to the capacity of such states to maintain stability, regardless of the presence or not of PMCs. This paper will examine three case studies in which PMCs, in differing forms and in three different time periods, were called upon to provide security and stability in this way. As profit-driven entities, is there any evidence to suggest that they hinder conflict resolution in order to further their own agenda? Or, on the contrary, do PMCs seek a quick resolution to a conflict in order to improve their reputation and future business prospects? And most importantly, how have they evolved from the Cold War era to the present day?

The Dawn of Private Military Companies and their Uses Throughout History

The earliest use of what could be called Private Military Companies was in medieval Italy, where local warlords, or Condottieri, recruited bands of professional soldiers, known as free companies, and hired out their services to the Italian city states. Despite their vast wealth, these city states had completely inadequate standing armies and relied on the Condottieri for protection. However, with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the emergence of the modern-day state system, armies became national assets and the entity of the mercenary as an individual, professional ex-soldier for hire began to emerge.¹

These freelance operators are what are regarded by many commentators as traditional mercenaries, and will be the focus of the first case study of this paper. Mark Duffield defines these individuals as mercenaries, describing them as “a soldier willing to sell his military skill to the highest bidder, no matter what the cause.”² However, ex British Army Lt Col Tim Spicer OBE, founder of two well-known PMCs, *Sandline International* and *Aegis Defence Services*, rejects this simplistic definition and sums up the evolution of non-state military actors in the following way: “mercenaries are usually individuals, recruited for a specific task. They have no permanent structure, no group cohesion, no doctrine, and no vetting procedure. Their standards, both behavioural and technical, are somewhat suspect and their motives can be questionable.”³ This is in contrast to contemporary PMC’s he asserts, stating:

a Private Military Company is a permanent structure with a large number of people on its books. It has a permanent presence, it has an office, it uses promotional literature, it has a vetting system, it has a doctrine and it has a training capacity internally as well as externally. It draws on the normal support you would expect from a business; it is the official military transformed into a private sector in a business guise.⁴

1 Singer, P.W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, New York: Cornell University Press.

2 Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books.

3 Kinsey, C. (2007) *Corporate Soldiers and International Security*, London: Routledge.

4 Ibid.

We can see that the modern-day PMC is about as far removed from traditional mercenaries as an organisation can be, while still operating in the same sphere. However, the legitimisation process is still ongoing. Operating since the end of the Cold War and only recently becoming de rigour in major conflicts, PMCs have yet to fully shed the mercenary tag that has clung to them since their move into the mainstream consciousness.

The Congo Crisis

The Congo Crisis was a period of conflict which followed in the immediate aftermath of that country's independence from Belgium in 1960. While it lasted until 1966, it was an extremely complex period of unrest, with various localised conflicts occurring at different times over the course of the crisis.⁵ The most significant of these however, is widely believed to be the attempted secession of the south-western province of Katanga, an incident which in many ways paved the way for an acceptance of private military organisations carrying out tasks alongside conventional militaries.

The Belgian Congo achieved independence on June 30th, 1960, becoming the Republic of the Congo, with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister.⁶ However, only a few days into the new nation's independence, Lumumba made the disastrous decision to raise the wages of all government workers, as promised, with the exception of the army. Disgruntled and already highly disillusioned, the Congolese army mutinied, attacking its mostly white officer corps and forming roving, heavily armed gangs which began marauding around the country, pillaging and attacking the civilian population. Without an officer corps in command and with access to large amounts of weaponry, the Congolese army proved completely uncontrollable and destroyed the new government's credibility within days of its formation, whilst dragging the country into anarchy.⁷

On the 11th of July, Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Katangan CONAKAT party, declared that the mineral-rich province of Katanga was seceding from the Republic of the Congo in order to escape the chaos and mindless violence which was enveloping the rest of the country. He cemented Katanga's independence with the presence of over 6,000 mostly Belgian gendarmerie, reinforced by several mercenary units, made up mostly of ex-Rhodesian, South African, British and Irish soldiers.⁸ Among these units was the infamous 4 Commando, led by the Dublin-born mercenary 'Mad' Mike Hoare, as well as other well-known units commanded by other notable characters, such as Bob Denard and Jean Shramme.⁹ Secure, and with firm law and order established, Katanga was in stark contrast to the rest of the country which remained in turmoil. Squabbling persisted among the new government, before it was then overthrown in a coup d'état by Joseph Mobutu, the Chief of Staff of the Army, whose forces soon murdered Lumumba. Following this incident, despite the law and order enjoyed by the residents of Katanga, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 161,¹⁰ authorising the removal of all mercenaries

⁵ Dunn, K.C. (2003) *Imagining the Congo; The International Relations of Identity*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan Press.

⁶ Oliver, R. and Atmore, A. (1994) *Africa since 1800*, London: Cambridge University Press.

⁷ Dayal, R. (1976) *Mission for Hammarskjöld: The Congo Crisis*, London: Oxford University Press.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Hoare, M. (1967) *Congo Mercenary*, Michigan: Paladin Press.

¹⁰ UN Security Council (1961) 'Resolution 161: The Congo Question', 21 Feb, available: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/161>, [accessed July 2011].

from Katanga, whose presence was seen by many as a step backwards in Congo's decolonisation process. Tshombe, who had no intention of reuniting with the rest of the country, provoked *Operation Rum Punch* which saw UN forces enter Katanga to dismantle the mercenary units operating there. Fiercely resisting the attempt to remove them from the province they were tasked with protecting, the mercenary units fought back against the UN advance. During this process, a heavily outnumbered contingent of Irish soldiers were surrounded at the town of Jadotville, where they were taken prisoner after running out of ammunition and water, and inflicting heavy casualties on the mercenaries. *Rum Punch* was followed by *Operation Grand Slam* during which Tshombe finally cut a deal with the UN, who offered him amnesty in return for demobilising all his mercenary forces, ending the secession attempt.¹¹

This was not the end of mercenary activity in the Congo, however. A year before Mobutu seized control in his coup, there was a rebellion in the north-eastern provinces of the country, Kivu and Orientale, which up until then had been largely neglected by the government due to the unfolding crisis in the south. Known as *the Simba rebellion*, it was largely in response to abuses of power being perpetrated by local officials in the absence of any supervision from the centralised government. When the rebellion broke out, Moïse Tshombe was, surprisingly, asked to assume the position of Prime Minister of a new government to combat the Simbas, or rebels. Tasked with crushing the rebellion, one of his first actions was to remobilise the hundreds of mercenaries which had fought loyally for him during his attempted secession in Katanga. These well-trained and battle hardened units inflicted huge casualties on the Simbas, which were comprised mostly of teenage tribesmen, many of whom believed themselves immune to bullets following rituals carried out by local Shamans. Neglecting even to carry modern weapons or take any form of cover, the Simbas suffered huge losses under the heavy machine guns of the mercenaries.¹² With total defeat looming on the horizon, the Simbas resorted to a tactic which became synonymous with their campaign – the taking of white hostages, both European and American. Once taken, the Simbas threatened to kill the hostages if the mercenaries advanced any further into their territory. However, due to international pressure and the harsh and inhumane treatment the hostages were being subjected to, on the 24th of November 1964, the USAF dropped a contingent of Belgian paratroopers into Stanleyville airport. Reinforced by mercenaries on the ground, they succeeded in rescuing the vast majority of the hostages.¹³

Whether or not the mercenaries attempted to hinder conflict resolution in order to further their own agenda is unclear. The chaotic period that was the Congo Crisis did not end with the quelling of the Simba Rebellion. The commanders of the mercenary units were aware, after twice restoring stability to Congo and growing accustomed to acting with a level of impunity, that they were in a position to extort the government which was relying on them for protection, and gain control of the country's mines and therefore its mineral wealth. When Tshombe attempted to pay off certain elements which threatened to make such a scenario a reality, they mutinied, and attempted to take control of the mines themselves. However, the American air support assets which were instrumental in the

¹¹ O'Brien, C.C. (1962) *To Katanga and Back*, London: Hutchinson.

¹² Taulbee, J.L. (1998) 'Reflections on the Mercenary Option', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 9(2), pp. 145-163.

¹³ Odom, T. (2009) *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute.

defeat of the Simbas, were used against the rebel mercenaries and they suffered heavy casualties. Several of those captured, mostly members of Bob Denard's ⁶ Commando, were executed, prompting many rebellious mercenary elements to flee the Congo.¹⁴

For the most part however, the quick resolution of the conflict and the fulfilment of their tasks was the main objective of most mercenary units. The Katangan gendarmerie successfully prevented the province they were tasked with protecting from descending into chaos and violence like the rest of the Congo, and the reason for their disbandment was the increasing pressure Tshombe was under from the UN to cease his secession attempt. Once he accepted an amnesty, the mercenaries were mostly rounded up and deported without incident.¹⁵

The case of these units, while not PMCs *per se*, is relevant to the examination of these organisations as they possessed, in their operation and organisation, many of the features of PMCs almost two decades before the first such companies were founded. Indeed, many of the mercenaries who served in these units went on to operate in corporate military organisations.¹⁶ One of these individuals was Laffras Luiting, who went on to become head of recruitment for the organisation which signalled the dawn of the bone fide PMC in modern conflict: *Executive Outcomes*.

Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes

The Sierra Leonean civil war began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an armed rebel group, began their incursion into the eastern provinces of the country in an attempt to overthrow the corruption-ridden government of then president Joseph Momoh. Founded and led by a man named Foday Sankoh, they immediately set about gaining control of the diamond mines in the eastern and southern areas of the country, starving the government of the revenue it needed to wage a war against them whilst at the same time boosting their own coffers. They were supported by the local population who were fed up with the inequality between them and the corrupt ruling elite, as well as the harsh treatment from the poorly disciplined Sierra Leonean army (SLA). By the beginning of 1992, they had complete control of all eastern and southern mines. In addition to this, the RUF began employing a tactic which was to become synonymous with their fight. Wearing looted SLA uniforms, the RUF began a campaign of terror among the local populace, roving throughout the countryside and villages and burning, pillaging and killing, leaving a trail of destruction and devastation in their wake. This of course led to further distrust of the SLA among the population, while increasing popular support for the rebels.¹⁷ Out of this chaos came the entity of the 'sobel',¹⁸ a combination of almost non-existent support for the SLA, low morale among its ranks and low wages. Facing a popular and motivated force, many SLA soldiers had come to realise that their reputation and future prospects were in tatters and thus sought to improve their chances of survival and financial situation by forging links and co-operating with the rebels. Over time, certain units of the SLA and the RUF became almost impossible to

¹⁴ Johnson, R.C. (1997) *Heart of Darkness, The Tragedy of the Congo, 1960-1967*, available: <http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v2/v2n3/congo.html>, [accessed July 2011].

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Howe, H.M. (1998) *Private Security Forces and African Security: The Case of Executive Outcomes*, London: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁷ Lansana, G. (2005) *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, Bloomington: Indiana Publishers.

¹⁸ A portmanteau of 'soldier' and 'rebel'. It was used to describe SLA members who engaged in rebel activities.

differentiate; such was the level of overlapping and collusion. Unsurprisingly, Momoh and his government soon found the last shreds of their credibility quickly evaporating. It was a matter of when, not if, he would be deposed.

On the 29th of April of that same year, a 25 year old SLA captain, Valentine Strasser, staged a coup which overthrew the incompetent and unpopular Momoh, and made him the youngest head of state in the world at that time. He established a new government, the National Provisional Ruling Council, and consolidated the SLA into a more disciplined, professional force which, under his command, began to make significant advances against the RUF. However, his new government lacked the resources to sustain their initial push. Following a tactical pause in the thick rainforests which engulfed thirty per cent of the country, the RUF regrouped and began a renewed advance towards Freetown where they planned to overthrow Strasser's government.

By March 1995, with the RUF twenty miles from Freetown, Strasser realised his weakened and demoralised army would have to outsource the task of confronting the rebels to Executive Outcomes (EO). Founded in South Africa in 1989 by former South African Defence Force (SADF) Colonel Eeben Barlow, as the apartheid regime which had been in place since 1948 began to disintegrate, EO already had a formidable reputation as an elite fighting force. Comprised mainly of personnel from some of the apartheid era's more controversial counter-insurgency units, such as the infamous 32 Battalion, the contractors in its ranks had plenty of experience in dealing with groups like the RUF, and its rag-tag teenage foot soldiers stood little chance. In order to secure Barlow's help, Strasser's impoverished government relied heavily on money borrowed from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pay him for his services. For a fee of \$1.8 million a month, Barlow agreed to ensure that his experienced and battle-hardened soldiers would complete several tasks, namely to secure the capital and halt the rebel advance threatening it, regain control of the mines and thus secure a source of revenue for the government, to locate and destroy the RUF's headquarters and leadership, and to remove the RUF from their areas of operation.

Just eighteen days after commencing operations, EO had the RUF pushed back into the country's interior and began a relentless seven month offensive, during which they retook all diamond mines, destroyed the RUF's headquarters in the city of Bo, and conducted mopping-up operations in areas formerly occupied by RUF, therefore successfully fulfilling all their obligations to Strasser and his government.¹⁹ Decimated, the RUF was forced to reconsider its strategy and enter negotiations, and in November 1996 the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed, bringing relative stability to the country. Following democratic elections in 1997, EO quietly withdrew from Sierra Leone, having suffered just two casualties in a conflict which cost an estimated fifty thousand lives.²⁰

Was there any evidence to suggest that EO hindered conflict resolution in order to further their own agenda, or on the contrary, was swift conflict resolution their primary objective? In examining the conflict, it would seem that the latter scenario is true. EO hit the ground

¹⁹ Shawcross, W. (2001) *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict*, New York: Touchstone Publishers.

²⁰ Howe (1998) op cit.

running in Sierra Leone, immediately waging an aggressive and relentless campaign against the RUF. As previously outlined, EO had the rebels pushed back into the interior of the country within a matter of days, something which the SLA were unable to do. In addition, it took them a mere seven months to completely destroy the RUF, while the SLA had been locked in a protracted low intensity conflict with the rebels for four years prior to the arrival of EO, without making any significant progress.

In addressing the question of whether EO was seeking conflict resolution or profit, in the case of Sierra Leone the two were tightly intertwined. Strasser knew he had to regain control of the diamond mines in order to pay Barlow, a fact which was not lost on the South African. Liberating the diamond mines and enforcing stability was therefore one of EO's main objectives. Once back in government control, diamond mining concessions were given to mining companies closely aligned to Executive Outcomes, guaranteeing a continued source of revenue as long as stability in the diamond-mining areas was maintained.²¹

The activities of Executive Outcomes drew attention the effectiveness of non-state military actors in conflict stabilisation. Unlike the mercenary units of the Congo, which were formed and disbanded on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the needs of a particular situation, EO represented a permanent corporate entity which could provide highly trained personnel wherever they were needed, and more importantly, it could do so discreetly. The precedent of hiring a corporate entity to fulfil a military role was to be utilised to a huge extent a decade later in Iraq.

Iraq: A Privatised War?

The Iraq war, which began on the 20th of March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, signalled a new dawn in the era of PMC proliferation. Unlike the previous two cases briefly examined in this paper, the Iraq case is unique, as there were, and still are, dozens of PMCs operating in the country at any one time. For example, a 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) report stated that there were over sixty recognised PMCs operating in Iraq at that time.²² However, it must also be noted that the actual number of PMCs was probably higher, but their activities were not always in the public domain due to their corporate nature. In this regard, the Iraq case is also unique in so far as the PMC activity being examined is still ongoing, and consequently a lot of information on the matter is restricted or not available publicly.

By 2004 the Iraqi insurgency was in full swing, and this period of violence saw a huge increase in the number of private military contractors operating in the country. The vast majority were tasked with providing defensive duties, both of private interests and also infrastructural facilities such as water and electricity plants, which were a favourite target of the insurgents. These duties remain the domain of PMCs in Iraq, whereas in the past, such tasks would have been carried out by conventional military forces. In a sense, Iraq

21 Montague, D. (2003) *The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone*, New York: Arms Trade Research Centre, World Policy Institute.

22 Isenberg, D. (2004) *A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq*, London: The British American Security Information Council.

became the first 'privatised' war, with the estimated number of security contractors anywhere between twenty and a hundred-thousand at the height of the conflict.²³ Coalition forces subcontracted some offensive roles to PMCs, such as the control and maintenance of unmanned drones. Other services they have carried out for coalition forces include intelligence gathering and the protection of key bases and buildings. Civil roles also continue to be carried out by PMCs in Iraq, such as policing and the protection of pipelines and power plants. They have also conducted other duties such as the training of the new Iraqi security forces. For the purpose of objectivity however, it must also be mentioned that PMC activity in Iraq has also had a destabilising effect on the country. PMCs have been implicated in some of the most damaging and unsavoury incidents to emerge during the Iraq war, including the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the 2007 Nisour Square shooting in Baghdad. In a 2005 report, it emerged that private military contractors had been involved in over 40% of reported abuse, but due to the ambiguous nature of their accountability under law at the time, no charges could be brought against them, unlike US soldiers who were also involved.²⁴ However, as the current situation in Iraq is still hostile due to the high level of sectarian violence which has continued after the official withdrawal of US troops in February 2010, there is as much demand as ever for the services of PMCs, and they are likely to have a presence in the country for some time to come.

Insofar as investigating whether or not the PMCs operating in Iraq are dragging out the conflict in order to further their own agenda, there is little evidence to suggest that that is the case. Ever since the withdrawal of the US military, there has been a huge demand for services that would normally be carried out by a conventional military entity. As a result, every PMC currently operating in the country is providing the service outlined in its contract. While pursuing their own corporate agenda, they have little effect on the complex sectarian, cultural and religious factors fuelling much of the conflict in present day Iraq.

Furthermore, unlike the previous two case studies, the PMCs operating in Iraq are not pursuing an agenda of conflict resolution. Such a task is the responsibility of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi security forces. PMCs, on the other hand, are mainly concerned with the provision of security to various private and public entities operating in troubled areas of the country.

This paper has examined the effect that the employment of PMCs has had on three different conflicts, each with differing social, chronological and political contexts. In doing so, it has considered how private military entities have evolved from impromptu units, which were formed and disbanded mission by mission, to fully fledged corporate entities, capable of carrying out the same tasks as some of the most sophisticated conventional military forces in the world, albeit on a smaller scale. Insofar as commenting on the effect they have on the stabilisation or destabilisation of a conflict, the truth is often contrary to what one might expect. As seen in the case studies examined, they

23 Christian, O. (2005) 'Private Military Companies in Iraq: A Force For Good?', *Liberty and Security*, [online], available: <http://www.libertysecurity.org/article127.html>, [accessed July 2011].

24 Singer, P.W. (2005) 'Outsourcing War', *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 84 (2).

can be extremely effective in ways that conventional militaries cannot, due to political, ideological and logistical reasons. Contrary to the popular opinion of mercenaries and PMCs as bloodthirsty, money-hungry warmongers, recent history has shown us that this assumption is simply not the case. That is not to say that there are not individuals and organisations operating in conflict zones today that fit that description, rather they are fortunately in the minority.

In summary, this paper has examined the stabilisation by defence role that private military operators carried out during the Congo Crisis, the stabilisation by offence role undertaken in Sierra Leone and the stabilisation by security currently being carried out in Iraq. It has also chronicled the evolution of non-state military actors from their most basic to the complex corporate behemoths operating in the contemporary age.

The argument, which can be fairly made, that the presence of outside actors in any conflict is going to provoke some kind of instability, is a true and valid one. However, what cannot be denied is that whenever they are deployed, PMCs are there in response to an unstable situation, and they provide a service that is very much in demand. Whether or not they indirectly cause some instability by their presence, the fact remains that there would possibly be a lot more instability without them.

An Examination of the Future Requirements of Naval Gun Shells

ABSTRACT

Developments in naval weapons systems and capabilities have thrown a spotlight on the utility of conventional naval guns in the contemporary operating environment. This paper examines some of the potential future uses and capability requirements of naval gun shells for employment in modern naval operations. It considers the relevance of naval guns and their recent use, before examining the three roles in which they can be employed in modern naval operations, including the type of projectiles used for each of these roles. An assessment of the potential improvements that could be made to naval projectiles is provided, which includes changes in the composition of their components and ingredients in addition to advances in their capabilities.

Naval gunnery is on the brink of a fundamental technology change: a new generation of extended-range, GPS-enabled precision-guided munitions, now in advanced development and expected to enter service later this decade, are set to deliver significant improvements in range, accuracy and cost. Moreover, they promise a transformation in maritime fires by overcoming the inverse relationship between range and accuracy associated with conventional ballistic ammunition.¹

Introduction

The requirement for naval guns in contemporary operations might seem to be greatly reduced as a result of the myriad of other, more modern naval weapons capabilities available today. For example, on some modern naval platforms, Point Defence Missile Systems (PDMS) are used to provide protection against air platform and missile threats. Such PDMS can consist of the NATO *Sea Sparrow* Missiles (500m to 11km max engagement) or *Evolved Sea Sparrow* Missiles (250m to 25km max engagement) coupled with a Close In Weapons System (CIWS). CIWS, such as *Goalkeeper* or *Phalanx*, are designed to detect, track and engage threats which have penetrated through the outer defences, using extremely high rates of cannon fire. With such a layered naval system of defence, one is looking at ranges from zero to twenty-five kilometres effective coverage from conventional attacks. Indeed with such modern capabilities, naval guns may seem like a throwback to another era, when the battleship was the premier naval asset. However, naval guns can be included in such a layered defence system, and their use goes far beyond that of a defensive tool. This paper examines some of the potential

¹ Scott R. (2011) 'Naval Gunfire support: taking aim at type 26', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 November.

uses of naval gun munitions, and considers the possible improvements which could be made to naval gun shells in the future, in order to meet the challenges of the operating environment and afford the maritime commander greater flexibility in the execution of naval gunnery tasks.

The world's navies generally acknowledge a shift from winning command at sea, to exploiting it from the sea.² The US navy clearly illustrates this point with their transition from power "At Sea" to power "From the Sea."³ Naval guns provide one such means of power projection from the sea. In the 2011 military operations in Libya under UNSCR 1973, in which British action was conducted under the name *Operation Ellamy*, British Royal Navy Type 42 Destroyer *HMS Liverpool* and Type 23 frigates *HMS Sutherland* and *HMS Iron Duke* fired 4.5 inch High Explosive (HE) ammunition and illumination rounds on several occasions during shore and anti-surface engagements.⁴ *Liverpool* bore the brunt of the effort, firing 211 rounds (113 HE and 98 illumination rounds) from its Mk8 Mod 0 medium calibre gun at various targets along the Libyan coast. Targets typically included static positions, such as vehicle check points, and mobile targets, such as the BM-21 truck mounted multiple rocket launcher and vehicles adapted to carry heavy machine guns. *Liverpool* also utilised its Mk8 gun to defeat rigid inflatable boats rigged with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).⁵ This operation illustrated some of the potential uses of naval gun munitions – there are others.

Potential Uses of Naval Gun Munitions

Eric Grove in *The Future of Sea Power*,⁶ argues that naval weapons systems are means to ends and not the ends in themselves. Therefore, it is best to examine such systems in the context of their function in the various dimensions of naval operations. Ostensibly, three uses of naval gun munitions are potentially possible:

- Anti-Surface Ship Warfare (ASUW).
- Anti-Aircraft Warfare (AAW).
- Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS).

ASUW Role

The attack of surface vessels with below the water line munitions, using warheads that utilise underwater shock energy, is extremely effective. Although the use of gun-launched projectiles to achieve this target effect might be desirable, the difficulty in attaining the necessary accuracy to accomplish this makes such engagement unviable, and for this reason, gun launched ASUW naval projectiles are typically intended to strike some portion of the target vessel above the water line. In this ASUW role, there is a need for two types of warhead. The first involves the attack of the structure of the ship, seeking to rupture and sink it or at least neutralise it, causing it to depart the scene as a result of

² Till, G. (2001) 'Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond' in O'Brien, P. (ed) *The Royal Navy in a New World, 1990 – 2020*, London: Frank Cass, p. 228.

³ Ibid, p. 227.

⁴ Scott (2011) op cit.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Grove, E. (1990) *The Future of Sea Power*, Suffolk: Rutledge, p. 61.

the damage inflicted. This will primarily be achieved through the use of a blast warhead detonating within the ship, and for this reason, the penetration of the ship is necessary prior to the detonation of the blast warhead. This is best achieved through the use of a tandem warhead with a primary penetrator followed by a secondary blast warhead. One method of achieving this in the past has been through the use of semi-armour piercing (SAP) rounds with a high impulse main charge energetic material fill. The second type of warhead that is considered necessary is a shell designed to target the runways of aircraft carriers and other vital equipment on a ship, such as radar pylons and CIWS.

AAW Role

Naval AAW projectile usage has diminished greatly with the advent of missiles and CIWS defences; however, for example as of 2011,⁷ Brazil, India, Pakistan, Iran and Thailand still maintained anti-aircraft capabilities for their 4.5 inch naval guns. AAW role projectiles normally have an airburst fragmentation warhead where the fusing is typically of the proximity type designed to initiate when close to the air target. This is essential, as point detonation on a fast moving aircraft is practically impossible, and multiple hits on a target are required. These shells can also be used in an airburst role in defence against attack by torpedo boats or small boats.⁸

Naval Gunfire Support

Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS), also sometimes referred to as operations against the shore or shore bombardment, essentially involves the use of naval gunfire to provide fire support for amphibious assault and other troops operating within range. NGFS is one of the three main components of amphibious warfare assault operations support, along with aircraft and ship-launched missiles. In modern operations, NGFS is also used to provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) for close air support. Well-timed salvos from naval gun fire can also be used to provide covering fire for sorties and prevent enemy troops and batteries from effectively using anti-aircraft weapons.

The prevalence of both 'soft' targets, such as air defence assets (e.g. exposed radars and missile launchers), and 'hardened' targets such as command and control (C2) buildings, requires naval shells which are capable of engaging both of these target types. The use of shells with a warhead typically containing an enhanced blast explosive within a penetrating warhead casing would suit such SEAD roles. Through the use of precision delivery to allow initiation inside of a targeted structure, C2 facilities can be effectively engaged, or alternatively, when fitted with a suitable proximity fuze, softer air defence assets can be effectively targeted. This use of indirect naval fire in SEAD is particularly effective when employed in conjunction with other more specific SEAD munitions such as anti-radar missiles. Anti-radar missiles detect an enemy's radar transmitters using the power transmitted by the radar to guide such missiles onto the target e.g. the American AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radar Missile (HARM) and British Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM).

⁷ Saunders, S. (2011) *Jane's Fighting Ships 2011 – 2012*, Ed 114.

⁸ Global security.org, (2013) 'Bullets-2-warheads', available: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/bullets2-warheads.htm> [accessed 29 Oct 2013].

Illumination rounds are utilised in a NGFS role in support of friendly forces on shore and in psychological operations against enemy forces. They are also used for illumination of the environs of other friendly forces vessels or during search and rescue taskings conducted in low visibility conditions. Given the possible uses of naval gun munitions, consideration will now be given to the potential improvements which could be made to such munitions.

Potential Improvements in Naval Gun Munitions

At the turn of the century, Geoffrey Till⁹ described a revolution in maritime affairs in which military developments are being led by civilian industry and business technology. He argues that it seems much less likely that war or the preparation for war is the mother of invention as may have been the case in the past. Navies are much more liable to be affected by external technological developments than they have been previously. They are floating on a fast-running current of technology and steering; they are not directing it. Consequently, it is suggested that there is ample scope for the development of munitions which are a substantial improvement on those currently available for naval guns. The following are some improvements that could be seen in future naval shells.

Improved Safety and Insensitive Munitions Characteristics

One of the problems with any device containing energetic material is the danger of inadvertent initiation of the energetic material by mechanical shock, heat, flame, friction, spark or impact stimuli. A series of accidents on board US Naval platforms, particularly during the Vietnam War (including the fire on board the *USS Forrestal* in which 136 servicemen died) led to a drive to produce safer munitions that would be less sensitive to accidental initiation. Insensitive munitions (IM) are munitions which reliably fulfil their performance, readiness and operational requirements on demand, but which minimize the probability of inadvertent initiation and the severity of subsequent collateral damage to weapon platforms, logistic systems and personnel when subjected to unintentional stimuli.¹⁰ The intention is to reduce the probability and/or the ease of inadvertent initiation of a munition and to reduce the violence if such an event occurs. Munitions can be designed with IM qualities through the use of energetic materials which themselves have IM characteristics, including reduced sensitivity to inadvertent initiation and/or a less violent response to such events, for example one of burning instead of high order detonation. However, when deciding on the energetic material formulation to achieve such desired IM characteristics, it is necessary to do so with a balanced approach to the required performance characteristics. The munition designer can also achieve IM qualities through engineering the munition so that it is designed to fail in a controlled manner that is less than a mass explosive event. An example of such IM design would be the use of passive venting that will release pressure from within a munition's casing before it reaches a dangerously high level, thus preventing a high order detonation of the munition.

⁹ Till (2001) op cit, p. 219.

¹⁰ NATO Standardisation Agency (2010) *NATO STANAG 4439 (edition 3) – Policy for introduction and assessment of IM*, Promulgated 17 March 2010.

Reduced Storage and Environmental Degradation Issues

Ideally, the storage of ammunition should have minimal husbandry requirements, with negligible reaction to a large range of ambient storage temperatures experienced during transport, long term storage and carriage awaiting deployment/usage. The storage conditions of a shore-based magazine can vary from moderate temperatures to the extreme cold of a sub-arctic location or the heat of an equatorial location. Munitions must also be capable of enduring storage on board a vessel's magazine. Such temperature variations, in addition to ambient humidity, have an impact on the performance and life of a munition's energetic material. Some of the factors that must be considered in relation to these storage issues are the energetic material's chemical stability, chemical compatibility, thermal stability (melting point) and volatility. It is also necessary to consider the changes in the properties of an energetic material due to variations in ambient conditions. Such changes could include the energetic material exuding out from within the casing (for example through the fuze threads), or changes in its physical stability or in its mechanical properties, all of which can alter its performance and increase the risk of an unintended initiation.

Decreased Environmental Impact

The constraints of environmental legislation will increase, as evidenced by current EU REACH legislation,¹¹ while in time, demilitarisation by incineration and disposal by open demolition will no longer be deemed acceptable. There will be a move away from ingredients with a high environmental impact during synthesis, such as those used in the manufacture of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) as well as the widespread use of certain manufacturing chemicals such as isocyanate curing agents. Similarly, manufacturing processes will need to use less solvent. Overall, future energetic materials will need to be more environmentally friendly throughout their life cycle, from manufacture to use or disposal.

Improved Cost and Availability of Material and Components

The cost of the components in any munition depends on many factors such as ingredient costs, processing costs and complete through-life costs from 'cradle to grave.' According to Geoffrey Till,¹² modern technology has affected maritime purposes and maritime conduct in a variety of ways. Notwithstanding its advocates, and despite the fact that there are those who point to the analogy of pocket calculators and computers which become cheaper in real terms, the sensors, weapons and platforms of modern navies have become progressively more expensive. Over the past half century the unit cost of most types of military equipment has risen by about ten percent per year.¹³ Therefore, there is an economic imperative to ensuring that ammunition is cost effective and delivers value for money. Of particular importance, is the need to appreciate that the cost of a munition is relative to its specification. For a high value munition, such as a guided missile made in low numbers, the cost of the energetic fill in the warhead may be a small percentage of the overall cost and a high performance energetic may be justified. However, for mass produced items such as naval shells, the cost of the energetic material within is a critical

¹¹ REACH refers to EU legislation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/index_en.htm.

¹² Till (2001) op cit, p. 221.

¹³ Ibid.

factor and must be minimised. Through-life costs can be reduced through the following approaches:

- Design the munition utilising pre-existing manufacturing processes to lower reject rates and reduce production down-time, while reducing time for introduction into service.
- Improved ageing characteristics of munitions can provide greater reliability, reduced requirements for monitoring their condition and longer service life.
- Appropriate munition design can reduce demilitarisation costs by making disassembly and recycling easier, i.e. disposal should be factored into the original design.
- Use of 'greener' formulations can reduce environmental impact and clean-up costs imposed by legislation.

In reality, as explained by Till, navies must decide on their strategy for investment in new platforms, sensors and weapons. If they conclude that the world is at the beginning of a period of rapid and fundamental technological change, it may make sense for them to wait until the dust settles. If, on the other hand, they foresee no more than a steady and general pace of development, they may decide to invest and build now, before further price rises place the systems out of reach.¹⁴

Improved Interoperability

Interoperability is key for successful modern military operations, not only within a nation's own services (Jointry), but also between partner nations contributing to a coalition force, given that such coalition operations have become the norm rather than the exception. This is reinforced by the fact that there is an almost universal view that future maritime warfare is likely to be expeditionary in nature and fought in the company of other services and other nations.¹⁵ Recent examples include NATO's *Operation Unified Protector* in Libya and the on-going anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa. The so-called *Revolution in Military Affairs* (RMA) of the past twenty years has led to space-based and other Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) assets capable of providing almost total situational awareness for military units, with everyone able to see everyone else's tactical picture and able to operate each other's sensors and weapons.¹⁶ For this reason alone, embedding interoperability with key allies beside whom a nation is likely to act in coalition, is essential. A coalition's sea-based units should be able to bring their collective power to bear ashore much more effectively than heretofore.¹⁷

Interoperability is also important when one considers that since World War Two, the US have possessed overwhelming naval superiority over its coalition partners, coordinating both strategy and the interoperability of equipment.¹⁸ This interoperability enhances the

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 222.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 227.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 220.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 227.

¹⁸ Elleman, A. B. and Paine, S.C.M. (2008) *Naval coalition warfare, from Napoleonic war to operation Iraqi freedom*, London and New York: Routledge Series: Naval policy and History, P. 219.

likelihood of the successful execution of coalition actions by ensuring the same capabilities are deliverable by all contributing partner nations, and the supply of war materiel as well as general logistical requirements is more secure due to the cross exchange of items if required. The downside of such interoperability and the utilisation of the same materials is that such resources may have a limited number of supply sources, and therefore it is necessary to put measures in place to protect these supply sources from interruption or interference. For example, certain rare metals used in the electronics of modern weapon systems have only a limited number of sources from which they can be acquired; however putting in place such protection measures may not always be possible due to the location of the supply sources and the manner in which access to them is controlled.

Guided Munitions

According to Elleman and Paine “The immediacy and global scope of media coverage has irrevocably altered the strategic environment.”¹⁹ Nowadays any incident which is newsworthy can be transmitted to a website or directly to a media outlet within seconds, provided someone on scene has a smart phone and a signal. With this comes an increased level of scrutiny of military actions, and an imperative to ensure that public support for military activity is maintained. For this reason, the use of unguided munitions, which includes most current indirectly fired naval shells, is becoming less acceptable, due to the potential for collateral damage and in particular, non-combatant casualties. Guided missiles entered service on naval platforms as a more effective weapon against aircraft and ships in the mid-20th century, and it is essential that in the future, munitions fired from naval guns be guidance capable.

Increased Stand-Off Capability for Naval Gunfire Support

It is acknowledged that naval forces possess a key advantage in their ability to influence the land with their stand-off capacity, using the water both to protect themselves from attack and to limit their visibility to the enemy and the media.²⁰ However, this stand-off has been put under considerable scrutiny following the events of the 34-day Israeli invasion into Southern Lebanon in June/July of 2006. During this invasion, Hezbollah forces used an Iranian version of the Chinese C802 anti-ship cruise missile against an Israeli corvette acting to enforce a naval blockade off Beirut.²¹ This resulted in the Israeli navy pulling its naval assets back beyond indirect fire support range, effectively removing them from the battle. More recently, on 03 August 2011, *HMS Liverpool* was fired upon from shore-based rockets²² which resulted in a return of fire from her 4.5 inch gun. Interestingly, *Jane's Fighting Ships* now includes land-based anti-ship missiles in its coverage, a further indication perhaps that the world's navies should give due consideration to how they respond to such threats.²³ These incidents, and the acknowledged threat posed by the proliferation of Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) indicate a need to address the threat posed by such anti-ship munitions. This requires the positioning of naval assets outside the range of such threats, while still being capable of providing indirect naval fire support on shore.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 231.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Grant, G. (2008) 'Hybrid Wars,' *Government Executive*, available: <http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2008/05/hybrid-wars/26799/> [accessed 01 May 2014]

²² Harding, T. (2011) 'Libya: royal navy warship HMS Liverpool comes under heavy fire', *The Telegraph*, 04th August.

²³ Till (2001) op cit, p. 222.

Increased Flexibility

Sea power is and must remain inherently flexible, so the argument goes, and does not lend itself to the application of rigid rules of conduct.²⁴ In *Technology and naval combat in the twentieth century and beyond*,²⁵ Till tells us that the financial resources available for defence are coming under scrutiny, and that most of the world's navies have fewer platforms than previously, although each platform must be much more capable than heretofore. Flexibility is a cornerstone principle of all military and security related activities, and emphasises the need for naval gunnery to provide the commander in charge with as many potential courses of action as possible. At present, naval gunnery is somewhat limited to its role of HE delivery to a surface or shore-based target, illumination and (in some cases) an anti-aircraft role as well as the delivery of chaff dispensing rounds for radar jamming.

According to Till a repeated theme in the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review was that "only forces equipped and trained for war-fighting will have the range of specific capabilities – as well as the deterrent factor – to be effective across the full range of peace support and humanitarian operations."²⁶ This may be interpreted as the modern equivalent of gunboat diplomacy; however it does indicate the need for flexibility in the range of options available to navies for the variety of taskings they are likely to undertake. When considered in the context of naval gunnery, such platforms should be capable of providing an array of conventional payloads along with novel new warhead types, which will include less lethal options to engage small boats approaching which may or may not pose a threat.

Harold J. Kearsley in *Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century* concludes that "the maritime environment has changed."²⁷ This is particularly apt now, more than two decades since he wrote these words, when one considers the asymmetric / hybrid nature of modern conflict. One asymmetric maritime threat which has received considerable attention is that posed by small to medium sized craft attempting to approach naval vessels in a suicide attack, similar to that which was carried out on the *USS Cole* in October 2000. The actual effect that asymmetric threats have on a conventional navy can be considered in terms of real damage and casualties inflicted, or the perceived loss of status. As Till puts it "...not least because the effect that some accidental success by grossly inferior forces could have on world opinion."²⁸ This concept of the disproportionate effects that asymmetric forces can have on conventional militaries highlights the role and power of global connectivity through near instantaneous established media outlets, social media and citizen journalism. However, it is not only unconventional asymmetric threats which will need to be considered in the future, as the world's smaller navies may be capable of mounting asymmetric challenges to larger ones,²⁹ thus requiring the retention of conventional anti-surface capabilities.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 225.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 221.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 227.

²⁷ Kearsley, H. J. (1992) *Maritime power and the twenty first century*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Ltd, p. 187.

²⁸ Till (2001) op cit, p. 228.

²⁹ Ibid.

Conclusion

It is proposed that Naval gunnery is far from an obsolescent capability; rather it is one that retains a key tactical place in modern naval operations, not least due to its ability to project relatively low unit cost payloads from a distance at a target. Naval shell design and capabilities may be on the cusp of a revolution, both from a technologically-driven perspective and from a requirement-needs perspective to provide a means to counter potential asymmetric threats with less lethal options, as well as being able to counter emerging threats with novel payloads. For these reasons, it is likely that navies will retain naval gunnery as a key component of their platform capabilities, with the ability to deploy an array of warheads for various target effects. These shells will ideally be more cost efficient and safer throughout their complete life cycle, with reduced environmental impacts, increased range and more accurate guided delivery, while being interoperable with partner navies contributing to coalition operations. The availability of such naval shells will provide a more flexible capability to commanders.

eLoran – Ireland’s Solution to an Inconvenient Truth?

Abstract

This article introduces the concept of Enhanced Loran (eLoran) technology and advocates it as a credible back-up system to Ireland’s current over-reliance on Global Positioning Systems (GPS), with a particular focus on the resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) segment of this system. This core PNT requirement is a necessity in the majority of modern technological systems, something the public and the Defence Forces take for granted. Ireland, an island nation, currently has no means of protecting its critical national infrastructure and abundant GPS reliant technologies from deliberate interference, otherwise known as jamming or spoofing. This paper provides an introductory overview of the operating principles of eLoran and outlines the detrimental impacts of jamming or spoofing by referring to specific case studies that reflect a growing problem in this domain. Ireland and the Defence Forces must address this inconvenient truth; especially in light of the fact that the Defence Forces espouses an expeditionary mind-set which requires the capability to operate both on island and overseas in the domains of air, sea and land.

The secret of change is to focus all of your energy not on fighting the old, but on building the new.

Millman.¹

Introduction

Since the cessation of selective availability² in May 2000 the global attitude toward Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) has transformed from one of caution to one of complete ubiquitous trust. GNSS is now commonly referred to as Global Positioning System (GPS), as the American Department of Defense-run system has become the universal benchmark against which all other GNSS systems are measured. Selective availability required all users of GPS to be cognisant of the information being provided and to practice alternative methods of obtaining and verifying positional data. As modern technology and systems have evolved over the last two decades, there has been a significant requirement to include GPS related information in their development. This application of GPS is more commonly referred to as resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). The majority of public users are not aware of the significant role performed by this core PNT requirement even though the world within which we live relies extensively on this critical input. The Defence Forces (DF) also relies heavily on this essential input

¹ Millman, D. (2000) *Way of the Peaceful Warrior*, 20th anniversary ed., UK: New World Library, p. 130.

² Selective availability (SA) added intentional, time varying errors of up to 100 meters (328 ft.) to publicly available navigation signals. This was intended to deny an enemy the use of civilian GPS receivers for precision weapon guidance. SA ceased on the 01st May 2000, after an Executive Order from US President Bill Clinton.

as many of its modern electronic systems require accurate PNT data; examples include communications systems, weapon control systems, fishery monitoring systems, aviation equipment and troop monitoring systems. It is also pertinent to note that, because Ireland is not a member of NATO, it does not have access to military grade GPS and must rely solely on the publicly available GNSS PNT data. Without a resilient PNT input, most modern systems would fail to provide the information required, particularly in the tactical domain where real-time information can be the difference between success and failure. This paper will provide an overview of the worldwide GNSS vulnerabilities while simultaneously outlining the credible option that exists for back-up resilient PNT systems.

PNT Requirement

There are approximately 3.5 billion users of GPS and PNT systems in the world today, 90% of whom use the signals for highly accurate time-keeping and frequency stability, not just for positioning and navigation.³ The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) requires resilience in e-Navigation and elaborates further on this requirement by stating that “any such system should be able to take into account issues of data validity, plausibility and integrity for the systems to be robust, reliable and dependable.”⁴ O’Rourke⁵ also acknowledges that resilient physical and social systems must be robust, redundant, resourceful and capable of rapid response, where:

- **Robustness** – The inherent strength or resistance in a system to withstand external demands without degradation or loss of functionality.
- **Redundancy** – System properties that allow for alternate options, choices, and substitutions under stress.
- **Resourcefulness** – The capacity to mobilise needed resources and services in emergencies.
- **Rapidity** – The speed with which disruption can be overcome and safety, services and financial systems restored.

To give such key tenets relevance, one should note that for the 90% of GPS users referred to earlier, time and frequency stability equates to a dependable, stable, ubiquitous timing source for the initiation and synchronisation of networks and communication systems worldwide.⁶ Widespread incorporation of precise PNT has truly changed the game for military, civil, commercial, and scientific endeavours of all kinds.⁷ Since the publication of the White Paper on Defence in 2000,⁸ the Defence Forces (DF) has invested heavily in technology-based systems in the domains of air, sea and land. This has ensured that the DF remains a modern, flexible and adaptable organisation that aspires to conduct expeditionary operations in support of Government security and foreign policy objectives.⁹ Resilient PNT dependency is a requirement not just for Ireland’s Defence Forces, but also for Ireland’s Critical National Infrastructure, such as:

³ Jewell, D. (2013) ‘Ubiquitous PNT and Sequestration: The World Runs on GPS Time’, Newsletter Editorials, *Defense PNT Newsletter*. p. 2.

⁴ International Maritime Organisation (2009) Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 85/26 Add. 1, Annex 21, available: <http://intind.org/wp-content/uploads/IMO-E-Nav-Strategy.pdf> [accessed 25th March 2014].

⁵ O’Rourke, T.D. (2007) ‘Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience’, *National Academy of Engineering*, 37(1), pp. 29 – 36.

⁶ Jewell (2013) op cit. p. 3.

⁷ McNeff, J. (2010) ‘The Way Ahead for Military PNT – Changing the Game Changer’, *Inside GNSS*, November/December, pp. 44-51.

⁸ Department of Defence, (2000) *White Paper on Defence 2000 – 2010*, Dublin: Government of Ireland.

⁹ O’Boyle, C. (2014) ‘The Challenge of Change’, *Signal*, 12(2), pp. 7 – 12.

- National Transport Networks.
- Aviation.
- Telecommunications.
- Power distribution.
- Finance.
- Emergency Services.
- Military Systems and Services.
- Internet.

Every major industrialised country has this same dependency on time and frequency stability for their Critical National Infrastructures and at present, they all utilise GNSS as their time source.¹⁰ The loss of this critical time component would be catastrophic for Ireland and would result in the collapse of numerous telecommunications, computer networks, internet, banking systems (including ATM's) and online services, as they would no longer be able to synchronise without a time source. Such a turn of events would also significantly impact on the ability of the DF to deploy and communicate. While this realisation may, and probably should serve as wake-up call, there is no need to completely turn our backs on GNSS just yet. As once noted, "The problem isn't the problem, the problem is our attitude about the problem,"¹¹ and as science would have it, the solution is already here.

The eLoran System

The International Loran Association defines Enhanced Loran (eLoran) as follows:

Enhanced Loran is an internationally standardised positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) service for use by many modes of transport and in other applications. It is the latest in the longstanding and proven services of low-frequency, Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) systems, one that takes full advantage of 21st century technology...eLoran meets the accuracy, availability, integrity and continuity performance requirements for aviation non-precision instrument approaches, maritime harbour entrance and approach manoeuvres, land-mobile vehicle navigation, and location-based services, and is a precise source of time and frequency for applications such as telecommunications.¹²

The LORAN solution has been in existence in various parts of the world for the past 70 years. It began its journey as a basic long range navigation system and is today a modern digital technology system. Table 1 below outlines the various versions of LORAN and demonstrates the progress that has been made in developing this terrestrial-based PNT system.

¹⁰ Jewell (2013) op cit, p. 3.

¹¹ Brashares, A. (2014), Available: <http://www.annbrashares.com/author> [accessed 20th March 2014].

¹² Basker, S. & Williams, P. (2009) 'Navigating eLoran: Challenges and the Way forward', *Research and Radio Navigation*, available: http://www.gla-rnav.org/pdfs/navigating_eloran_paper_for_iala_2010.pdf [accessed 20th March 2014]. pp. 1 – 7.

Table 1 – Performance delivered by different generations of LORAN¹³

Supported Application	USCG Loran-C	Modernised Loran-C	Prototype eLoran	eLoran
Resilient PNT				√
Maritime: Ocean		√	√	√
Maritime: Coastal & Harbour			√	√
Aviation: Non-precision Approach				√
UTC			√	√
Precise Timing				√
Land Mobile			√	√
Interference Detection & Mitigation			√	√

Terrestrial PNT users would be more familiar with the Loran-C system which was operational from the early 1990s until recently. Ireland had intended to participate in the North-western European Loran-C System (NELS) by extending the system's coverage in to the North Atlantic. Due to planning issues experienced at the intended site at Loop Head, County Clare, this extension of the NELS network did not proceed. This set-back only served to leave Ireland and Western Europe without a suitable redundant system in the event of a complete loss of GNSS signal. Today's modern eLoran has been in testing since 2008 and now operates continuously off the coast of the UK. It complies with IMO standards for Radio Navigation Systems¹⁴ and its basic operating procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ IMO resolution A.1046(27) World-Wide Radio Navigation System (RNS), Annex 27, adopted 30 November 2011, available: [http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Documents/A%20-%20Assembly/1046\(27\).pdf](http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Documents/A%20-%20Assembly/1046(27).pdf) [accessed 25th March 2014].




Figure 1 - Nominal UK eLoran System Design¹⁵

eLoran Testing & Performance

This paper has referred to the manner in which eLoran, as a system, can be made resilient by building-in, or otherwise providing standby capacity or by switching to alternative operational procedures. Since 2008 the General Lighthouse Authority (GLA) in conjunction with Accessibility for Shipping, Efficiency Advantages and Sustainability (ACCSEAS)¹⁶ has invested significant time and effort in developing and implementing an eLoran system within the United Kingdom (UK). Initial testing took place in Harwich and the Dover Straits as this is an area that experiences significant volumes of marine traffic and has also experienced an increase in GNSS signal jamming. In conjunction with the installation of eLoran transmitters and receivers onboard test vessels, the GLA also had to complete an Additional Secondary Factor (ASF) survey around the Dover Straits. The purpose of ASF is to account for land propagation as the figures obtained are unique to the particular environment within which the transmitter and receiver are located. It should be noted that by definition, ASF is zero for an all-sea water path, but the nature and topographical features of the local coastline merits an ASF survey to ensure signal accuracy.¹⁷ ASF surveys are relatively inexpensive and once complete, result in significant improvements to the signal quality. Just as GPS has differential GPS (DGPS),¹⁸ eLoran

¹⁵ International Loran Association (2007) 'Enhanced Loran (eLoran): Definition Document', *International Loran Association*, Report dated 16 October 2007, Version 1, p. 16.

¹⁶ ACCSEAS / GLA Resilient PNT Demonstration; available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNAr8eQQ_9E [accessed 20th February 2014]

¹⁷ Hargreaves, C. (2010), *ASF Measurement and Processing Techniques, to allow Harbour Navigation at High Accuracy with eLoran*. Dissertation submitted to University of Nottingham for the degree of Master of Science in Navigation Technology, September 2010, p. 20.

¹⁸ DGPS is an enhancement to GPS and provides improved location accuracy, from 15 meter nominal GPS accuracy to about 10 cm in cases of the best implementations. DGPS uses a network of fixed, ground-based reference stations to broadcast the difference between the positions indicated by the satellite systems and the known fixed positions. The digital correction signal is typically broadcast locally over ground-based transmitters of shorter range.

also has a differential service input in the form of eDLoran. These stations are used to monitor the ASF at a particular site and broadcast the corrections to any users in the vicinity. This process is demonstrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2 – Changes in ASF for eLoran are analogous to changes in atmospheric delay for GPS, and can be mitigated by a differential service in much the same way.¹⁹

The trial conducted on the south coast of the UK has produced significant results, and the GLA reported static positioning accuracies of <7m (95%) at Harwich. This empirical evidence has resulted in the GLA announcing the full implementation and installation of eLoran around the UK coastline, with full operational capability (FOC) to be achieved by 2019.²⁰ This FOC will cover all major ports in the UK plus Traffic Separation Schemes in the English Channel and UK Southwest approaches. Figure 3 provides an overview of the coverage offered by eLoran as it currently exists. This bleak and realistic overview demonstrates the poor basic coverage and accuracy levels currently present in Ireland.

¹⁹ Williams, P. (2013) 'eLoran Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in the UK', Keynote Speech on PNT delivered to French Maritime Industry, 10 September 2013. Slide 3.

²⁰ Ibid, Slide 8.




Figure 3 – eLoran Accuracy of <10m (95%) with Differential Service (Green Areas)²¹

Why eLoran – Why Now?

As outlined by Brad Parkinson, the founding architect of GPS, the system must be made more robust to ensure worldwide availability of services to users, particularly those in the maritime industry who have taken GPS for granted and at present have no adequate or internationally approved back-up system.²² Parkinson's concerns are primarily related to the valid threats currently being posed to the loss of authorised frequency spectrum (implicitly creating licensed jammers), space weather due to hyperactive ionospheric conditions and deliberate or inadvertent jamming of GPS signals. General Schwartz, US Air Force Chief of Staff, added to these observations as he noted that "our dependency on GPS has also created certain vulnerabilities that our adversaries can exploit through jamming and other tactical denial techniques."²³ eLoran's high-power, low-frequency signals are very difficult to jam and have the added benefit of penetrating buildings, foliage and shallow water, something impossible for GNSS signals.²⁴ Ireland must pay heed to these stern and frank warnings as Parkinson observes that "most

²¹ Ibid. Slide 7.

²² Parkinson, B. (2014) 'GNSS Vulnerabilities and Resilient PNT', Keynote Speech delivered to Royal Institute of Navigation. 21 January 2014.

²³ Schwartz, N. (2010) 'GPS Dependency,' PowerPoint Presentation delivered to USAF Associations Air Warfare Symposium and Technology Exposition, Orlando, Florida, available: <http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1881> [accessed 15th March 2014]

²⁴ McNeff, J. (2010) 'The Way Ahead for Military PNT – Changing the Game Changer', *Inside GNSS*, November/December, pp. 44-51.

western Governments are in their infancy in recognising the problem”²⁵ and have not yet admitted to this inconvenient truth – that GNSS cannot offer full PNT redundancy when deliberately attacked. GPS signal can be easily degraded and some illustrative case studies will now be examined. There are three distinct forms of deliberate interference with GNSS signals:²⁶

- Jamming - Most likely to impact conventional industrial use of GPS.
- Meaconing - Delaying and rebroadcasting GPS signal.
- Spoofing - Creating or sending a false signal.

GPS Jamming

Since 2010, South Korea has been subjected to annual GPS jamming attacks by North Korea. The severity of the jamming has varied, with the longest being a continuous 16-day attack that employed various frequencies, techniques and signal strengths. During 2012 alone, South Korean officials estimated that 1,016 aircraft lost GPS signals, as did 254 ships and a large number of mobile telecommunications towers.²⁷ The jamming seriously affected South Korea's substantial merchant fleet and its key trans-Pacific export trade to the US, for which GPS has become a standard navigational aid.²⁸ In April 2013, South Korea announced plans for a network of 43 eLoran ground-based radio towers, and with Chinese and Russian assistance, it hopes to expand coverage across the region.²⁹

GPS Jamming is also prevalent in Ireland, and the number of incidents being chronicled is on the increase annually.³⁰ This trend would appear to replicate findings in both the US and UK where the following national reports have been published:

‘The Department of Homeland Security has determined that the GPS timing signal is essential for the operation of 11 of the nation's 16 critical infrastructure sectors; all sectors use GPS information in some form. The number of jamming and spoofing incidents in the US continues to grow each year and the threat to our national, homeland and economic security increases,’ the RNT Foundation wrote in a white paper released Wednesday (November 6, 2013).³¹

The SENTINEL research project has clearly shown to Government agencies that GPS jamming from small, low-cost, commercially available GPS jamming devices is a clear and present threat. Now our research will enable organisations to assess their vulnerability to this threat so they can explore mitigation options.³²

²⁵ Parkinson (2014) op cit.

²⁶ The Royal Academy of Engineers (RAOE) (2011) ‘Global Navigation Space Systems: Reliance and Vulnerabilities’ [online], available: www.raeng.org.uk/gnss [accessed 19 March 2014], p 20.

²⁷ Sheridan, J. (2013) ‘South Korea To Install eLoran To Counter North Korean GPS Jamming,’ *Aviation International News*, 02 August 2013.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ The Economist (2014) ‘GPS Jamming: Out of Sight’ [online], available: <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21582288-satellite-positioning-data-are-vital-but-signal-surprisingly-easy-disrupt-out> [accessed 25 March 2014].

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Divis, D. A. (2013) ‘New Foundation Formed to pursue eLoran as Backup for GPS,’ *Inside GNSS*, November/December.

³² Curry, C. (2013) ‘Chronos Launches GPS Interference & Jamming Detection and Monitoring Service’ [online], available: <http://www.gps-world.biz/index.php/products/gps-jamming-detection/jamming-detection-products-a-solutions> [accessed 04th March 2014].

Meaconing & Spoofing

Meaconing and spoofing occurs when fake GPS signals are generated and broadcast to a GPS receiver. Such tactics have been employed by militaries since the First World War and form an integral part of modern military training and operational doctrine.³⁸ These deliberate attacks could be devastating for military forces, particularly if an organisation's tactical system were spoofed, resulting in a 'blue on blue' scenario.³⁹ This concept is a proven reality and merits pause for thought, particularly as the Defence Forces has introduced systems that either utilise or are dependent on GPS information. Examples of DF equipment that utilise GPS information include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's), Tactical Battle-space Management Systems (TBMS), and Naval and Artillery Fire Control Systems. An example of the consequences of ignoring such weaknesses occurred in 2011, when Iranians captured a highly classified US Central Intelligence Agency drone, a stealth Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel, purportedly by spoofing its GPS equipment.⁴⁰

Another example of spoofing outlines how researchers in the US successfully managed to spoof GPS signals, resulting in the target vessel being set hundreds of metres off course while simultaneously fooling the crew into thinking that the yacht remained perfectly on course. This test was conducted in 2013 off the coast of Italy, and was the climax of years of research by students from the University of Texas in Austin.⁴¹ To fool the vessel's GPS system, the researchers needed to generate fake signals that were slightly different to the legitimate ones. In theory, the navigation system would accept the signals, but the result would be a location that wasn't completely accurate. If only one satellite signal was faked, it might get discarded by the receiver as erroneous because it was out of character with all the others. If only half of the signals were faked, the system might sense it was being attacked or fed false information. To avoid any detection, the research team mimicked the entire GPS constellation,⁴² thus allowing the fake signal to mix with the legitimate signals in the receiver, only their signal was stronger.

Once the yacht's GPS system was being fed the spoofed data, the researchers began to manipulate the fake GPS signals so that the yacht would think it was heading off course. In reality, it hadn't deviated from its course, but once the erroneous position was fed to the yacht's computer it issued a course correction that resulted in the yacht actually turning. Because the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) was basing its movements on fake signals, the ECDIS display on the bridge showed the yacht moving in a perfectly straight line. On completion of the trial phase, the yacht was several hundred meters off course.⁴³ Figure 6 outlines the basic process that occurs when GPS signals are spoofed. To counteract such interference, the Naval Service (NS) regularly subjects its ships to a system denial environment and requires all navigators to navigate at high speed via first principles utilising sextants, RELNAV⁴⁴ techniques and a magnetic compass. Such assessments ensure NS ships maintain high levels of

38 Langley, R. (2013) 'Innovation – GNSS Spoofing Detection', *GPS World*, available: <http://gpsworld.com/innovation-gnss-spoofing-detection-correlating-carrier-phase-with-rapid-antenna-motion/> [accessed 10th April 2014].

39 'Blue on Blue' is a NATO term used to describe an attack by a military force on friendly forces while attempting to attack the enemy. This can occur when a force misidentifies the target as hostile, or experiences errors or inaccuracies relating to the positioning of its personnel and/or mobile units.

40 Langley, Op Cit.

41 Humphreys, T. (2013) *UT Austin Researchers Spoof Superyacht at Sea*, Austin: Cockrell School of Engineering.

42 Ibid.

43 Animation of GPS Spoofing available at <http://www.engr.utexas.edu/features/superyacht-gps-spoofing> [accessed 15th March 2014].

44 RELNAV – A navigation technique used in coastal waters to establish the ships position relative to land or shoals.

operational readiness, thus enabling them to operate unrestricted in any high risk or potentially hostile environment in support of DF deployments.




Figure 6 – The Portable Receiver-Spoofing Architecture Simplifies a Spoofing Attack⁴⁵

What Next for Future PNT?

While some of us will have been aware of the threats already discussed in this paper, there are many who will have been unaware of such hazards. The international community has slowly begun to grasp the clear and present danger presented by this problem and has sought to implement change. In 2004 the US, under the Bush administration, issued a National Space Policy (NSPD-39)⁴⁶ which addressed the problem of GPS dependence. The policy essentially sought to find a suitable back-up and augmentation for GPS, and the US decided to maintain and upgrade their Loran-C network. While this policy had initial success, the current US administration began to dismantle the US Loran network due to budgetary constraints, a decision that was widely criticised. A subsequent policy U-turn has materialised and the US is now seeking to implement eLoran based on the research conducted by the US Government Accountability Office, which supports such proactive policy implementation.⁴⁷

In Europe, the implementation of eLoran has expanded. The port of Rotterdam, Europe's busiest port with approximately 32,000 ships visiting annually,⁴⁸ is the latest addition to the eLoran family. The Dutch system includes an eDLoran reference station and eDLoran receivers for the pilots, which have recorded accuracies of <5 metres on a continuous basis.⁴⁹ France too has experimented with eLoran and is currently awaiting a policy decision that will determine whether or not to continue with the eLoran programme. Russia, which operates the GLONASS⁵⁰ constellation, also maintains a terrestrial based system in the form of the 'CHAYKA' system. This system operates on the same principles as Loran and at present, Russia has no plans to remove this reliable back-up service.

⁴⁵ Last (2013) op cit.

⁴⁶ NSPD (2004) 'U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy' [online], available: <https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-39.htm>. [accessed 10th March 2014]

⁴⁷ GAO (2013) 'Efforts to Assess Risks to Critical Infrastructure and Coordinate Agency Actions Should Be Enhanced' GAO-14-15, Published: Nov 6, 2013.

⁴⁸ Eurostat (2014) 'Europe's Busiest Ports', *Eurostat Annual Report*, Published: Jan 2014.

⁴⁹ RIN (2014), 'Differential Loran for Rotterdam', available: <http://www.rin.org.uk/News>, [accessed 20th March 2014].

⁵⁰ GLONASS, otherwise known as the "Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema" or "Global Navigation Satellite System," is a space-based satellite navigation system operated by the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces. It provides an alternative to Global Positioning System (GPS) and is the only alternative navigational system in operation with global coverage and of comparable precision.

The Way Forward

As we look forward, it is important to be aware of the omnipresent threat that exists in relation to the susceptibility of GNSS and its inherent PNT capability. In order to safeguard their critical national infrastructures, many European nations have already commenced implementing eLoran as their standby system, as no one has oversight of the increasing range of every-day services that are dependent on GNSS, or the complex ways in which they interact. Such steps are necessary due to the current inability to reliably predict the consequences of a significant disruption of GNSS signals.⁵¹ Ultimately, even a sky blanketed with GPS satellites will not guarantee service in all possible locations at all times, therefore complimentary technologies will be needed to provide high fidelity PNT service when GPS is unavailable. This in turn will act as a deterrent to anybody who might attempt to interfere with GPS. After all, if you cannot jam or spoof the back-up terrestrial PNT system, why would you bother trying to jam or spoof the primary system?⁵² Therefore Ireland must make decisions about developing alternative means of obtaining PNT information. The Defence Forces, in conducting its primary role in defending the State,⁵³ also has a responsibility to ensure that it can operate holistically within the domains of air, sea and land when in a system denial environment, and should actively seek to take a leading role in the national acquisition of a resilient PNT system.

The need for Ireland to strengthen its internal PNT terrestrial coverage to include marine, urban, indoor, underground and underwater domains will continue to grow as technology continues to develop. Anyone charged with producing a strategy and a policy in this area should pause and reflect on the words of J.C. Wylie:

There is more work to be done, a great deal of it, before we can force order into situations inherently disorderly, before we can better predict the unpredictable and before we can apply equivalent experience to situations inherently novel in the vast social and technological revolutions of our time.⁵⁴

Ultimately, the facts speak for themselves. The technological world as we know it today needs resilient PNT in order to function, and the time has now come for Ireland, an island nation, to embrace the solution to this inconvenient truth.

⁵¹ The Royal Academy of Engineers (RAOE) (2011), 'Global Navigation Space Systems: Reliance and Vulnerabilities', [online], available: www.raeng.org.uk/gnss, p. 14. [accessed 10th March 2014].

⁵² Jewell (2013), p. 4.

⁵³ Department of Defence (2000), op cit.

⁵⁴ Jermy, S. (2011) *Strategy for Action*, London: Knightstone Publishing, p. 277.

To What Degree Can Air Power's Inputs to Battle be Considered Strategic?

Abstract

This paper examines the degree to which air power has a role to play in the strategic outcome of a conflict. The Falklands War of 1982 is used as a case study, demonstrating the extent of the involvement of airpower in the conduct and the outcome of the campaign. It provides clear evidence that in carrying out roles that were at the outer reaches of the operating limits of aircraft, forces on both sides were obliged to adjust their operations due to the peculiarities of the region, and this influenced the strategic outcome of the conflict. Operations in the South Atlantic are contrasted with previous conflicts in the Middle East, where the use of air power provided a much different understanding of the role it played in those campaigns.

There are the ships. Two grey silhouettes could be seen near the coast.
I straightened up and banked to the left. Here we go again.¹

Carballo

Introduction

While air power itself does not hold the key to resolving a military conflict, it is a force enabler, a means of assisting and complementing other military operations. It can be used to provide effects, but cannot on its own win a conflict. This has been demonstrated to varying degrees in countless conflicts in the twentieth century, and the purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which air power can play a decisive² role in battle. Air power can be defined as "the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events."³ As all aspects of air power possess the ability to affect the battle, the extent to which the overall outcome will be affected will depend on a number of factors. These factors can include geographical constraints, opposing forces, allied forces and alliances, levels of equipment and budgetary considerations.

The Falklands conflict of 1982 is used to provide the backdrop for this paper, which highlights discrete aspects of the campaign in which air power played a significant role in its outcome, with other conflicts also given consideration as a way of providing

1 Carballo, P. (1989) 'Attacking the Sir Galahad, June 1982' in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 56.

2 For the purpose of this paper, "Decisive" is taken to mean "favourable military achievement which forwards achievement of the war's 'political object.'" See Gray, C. (2002) 'Defining and achieving decisive victory', [online], available: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub272.pdf>, [accessed 26 May 14], p.12.

3 AP 3000 (2009), *British Air and Space Power Doctrine*, 4th edn., available: http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/4thEdition_WebVersion-u.pdf, [accessed 18 Dec 2010], p. 14.

contrast. Traditionally, long distances favour the use of air power as it employs the core characteristics of speed, reach and height.⁴ In the case of *Desert Shield* in 1990, while sea was used for the movement of heavy loads and equipment, it was the use of airlift that was critical to the success of the campaign, especially within theatre.⁵ In the case of the Falklands however, the geography of the region presented two significant considerations for the British Forces: extremely long lines of communication as well as the onset of the South Atlantic winter. Lack of Host Nation Support (HNS) meant that the nearest suitable air and naval bases were located on Ascension Island, three thousand miles away, which meant that the only way to bring a force to the region was as part of a maritime Task Force (TF).⁶

The air segment of the conflict also saw distance constitute a very important consideration for both sides, with Fuerza Aérea Argentina⁷ (FAA) aircraft operating at the extremity of their ranges, which severely restricted their ability to strike the British forces.⁸ Similarly, the Royal Navy (RN) Harriers, although based close to the islands, could not strike the mainland bases of the FAA. While surveillance, reconnaissance, close air support and airlift did play a part in this conflict, it was the primary role undertaken by the Harriers of air to air, and the role of maritime strike undertaken by the FAA which would prove crucial in the end.

Strategic Effect

Strategy can be defined as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronised and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives;”⁹ while Clausewitz says that “strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”¹⁰ From these definitions it can be taken that a strategic effect is one that has a direct impact on achieving the aim of the war, rather than influencing a particular battle.

In limited wars there can be a tendency to think of air inputs as being localised or tactical in nature, in that there is never really one significant event that determines the overall outcome of the action or conflict. Often it is the cumulative effect of these small battles which is decisive to the overall object of the war, and thereby a number of tactical victories can accumulate to a strategic victory. In a decisive battle however, the tactical input may have a strategic effect. Ultimately, the strategic victory results in the attainment of the national objective¹¹ and in the case of the Falklands, from the Argentinian viewpoint, this would have been the retention of control over the islands, which could have been brought about by defeating the TF. For this to occur, the sinking of one of the carriers before the landings took place would have delivered the desired effect.¹² Once the landings had taken place “the conclusion was no longer in doubt”¹³ and the task of achieving this

4 Ibid, p. 16.

5 Nordeen, L. (2002), *Air Warfare in the Missile Age*, Washington: Smithsonian, p. 226.

6 Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S. (2010) *The Battle for the Falklands*, London: Pan, p. 97.

7 Argentinian Air Force.

8 Nordeen (2002) op cit, p. 177.

9 USAF (2008), JP 3-0 *Joint Operations*, available: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf [accessed 10 Dec 2010], p. GL-27.

10 Von Clausewitz, C. (1993) *On War*, Rappoport, A. (ed), New York: Everyman's Library, p. 207.

11 Meilinger, P.S. (2005) *Air War - Theory and Practice*, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 38.

12 Nietzel, S. (2007) *The Falklands War: Understanding the Power of Context in Shaping Argentine Strategic Decisions*, US Naval Post-Graduate School, available: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2007/Sep/07Sep_Nietzel.pdf [accessed 01 Dec 2010], p. 42.

13 Ibid, p. 54.

strategic victory became more difficult as the role of the carriers diminished considerably and it was the land forces that now had to be defeated.

In previous conflicts, the role of air power has varied considerably in relation to the final outcome, and on occasion it has proven to be very significant, indeed decisive. In the case of the Six Day War of 1967, the Israeli Air Force was able to deliver a strategic effect through the destruction of the Arab air forces on the ground in the opening hours of the war, and while this action did not in itself gain victory for the Israelis, it did prove decisive in permitting complete freedom of movement for Israeli ground forces.¹⁴ This level of air supremacy¹⁵ which is defined as “that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference”¹⁶ represented a significant force multiplier for the overall effort, and in this particular case enabled the air force to focus on supporting the ground forces. By the time the Yom Kippur War took place in 1973, this perceived level of air superiority was found wanting when the complex face of air power was severely challenged by advances in technology and tactics that were in complete contrast to what had occurred six years previously.¹⁷

A level of air dominance similar to that achieved during the Six Day War was accomplished in *Desert Storm* (Gulf War I) in 1991, presenting the coalition with complete freedom of movement throughout the battlespace. The desire to keep casualties to a minimum resulted in continuous air actions against Iraqi ground forces to the extent that no battle was entered into by coalition ground forces until the air part of the campaign had been decisive in depleting the Iraqi fighting capability.¹⁸

Finally, by way of example, the Eastern Front during World War II illustrated how effective air power could be from a strategic point of view, while not being used in a strategic role, and presented a clear illustration of the cumulative effect of airpower in determining the overall outcome. The German *Blitzkrieg* offensive, undertaken as part of *Operation Barbarossa*, was instrumental in achieving early success on the battlefield¹⁹ and in facilitating rapid advances of German forces into the USSR. As the German advance faltered, the Soviets went on the offensive at Stalingrad, tending to stress mass as opposed to the German finesse. Employing tactical airpower as flying artillery, the Soviets’ concept of manoeuvre warfare relied heavily on air power to support their mobility, tempo and mass of attacks as they regained the initiative, achieving air parity in 1943.²⁰

Centre of Gravity

When it comes to inflicting the significant impact on an enemy, there is usually a particular area upon which an opponent will focus. This area may be a force, a leader, or a capability and is termed the Centre of Gravity (CoG), identification of which is a fundamental element of the military planning process. The CoG is “the point where the enemy is most

14 Crevelld, M., Canby, S.L. and Brower, K.S. (2002) *Air Power and Maneuver Warfare*, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, p. 160.

15 Ibid, p. 165.

16 US Department of Defense (2005) JP 1-02 *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, available: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf [accessed 10 Dec 2010], p. 22.

17 Nordeen (2002) op cit, p. 123.

18 Keaney, T. and Cohen, E.A. (1993) *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report*, USAF History website available: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/gulf_war_air_power_survey-summary.pdf on, [accessed 07 Nov 2010], p. 246

19 Van Crevelld et al (2002) op cit, p. 74.

20 Ibid, p. 14.

vulnerable and ... an attack will have the best chance of being decisive.”²¹ This quote is taken from Clausewitz’s original definition, which conceived of the CoG as the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends ... the point against which all our energies should be directed.”²²

Correct identification of an opponent’s centre of gravity results in the determination of the critical vulnerability, which is something that can be exploited or attacked during battle. While it must be assumed that the Argentinians completed a detailed analysis in this regard, and correctly identified the British CoG, the lack of detailed, intense and co-ordinated attacks on the British fleet, which would possibly have gained that decisive effect, would indicate otherwise. It may be argued that the British centre of gravity shifted as the conflict progressed through its various phases. The carriers constituted their centre of gravity for the initial part of the conflict, because of the critical capability they possessed in permitting the Harriers to operate in the air to air role. The Harriers, using the latest model of the Sidewinder missile (AIM-9L, brought in from the US)²³ posed the greatest threat to the FAA in protecting the fleet. Once the decision was made to commit to land the ground forces, the British centre of gravity shifted to its ground forces, but up until that point, the protection of the carriers was foremost in the TF Commander’s decision making.²⁴

A critical vulnerability of the British CoG was the lack of an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability, which resulted in ships being used as radar pickets to pick up incoming aircraft.²⁵ This meant that they were in the first line whenever attacks came in, a role *HMS Sheffield* was fulfilling when it was hit by an Exocet missile. The inability of the Argentinian forces to successfully press home an attack on the carriers was to prove decisive in terms of the continued threat posed by the Harrier force to Argentinian attack aircraft.

On the other side, the Argentinian CoG was identified as its mainland air bases. The physical inability of the deployed British forces to launch an attack on these bases, as well as the political restriction which prevented any other air or Special Forces (SF) from attacking them meant that they were never targeted as they should have been.²⁶ Its critical capability was the potential it provided to the air elements to attack the TF prior to ground forces being landed where “the loss of a carrier would signal disaster”²⁷ and would have resulted in the British withdrawing from the Falklands and abandoning its objective of retaking the islands. However, the distance involved in pressing home attacks on the TF, and the decision to keep the TF well to the East of the Falklands, meant that attacks by FAA aircraft were limited in their duration and intensity, although they were still effective and had the potential to be decisive. The level of air attack conducted by the FAA never reached the intensity it should have, which could easily have saturated air defences within the British fleet and caused many problems in dealing with multiple co-ordinated attacks.²⁸

21 Warden, J. (1989) *The Air Campaign – Planning for Combat*, Washington DC: Brassey’s, p. 7

22 Howard and Paret (1993) op cit, p. 720.

23 Nietzel (2007) op cit, p. 19.

24 Hastings (2010) op cit, p. 197.

25 Wilcox, M.A. (1999) *Fleet Air Defense in the Falkland Islands Conflict: A Failure in Operational Protection?*, available: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA363067&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> [accessed 18 Dec 2010], p. 1.

26 Hastings (2010) op cit, p. 205.

27 Ibid, p. 204.

28 Funnell, R.G. (2009) ‘It was a bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the South Atlantic War’ in Stephens, A. (ed.) *The War in the Air 1914-1994*, RAAF, available: <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/394/The-War-in-the-Air-2nd-edition-2009.aspx> [accessed 26 Apr 2010], p. 162.

One of the FAA's main vulnerabilities was the fact that it had no bases capable of operating its jet fighter aircraft on the Falkland islands and as a result, they had to operate at the extreme limit of their range. The decision not to extend the existing runway on the Falklands demonstrated a lack of foresight and a failure to appreciate the implications of this inaction. Possessing the equipment and expertise, it was estimated that the FAA could have extended the runway on the Falklands within a week.²⁹ Another critical vulnerability was the very limited air-air refuelling capability available to the FAA. They relied on just two C-130 Hercules aircraft³⁰ for this purpose, however only the Skyhawk and Etendard aircraft could be refuelled in the air, the Mirage III and Dagger aircraft could not, which "exposed a major operational limitation."³¹ The range at which the tankers were refuelling the FAA aircraft from the Falklands meant that they were effectively never going to be engaged by the Harriers. Because of the distance to the mainland, the Harriers were only ever going to be used in a defensive counter-air role to protect the British fleet, which handed the initiative over to the FAA, thereby permitting them to dictate the pace of the air battle.

Air Superiority

"Air superiority is always a supporting objective in an overall operational design"³² and it had been earmarked by the TF Commander as a precondition prior to commencing landings. However, the result of the FAA's decision to avoid direct air-to-air combat meant that air superiority was never going to be achieved, other than on a local basis, and the air war became one of attrition, with the possession of superior air to air missiles (Sidewinder AIM-9L as opposed to Matra 530) giving the Harriers a distinct advantage in the air to air role. Another factor was the ability of the Harriers to conduct Combat Air Patrols (CAP's) for extended periods of up to sixty minutes, due to the proximity of the carriers, while the FAA aircraft only had about five minutes on target, because they were operating at the extremity of their range.

This was a significant aspect of the air war because the FAA had to change tactics for the conflict, finding itself having to operate in a role for which it had not been properly trained. Traditionally, the perceived opponent of Argentina was Chile, and its forces had trained for such a conflict using Close Air Support (CAS) as the primary basis for its expected operations.³³ In addition, it must be stated that the British had never perceived a situation whereby their only means of attaining and maintaining control of the air would rely solely on their carriers. Neither side was able to establish air superiority to any sustained degree, and it was on this basis that the landings would have to be undertaken.³⁴

The decision to proceed with the landings on the night of 21 May meant that, because they were taking place under cover of darkness, extra ships were provided for air defence. However, because the Argentinian aircraft were limited to daytime operations, a level of

29 Pereyra, R. (2006) 'Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War', *Air & Space Power Journal*, XX (3), pp. 111-119, available: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/pereyra.html> [accessed 30 Nov 2010], p. 116.

30 Corum, J.S. (2002) 'Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View', *Air & Space Power Journal*, XVI (3), pp. 59-76, available: <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/corum.html> [accessed 15 Dec 2010], p. 62.

31 Funnell (2009) op cit, p. 155.

32 Huber, J.L. (1995) *The Falklands Air War: Lessons Revisited*, Naval War College, available: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> [accessed 15 Jul 2010], p. 7.

33 Corum (2002) op cit, p. 62.

34 Hastings (2010) op cit, p. 205.

air superiority did exist for the British forces.³⁵ On the following day, a series of sorties by the FAA demonstrated the offensive capability of their forces. Significantly, the very low level tactics used by the attackers had the effect of limiting the bomb damage inflicted on the British ships that were struck, as the reduced flight time of the bombs meant that they didn't have enough time in flight to arm.³⁶ The result was that a lot of the bombs that hit their targets didn't explode. Thirteen bomb hits were achieved that day, but even if only half had exploded, the landings would have been in serious danger of collapse.

The attack on the 25th May which resulted in the loss of the *Atlantic Conveyor* was significant in terms of how it affected the future conduct of the campaign by the British. The *Atlantic Conveyor* had been used to ferry extra Harriers and helicopters down to the South Atlantic, and three Chinooks and ten Wessex helicopters were still on board when it was hit and sank. The British had been expecting to use these helicopters to facilitate the breakout from the bridgehead, and this loss inflicted additional hardship on troops and reduced lift capability significantly.³⁷ The result of the attack meant that the TF would now be kept well to the East of the Falklands to minimise the possibility of a successful attack on the carriers.

A further factor that highlighted the limited control of the air attained by the British was the continued ability of the FAA to supply the islands right up to the day before the surrender. This not only demonstrated the determination of the crews to conduct the mission and the ability of air power to sustain an operation (in this case re-supply and medical evacuation taskings), it also continued to highlight the limited capability of the British forces to attain total air superiority.³⁸

Conclusion

The conflict in the South Atlantic in 1982 was quite unique in its character, and more than any other recent conflict, provided some important lessons for future conflicts involving the use of airpower. While it may be said that in warfare "numbers are not enough, it is how you deploy and use your numbers that determines the outcome,"³⁹ the fact remains that the Argentinians did not utilise their numerical superiority to their advantage.

"The decisive battle that determined the fate of the islands was fought in the air"⁴⁰ and the advantages displayed by the use of Harriers in the defensive counter-air role was enough to tilt the balance against the FAA. In stating that the air battle was decisive, the decision not to extend the runway at Stanley is probably the single most significant factor of the conflict. While the Harriers did decisively win the war in the air, even without an AEW capability, the FAA demonstrated the effectiveness of anti-shipping operations, even with dumb bombs, and illustrated what potentially could have transpired if intense and co-ordinated attacks had been conducted against the British fleet and resulted in damage to one of the carriers. The use of newer technologies in terms of Sidewinder AIM-9L air to air missiles and Exocet AM-39 air to surface missiles

³⁵ Ibid, p. 238.

³⁶ Corum (2002) op cit, p. 70.

³⁷ Hastings (2010) op cit, p. 296.

³⁸ Funnell (2009) op cit, p. 164.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 152.

⁴⁰ Corum (2002) op cit, p. 59.

indicated the importance of updating technologies and maintaining at least a par with potential opponents.

While nothing other than local air superiority was ever attained during the conflict, the air components of each side continued to operate up until the surrender. Even so, while the FAA had the potential to conduct decisive attacks which could have resulted in the withdrawal of the fleet and thereby effected a strategic decision, it was the Harrier force, combined with the picket ships which inflicted such losses on the FAA that it was unable to sustain its offensive actions.

‘To Thine Own Self Be True?’ An Examination of the Cultural Barriers to Authentic Leadership in the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

Over the last 10 years there have been increasing calls for greater authenticity from our leaders. Despite the significant research undertaken on authentic leadership recently, the literature fails to examine the factors which discourage a leader from demonstrating greater authenticity. This study makes an initial contribution to the filling of that gap by exploring the barriers which discourage the exercising of authentic leadership by Commandants within the military culture of the Irish Defence Forces. The review of the literature was drawn towards an exploration of the criticisms relating to the impact of military culture on its leaders, from which the following themes emerged: a strong ethos of devotion to duty, a low tolerance for innovation and an undervaluing of moral courage. In light of highly publicised unethical behaviour by soldiers of other Western military forces while on operations in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, these findings indicate the need for greater discussion regarding the conflict between personal and organisational values.

Introduction

Leadership plays a significant role in every organisation, particularly during periods of uncertainty, danger and/or change.¹ Within a military context, leadership plays a key role in the moral component of fighting power.² Although there is little doubt as to the importance of leadership in the military, questions remain regarding the most appropriate theories and styles of leadership required given the complexity of the challenges faced by military leaders. In recent years there have been calls for leaders to demonstrate greater authenticity in response to the failures of transformational leadership to effectively respond to many of the global crises which have occurred towards the end of the last century and the beginning of this one.

This paper explores authenticity in the military context of the Defence Forces and examines the cultural barriers to authentic leadership within the organisation. In doing so, it explores the value of diverse, authentic and sometimes eccentric leaders who are willing to demonstrate their own unique brand of leadership, who challenge cultural

¹ Kotter, J.P. (1990) *A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs from Management*, New York: Free Press.

² Defence Forces Ireland (2012) *Defence Forces Capstone Doctrine* (Pre-publication Draft), DF Strategic Planning Office, Newbridge.

norms, who have the courage to speak the truth to those in power, and who follow their own moral values, against the flow of the military culture in the Irish Defence Forces (DF). The study identifies a number of cultural barriers which discourage the exercising of Authentic Leadership (AL) by Commandants in the DF, including a strong ethos of devotion to duty, a low tolerance for innovation and an undervaluing of moral courage. In order to place the research in context, it is instructive to examine the available literature relating to authentic leadership and organisational culture.

Authenticity

Harter traces *authenticity* back to Greek philosophy which is reflected in the Greek aphorism “be true to oneself.”³ He also explains that the etymology of the word authentic relates to the Greek word *authento*, meaning “to have full power” and involves owning one’s personal experiences and acting in accordance with one’s true self. Authenticity does appear to mean different things to different people, particularly within the variety of fields which have adopted the term, from positive psychology to the philosophical movements of existentialism and phenomenology.⁴

Authentic Leadership

The incorporation of authenticity into leadership theory was first proposed by Henderson and Hoy,⁵ but the concept has grown in popularity, largely in response to growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which leaders behave and are portrayed in society. Gardner et al⁶ refer to the pressure to “promote style over substance, dress for success, embrace flavour of the month fads and fashions, and compromise one’s own values to satisfy Wall Street’s unquenchable thirst for quarterly profits.”⁷ Leadership failures have motivated George to call for “a new kind of leader.”⁸ More recently, calls for greater ethical leadership have extended to the military⁹ and within an Irish context to both financial¹⁰ and religious¹¹ institutions.

The emergence of literature in the area, originating in a variety of philosophical approaches, has resulted in a plethora of competing theories. This leads to confusion regarding what it means to be an authentic leader. However, the model developed by Walumbwa et al¹² has attracted the majority of most recent discussion on the value of AL within organisations.

3 Harter, S. (2002) ‘Authenticity’ In C. S. Snyder, C.S. and Lopez, S.J. (eds.), *Handbook of Positive Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 382-394.

4 Gardner, W.L., Cogliser, C.C., Davis, K.M. and Dickens, M.P. (2011) ‘Authentic leadership: A review of the literature and research agenda’, *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22, pp. 1120-1145.

5 Henderson, J. E. and Hoy, W. K. (1983) ‘Leader authenticity: The development and test of an operational measure’, *Educational and Psychological Research*, 3 (2), p.p. 63-75.

6 Gardner et al (2005) op cit. P. 344.

7 Gardner, W. L., Avolio, B. J., Luthans, F., May, D. R. and Walumbwa, F. O. (2005) ‘Can you see the real me? A self-based model of authentic leader and follower development’, *The Leadership Quarterly*, 16, 343–372, p. 344.

8 George, W. (2003) *Authentic leadership: Rediscovering the secrets to creating lasting value*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p. 9.

9 Examples include the treatment of detainees by Canadian Airforce personnel in Somalia in 1993 (Fluri and Johnsson, 2003); the abuse of detainees by US forces in Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq between October and December of 2003 (Schlesinger, 2004); and the death of Mr. Baha Mousa, while in British military custody in Iraq in 2003 (UK Ministry of Defence, 2008).

10 Regling and Watson (2010); Honohan (2010); and Nyberg (2011).

11 Department of Justice (2005) relating to the Catholic Diocese of Ferns; Department of Justice and Equality (2009) relating to the Archdiocese of Dublin; and Department of Justice and Equality (2011) relating to Diocese of Cloyne.

12 Walumbwa, F. O., Avolio, B. J., Gardner, W. L., Wernsing, T. S., and Peterson, S. J. (2008) ‘Authentic leadership: Development and validation of a theory-based measure’, *Journal of Management*, 34, pp. 89-126.

The Walumbwa et al Model

Walumbwa et al define AL as:

a pattern of leader behaviours that draws upon and promotes both positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, relational transparency, balanced processing of information and an internalised moral perspective on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self-development.¹³

The four components outlined in the definition of AL proposed by Walumbwa et al reflect resolutions to many of the concerns raised by authors such as Kerins,¹⁴ Sparrowe¹⁵ and Shamir and Eilam¹⁶ relating to previous conceptualisations of the theory. *Self-awareness*, as described in the model, incorporates an understanding by the leader of their own strengths and weaknesses, a strong sense of self through exposure to others and a cognisance of their impact on followers. Branson¹⁷ suggests that the level of self-awareness demanded of leaders in the AL literature is difficult to achieve at an individual level. The outward manifestation of self-awareness is closely related to the second of the AL components: relational transparency.

Relational transparency refers to a leader's presentation of their true thoughts and emotions in an open and transparent manner, consistency between a leader's values, beliefs and actions and the minimal display of inappropriate emotions.¹⁸ The inclusion of *balanced processing* is also drawn from the earlier work of Kerins and refers to the willingness of a leader to solicit opinions which challenge their own deeply held views and to demonstrate that they can objectively analyse all relevant data prior to making decisions. The *internalised moral perspective* construct recognises the need for authentic leaders to exhibit behaviour and make decisions that are consistent with their own internal standards and values rather than surrender to group, organisational, and/or societal pressures.

Of the four components of AL, the moral component remains the most controversial. Shamir and Eilam¹⁹ deliberately omit consideration of the leader's moral perspective from their conceptualisation of AL, arguing that a leader can be "true to self" without attaining a high level of moral development or complying with high standards of ethical conduct. Sparrowe²⁰ goes further by outlining his concerns regarding the value of authenticity in leaders who have narcissistic or otherwise dysfunctional personalities. These latter models, proposed by Shamir and Eilam and Sparrowe reflect the philosophical and phenomenological perspectives of their proponents respectively. As a result, these latter models are much more focused on the individuality of the leader and his/her ability to reflect and attach meaning to the key events that occur in their individual and unique life narratives, than the version presented by Walumbwa et al.²¹

¹³ Ibid, p. 94.

¹⁴ Kernis, M. H. (2003) 'Toward a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem', *Psychological Inquiry*, 14, pp. 1-26.

¹⁵ Sparrowe, R. T. (2005) 'Authentic leadership and the narrative self', *The Leadership Quarterly*, 16, pp. 419-439.

¹⁶ Shamir, B. and Eilam, G. (2005) "What's your story?": A life-stories approach to authentic leadership development', *The Leadership Quarterly*, 16, pp. 395-417.

¹⁷ Branson, C. M. (2007) 'Improving leadership by nurturing moral consciousness through structured self-reflection', *Journal of Educational Administration*, 45(4), pp. 471-495.

¹⁸ Kerins (2003) op cit.

¹⁹ Shamir and Eilam (2005) op cit.

²⁰ Sparrowe (2005) op cit.

²¹ Walumbwa et al (2008) op cit.

Criticisms of AL

Based on the writings of the Danish existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard²² and the more recent existentialist writings of Jackson²³ and Earnshaw,²⁴ Algera and Lips-Wiersma²⁵ suggest that most models of AL create highly unrealistic expectations regarding both leaders and followers and they fail to recognise inauthenticity as a natural and unavoidable aspect of organisational life. Their analysis reflects the complexity and contradictions which exist within the literature on AL. These authors recognise that authenticity in general, and AL in particular, is a deeply personal phenomenon which is grounded in an individual's ability to make sense of and interpret his/her unique life narrative. However, Algera and Lips-Wiersma also acknowledge that individuals are exposed to multiple norms, pressures and expectations which distract them from being aware of their own individuality and from finding meaning in life. Such shared mental assumptions within an organisational setting are referred to as the organisational culture.²⁶

AL and Organisational Culture

Schein suggests that “leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin.”²⁷ He argues that leaders are the main architects of organisational culture. However, Schein also posits that the reverse can also be true. He explains that culture can ultimately dictate the type of leadership which is accepted in an organisation, through the values shared by the organisation's members and the tacit assumptions or unspoken rules which may only be identifiable to the most experienced or senior members of the group. Schein highlights the complexity of organisational culture by suggesting that superficially, organisational rewards may imply that a certain type of behaviour is rewarded while paradoxically, at the deepest level of organisational culture, contradictory behaviours are being reinforced. Within the literature, military culture is particularly unique.

Military Culture

Most discussions on military culture commence with Burk's²⁸ conceptualisation, consisting of four constituent parts: discipline, professional ethos, ceremonial displays and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps. In recent years military culture has been viewed as adversely influencing the type of leadership exercised in Western armed forces. A number of the themes which have emerged from a review of these criticisms will be used as the starting point from which to investigate the barriers to the exercising of AL within the military culture of the DF. The strongest themes to surface from the extensive literature on military leadership include: a strong ethos of devotion to duty, a lack of tolerance for innovation and an undervaluing of moral courage.²⁹

22 Kierkegaard, S. (1948) *Purity of Heart is To Will One Thing*, translated by Steers, D., New York: Harper and Brothers and Kierkegaard, S. (2005) *Fear and Trembling*, translated by Hannay, A., London: Penguin Books.

23 Jackson, K. T. (2005) 'Towards authenticity: A Sartrean perspective on business ethics', *Journal of Business Ethics*, 58 (4), pp. 307-325.

24 Earnshaw, S. (2006) *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed*, London: Continuum International Publication Group.

25 Algera, P.M. and Lips-Wiersma, M.S. (2012) 'Radical authentic leadership: Co-creating the conditions under which all members of the organisation can be authentic', *The Leadership Quarterly*, 23 (1), pp. 118-131

26 Ravasi, D. and Schultz, M. (2006) 'Responding to organisational identity threats: exploring the role of organizational culture', *Academy of Management Journal*, 49 (3), pp. 433-458.

27 Schein, E.H. (2010) *Organisational Culture and Leadership* (Fourth Edition), Hoboken, NJ Jossey-Bass, p. 3.

28 Burk, J. (2003) 'Military Mobilization in Modern Societies', in Caforio, G. (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, New York: Plenum, pp. 111-30.

29 The relevance of these particular themes was confirmed during the analysis of data collected in field research.

Devotion to Duty

Military culture is based on the notion of discipline. This strict disciplinarian culture has served the military well throughout the ages and has been described as the “bedrock of military effectiveness.”³⁰ Dixon argues that military culture is perpetuated by a hierarchical system which obviously flavours the advice which he proceeds to offer any young military officer “...stick to the rule book, do nothing without explicit approval from the next higher up, always conform, never offend your superiors, and you will float serenely, if a trifle slowly, upwards.”³¹ This advice directly conflicts with the notion of relational transparency posited in the theory of AL proposed by Walumbwa et al.³²

A Lack of Tolerance for Innovation

Yingling,³³ a military officer in the US, highlights the tendency to promote mild-mannered team players, with remarkably similar career paths, at the expense of officers who demonstrate creativity and moral courage. In this regard, the literature suggests that conformity breeds conformity. In a review of US military culture from World War II onwards, Ricks suggests that despite the brave rhetoric in US doctrine, the advice to junior officers is “don’t take risks, don’t depart from the norm, and don’t dare be less than successful in using a new approach.”³⁴ He suggests that those who ignore this wisdom are ostracised by words like “irresponsible, maverick, immature, [and] reckless.”³⁵ Dixon³⁶ suggests that “if the military provides a congenial vocation for those with a fear of failure, it is also adept at keeping them that way,” which emphasises the degree of the challenge facing the aspiring authentic leader to do things differently.

Interestingly, Ricks³⁷ blames a preoccupation with careerism as the primary justification for this conservative mind-set. As a result, it is difficult to envisage leaders in any military organisation soliciting perspectives that challenge their own deeply held views, objectively analysing these alternative outlooks, and/or possessing the conviction to pursue a particular course of action which is radically different than previous attempts to resolve a problem. Such an environment makes the balanced processing component of AL unlikely without leaders who possess significant moral courage.

An Undervaluing of Moral Courage

Forand argues that the moral dilemma of the soldier can only be resolved if he or she is willing to remain “true to thyself,” as immoral deeds are likely to “...destroy something in him which he values more than life itself.”³⁸ On the other hand van de Pitte argues that the career soldier forfeits the right to moral self-determination and declares acceptance to their leaders’ value-laden directives upon recruitment.³⁹ She also argues that military leaders demonstrate an implicit willingness to violate the moral conscience of those they command, given the soldier’s duty to obey. Ricks highlights the belief within the military

30 English, A.D. (2004) *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, Quebec: McGill-Queen Press, p. 10.

31 Dixon, N. (1976) *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, London, Pimlico, p. 244.

32 Walumbwa et al (2008), op cit.

33 Yingling, P. (2007) ‘A Failure in Generalship’, *Armed Forces Journal*, (May).

34 Ricks, T.E. (2012) *The Generals*, New York: The Penguin Press, p. 392.

35 Ibid, p. 392.

36 Dixon (1976) op cit., p. 244.

37 Ricks (2012) op cit.

38 Forand, A. (1996) in Forand, A., Tousignant, G., Lemieux, C. and Matthews, D. (eds.), ‘Ethical dilemmas of commanders on operational missions: Four views’, *The many faces of ethics in Defence*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, p. 31.

39 van de Pitte, M. (2007) ‘What is Wrong with a Military Career?’ *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 19: pp. 183–189.

that a decision by an officer “not to rock the boat” is valued more than talent. Ricks suggests that all too often promotion is not based on “professional competence” but on the fact that an officer is deemed to be “a good guy” which Ricks suggests is code for being a member of the “club.”⁴⁰ However, the reluctance to demonstrate moral courage or ethical concern in combat has also been blamed on impatience by military leaders to “get the job done.”⁴¹ These challenges to the exercise of moral courage are likely to make it difficult for leaders to remain consistent with their internalised moral perspectives in the face of group, organisational and societal pressures.

Research Findings

The tensions which exist between the themes of devotion to duty, a lack of tolerance for innovation and an undervaluing of moral courage within military culture and the four constructs of AL were examined. Although there is considerable overlap between the themes identified in the literature review and those identified in the analysis of data, the clear separation of boundaries proved challenging and in some cases was impossible. Consequently, the findings are much more entangled than the literature suggests which perhaps is a more accurate reflection of the complexity and power of the concepts at the heart of this research.

The Challenge to be Authentic

If authenticity is personal and not about how others perceive you, then it is reasonable to assume that conflict exists between remaining authentic and folding to the pressure of organisational culture, as indicated by Algera and Lips-Wiersma. When asked if there is conflict, one participant admits: “[t]he way I'd love to answer that question is ‘absolutely not. There is no conflict.’ But of course, everyday there is conflict at least with me.” It is interesting to note that a number of individuals appear to thrive on the conflict and paradoxically in some cases this clash can provide the impetus for even greater authenticity.

“Playing the Game”

Analysis of the data collected suggests that leading in the DF is quite a prescriptive process, which a number of participants describe as “playing the game.” Similar to the US military culture defined by Ricks, those who “play the game” are likely to be seen as “good guys” which Ricks describes as code for being a member of the “club” which is likely to result in promotion. Those who ignore the rules of the game and “rock the boat” are likely to be ostracised and side-lined in promotion competitions. The challenge for Commandants in the DF appears to be the balance between “playing the game” while continuing to remain authentic.

Moral Courage, Devotion to Duty and Pragmatism

The conflict between conformity and the exercising of moral courage by participants re-emerged regularly throughout the analysis of data. Three reasons are offered by the participants for the amount of emotional energy that they invest in attempting to resolve this particular tension: the absence of role models, careerism and devotion to duty.

⁴⁰ Ricks (2012) op cit. p. 455.

⁴¹ Cook, M.L. (2004) *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military*, Albany: SUNY Press, p. 47.

One participant remarked: “[l]ooking up, it seems that senior leaders don’t have the moral courage that I would like them to have and it seems to be a case of ‘don’t rock the boat.’” However, he also believes that “...the attitude from the generation coming through is different from that era.” Interestingly, the reflections of one participant provide significant grounds for optimism given his belief that a large number of middle ranking officers are demonstrating a willingness to “do the right thing as much as possible – put the organisation’s needs before your own...as opposed to maybe just worrying about promotion or stuff like that.”

All participants in this study shared concerns regarding their willingness to allow their authenticity to interfere with the completion of the mission. One of the participants pondered:

You have to find a balance between sticking to your own principles obviously and carrying out a mission which may be unpalatable to you. But we have signed up to that. We have to accept that as long as it’s lawful, then our duty is to carry out the orders of the commander as if they’re your own.

He develops this point by suggesting that the duty to adhere to orders, without questioning, is used a little too often, and is relied upon to justify the rejection of alternative points of view.

A Lack of Tolerance for Innovation

Kerins⁴² explains that self-awareness incorporates an understanding by the leader of her or his own strengths and weaknesses, which is accepted by all participants as important. One participant suggests that “[a] good leader in my opinion is going to acknowledge his shortcomings and weaknesses. He’s going to focus on those and try to improve them, but he’s going to make mistakes in that process. He picks up the pieces from that and improves but he also doesn’t try to shroud or shield the fact that he doesn’t know something or that he has made a mistake.” The majority of those interviewed in this study, indicate that such authentic behaviour is in direct conflict to the culture of the organisation. Instead the prevailing culture appears to value the masking of personal weakness and failure.

There are a number of potential reasons for this intolerance to failure, the first of which is career progression as discussed earlier. A perception exists that a small blemish on one’s record could handicap promotion prospects. Secondly, the absence of any challenging operational deployments for leaders at the current time shifts the emphasis of senior leaders, in terms of what is viewed as a “serious mistake.” When operations are challenging, the organisation tends to focus on safety and security of personnel and therefore mistakes are tolerated provided that death or serious injury to personnel does not occur. When operations are more routine, priorities change and the emphasis shifts to the illumination, investigation and punishment of even the smallest mistakes. Thirdly, stories about the failings or errors of others are embellished and relished as part of the organisational culture. Any tales regarding unsuccessful innovation appear to attract

⁴² Kerins (2003) op cit.

significant attention and are likely to be used as “a parable to warn young officers of the perils of any bright ideas they might possess” according to one participant. He warns that “nobody wants to be the lead character in such a tale.”

This concern regarding the potential impact of damaging stories on the reputation of participants, whether through failed innovation or simple error of judgement, is linked to organisational “cynicism” and the “begrudger” mentality referred to by one participant. The former refers to a belief by a small minority within the organisation that no leader engages in AL activity which does not in some way benefit his or her own career. The second refers to a perception that a leader who demonstrates high levels of AL behaviour could be seen as trying “to get ahead.” If this is the perception, then such authentic deeds are likely to be resented by peers.

Communication and Feedback

The data collected in this study found the absence of communication and feedback as a further barrier to authenticity. The data suggests a lack of appreciation by senior leaders of the need for explanation when communicating decisions and a failure by such leaders to acknowledge the importance of the feedback provided by followers in response to decisions which they have had to execute at lower levels in the organisation. One participant explains the irony of the culture: “[w]e want people to be open and enquiring and if they are open and enquiring they deserve an answer.” However, it appears that the answers are rarely forthcoming which places the authentic leader in a difficult predicament.

The absence of clear communication from the upper echelons of the chain of command downwards appears to handicap Commandants in attempting to clarify goals and objectives. The inability of Commandants to provide clarification to subordinates on the goals and objectives of the organisation impacts on their ability to provide hope and optimism regarding the organisation’s future, particularly in this period of transformation and significant re-structuring. Such feedback is difficult to return up the chain of command. The combination of these themes appears to cause significant tensions between the freedom of a Commandant to be authentic and the military culture of the DF, or what could be deemed a collision of forces.

Military Culture and Authenticity – A Collision of Forces

The power of the two conceptual forces: military culture and AL is the most striking finding in this study. In some cases these forces are travelling in similar directions, suggesting alignment between an individual leader’s AL style and the organisational culture. In others there is significant friction indicating that the organisational culture often conflicts with the purpose, values and beliefs of particular leaders. For some participants, at certain times and in certain situations, frictions or collisions are actively avoided by the muting of their authenticity out of sheer pragmatism that the more powerful force of the organisational culture will steam roll their authenticity. For others, authenticity involves following orders, even those with which they don’t agree, because to do anything less would be inauthentic given the oath they signed. For a small group, sacrificing their authenticity is not an option and results in regular collisions or shocks implying a significant divergence between the

organisation culture and the principles and standards of leaders. The power of the forces at play in the analysis of the relationship between military culture and authenticity is a re-occurring theme throughout this research and can be felt in the passion and intensity of the responses provided by each of the participants and which was impossible to capture in their study.

Conclusions

This paper highlights the tensions which exist between authenticity and organisational culture. These tensions have the potential to place significant stress on aspiring authentic leaders, their superiors and on their subordinates. Formal mentoring and coaching policies would allow greater discussion of the challenges facing leaders and followers in managing their own authenticity within the DF. The study suggests that the balance between devotion to duty and possession of an internalised moral perspective may have shifted too far in favour of the former at the expense of the latter. The boldness of this statement must be placed in the context of growing evidence of immoral behaviour by soldiers from a variety of Western military forces on peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions around the globe. However, it is also worth acknowledging the importance of devotion to duty in the day to day activities of DF personnel. The research highlights the importance of authentic leaders who are willing to set aside their devotion to duty in order to challenge the prevailing culture, contest an order or demand intervention. The importance of authenticity should be reflected in DF leadership doctrine through the encouragement of commanders to explain decisions and discuss concerns, particularly in a training environment. The research also highlights the need for leadership doctrine to encourage greater tolerance of mistakes and greater appreciation of attempted innovation. Furthermore, the recent inclusion of peer review in career courses is likely to improve the self-awareness of personnel and encourage greater acknowledgement of personal weakness.

The research highlights that a certain style of leadership is expected within the organisation, akin to 'playing the game,' and therefore considerable friction exists between the forces of authenticity and military culture. This friction also creates considerable energy and traction for both the individual and the organisation as a whole. The challenge for every leader aspiring to greater authenticity is to feed off the energy without being burned by the sparks.

Should Defence Forces Leadership Doctrine Embrace the Concept of Followership?

ABSTRACT

Followership, as a strand within the leadership discourse, has been largely overlooked by the leadership literature until relevantly recently. This paper makes an initial contribution towards ensuring that the Defence Forces' leader-centred paradigm of leading considers and incorporates followership as a key concept within its new leadership doctrine. It is argued that incorporating followership now is appropriate given that the Defence Forces is about to promulgate leadership doctrine for the first time in its history. The inclusion of followership would assist in two ways; firstly, it would provide a much needed counterbalance to the lopsided focus on leaders, and secondly, it would create a more holistic and complete picture of how leadership works or fails, thereby creating more effective leadership. In view of the increasingly complex contemporary operating environment which the Defence Forces face, it is argued that including followership into leadership doctrine is both timely and appropriate.

...Followership dominates our lives and organisations, but not our thinking, because our preoccupation with leadership keeps us from considering the nature and the importance of the Follower.

Kelley, 1988:143.¹

Introduction

Until relatively recently followers, as Kelley² points out, have been largely neglected in the study of leadership,³ despite the fact that seminal leadership authors such as Burns conceived of leadership as a mutual influence process between leaders and followers.⁴ Yukl points out rather obviously that “without followers there would be no leaders”⁵ and hence having followers is the most critical element of leadership. And yet for the Defence Forces (DF), the assertion in the DF Manual of Staff Duties that “the commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do” and that “[h]e cannot delegate this responsibility to any other individual”⁶ captures the essence of all militaries, which clearly emphasises a leader-centred approach to leadership, expressed through the role of position.⁷ Reading these assertions whilst undertaking a leadership module as part

1 Kelley, R.E. (1988) 'In Praise of Followers', *Harvard Business Review*, 6 (66), pp. 142-148.

2 Ibid.

3 Bennis; Riggio, R.E., Chaleff, I., Lipman-Blumen, J. (2008) *The Art of Followership: How Great Followers Create Great Leaders and Organisations*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

4 Burns, J. (1978) *Leadership*, New York: Harper Row.

5 Yukl, G. (2010) *Leadership in Organisations*, (7th edn), New Jersey: Pearson Educational Inc., p. 235.

6 Department of Defence, (1996:101) *Manual of Staff Duties*, Dublin: DFPO.

7 Grint, K. (2005) *Leadership Limits and Possibilities*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan and Northouse, P. (2013) *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, (5th edn), Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

of a masters programme, I became intrigued to know whether the DF's leader-centred emphasis of leading presented the organisation with the optimum leadership paradigm. What would happen if the lens were to be reversed and one were to investigate leading from a follower's perspective?⁸

Aim and Purpose

The aim of this paper is to present the reader with an overview of followership as a relatively new line of inquiry within the leadership discourse. By way of background, my original purpose in researching followership was two-fold; firstly from an organisational perspective, I suspected that the DF was not fully maximising its leadership potential in respect of followership, and I wanted to use this study to explore whether this was the case in order to make DF leadership more effective. Secondly, from a personal perspective, as a leader and follower with 28 years service, I wanted to inform my own leadership philosophy by exposing myself to a more holistic view of leadership⁹ and ultimately render my own leadership more effective. Having briefly outlined the aim and purpose of this paper, I will now trace followership's origins, how it is incorporated within the leadership discourse, offer a definition of followership and consider some perspectives on the concept. Thereafter, I will consider the DF as a context for followership, before presenting my research findings.

Followership

Origins of the Concept

It is generally accepted that followership as a concept was introduced by Burns over 35 years ago when he implied in his now infamous quote "If we know too much about our leaders, we know far too little about *leadership*,"¹⁰ that *leadership* is something different from leaders. At that time, Burns defined leadership as a "...reciprocal process of mobilizing...in order to realize goals...held by both leaders and followers."¹¹ This acknowledgement in and of itself was significant because it encouraged broadening people's understanding of leadership into acknowledging that there is more to leadership than simply the leader.¹² Moreover, it paved the way for many of the subsequent developments within the leadership literature. Among the more influential researchers of the concept, Robert E. Kelley is widely acknowledged as having pioneered the concept of followership in his seminal Harvard Business Review article *In Praise of Followers* and in his best-selling book *The Power of Followership*.¹³ Through these contributions, he is generally credited with moving the discourse on leadership away from its traditional leader-centred orientation toward making followership a distinct line of inquiry.¹⁴

A Definition of Followership

According to Yukl, a follower "[is]...a person who acknowledges the focal leader as the primary source of guidance about the work, regardless of how much formal authority the

8 Shamir, B. (2007) 'From passive recipients to active co-producers: Followers' roles in the leadership process' in Shamir, B., Pillai, R., Bligh, M.C. and Uhl-Bien, M. (eds.) *Followership-Centered Perspectives on Leadership: A Tribute to the Memory of James R. Meindl*, Greenwich, CT: Inform Age.

9 Bryman, A. (1992) *Charisma and Leadership in Organisations*, London: Sage.

10 Burns (1978) op cit, p. 1.

11 Ibid, p. 425.

12 Bass, B.M. (1985) *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, New York: Free Press.

13 Kelley, R.E. (1992) *'The Power of Followership': How to create leaders people want to follow and Followers who lead themselves*, New York: Currency Doubleday.

14 Ibid.

leader actually has over the person.”¹⁵ Other authors contend that being a follower is an individual's construction of leadership.¹⁶ As a concept, it is defined as a *role* played by one person in the context of a *reciprocal relationship* between a leader and a follower, as part of a collective *process*. And yet, for some authors, the concept of followership is “...an outmoded concept that is dysfunctional and even destructive... as a concept it is out of touch with the world we live in.” Rost contends that describing followership as a process is more in keeping with the “industrial understanding of leadership,” where there is little room for followers. For him, followership in this paradigm “... is a consequence of industrial assumptions and actions based on top-down management and the Great Person view of leadership.”¹⁷ In today's ‘post-industrial world,’ Rost argues that leadership must be defined as a *relationship* wherein leaders and followers collaborate in working towards a shared common purpose. According to some authors, followers have been systematically devalued, where the very word follower conjures up unfavourable images.¹⁸ Others argue that followers' perceptions and expectations play a moderating effect in leader behaviour and that leadership is as much “in the eye of the beholder” as it is in the actions of the beheld.¹⁹

Why Research Followership and What Can it Contribute to the Leadership Discourse?

Leadership literature overwhelmingly focuses on the people in charge, where the follower has typically been included as an afterthought, or by implication in most traditional, reductionist leadership theories.²⁰ Moreover, these theories put the responsibility for the leader-follower relationship with the leader, where followers don't play an active role in the leadership process. Within this paradigm, followership tends to be viewed as a leadership outcome rather than an input, as posited by the trait and behavioural approaches in particular. Essentially this western-oriented leadership philosophy, and its associated scientific enquiries, has emphasised the leader, typically to the exclusion of followers and the context in which both interact.²¹ Notwithstanding this, it appears that the practice of leading has in effect overtaken the theory and that this development may go some way in explaining how the leadership field has broadened its emphasis beyond the leader. Researching followership therefore provides a much needed counterbalance to the lopsided focus on leaders held not only by academics, but by the general populace. Moreover, it helps to create a more holistic and complete picture of how leadership works or fails, thereby encouraging us to reflect and actively think about what we might change in our role as followers to co-create better and higher forms of leadership.²²

Some Perspectives on Followership

Various authors conceive of followers in different ways. In their consideration of followers, Shamir et al²³ identify five roles, which they contend followers have traditionally played in

¹⁵ Yukl (2010) op cit, p. 27.

¹⁶ Shamir (2007) op cit.

¹⁷ Riggio et al (2008) op cit, pp. 53, 56.

¹⁸ Alcorn, D.S. (1992) ‘Dynamic Followership: Empowerment at work’, *Management Quarterly*, 33, pp. 9-13.

¹⁹ Lord and Maher (1990); cited in Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D and Platow, M.J. (2011) *The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence and Power*, UK: TJ International Ltd, p. 29.

²⁰ Avolio, B. J. and Gardner, W. L. (2005) ‘Authentic leadership development: Getting to the root of positive forms of leadership’ *The Leadership Quarterly*, 16, pp. 315–338.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Jackson, B., and Parry, K. (2011) *A very short, fairly interesting and reasonably cheap book about studying leadership*, London: Sage publications Ltd.

²³ Shamir (2007) op cit.

leadership theories in an effort to promote a more follower-centred approach to leading. These five follower roles view 'followers as recipients of leader influence'; 'followers as moderators of leader impact'; 'followers as substitutes for leadership', 'followers as constructors of leadership' and 'followers as leaders'.²⁴ In summary, within their treatment of these roles, Shamir et al analyse follower roles along a continuum ranging from one end, where followers are presented as passive and dependent agents in the leadership process, to the other end of the continuum where followers are presented as capable, empowered, autonomous and intrinsically motivated individuals.

For his part, Kelley²⁵ posited five follower types based on a number of roles and qualities which follower's possess. Kelley's follower types (Figure 1) were labelled 'sheep', 'yes people', 'alienated', 'survivors' and 'effective', with each being rated according to their levels of active participation and critical thinking. At the most desirable end of the scale, Kelley's effective follower represents the optimum follower type, possessing four key qualities; self-management, commitment, competence/focus and courage. In short, according to Kelley, the key to effective followership is the ability to 'speak truth to power' and to demonstrate the capacity to 'dissent courageously',²⁶ when and where appropriate.




Figure 1: Follower Types²⁷

One of the most striking observations of both theories is that the roles and qualities which both authors contend make an effective follower are almost identical to the qualities found in most effective leaders. According to Kelley "[T]his is no mere coincidence, of course" given that followership is a role and not a person.²⁸ The inference here is that the ultimate goal is in delivering effective leadership, by integrating followers and leaders. In this respect the followership literature reflects the continuing search for leadership's 'Holy Grail'— *effective* leadership, where acknowledging the need for greater reciprocity between leader and follower requires a distinctly different and more diverse application of leadership than has been applied heretofore. As a concept, followership is situated within the 'New Leadership' paradigm, which will now be discussed.

²⁴ Shamir, B., Pillai, R., Bligh, M., and Uhl-Bien, M. (2007) add a sixth to Shamir's five Follower roles—'Followers as co-producers of leadership', a construct which they say offers a "...critical alternative to the five ways in which Followers have traditionally been conceptualised" in *Followership-Centered Perspective on Leadership- A Tribute to the Memory of James R. Meindl*, Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, p. 43.

²⁵ Kelley (1988), op cit.

²⁶ Latour, S. and Rast, V. (2004), 'Dynamic Followership', *Air & Space Power Journal*, 18 (4), pp. 102-110.

²⁷ Adapted from Kelley (1988) op cit.

²⁸ Kelley (1992) op cit, p. 146.

The New Leadership Approach

'New Leadership' describes and categorises a number of approaches to leadership which emerged in the 1980s and exhibited common, or at least similar, themes. Some of the better known theories in this paradigm include Leader Member Exchange (LMX), Charismatic, Transformational, Servant and more recently Authentic Leadership (AL) theory. Together, these different approaches seemed to signal a new way of conceptualising and researching leadership, and remain strong today.²⁹ In essence, New Leadership is underpinned by a depiction of leaders as 'managers of meaning'.³⁰ Moreover, they share a number of common threads; firstly, they all emphasise a strong ethical dimension with an explicit intention to develop followers. Secondly, despite the fact that the New Leadership paradigm has broadened the study of leadership into looking beyond the traditional reductionist leadership theories, the reality is that one of its key features is that it is firmly leader-centred in its orientation. Notwithstanding that, one of its enduring characteristics has been that it looks beyond the narrow considerations of leadership as posited by other paradigms to consider, among other things, the role of followers.³¹ Crucially, it conceives of leadership as being part of either a process³² or a relationship,³³ and argues for a more holistic view of leadership, which is multilevel and includes the leader, follower and the context.³⁴ Viewed from a systemic perspective, leading within this paradigm is seen as an influence process that occurs naturally in a social system as a pattern of relationships, with no clear distinction between leaders and followers.³⁵

Significantly, New Leadership theories have moved the leadership discourse toward examining leadership *of* rather than *in* organisations,³⁶ where followers are treated as inputs rather than outcomes of the leadership process (Figure 2).³⁷ In this respect followership is no longer viewed as a passive activity for the meek and submissive. Followers have responsibilities and obligations to their organisation and to their leader.³⁸ At its core, the New Leadership literature shares the same aspirations as traditional leadership theories in attempting to discover leaderships 'Holy Grail'— *effective* leadership, with the ultimate prize being to maximise organisational output.³⁹

29 Jackson and Parry (2011) op cit.

30 Smircich and Morgan (1982); cited in Jackson and Parry (2011) op cit.

31 Ibid.

32 Stogdill, R. (1948) 'Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A survey of the Literature'. *Journal of Psychology*, 25, pp. 35-71.

33 Bryman, A. (1992) *Charisma and Leadership in Organisations*, London: Sage.

34 Smith, R.M., (1997) 'Defining Leadership through Followership: Concept for Approaching Leadership Development.' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association, 83rd, Chicago, IL, 19-23, November 1997, University of Tennessee.

35 Lichtenstein, B.B., Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., Seers, A., Orton, J.D. and Schreiber, C. (2006) 'Complexity leadership theory: An interactive perspective on leading in complex adaptive systems', *Emergence: Complexity and Organization*, 8 (4), pp. 2-12.

36 Clegg, S., Hardy, C., Lawrence, T., and Nord, W. (2006) *The Sage Handbook of Organization Studies* (2nd edn), London: Sage publications Ltd.

37 Jackson and Parry (2011) op cit.

38 Commonwealth of Australia (2007) *Leadership in the Australian Defence Force*, ADDP 00.6, Canberra: Director Centre for Defence Leadership Studies.

39 Chaleff, I. (1995) *The Courageous Follower*, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

The Leader-Follower Relationship



Figure 2: The Leader-Follower Relationship⁴⁰

The Defence Forces as a Context for Followership

Military Culture as a Context for Leading and Following

Culturally, leadership continues to be a mainstay of the military, where it remains inextricably intertwined at every level: direct, systems and organisational,⁴¹ wherein leaders are appointed rather than emerge.⁴² Although the DF tends to adhere to and emphasise a leader-centred paradigm, which incorporates command,⁴³ it also acknowledges, and indeed expects, all personnel to assume emergent leader roles, and lead outside the formal hierarchical command and control structures. It achieves this by its adoption of Mission Command⁴⁴(MC) as its command philosophy of choice. The DF is not unique in its adherence to MC; research has shown that it has become the command philosophy of choice among many of the world's militaries.⁴⁵

According to Smith⁴⁶ the term 'military leadership' has been incorrectly used by civilian commentators to describe the legitimate practice of command; a practice where subordinates (wrongly called followers) are compelled to obey lawful orders. Other authors concur, stating that leadership as a concept is the same the world over, with universal principles, and that there is no such thing as military leadership. What does change however, is the context and or culture in which leadership is practised.

Organisational Culture

Schein⁴⁷ argues that culture is created, embedded, evolved and manipulated by leaders, who he described as the "main architects of organisational culture."⁴⁸ Other authors

⁴⁰ Riggio et al, op cit, p. 175.

⁴¹ Hunt, J. G. (1991) *Leadership: A new synthesis*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

⁴² Department of Defence (2011) *Defence Forces Capstone Doctrine (Pre-publication edition)*, Newbridge: DF Strategic Planning Office.

⁴³ Commanders in the DF derive their authority to lead from the Irish Constitution and from statutory provisions established in Section 17 of the Defence Act, 1954.

⁴⁴ Freedom to make decisions without referral, but within set guidelines in pursuance of a superior's intent, see Spacie, cited in Essens, Vogel, Taner, and Winslow (2001), *The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations*, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt. p. 205.

⁴⁵ McCann, C. and Pigeau, R. (2000) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*, New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

⁴⁶ Smith (1997) op cit.

⁴⁷ Schein, E.H. (2010) *Organisational Culture and Leadership* (4th edn), Hoboken NJ: Jossey-Bass.

⁴⁸ Schmidtchen, D. (2001) 'Developing creativity and innovation through the practice of Mission Command', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 146, pp. 11-17.

such as Goffee and Jones⁴⁹ disagree with this viewpoint and argue that this view of organisational culture tends to perpetuate the traditional leader-centred view of the world. In doing so, they contend that this skewed perspective fails to capture the complex cultural context within which leaders are often framed and constrained by other factors, including followers, relationships and context. For his part, Kotter⁵⁰ notes that culture can be stable over time but that it is never static and that crises sometimes force a group to re-evaluate some values or set of practices. Although the importance of leadership to the military is recognised throughout the literature, a number of writers suggest that military culture can negatively impact leadership development. Some suggest that military culture encourages a 'can do' attitude and a reverence for authority. Similarly, other authors argue that an over reliance on regulations and doctrine by the military promotes a conformist culture.⁵¹ On this issue Grint⁵² suggests that leadership should facilitate "constructive dissent", which he describes as the questioning of a leader's decisions by his followers, which could be viewed as insubordination within the military.

While these views may have been reflective of militaries in times past, this 'regimental and inflexible' stereotype of militaries is no longer valid. For instance, the DF "fully supports the recognition of lifelong learning and has committed to provide accreditation for all learning conducted within the organisation through collaboration with appropriate higher education institutions."⁵³ These professional and personal development initiatives are undertaken to develop and leverage the organisation's 'human capital', which is regarded as its most important resource. Additionally, it is also undertaken to enable the organisation to be postured to cope with a fast-changing external environment. As the followership literature posits, one of the key characteristics of an effective follower is in being a 'critical thinker',⁵⁴ who demonstrates the ability and willingness to "dissent courageously."⁵⁵ In the case of the DF, important competencies such as advocacy and critical thinking skills are encouraged and indeed demanded through the provision of various formal educational opportunities promoted by the organisation.

Organisational Structure

In terms of organisational form, the military is unquestionably traditional. In the military context there is a clear delineation of power permeating across hierarchical levels, and clear prescriptions about how leaders and subordinates are expected to interact. In essence, the military context is defined by its hierarchical structure and command-and-control leadership style. By extension, leading in the military is a contextual phenomenon, where context can include the environment, the prevailing culture, the follower's abilities and attitudes, and the nature of any problem encountered. Given the centrality of leadership, militaries emphasise its importance at all levels and strive to develop leaders through formal education, operational assignments, and self-development.

49 Goffee, R. and Jones, G. (2006) *Why Should anyone be led by you?: What it takes to be an Authentic Leader*, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.

50 Kotter, J. (1977) 'Power Dependence and Effective Management', *Harvard Business Review*, Jul-Aug, pp. 1-36.

51 Fastabend, D.A. and Simpson, R.H. (2004) 'Adapt or die: The imperative for a culture of innovation in the United States Army', *Army*, (February).

52 Grint (2005) op cit.

53 Department of Defence (2006) *Defence Forces Human Resources Strategy 2006-2010*, Dublin: DFPO.

54 Kelley (1988) op cit, P. 15.

55 Latour and Rast (2004) op cit, p. 109.

Followership in the Defence Forces

One could argue that the concept of followership is espoused within the DF Capstone Doctrinal Manual which states that in order to be truly effective, "...military leadership should not depend exclusively on the prestige of command authority – it requires validation by subordinates." Furthermore, "...effective military leaders can persuade subordinates by force of character, rather than simply compel them by force of law [and] military commanders are not considered leaders until their position has been ratified in the hearts and minds of those they command." Moreover, the DF's Capstone Doctrinal Manual asserts that "[E]very member of the DF, regardless of rank or appointment, is a leader,"⁵⁶ thereby promoting morally desirable and altruistic behaviour in leaders-followers.⁵⁷ These quotes go to the heart of the DF's leadership philosophy, which is based on two fundamental principles: values-based leadership⁵⁸ and the development of subordinates, very much in keeping with the New Leadership literature, where leadership is regarded as being a 'collective phenomenon' and conceptualised as a 'group' enterprise.⁵⁹ While the first principle places a heavy emphasis on the leader creating the correct command climate in line with organisational values,⁶⁰ the second principle recognises the vocational nature of military service, and places an onus on DF leaders to facilitate subordinate development. This encompasses "... individualised consideration, delegation, trust and empowerment...,"⁶¹ development of capacity in others is fundamental to the concept of 'Distributed Leadership.'⁶² It can be argued that through its adherence to the principle of subordinate development, DF leadership philosophy is congruent with transformational leadership theory as posited by Burns and Bass,⁶³ where trust in all its manifestations acts as a key ingredient of organisational effectiveness.⁶⁴

Findings Reviewed

From the literature review, a number of key themes emerged which underpin followership, namely; organisational culture, trust, morality, motivation and empowerment. The research methods used included semi-structured interviews and Focus Groups wherein opinion was sought from a selected group of Officers, NCOs and a senior business executive, in order to elicit their views on the theory and to gather data on the key concepts. Hereunder the main results of the research, based on a consideration of the key themes, are presented:

- The research confirmed what the literature review had indicated, that organisational culture, or what the DF sometimes labels, 'the command climate' is the dominant theme which enables and promotes followership, acting as the most important determinant of the other four themes. Moreover, given that DF culture was described by interviewees as being 'can do' and more 'open and receptive' than it has been in

⁵⁶ Department of Defence (2011) op cit, p. 49.

⁵⁷ Conger, J.A. and Kanungo, R. (1998) *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*, CA: Sage.

⁵⁸ Focusses on the character of the practitioner - military leaders should be guided in their behaviour by the organisational values of the DF, and are expected to establish and maintain a healthy ethical climate - Department of Defence (2011) op cit, p. 51.

⁵⁹ Horn, B. and Walker, R.W (2008) *The Military Leadership Handbook*, Toronto: Dundurn Press.

⁶⁰ Stewart, K. (2006) 'Mission Command: Elasticity, Equilibrium, Culture, and Intent' [online], available: <http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/inbasket/CEBsupport.061122_1521.TR-2006-254.pdf>. [Accessed 30 March 2013].

⁶¹ DoD (2011) op cit, p. 50.

⁶² Manz, C., and Sims, H.P. (1989) *The new superleadership: Leading others to lead themselves*, New York: Prentice.

⁶³ Bass, B.M. (1990) 'From transactional to transformational leadership: learning to share the vision', *Organizational Dynamics*, 18, (3), pp. 19-31.

⁶⁴ Dirks, K.T. and Ferrin, D.L. (2002) Trust in Leadership: Meta-Analytic Findings and Implications for Research and Practice. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87 (4), pp. 611-628.

the past, it is argued that the time is right to integrate followership into leadership doctrine. Its inclusion, in turn, would drive further cultural change, given what Schein says about culture, “we see that they are two sides of the same coin; neither can really be understood by itself.”⁶⁵

- Related to the finding on DF culture, is the perception among middle ranking officers and NCOs that a positive shift has occurred within the DF towards a more open and receptive culture; more amenable to empowering subordinates. While the possible reasons and factors involved are beyond the remit of this inquiry, they may warrant further research.
- A key finding was the acceptance among several influential senior DF leaders that the DF has emphasised one aspect of leadership for too long and that followership ought to be included in the DF leadership discourse. Against this backdrop, the concept of followership; expressed as ‘subordinate development’, is certainly espoused within the extant DF Capstone Doctrinal Manual, as the DF literature indicates. This points towards the existence of a conceptual gap in DF leadership doctrine. Furthermore, it suggests that the DF is not fully maximising its leadership capacity, as posited in the introduction, and that in order to do so, followership needs to be included in DF leadership doctrine. Doing so would acknowledge the need for greater reciprocity between leader and follower and provide a more holistic understanding of the collective leadership process. In turn, this finding corresponds with the thrust of contemporary leadership literature.
- Given the various challenges posed by the DF’s external environment (globalisation, the information age and the increasingly complex contemporary operating environment), the research indicated the importance of integrating the concept of followership into DF leadership doctrine in order for the DF to maximise its leadership capacity.
- In turn, the importance of education in general, and ‘life long learning’ in particular, was regarded as a key enabler in assisting the DF in coping with some of the external environmental challenges. This emerged as an important sub finding, which facilitates effective followership and fits into the DF’s commitment to ‘life-long learning’.

Recommendations and Implications

A number of recommendations arose from the research, generally in the areas of DF doctrine and education:

- The research identified a requirement to integrate the concept of followership into DF leadership doctrine; thereby answering in the positive that DF leadership doctrine should indeed embrace the concept of followership. This initiative would achieve two things; firstly, it would close off the current conceptual gap which exists within DF leadership doctrine, where it has tended to be too leader-centric in its orientation, and secondly, it would ensure that the DF maximises its leadership capacity, which in turn would allow the DF to adapt to its fast changing external environment.

⁶⁵ Schein (2010) op cit, p.11.

The DF should consider undertaking a thorough assessment and analysis of key follower traits and behaviours required to deliver effective following, ensuring that these are aligned with DF culture and values. The identification and articulation of these follower attributes would ensure that the organisation develops followers who are aligned with organisational imperatives. This would be a necessary precursor before undertaking the third and final recommendation.

- Formal instruction on followership needs to be developed and imparted to all DF personnel. This could be achieved by teaching followership on all career courses for DF personnel at DF educational institutions and by designing leadership development programmes aimed specifically at the development of followers. These initiatives would represent necessary first steps in facilitating its dissemination and adoption throughout the organisation, as recommended by Krulak.⁶⁶

Conclusion

This paper set out to provide the reader with an overview of followership as one of the less well known lines of inquiry within the leadership discourse; tracing followership's origins and offering a definition of the concept. Thereafter, the paper presented the views of some of the leading authors in the field, before placing followership within the 'New Leadership' paradigm. The paper then outlined the DF's unique culture and hierarchical structure, and suggested how followership could be included within this specific context. Arising from the field research, organisational culture is revealed to lie at the heart of the followership debate, which in turn is supported by other related themes such as trust, morality, motivation and empowerment. Additionally, the research has shown that it would be a mistake for the DF to continue to consider one side of the 'leadership coin' – an enduring legacy in the study of leadership, where leaders and followers have been traditionally viewed separately from each other as opposed to being integrated. The main conclusion to be drawn here is the need for DF leadership doctrine to acknowledge and incorporate the concept of followership in order to promote a more holistic understanding of leadership. Doing so would ensure that the DF maximises its leadership capacity, which in turn would enhance the DF's capability to adapt to the contemporary operating environment.

⁶⁶ Krulak, C. (1999) 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', *Marines Magazine*, 28 [online], available: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm>. [Accessed 28 November 2013].

Most Analyses of Military Theorists Tend to Emphasise the Differences Between Jomini and Clausewitz. Are They Irreconcilable, or Can They Coexist?

ABSTRACT

For many, Clausewitz and Jomini are considered to be polar opposites in the analysis of military theory. However, the similarities between the philosophies of these two renowned theorists cannot be denied. Jomini has been the foundation for instruction throughout most western military academies. His principles and edicts have constituted a staple diet of military training. Similarly, Clausewitz has gained considerable traction in professional military education, and the art of modern warfare has found refuge and guidance in his literature. For years, many military professionals enjoyed quoting Clausewitz, but they were actually guided by the principles of Jomini. This paper advocates that Clausewitz and Jomini are not in fact polar opposites, but rather they co-exist naturally on the modern military battlefield. Jomini guides the tactical procedures needed to achieve the strategic and operational objectives advocated by the teachings of Clausewitz.

One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and a facile pen. But this pen, at times a little vagrant, is above all, too pretentious for a didactic discussion, in which simplicity and clearness ought to come first. Besides that, the author shows himself, by far, too skeptical in point of military science.¹

The Napoleonic Wars not only revolutionised warfare, they also produced two of the greatest military theorists of all time. Napoleon Bonaparte emerged as one of the great strategists in history; however he left no written record of his concepts and philosophies except for 115 maxims which are mere military clichés.² Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz were the main architects in recording and translating the strategies of Napoleon. Both lived and fought during this era, and both deserve enormous credit for analysing and interpreting the strategies that were used during this period. These

¹ Hittle, J.D. (1958) *Jomini and his Art of War*, Harrisburg: The Telegraph Press, p. 42.

² Collins, J.M. (1973) *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute.

military theorists turned the strategies of the time into concepts that are still relevant, contemporary, and being used to this day.

This paper argues that there are very negligible irreconcilable differences between the military theories advocated by Jomini and Clausewitz, and that they are not contradictory. They actually coexist effectively on the modern military battlefield. The importance of this study is underscored by the fact that both Jomini and Clausewitz have been the preeminent and most influential military theorists on which the United States and the Western world have based their military doctrine.³

The proof of this coexistence will be supported by firstly examining the diverse philosophies, backgrounds and experiences of Jomini and Clausewitz, and how these have produced complementary theories. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that Jomini's *Principles of War* are similar to, and were actually preceded by, *Principles of War* which Clausewitz wrote for the Prussian crown prince, Frederick William. Thirdly, both Clausewitz and Jomini placed great importance on the masterful commander and the coup d'oeil (stroke of [the] eye). Lastly, both advocated the connection between politics and war. The aggregate sum of this analysis will support the assertion that the philosophies of these two theorists are complimentary, and should co-exist on the modern battlefield. As Hittle alluded to in the opening quotation, Jomini is the science while Clausewitz is the art.

Before analysing these co-existing philosophies, it is instructive to provide a short summary of the respective careers of Jomini and Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), of Prussian origin, first entered combat as a Cadet at the age of 13; and rose to the rank of Major-General at 38. Clausewitz was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars (1805–1814), where he fought with both the Prussian and Russian armies. *Vom Kriege* (*On War*, 1832), his most famous theoretical tome, has become the most influential work of military philosophy in the western world and beyond. The text has been translated into virtually every major language and remains a living influence on historians and modern strategists in many fields.⁴ Its preponderant theories include centres of gravity, friction, and the Clausewitzian paradoxical trinity. Today, everyone likes to quote Clausewitz, but the majority of modern western military doctrine is based on Jomini.

Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini (1779–1869) has become one of the most significant military theorists of the modern age. His principles have formed the basis for professional military education, and influenced teaching in European and North American military academies throughout the 19th century.⁵ Jomini was Swiss, of French extraction, and he received his military experience in the French and Allied armies during the Napoleonic Wars (1805–1814); in the Russian Army as an advisor during the Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829); and during the Crimean War (1853–1855). He is also credited with the creation of the Russian Military Academy in 1832. In 1858, Napoléon III of France requested Jomini to furnish plans for his campaign in Italy. Jomini is best known

3 Otero, C. (2011) 'Reflections on Clausewitz and Jomini', [online], available: <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

4 Bassford, C. (2012) 'Clausewitz, Oxford Bibliographies', [online], available: <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

5 Vovsi, E. M. (2012) 'Jomini Oxford Bibliographies', [online], available: <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

for his Treatise on Grand Military Operations and *Precis of the 'Art of War,'* essentially interpretations of the Napoleonic experience. Most writers agree his intent was to publish a 'handbook' or 'field manual' which would summarise the principles he believed were responsible for Napoleon's unprecedented successes.⁶

Clausewitz and Jomini shared a number of common characteristics and experiences. They both demonstrated an interest in the historical campaigns of Frederick the Great; they both served the Russian Czar and they were also students of each other's theories and books.⁷ Jomini and Clausewitz were privileged witnesses of and actors in the Napoleonic Wars and the related 19th century military revolution. Both were born within one year of each other in the late 18th century, and came from modest families. They both had very prominent mentors in their respective careers: Clausewitz was influenced early on in his military career by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,⁸ and Jomini by Ney.⁹ In their work, they tried to understand and capture the essence of the Napoleonic wars, and wanted to share their conclusions with future military leaders.

Despite sharing these commonalities, their approaches to military theory were somewhat different, and the source of these differences can be found in their personalities, which were very dissimilar. Their experience and education had forged them to be different. For most of his career, and certainly in the beginning, Clausewitz suffers defeat. His description of danger while accompanying a novice in the battlefield tells us the importance he attached to the psychological aspect of warfare. Clausewitzian theory was based more on German philosophy. Clausewitz had been "imbued with the spirit of search for the 'absolute,' for the very nature or the 'regulative idea' of things, a spirit which then dominated German philosophy."¹⁰ He argued that Jomini "tried to reduce warfare to a single set of rules,"¹¹ while he himself was acutely aware of the dangers of imposing rules, and of how restrictive they might prove for a commander.

Jomini did not have the same starting point, in that he did not suffer defeat. He tries to explain success, which is diametrically different from Clausewitz. Jomini was also strongly influenced by the French Enlightenment and his theories were based more on reason, the concepts of religious freedom for all, equality before the law and the supremacy of human purpose. These theories were proclaimed loudly by the heroes of the enlightenment.¹² These heroes included philosophers such as Voltaire, Montesquieu and the physicist Newton.¹³ This probably explains why Jomini searched for answers in the scientific realm, while Clausewitz searched for answers in a broader and deeper intellectual realm that rejected Newton's scientific ideal. The dichotomy between the French and German Enlightenments is probably what made Jomini and Clausewitz ultimately so different, but both philosophical trends are as complementary as Clausewitz and Jomini's theories.

6 Osgood, J. (2000) 'Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy', [online], available: <http://www.lexixa.com.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

7 Abegglen, C.M.V. (2003) *The influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*, London: King's College.

8 Huber T.M. (2012) *Précis: Clausewitz, H100 – Rise of the Western Way of War*, Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, p. 227.

9 Huber T.M. (2012) *Précis: Jomini, H100 – Rise of the Western Way of War*, Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, p. 233.

10 Earle, E.M. (1942) *Relentless war, the key to victory*, London: Oxford University Press, p. 94-95.

11 Bassford, C. (1993) 'Paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe', on 26 Feb 1993, Georgia State University.

12 Mulder, H. (2012) 'The Enlightenment', [online], available: <http://www.scienceandyou.org.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

13 Ibid.

In his early writings on the Principles of War for the Prussian Crown Prince, Clausewitz enunciated four principles: employ all available forces with the utmost energy; concentrate where the decisive blow is to be struck; lose no time and surprise the enemy; follow up success with the utmost energy.¹⁴ These principles hold true today, and along with his publication *On War* are very much revered. But for much of the 19th century, his rival Jomini, a far more superficial and emotional writer, was very much more influential: the triumph of style over substance.¹⁵

On analysing Jomini's Principles of War, a number of similarities with the Clausewitzian principles are evident. Both advocate using the mass of an army upon the decisive point. They also advocate using manoeuvre and energy at the proper time.¹⁶ The Clausewitzian and Jominian principles are evidently comparable, and similar in their convictions. This strengthens the premise that these two theorists can actually coexist on the modern battlefield, and are not polar opposites. One of the concepts that marks Jomini out as required reading for military commanders is his theory on Lines of Operation. He advocates that a strategist with shorter or more direct Lines of Operation has a marked advantage. Clausewitz, in his writings on the Principles of War, supports this fact, and states that "in strategy, therefore, the side that is surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces. Colonel Jomini was right in this."¹⁷ These shortened Lines of Operation are still preferred today and should be a concern and motivation for the modern military commander.

Lines of Operation, or LOOs, are now interlinked with Lines of Effort (LOEs) in modern operational planning parlance. The US Army ADRP 3-0, states that a LOO is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.¹⁸ However, Lines of Effort are more conceptual in their utility. They link multiple tasks and missions using logic or purpose rather than geographic reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.¹⁹ Clausewitz concurs with Jomini in emphasizing these facts; Jomini is perceived to be the advocate of the scientific LOO, while Clausewitzian literature would support the more holistic and all-encompassing LOE.

What constitutes 'the modern battlefield' and how can philosophies that are nearly two hundred years old support and assist the present day commander? Major General Sami Turgeman of the Israeli Defence Forces recently defined success on the modern battlefield as follows: "a fast and lethal maneuver shortens the duration of war while preserving our old concept of security – of moving the action to the enemy's territory as fast as possible."²⁰ Jomini's and Clausewitz's theory on shorter Lines of Operation/Effort would certainly support General Turgeman's assertions. Clausewitz cautioned that war is not like a chess game. Not only do combat decision makers not take turns, they also lack the omniscience of seeing all the relevant pieces on a uniform board.²¹ Clausewitz

14 Clausewitz, C. (2003) *Principles of War*, New York: Dover Publications.

15 Holmes, R. (2001) *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, London: Oxford University Press.

16 Jomini, A.H. (1992) *The Art of War*, London: Greenhill Books.

17 Clausewitz (2003) op cit, p. 49.

18 US Army (2012) 'ADRP 3-0, 4-22', [online], available: <https://armypubs.us.army.mil.html>, [accessed 26 Oct 2012].

19 US Army (2012) 'ADRP 3-0, 4-23', [online], available: <https://armypubs.us.army.mil.html>, [accessed 26 Oct 2012].

20 Urich, J. (2011) 'We will link all the divisions with the same Digital Army Program system', [online], available: <http://www.israeldefenceforces.com.mil.html>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

21 NWDC, Mission Command Document, [Internet], available: <https://www.mcu.usmc.mil.html>, [accessed 26 Oct 2012].

goes on to note that uncertainty, friction, danger, fear, risk, chance and death are intrinsic characteristics of war.²² Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the misguided assumption that robust technical means could clear the fog of war.²³ Such flagrant techno-centrism reveals the human propensity for optimism, even in war.²⁴ The uncertainty of modern war, with its wide array of factors, can only be controlled by the coup d'oeil, or masterstroke of great commanders. This allows them to analyse the situation and find their own solution.²⁵ Jomini saw war largely in personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander.²⁶ The Jominian masterful commander can determine the decisive moment in battle: "and it is precisely here that genius and experience are everything, and mere theory of little value."²⁷ Within the modern day concept of Mission Command,²⁸ Clausewitzian principles are intrinsically linked to understanding and visualising the battlefield, while Jominian principles lend themselves to the detailed planning associated with the describe and direct functions of Mission Command.²⁹ Clausewitz proposes the art, while Jomini asserts the science. Thus again we see evidence that supports the necessity for their coexistence on the modern battlefield.

Jomini and Clausewitz are extensively used in the professional military education of many modern militaries. Jomini, with his emphasis on principles and application, may dominate at the tactical level of war. Clausewitz, with the emphasis on ambiguity, complexity and politics, tends to become more important at the strategic level.³⁰ Jomini stated in his early works that in politics, a government should "choose its ablest military commander, and then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles. Governments should not neglect their armed forces, but they must not meddle in matters that only educated and experienced officers understand."³¹ However, later on in his life, Jomini recognised the truth of Clausewitz's relationship between war and politics. This is supported by his later assertion that "the first care of a commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war."³² This compares positively with Clausewitz, and his contention that "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking."³³ Clausewitz further concurs with this Jominian assertion by stating that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."³⁴ In his paradoxical trinity, Clausewitz proposes that a relationship exists between the government, the military and the people.³⁵ These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject, and yet variable in their relationship to one another. Indeed, Bassford contends that any theory or military policy advocated by the government that ignores the relationship between these

22 Clausewitz, C. (1989) *On War*, Howard, M., Paret, P. (trans & eds), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

23 Ibid.

24 NWDC, Mission Command Document, [online], available: <https://www.mcu.usmc.mil.html>, [accessed 27 Oct 2012].

25 Howard, M. (2002) *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*, New York: Oxford University Press.

26 Paret, P., Alexander Craig, G. and Gilbert, F. (1986). *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, New York: Oxford University Press.

27 Jomini, A.H. (1992). *The Art of War*, Greenhill Books, London, p 334.

28 *Mission Command* is a philosophy which promotes decentralised command while being responsive to superior direction - Department of Defence (2011) *Defence Forces Capstone Doctrine* (Pre-publication edition), Newbridge: DF Strategic Planning Office.

29 Otero (2011) op cit.

30 CGSC History 'The Leavenworth Way of War', [online], available: <https://www.wordpress.com>, [accessed 25 Oct 2012].

31 Jomini (1992) op cit, p. 334.

32 Bassford, C. (1993) op cit.

33 Clausewitz (1989) op cit, p. 88.

34 Ibid, p 87.

35 Summers, H. G. (1981) *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, p. 2.

three separate but intrinsically linked tendencies, would conflict with reality to such an extent, that for this reason alone, it would be totally useless.³⁶

In conclusion, the coexistence of similarities between the philosophies of these two great theorists cannot be denied. These similarities, along with mutually supportive ideals, allow the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini to operate concurrently and coexist in modern warfare. Both theorists advocated that war requires principles; however today, officers must be educated to a greater degree, particularly in history and the emerging sciences. Training is for the known, but a wide ranging military education allows us to deal with the unknown. The Jominian principles and philosophy have formed the foundation for western military doctrine since the 19th Century. They have provided the framework for western doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures since they were first advocated by Jomini in his manuscript *The Art of War*. Clausewitz has gained considerable traction in the realm of professional military education in recent years. His book *On War* has become the corner stone of modern military schooling. His concepts on the friction and fog of war have helped to educate the minds of modern military commanders in how to deal with the unknown and unplanned aspects of the modern battlefield. They also provide the context for operational and strategic planning by modern military staff officers.

Both Jomini and Clausewitz believed that the masterful commander on the battlefield is the key to victory. The ability to keep focused on the end state and the overall commander's visualisation is vital to success. "It is a terrible thing to see and have no vision."³⁷ This assertion is still extremely relevant and helps to underline the necessity for the commander to possess the *coup d'oeil* or masterstroke as advocated by both Clausewitz and Jomini.

Later on in his life Jomini agreed with Clausewitz on the need for politics and war to act in unison in order to be successful. It should be the unifying procedure that allows strategic intent to form the basis of the tactical and operational end states.

The broad interpretation of both theorists endows them with a lasting prominence; regardless of how much modern conditions differ from the age of Napoleon. The theories of both men still hold true today, and should act in harmony when planning and prosecuting complex military operations. Jomini was a military scientist, who searched for the principles of warfare, while Clausewitz was more taken with the art of war. The science of control must coexist with the art of command on the modern battlefield. This allows the commander to penetrate the fog and friction as advocated by Clausewitz and conduct the detailed planning associated with Jomini.

The study of Jomini and Clausewitz is still very relevant for military leaders. Both theorists are extensively studied in most of the western military academic institutions. While Jomini helps us understand the origins of our organisation and operational tactics in a conventional setting, Clausewitz offers us a broader perspective of war at the strategic and political levels. The differing approaches of both writers - scientific in the case of

³⁶ Bassford, C. (2007) 'The Clausewitzian Trinity', [online], available: <http://www.clausewitz.com.html> , [accessed 28 Oct 2012].

³⁷ Haun, G. (2009) *Reflections of Helen, and analysis of the words and wisdom of Helen Keller*, Bloomington: Author House, p. 85.

Jomini and intellectual on the part of Clausewitz, afford them the ability to co-exist and their theories to be complementary. Simply making an 'either or' choice should not arise, because to do so would ignore an important part of their respective legacies to the military. The continued study of both of these theorists is essential to the conduct of future warfare, because nobody knows what kind of warfare the future holds. *Cave ab homine unius libri*.³⁸

³⁸ *Beware the man of one book.*

Social Media, Clausewitz and Conflict Resolution

ABSTRACT

While social media has the potential to promote conflict resolution, this continuously developing and fast proliferating technology presents challenges for those involved in resolving conflict. Using a flexible interpretation of Clausewitz's trinitarian concept of war which focuses on the elements of Passion, Chance and Reason as a framework for analysis, this paper outlines the impact of social media on contemporary conflict and its resolution. It argues that social media threatens to unbalance the trinitarian nature of war and outlines four contexts in which it facilitates the inflammation of Passion at the expense of Reason. It concludes with recommendations for addressing this imbalance.

Introduction

Works published in previous editions of the *Defence Forces Review* have mapped out the emergence of new media and their impact on the conduct of military operations, including the Peace Support Operations (PSOs) conducted by the Irish Defence Forces.¹ The focus of these articles has primarily been on coping with publicity, the impact on security and more recently on leveraging or embracing the developments to support military operations.² This paper, while acknowledging and advocating the potential benefits of harnessing new media, presents a caveat by suggesting that too much openness or transparency in international conflict resolution (including PSOs) can hinder the application of discretion as well as the ability to act dispassionately and rationally. These technologies can pose a threat to diplomacy which requires a degree of discretion and which provides scope for seeking compromise and sustainable solutions to conflicts.

The effects of social media on warfare are examined utilising the framework provided by Carl Von Clausewitz for describing the character of war – his paradoxical trinity.³ It is argued that social media has injected a new dimension into this framework which, if not properly evaluated, threatens to destabilise conflict situations and thwart efforts to resolve them. The work begins by offering a less prescriptive interpretation of Clausewitz's trinitarian concept of war than is generally prevalent today, which allows the concept to be applied more liberally to contemporary conflict and specifically to conflict resolution. The paper continues by examining the impact of social media on this framework, before concluding with recommendations for policy makers and agents of conflict resolution.

1 O'Connor, P. (2012) 'The Strategic Private in the Virtual Sphere: Social Media's Omnipresent Moral Gaze on the Defence Forces', *DF Review 2012*, Dublin: DFHQ; O'Brien, A. (2012) 'Beyond Rules of Engagement: Social Media and the Irish Defence Forces', *DF Review 2013*, Dublin: DFHQ.

2 O'Brien (2013) *op cit*.

3 Clausewitz, C. (1989) *On War*, Howard, M., Paret, P. (trans & eds), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The Dead Prussian

Nearly 200 years after his death, Clausewitz's *On War* continues to provide the most influential (and convincing) theory on the nature of war.⁴ The book is included on the syllabi of military academies throughout the world. Clausewitz described war as balancing between the three vertices of:

...a remarkable trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force: of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people, the second the commander and his army; the third the government.⁵

The literal application of this passage, by writers such as Summers, has been used to develop a prescriptive trinitarian concept of war which emphasises a trinity of the people, the government and the army and the requirement for achieving equilibrium between all three for the successful prosecution of war.⁶ Gat provides a detailed examination of the tension between two aspects of these vertices; namely the relationship between the political establishment and the Military Commander in war.⁷ Others, such as Martin Van Creveld and John Keegan, have used this prescriptive definition to attack Clausewitz's understanding of the true nature of war.⁸

It is arguable whether Clausewitz intended such a degree of prescription.⁹ This paper does not engage in that debate, but rather by drilling down from the prescriptive interpretations of Summers and others, it explores the interpretive possibilities of these three vertices as 'Passion', 'Chance' and 'Reason.' In doing so, the paper provides a more flexible interpretation of the framework with the potential for wider application in understanding contemporary conflict and its resolution.

Understanding War

The primordial violence, hatred and enmity referred to by Clausewitz can be understood as 'Passion', which represents the emotive aspect of warfare. It emerges and is fuelled from diverse sources such as: perceived existential threat; religion; nationalism; pride; rage; etc. 'Passion' demands swift action with a focus on the immediate outcomes and results. It represents a powerful motivating force in warfare – an emotional shot of adrenaline into military operations – which can be reckless or self destructive. Unchecked, it can lead to pyrrhic victory by encouraging action with short term success but with far reaching negative strategic consequences.

The play of 'Chance' represents the 'roll of the dice' character of military operations. It is linked to two other classic Clausewitzian concepts of fog and friction. Fog represents what is *unknown* in warfare. This can be a lack of knowledge of the terrain or of enemy

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid, Bk 1, Chapter 1, p. 89.

6 Summers, H.G. Jr. (1982) *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, pp. 26-27.

7 Gat, A. (2001) *A History of Military Thought. From Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

8 Van Creveld, M. (1991) *The Transformation of War*, New York: The Free Press; Keegan, J. (1993) *A History of Warfare*, New York: Knopf.

9 Bassford, C. and Villacres, E.J. (1995) 'Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity', *Parameters*, Autumn.

strengths and dispositions or of some critical shortcoming in friendly forces. Friction on the other hand, represents the *unknowable* in warfare – a form of Prussian '(Von) Murphy's Law.'¹⁰ It takes many forms. It can relate to aspects of human behaviour – the failure of courage to act in the face of the enemy; a breakdown of discipline; the toxic result of 'group think';¹¹ unpredictable decision making; loss of an ally, etc. It can also relate to technical aspects of warfare, such as equipment failure, the failure of military staff systems or unexpected sickness in a military force. It can also refer to environmental factors such as weather. 'Chance' embraces the unpredictability of warfare and has impacted on it from antiquity. For example, in the fifth century BC, the Athenian State was saved from the Persian fleet when it (the fleet) was destroyed in an unexpected storm at Eritria.¹² In the Second World War, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, 'Operation Barbarossa', was foiled (in part) by the early onset of the dreaded Russian winter.¹³ More recently, Libya's ruler of over four decades was driven from power following an unexpected breakdown of national tribal alliances. Clausewitzian 'Chance' also recognises the unpredictability of the enemy – a thinking and proactive adversary, not an inert agent who willingly conforms to friendly force plans; "Now war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass."¹⁴ 'Chance' acknowledges that in military operations, despite apparently overwhelming superiority, success cannot be guaranteed and military actions may have unintended consequences.

'Reason' represents the rationality of decision making, the ability to decide and act dispassionately and according to a logic that takes into consideration the broader strategic environment. It considers the wider range of consequences of military action (or inaction) in an elongated time frame. 'Reason' recognises that some concessions may have to be made, some principles may have to be sacrificed or some pain may have to be endured in order to attain a greater strategic benefit (or avoid even greater sacrifice/pain).

Clausewitz's genius was being the first to clearly articulate these three competing tensions in warfare. All three are important, but all must exist in a form of equilibrium. Not all policies, conceived through reason, are supported by passion. Nor can they be guaranteed to succeed the play of chance. Passion often supersedes reason and ignores chance. Chance always has the capability to trump both reason and passion. Prosecuting a successful war requires the consideration of all three factors. Over-reliance on one, or the exclusion of another, runs the risk of campaign failure.

Having presented an interpretation of Clausewitz's philosophical framework for understanding war, this paper posits that the framework is just as important for understanding the process of terminating war/conflict. The process of conflict resolution must acknowledge and address the same three vertices of the nature of war in order to create and maintain enduring solutions to conflict. The focus of the paper now turns to the impact of social media on such processes.

10 "Murphy's Law" – a pessimistic Irish epistemology that states: 'Anything that can go wrong will go wrong!'

11 Daly, T. (2010) 'The Ultimate Cost of Poor Decision Making is the Loss of Human Life', *Defence Forces Review* 2010, Dublin: DFHQ.

12 Holland, T. (2007) *Persian Fire; The First World Empire and the Battle For the West*, London: Anchor.

13 Clarke, A. (2012) *Barbarossa The Russian German Conflict: 1941-45*, London: Cassel Military Paperback..

14 Clausewitz (1989) op cit, Book 1, Chapter 1, 4.

Social Media and Conflict

The rapid development and proliferation of social media has had a stunning effect on contemporary conflict. It has, for example, been associated with assisting the generation of widespread opposition movements to the governments in North Africa and the Middle East in the 'Arab Spring.'¹⁵ New media has opened up war reportage to everyone with a mobile phone, creating a vast reservoir of 'citizen journalists.' This has facilitated the rapid and widespread transfer of pictures, videos and other data relevant to conflict. While acknowledging the scepticism in some quarters regarding the overwhelming influence of social media,¹⁶ it is posited that the proliferation of this technology has injected a new dynamic dimension into the trinitarian understanding of war. This section looks at this new dimension and its influence on conflict.

It can be argued that the impact of social media on war fits seamlessly into the Clausewitzian trinitarian concept and the tension between each vertex. Promptly available and accurate information supports the 'Reason' vertex, in that facts in the form of pictures, film, oral and written communications from reliable sources can challenge uncertainty, rumour, speculation, etc, and provide a firmer basis for decision making. In theory, established facts rather than hypothesis, conjecture or intuition provide the foundation for policy. Social Media can also buttress the 'Passion' vertex. Graphic and emotive pictures, film, testimonies, etc. of events in conflict can generate public outrage and support for robust military action. Finally, accurate and comprehensive information should, in principle, impact on the effect of 'Chance.' More detailed situational awareness reduces uncertainty and the number of imponderables when planning and executing military or security responses, and therefore improves the chances of success.

However, it is suggested that, notwithstanding the potential for improved situational awareness and rational decision making, Social media can also threaten to destabilise the trinitarian nature of war. It is argued that it can create the conditions that undermine or overwhelm the 'Reason' vertex, making it difficult for rational decision making and increasing the likelihood of conflict and its prolongation. This occurs in four discrete but complimentary aspects.

Firstly, Social Media threatens to inflame the 'Passion' vertex, endowing it with disproportionate influence over 'Reason.' The 'citizen journalist' phenomenon can flood the public consciousness with inflammatory imagery in the form of still pictures and videos. This occurred throughout the countries affected by the 'Arab Spring,' including Syria, as well as in conflicts in other parts of the globe, such as the coverage of the Boko Haram abductions in Nigeria, the troubles in Eastern Ukraine and the conflict in Afghanistan. These images appear not only on personal social media accounts such as *facebook*, *twitter*, *youtube*, etc, but they also find wider circulation when utilised by mainstream traditional print and television media. They are available almost instantly, and despite state attempts to control the proliferation of 'citizen journalists', they are effectively omnipresent, leaving no corner of the battlefield without some form of

¹⁵ Rovner, J. (2013). 'Intelligence in the Twitter Age', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*. Volume 26, Issue 2, pp. 260-271.

¹⁶ Manrique, M. and Mikail, B. (2011) 'The Role of New Media and Communication Technologies in Arab Transitions', *Policy Brief*, No 106, FRIDE, available: www.fride.org, [accessed 25 Feb 2014].

surveillance or scrutiny. While this aspect of social media provides a level of openness and transparency in conflict zones it also has the power to shock and generate impulsive often violent reactions. The graphic nature of the reportage, often depicting the death of civilians including women and children; the destruction of property or the desecration of holy sites, stirs the 'Passion' in the viewer in a disproportionate manner relative to any consideration of 'Reason'.

Linked to this inflammation of 'Passion', the second aspect relates to the nature of decision making in conflict situations. While tactical or even operational decision making is routinely delivered through a rapid and dynamic cyclical process, strategic decision making, which should inform the decision making process of conflict resolution, should be taken in a cool and dispassionate environment. Social media can cut the supporting ground from under reflective thinking by stirring the impulse for immediate action, and therefore, rather than supporting conflict resolution, it has the potential to undermine it. A further twist in this aspect (a third order effect) is that the ubiquity and appeal of social media places pressure on the decision making processes of intelligence agencies, in what Rovner refers to as 'competition for policy attention.'¹⁷ The speed of social media reportage has placed an additional pressure on these agencies, limiting the time available for establishing the reliability of sources. This leads to a risk of governments (agents of policy / reason) making decisions on data that are not thoroughly analysed.

The third aspect is the fact that social, like traditional media, is open to forms of manipulation and therefore its objectivity can be undermined. Morozov asserts that authoritarian governments have seized the opportunities provided by the internet and the spread of social media to increase surveillance on the public, to enforce new ways of censorship and also to provide a platform for their own propaganda.¹⁸ This has thrown a shadow over the reportage from conflict zones where doubt as to the veracity of images on social media sites undermine such coverage. This results in a knock on effect for conflict resolution processes. Disrupters can continue to provoke 'Passion' by distributing fake or exaggerated data. The processes themselves can be undermined if certain baseline facts which underpin them, drawn from social media, are subsequently proven to be untrue. Finally, the spin doctors of participants in conflict are seizing on the potential of social media to promote their own causes. Militaries throughout the world are adapting to and embracing the potential of social media for propaganda operations; deception operations; Psychological Operations (PsyOps), cyber espionage and cyber offensive operations.¹⁹

The fourth aspect concerns the impact that social media has had on diplomacy. The current system of international diplomacy, built over centuries, has developed on the basis of discretion and the avoidance of inflaming the 'Passion' vertex. Diplomatic protocols, while appearing archaic in the modern world, are a proven method of avoiding offence and provide channels through which intractable disputes can be either avoided, prevented from developing or solved. This aspect of discretion runs counter

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Morozov, E. (2012) *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, New York: Public Affairs.

¹⁹ Paganini, P. 'Social Media use in the Military Sector', available: <http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/social-media-use-in-the-military-sector/> [accessed 02 June 2014].

to the contemporary trend in Western democracies towards transparency in the public sphere, which is facilitated by the spread of social media. The *Wiki Leaks* affair, where classified material was leaked by a US Army Private, Bradley/Chelsea Manning and the revelations of NSA surveillance activity by Edward Snowden, a former employee, provide two contemporary examples of the clash between the imperatives of national security/discretion and those of accountability. This paper does not enter into a debate on the morality of any governmental behaviour; however the aforementioned cases draw attention to a phenomenon which is highly relevant to the subject matter under discussion, namely the uncloaking of diplomacy. In both of these examples, the system of international diplomacy has been substantially undermined. Diplomatic communication or deliberation has never been intended for immediate publication. Hence, most states insist on lengthy delays in the publication of diplomatic records. This restriction, designed to protect sources, is also intended to keep the 'Passion' vertex in check by avoiding overly emotional responses to crises.

One of the consequences of both Manning's and Snowden's revelations is the identification of personnel communicating with diplomats, both at home and abroad. These interlocutors comprise not only diplomats and military figures from other nations, but also a wide range of actors who play key roles in conflict resolution. They include business figures; members of governmental and non governmental agencies; representatives of civil society organisations; members of humanitarian organisations; ethnic and religious minorities; members of opposition movements; women's rights organisations; members of local media; etc. By identifying them locally and to the wider world through social media, they have been exposed to both their own communities and to their opponents – with potentially fatal consequences in the more extreme cases. The exposure of sensitive negotiations to open and immediate public scrutiny can, and usually will, scupper attempts at conflict resolution. Could there have been a peace process in Northern Ireland if someone was tweeting from the Fr Alec Reid brokered meetings between republican, SDLP and Irish government representatives in the 1980s?

Social media has the potential for long-term damaging consequences for diplomacy. It can inhibit rather than promote contact between parties, creating reluctance to communicate for fear of being exposed. It can also result in a reluctance to explore possibilities to resolve conflict for fear of appearing weak or immoral, and may actually undermine transparency and accountability by discouraging the maintenance of records.

The consequences for those involved in conflict resolution – for example Irish troops involved in PSOs – are substantial. More than ever, the social media outlets can drive the agenda in negotiating disputes, and all troops, not just specialists or senior staff officers, must be prepared for this in predeployment training.

Conclusion

Two centuries later, Clausewitz still provides a meaningful framework for understanding conflict and its resolution. The proliferation of new media technologies and the creation of citizen journalists through social media platforms, while having undoubted advantages for promoting communication and accountability in national and international relations,

suffers from the same limitations as traditional forms of media. It is as likely to be harnessed by states and non state actors to spin their preferred policies or interpretations of events. More alarmingly, it can deny the space and the cooling down time required to reduce tensions, or it can act as an agent for increased tension by broadcasting/publishing inflammatory content, which can be fake as much as it can be factual. This poses enormous challenges for those involved in conflict resolution, and the solutions will remain elusive.

This paper posits that action is required on a number of levels. Internationally, agreed protocols need to be developed for the restriction of the publication of diplomatic traffic. Such protocols should balance the requirement for accountability and transparency with respect for the inviolate nature of diplomatic discourse. Unauthorised violation of diplomatic communications should be accompanied by sanctions for news networks or social media providers. At state level, media organisations should be encouraged to develop and adopt appropriate social media policies which include consideration of the impact of unsubstantiated reportage on conflict and its resolution. Military officers and others engaged in conflict resolution require education and training with regards to the potential of, and the challenges posed by the proliferation of social media. Operational planning must also consider these factors. Finally, there is a requirement for continued research into the harnessing of these developing technologies to promote and assist in conflict resolution.

Win-Win Versus Win-Lose: Integrative and Distributive Approaches to Conflict Negotiations

ABSTRACT

In the world of conflict resolution, negotiations are one of the tools that can be used to bring an end to the conflict. There are, however, different negotiation styles that may be adopted by the negotiator or mediator, with the Competitive Distributive and Collaborative Integrative styles the principal approaches in use. This article discusses the characteristics of both styles in order to develop a greater understanding of the choices available to the negotiator. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, using examples from the Middle East and Afghanistan, as well as the author's experience in facilitating negotiation workshops, to better illustrate the arguments for and against both negotiation styles. It is argued that the integrative approach is best suited to conflict resolution negotiations, and has a greater chance of delivering a successful, sustainable agreement for all parties involved in the negotiation.

Introduction

There are a myriad of ways to end any conflict. These include removing the underlying causes of the conflict, armed intervention, educating the groups involved - and of course negotiation.¹ Not only is negotiation one way to resolve conflict but as the United States Institute for Peace points out, it is:

...a *principal* tool used in conflict management and resolution. Negotiation can be used to prevent violence before it has taken hold...to stop violence once it has begun...and to prevent its recurrence and create conditions for a lasting peace in the aftermath of violence.²

It has been observed that "In recent years, more armed conflicts than ever before have been resolved by peace processes centred on talks and agreements."³ These talks involve the full range of negotiation skills discussed in this article. Although there are a variety of negotiating styles that a negotiator or a mediator can adopt, this article will address the two predominant approaches – the *integrative* and *distributive* styles. In doing so, the characteristics of both styles are discussed and their relative advantages

1 Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Maill, H. (2005) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

2 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) (2010) *Certificate Course in Negotiation and Conflict Management – Course Book*, Education and Training Centre. See www.usip.org/training/online.

3 Slim H. (2007) *A Guide to mediation*, Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

and disadvantages are evaluated with the aim of assisting the negotiator in deciding which style would represent the best choice for negotiating in a conflict setting.

The paper sets out by establishing the principal characteristics of these primary negotiating styles through an examination and synthesis of the academic literature on negotiations. In discussing which style is most apt for negotiations in a conflict setting, two case studies are examined to illustrate both approaches in practice; the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in the 1970s concerning the Sinai, and the failed negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq that led to the war in Iraq in the 1990s. It will also draw on secondary research based on lessons learned from US army personnel in the most recent conflict in Afghanistan. The arguments for and against both styles are also supported by primary research carried out by the author. This research was carried out through direct observation of more than 3,000 participants on negotiation workshops spanning a period of more than ten years (2001 – 2014).⁴

In order to facilitate an understanding of what follows, it should be stated that this article has adopted the point of view that a negotiation is a process, not a result. It bases this viewpoint on clear definitions of what constitutes negotiations by leading authors in the field⁵ and by organisations such as the United States Institute for Peace. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there is still much debate as to exactly what structure that process may take, with some authors conceiving of it as consisting of as few as three⁶ or four⁷ distinct stages; while others, including the author, conceptualise it as containing as many as seven stages. Invariably, the steps that constitute the process involve the following parts to a greater or lesser extent: some level of preparation; exchanging information; bargaining and commitment and post-negotiation implementation. The aim of this paper is to critically examine the two primary negotiation styles designed to resolve conflicts,⁸ which refer to “any political conflict, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force.”⁹

A Question of Style

The difference between the two predominant negotiating styles is succinctly explained by one of the leading authors on negotiations, Louise Nieuwmeijer, who posits that in an integrative negotiation:

both parties attempt to achieve the greatest gain, with the smallest possible loss for the other party by means of cooperation. [whereas a] Distributive negotiation entails the greatest gain for a party without considering the position of the other, and is achieved through competition.¹⁰

⁴ Members of the Defence Forces, Diplomatic Corps, civil servants, employees of semi-state bodies and private industry from over 15 nationalities took part in these workshops.

⁵ Shell, R. (2006) *Bargaining for Advantage*, New York: Penguin; Nieuwmeijer, L. (1992) *Negotiation*, Pretoria: HSRC publishers.

⁶ Susskind, L. and Cruickshank J. (1988) *Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes*, New York: Basic Books.

⁷ Shell (2006) op cit.

⁸ Hereinafter referred to as 'conflict negotiations.'

⁹ Ramsbotham et al. (2005) op cit, p. 27.

¹⁰ Nieuwmeijer (1992) op cit.

This serves as a working definition for both approaches, though it is felt that for the purpose of this paper, a more detailed examination of the defining characteristics of both styles is required.

Distributive Style - Claiming Value in a Negotiation

George Ross, Donald Trump's lawyer sums up the rules of this negotiating style with two questions:¹¹

Are there any rules in negotiation? The right answer is, 'No, there are no rules in negotiation.'

Are lying, cheating, and deception permitted? The right answer is 'yes, anything goes.'¹²

Leading on from these two questions, there are a number of other common elements which characterise the competitive distributive style:

- *A win-lose mentality* – what one side gains, the other side loses, and a corresponding desire on the part of the distributive negotiator to be the one who wins.¹³
- *A readiness to abuse the relationship with the other party in the interests of achieving one's own goals.* This may involve "hard" tactics such as blackmail, intimidation or force but may also involve "softer" tactics such as guilt, flattery or seduction.¹⁴
- *A focus on achieving as much as one can without any necessary reference to 'fair' or objective standards of legitimacy.* This takes the view that the negotiator should enter the process with extremely high expectations and then push to achieve their goals through bargaining skill as opposed to legitimate claims.¹⁵
- *A tendency to bargain from fixed positions* (pushing, pulling and nibbling) instead of finding common, complimentary or overlapping interests.¹⁶

Integrative Style: Creating Value in a Negotiation

One of the key sources when defining the integrative style is the book *Getting to Yes* by Fisher and Ury.¹⁷ They were responsible for the introduction of several terms in the negotiators lexicon, including *principled negotiations* and *BATNA* (discussed below) as well as founding the Harvard Programme on Negotiations. A second building block in this paper's definition of integrative negotiations is the work carried out by Rackham and Carlisle¹⁸ in the 1970s on identifying the traits of highly effective negotiators. Synthesising the ideas from both sources leads to seven elements that the author feels best characterise the integrative style of negotiations:

¹¹ It should be noted that George Ross does not intentionally define himself as a distributive negotiator. It is simply the opinion of the author that George Ross has neatly defined two rules for negotiation that fit with what most other authors would consider to be the guiding principles of a distributive negotiation style.

¹² Ross, G.H. (2006) *Trump-Style Negotiation*, New Jersey: Wiley.

¹³ Ury W. (1991) *Getting past no*, London: Random House.

¹⁴ Stark, P. and Flaherty, J. (2003) *The only Negotiating Guide You'll ever need: 101 ways to win every time in any situation*, New York: Broadway Books.

¹⁵ Karass, C. (1974) *Give and Take*, New York, Harper Books.

¹⁶ Ury (1991) op cit. It should be noted that Fisher and Ury refer to the integrative style as 'the principled style.'

¹⁷ Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991), *Getting to Yes*, New York: Penguin Books.

¹⁸ Rackham, N, Carlisle, J. (1978) 'The Effective Negotiator - Part I: The Behaviour of Successful Negotiators', *Journal of European Industrial Training*, 2(6), pp. 6-11.

*The Importance of Interests as Opposed to Positions*¹⁹

It is of primary importance to ascertain what lies behind the initial position adopted by the other side (i.e. they may ask for monetary compensation for loss of income but is their true concern greed, a need to be respected, food for family, housing needs etc.?).

Creative Solutions for Mutual Gain

Those who follow the integrative style believe in spending time trying to find solutions that will satisfy all parties involved. They believe that the principal goal for the negotiation should be satisfaction on the part of all concerned that the final agreement is better than their alternatives, not an equal division of resources. The concept of *Win-Win* is regularly referred to by integrative negotiators to describe this outcome.²⁰ For example, one side may need very little to be satisfied with the agreement (sometimes an apology is sufficient) and therefore an agreement that simply focuses on cutting up the issues into neat parts of equal size, is not necessarily a *Win-Win* agreement.

The Use of Objective Criteria

The strategy of the integrative negotiation style is to use objective criteria such as precedents, standards, norms, regulations and independent facts and statistics when building an argument. This ensures legitimacy and fairness in the structuring of a deal.²¹

Developing a Strategy to Deal with the People Involved as Separate to the Issues

The need to build trust and develop a healthy working relationship between the negotiating parties is considered essential by proponents of this style.²² As Lyons states: "Negotiating with integrity is a system of actively getting what you want but at the same time building lasting relationships with those you are negotiating with."²³ This can be achieved through effective communication, a reduction in 'irritators',²⁴ trusting the process or understanding the other party.

Best Alternatives and Options

The integrative style focuses on developing alternatives to, and options within the negotiation as a means of gaining power and flexibility.²⁵ This is related to the concept of BATNA, or *Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement*, which was introduced by Fisher and Ury.²⁶ BATNA concerns the identification of the most favourable alternative to the present negotiation in the event that the process concludes without reaching an agreement. The argument made by Fisher and Ury is that the stronger a negotiator's BATNA, or alternative, the greater their power in the negotiation. As they state "That is the only standard which can protect you from accepting terms that are too unfavourable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept."²⁷

¹⁹ Lyons, C. (2007) *I Win, You Win*, London: A&C Black.

²⁰ Fisher, R. and Ertel, D. (1995) *Getting Ready to Negotiate*, New York: Penguin Books.

²¹ Fisher et al (1991) op cit.

²² Ibid.

²³ Lyons (2007) op cit, p. 3.

²⁴ Rackham and Carlisle (1978) op cit.

²⁵ Fisher et al (1991) op cit.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 100.

Negotiation as a Process

The premise that a negotiation is a process which must be clearly followed, and not an outcome to be rushed towards, has gained credence following the experience of military personnel in Afghanistan, and hence its inclusion here as a characteristic of the integrative style.²⁸ Adopting this approach also means that the process can be improved and studied.

Preparation

Careful planning and preparation is considered essential for the integrative style of negotiation, from understanding the bigger picture (stakeholders, history behind the negotiation, economic and political factors, and influencing ideologies) to understanding the interests, motivators and personalities of the negotiating parties.²⁹ In adopting the integrative approach, it is not enough to simply enter the negotiation and start bargaining.

The primary differences between the two negotiating styles are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: Integrative vs Distributive Negotiation Styles

Integrative	Distributive
Creating Value	Claiming Value
Win-Win Mentality	Win-Lose Mentality
Preparation Essential	Preparation Not Necessary
Negotiate Interests	Negotiate from Positions
Soft on People, Hard on Issues	Hard on People, Hard on Issues
Objective Standards	Bargaining Skill
Long Term Relationship	One off Deal
Process	Process

Having examined the characteristics of the Integrative and Distributive styles of negotiation, the question follows - which approach is the optimal style to choose in a conflict negotiation?

²⁸ Weiss, J., Donigian, A., Hughes, J. (2010) 'Extreme Negotiations', *Harvard Business Review*, November.

²⁹ Shell R. (2006) *Bargaining for Advantage*, New York: Penguin Books.

Distributive: The Case For and Against

A distributive negotiation style may be deemed appropriate when there is a need for timely decisions in times of crisis or urgency (when there is no time for preparation or an in-depth discussion of interests); during a once off negotiation where it is highly unlikely that the other party will be encountered again (and therefore any damage to the relationship is less of a concern); and finally, when defending vital interests and principles where any concessions or movement will damage those interests.³⁰

However, adopting this style also has risks. The dishonesty and deception which very often characterise this type of negotiation, increase the mistrust between the parties, and, as may happen in any negotiation, ploys or 'dirty tricks' that may have been used are often discovered soon after the agreement has been signed. As the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue points out: "You only need to be found to be bluffing once and your entire credibility is lost. Bluffing may be most effective in one-off negotiations with a person whom you know you will never see again, but it is not advisable in long-term negotiating relationships."³¹

In a conflict setting, where the dynamics of the situation, including rule of law issues, may be far more complex than those at play in a straightforward business deal, one or more parties may simply renege on the agreement if they discover that they have signed a deal that does not truly benefit them. Jonathan Powell writes that several times during the post-Good Friday Agreement talks, the parties concerned reached initial agreements that were later rejected once examined in greater detail or discussed with their stakeholders.³²

Author's Research

During the course of negotiations workshops, when participants failed to separate the issues from the people involved, it was generally found that the negotiation experienced difficulties very early on. Some participants felt that if their counterparts appeared satisfied with the result, then they were not pushing hard enough and opened another round of bargaining, to which the other side responded in like fashion. On a related note, ego and emotion frequently became obstacles to achieving an agreement (anger and frustration at perceived offenses, intransigence, pride, fear, mistrust). Indeed, among the most noteworthy issues on the workshops were those relating to irritation of the other side; aggressive comments, arrogance, direct insults, disrespectful body language, condescending attitudes, etc. which are more associated with the distributive negotiation style. This usually led to point scoring, with a spiraling of the irritating factors leading, on occasion, to a breakdown in the process. Yet, as Rackham and Carlisle observe,³³ the most effective negotiators have an ability to reduce irritators in a negotiation.

On many occasions, through a lack of planning and a focus on getting a result rather than following the process correctly, participants pushed through agreements that were markedly inferior to their alternatives to the negotiation.³⁴ By focusing on achieving a

³⁰ USIP (2010) op cit.

³¹ Mancini-Griffoli, D. and Picot, A. (2004) *Humanitarian Negotiations*, Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, p. 74.

³² Powell J. (2008) *Great Hatred, Little Room*, London: Vintage Books.

³³ Rackham and Carlisle (1978) op cit.

³⁴ Identified as a key area in Weiss et al (2010) op cit.

result, and in particular on 'winning,' negotiators can become blinded to their alternatives and options outside the process which may in fact be superior to the deal reached. For example, building a well might be a more favourable solution than negotiating over access rights to an existing water supply.

*Iraq and Kuwait: Distributive Negotiations Lead to War*³⁵

After the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was heavily indebted to other Arab states, including a \$14 billion debt to Kuwait. Iraq felt that, as it had acted as a bulwark against Iran, those states, including Kuwait, should cancel the debts. Iraq also hoped that rising oil prices would assist in repaying its debts. Kuwait on the other hand was actively involved in driving down the price of oil in order to give it better leverage in the negotiations.³⁶ On 31 July 1990, the Saudis invited the Iraqis and Kuwaitis for high-level crisis talks. An agreement seemed possible.³⁷ Unfortunately the talks became personal, and both sides used "soft" and "hard" tactics. On the Iraqi side was Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Hassan al Majid (Chemical Ali) and on the Kuwaiti side was the Crown Prince of Kuwait. Neither side could make the necessary concessions to reach a compromise (in a distributive negotiation there is a tendency to haggle from positions) and eventually both sides finished by shouting at each other. The Iraqi negotiator tried to use guilt and compassion (emotional soft tactics) by saying that the Iraqis, fellow arabs to the Kuwaitis, were suffering terribly in poverty. The Kuwaiti Crown Prince came back with the reply that if the Iraqis were so poor they should send their women onto the streets to earn some money.³⁸ When his comment reached Saddam Hussein, he became so incensed that further negotiations became impossible. Two days later, on the 02nd of August, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Integrative: The Case For and Against

There are certain disadvantages to the integrative style that are worth noting: Sometimes the very nature of the negotiation punishes one side for opening up too readily about their interests, because valuable information is given away which the other side then uses to their advantage.³⁹ When practised naïvely therefore, the integrative style can actually result in the integrative negotiator losing out in the negotiation as they share information about their interests when there is no intention on the part of the other side to reciprocate.⁴⁰ Sometimes an integrative negotiator may also feel that a Win-Win agreement is always possible, or that Win-Win means an equal rather than a fair distribution of the issues on the table. This may lead to unrealistic expectations on their part, as they may feel that there is always a solution whereby everyone gets what they wanted at the beginning of the negotiation.⁴¹

On the other hand, there are many convincing reasons why the integrative style of negotiation may be considered the optimal style to choose as a general rule when involved in a conflict negotiation. These are discussed below under the seven areas that characterise this approach.

³⁵ Ross S. (2010) *Understand the Middle East since 1945*, London: Holder Education.

³⁶ Klein D. (2003) *Mechanisms of western Dominance: A short history of Iraq and Kuwait*, California State University (lecture paper): Northridge.

³⁷ Ross (2010) op cit.

³⁸ Simpson J. *The Wars against Saddam, taking the hard road to Baghdad*, London: Pan McMillan.

³⁹ USIP (2010) op cit.

⁴⁰ Camp, J. (2002) *Start With No*, New York: Crown Business.

⁴¹ USIP (2010) op cit.

Separating People from the Issues

"Most armed conflicts are deep and protracted with painful histories of extreme violence, inter-group hatred, oppression, humiliation, profound political suspicion and the active involvement of other states."⁴² In this environment, it is even more important to spend time developing a working relationship where there is a degree of trust in either the actions of the other side, the mediators or the process. As Shapiro points out, however, it is not necessary to agree with or even like the other side when developing a working relationship.⁴³

There may be a feeling that being "soft" on the people means being soft on the issues and therefore it means conceding power. This is not the case.⁴⁴ Treating the people with respect and developing a working relationship helps to build an atmosphere of trust where they are willing to disclose their underlying interests which in turn makes it easier to craft a solution to everyone's needs.

Interests, Not Positions

By focusing on interests, it is possible to be more flexible as there may be several positions that will satisfy the same interests. It also helps the parties involved to save face as they do not have to 'climb down' from strongly held positions adopted at the beginning of a negotiation. In a conflict setting, helping the parties involved to save face can be an important step in getting movement on the issues.⁴⁵

The Process

By treating the negotiation as a process rather than an outcome, the focus remains on negotiating correctly instead of trying to reach an agreement. This is especially important in a conflict negotiation, as reaching a successful agreement might not even be the objective of the other side. As Slim states:

Talks may be engaged in for many reasons other than a peaceful solution: to save face; to gain or keep international prestige; to stall while continuing or preparing wider military activity; or to beat the opponent at the table while he is weak on the battlefield.⁴⁶

This could be considered especially useful in a context where negotiators are on tours of duty which last only six months, but the negotiations themselves with locals may last much longer. By following a process it is possible for different negotiators to take over from the points reached by their predecessors.

Creative Solutions for Mutual Gain

The rule of law may be absent in a conflict situation, and many conflict negotiations take place as a result of a breakdown in the rule of an effective legal system. This implies that the mere fact that a contract is signed is no guarantee that the agreement will be implemented. Simply put, "Signature and ceremony is not everything."⁴⁷ A fair agreement

⁴² Slim (2007) op cit, p. ii.

⁴³ Fisher, R. and Shapiro, D. (2007) *Building Agreement, using emotions as you negotiate*, London: Random House.

⁴⁴ Weiss et al (2010) op cit.

⁴⁵ Ury (1991) op cit.

⁴⁶ Slim (2007) op cit, P. 8.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 14.

that benefits both sides, and is implemented due to the desire of both sides to see it work, has a greater chance of success than one simply enshrined in a written document. This is especially important when considering a scenario where the troops who have supported the negotiation process leave some time after the agreement has been signed. If the balance of power then changes, the agreement may not hold if it was not designed to benefit both sides.

Alternatives and Options

When entering a negotiation, it is necessary to remember that it is only one of several ways of reaching an objective. Mancini-Griffoli and Picot recommend that a negotiator always ask themselves “how else could I reach my objective?”⁴⁸ If they do not consider their alternatives and simply focus on bargaining and winning within the negotiation, then “negotiators are prone to developing tunnel vision that leads them to reach agreements inferior to their alternatives.”⁴⁹ This can be directly relevant in a conflict setting where, for example, it may be found that a return to force, or simply avoiding the negotiation until conditions are ripe, are alternatives that should be pursued instead of pushing for an agreement for agreement’s sake.⁵⁰

Preparation

“Successful negotiation means preparation.”⁵¹ If a negotiator understands the bigger picture (stakeholders, history behind the negotiation, economic and political factors, influencing ideologies etc.), and the values, motivators and personalities of the other negotiating parties, then they have a greater chance of finding creative solutions that meet the interests of both sides and that can be implemented after the formal negotiation has finished.⁵² In a conflict negotiation, where internal and external pressures can be high, effective preparation enables the negotiators to be proactive, rather than reactive and to not take impulsive decisions influenced by the moment.

Objective Standards

By using objective standards to create legitimacy, the emphasis moves away from one of trying to find out who can deploy the most power towards finding out who has the ‘fairest’ solution.⁵³ This results in the negotiated agreement continuing to make sense even if the balance of power shifts later from one side to another. In a scenario where there is a rotation of negotiators, it is also easier for each successive negotiator to defend the rationale of their predecessor in the field when the arguments the previous negotiator used were based on legitimate standards and not personal biases or personality.

Author’s Research

In every workshop where participants were given time to prepare, they performed better than participants who negotiated on the strength of their personality and bargaining skill.⁵⁴ When participants were told to focus on the process, they spent more time

48 Mancini-Griffoli and Picot (2004) op cit, P. 85.

49 Boyle S. (2013) ‘Solid Planning trumps wit for negotiation’, *Irish Independent*, 05 September.

50 USIP (2010) op cit.

51 Levinson (1999) *Guerrilla Negotiating*, pg 2.

52 Shell R. (2006) *Bargaining for Advantage*.

53 Fisher et al (1991) op cit.

54 Levinson et al would indicate that this is inevitable. See Levinson, C., Smith, M. and Wilson, O. (1999) *Guerrilla Negotiating: Unconventional Weapons and Tactics to get what you want*, New York: Wiley.

uncovering hidden interests and agendas that later helped them to craft solutions that were acceptable to the other side.⁵⁵ In cases where they deliberately prepared strategies to reduce irritators and treat their relationship with their counterparts as separate to the issues, participants were able to avoid derailing the negotiations when personal conflicts arose.⁵⁶ By focusing on the interests of the other side from the planning stage onwards, there was less of a tendency to adopt entrenched positions that had to be defended and more of an impetus to find solutions that would satisfy the needs of all concerned. On some occasions it was clear that the agreement that might be reached was inferior to the alternatives to the negotiation. The participants who followed the process, rather than focusing on reaching an agreement, were able to identify this and reached no deal, as opposed to a 'bad' deal.

Sinai: The Perfect Example of the Integrative Approach?

One of the most cited examples⁵⁷ of the integrative approach working in practice is the negotiations in the late 1970s between Egypt and Israel concerning the Sinai desert. Officially, the position of both countries was to claim sovereignty over this area. After Anwar-el Sadat made his famous trip to Jerusalem in 1977, the situation seemed ripe to open negotiations. Almost immediately, they floundered when the Israelis "demanded at the outset that they be allowed to retain civilian settlements and military air bases in Sinai."⁵⁸ The American President, Jimmy Carter, then invited the leaders of the two countries to Camp David where they could negotiate in a secluded environment. Teams of American advisers worked on understanding the needs of the two sides and investigating possible creative solutions that would satisfy these needs.⁵⁹

A working relationship was established between the leaders of Israel and Egypt. The interests underlying their initial positions were then uncovered and identified. Egypt's main interest lay in national territorial integrity, while Israel's main interest lay in security.⁶⁰ The agreement that was reached gave the Sinai desert back to Egypt on the basis that it would remain de-militarised. The interests of both sides were met, resulting in an agreement that was mutually beneficial. The relationship between both countries was strengthened and the very nature of the deal meant that both sides continue to implement it today.

Afghanistan: The Integrative Approach in Action

In November 2010, an article was published in the *Harvard Business Review* called *Extreme Negotiations*. This article, by Weiss, Donigian and Hughes⁶¹ discussed the application of negotiation skills by military negotiators. Their findings were based on interviews with active duty personnel in Afghanistan. While they called these negotiators *In Extremis Negotiators*, they carry all the hallmarks of the integrative negotiator as defined in this article.

⁵⁵ This follows the experience of the military in Afghanistan, according to Weiss et al (2010) op cit.

⁵⁶ This is consistent with what Rackham and Carlisle predicted. See Rackham and Carlisle (1978) op cit.

⁵⁷ This is a recurring case study in the literature. See, for example, Fisher and Ury (1991), Ramsbotham et al (2005), Raiffa (1982).

⁵⁸ Raiffa, H. (1982) *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, London: Harvard University Press.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ramsbotham (2005) op cit, p. 18.

⁶¹ Weiss et al (2010) op cit.

They noted that there was a need to focus on five specific areas when negotiating in a conflict setting: getting the big picture (preparation); uncovering interests and collaboration (interests instead of positions and solutions for mutual gain); eliciting genuine buy-in (using objective criteria as opposed to force); building trust first (developing a working relationship while separating the people from the issues); and focusing on process before outcomes. Through specific examples and experience, they were able to show that the integrative approach to negotiations works at the tactical level (troops on the ground) in a conflict environment, and is not merely confined to the strategic level (e.g. politicians discussing territorial issues).

Summary

The integrative and distributive approaches to conflict resolution negotiations differ from each other in several important aspects. The distributive style focuses on the bargaining skill of the negotiator, sees negotiations as having win-lose outcomes, and believes in using and abusing the relationship with the other negotiator in order to reach goals. It is essentially short term in outlook. In contrast, those who use the integrative style use objective criteria to defend their arguments, seek to find win-win solutions that are mutually beneficial and set out to gain a resolution of the issues and build a working relationship with their counterparts. It has a long-term outlook.

In a negotiation to end a conflict, the distributive style appears to present many disadvantages, worsening what is often an already difficult relationship between the parties, not creating sustainable agreements and focusing on reaching a deal as opposed to a solution. The example of the failed negotiation between the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis in 1990 demonstrates the negative results of using the distributive style in a conflict situation, as does the primary research carried out by the author over a 10 year period.

The integrative style, on the other hand, by focusing on creating a working relationship and separating the people from the issues, would indicate that it is more suitable for a negotiation already fraught with mistrust and possibly even hatred. By focusing on the process and uncovering interests, it is possible to create solutions which are supported by objective arguments and ultimately have a greater likelihood of continued success in the long term. This is supported by the author's own experience, the celebrated case of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations concerning the Sinai and the lessons learned by the US military in Afghanistan.

It is contended here that the optimal style to adopt for a conflict negotiation is the collaborative integrative approach. By focusing on improving the relationship between the concerned parties and finding mutually satisfying solutions to the conflict, there is a much greater probability of achieving an agreement which is sustainable over the long term than if a distributive approach were used. More empirical work needs to be carried out to further analyse the veracity of this argument, however the case in favour of adopting an integrative approach to conflict resolution negotiations is indeed a compelling one.

Abstracts

70 Senior Command and Staff Course

**MA in Leadership, Management
and Defence Studies**

The Consequences for Soldiers and Higher Command in Introducing Military Representation in the Armed Forces of Malta. Lessons from the European Experience

ABSTRACT

Independent military representation has been established in Europe for several years. Yet, in my home country of Malta, the introduction of independent military representation in the Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) has only recently been announced and will be a historic event for Maltese soldiers. The primary aim of this thesis was to develop an in-depth understanding of military representation in Europe and related consequences prior to the actual implementation in Malta. Two main themes emerged from the conceptual framework on the study of the consequences of military representation. Theme one was the study of the soldier and the state with a sub theme which analysed soldiers' rights and freedom of expression. Theme two covered trade unionism and military representation in Europe and investigated if their development has affected the chain of command and discipline.

In the literature, we have witnessed a peak in studies on military representation during the 1970s when conscription was at its height. A fear of military representation in some countries was identified and there has been a new resurgence by European Institutions placing soldiers' rights back on the agenda. This has been championed by associations such as the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) which demands equal rights for military personnel in Europe.

A post-positivist qualitative research approach was adopted for my study since qualitative studies allow the researcher to study things in their natural setting. The Irish Defence Forces was selected for my case study due to the comparative similarities in size, structure and roles of the Irish Defence Forces and AFM. My study was greatly facilitated by interviewees who have a wide range of experience of military representation from its introduction in the early nineties to the recent challenging experience during Ireland's economic collapse between 2008 and 2011. This applies equally to both the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO) and the Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks Representative Association (PDFORRA).

The data has confirmed that the introduction of representation in the Irish Defence Forces was not initially accepted by the Higher Command and even today resistance continues to exist at certain levels. In answering the question of the consequences of military representation, it is apparent in the findings that independent military representation has both positive and negative consequences. The implication for the AFM is that there is a requirement for compromise between representative organisations and Higher Command, so that mutual benefits can be achieved.

‘An Army of Followers’ Can Followership Awareness Improve Leadership in the Irish Defence Forces?

ABSTRACT

Followership is a relatively new concept which “is the other side of the coin” of leadership. Military organisations that espouse leadership, however, perceive the term ‘follower’ negatively even though all military leaders are also followers. Followership as a concept is therefore relatively unknown and receives little attention in military doctrine and literature.

The research utilised a hermeneutical phenomenological approach as part of a qualitative case study to investigate the level of awareness of followership in the Irish Defence Forces (DF) and determine whether a better understanding of the concept can lead to more effective leadership. In-depth interviews were conducted with two Generals, three Commandants and a focus group was conducted with five Cadets in order to ensure a spread of experience and attitudes towards followership and leadership.

The findings indicate that followership awareness is limited in the DF and only learned through experience by “osmosis”. The findings also highlight that a better understanding of followership can improve leadership in the DF because leaders are influenced by followers. If leaders can recognise follower styles and behaviours then they can become more effective. In fact, effective leaders practise good followership and good leadership. In addition, the findings suggest that understanding followership can enable leaders to identify when dissent is not insubordination and therefore encourage followers to dissent when appropriate. This leads to both leaders and followers understanding their ethical responsibilities while sharing common organisational values.

The implications of these findings are that DF personnel need to increase their understanding of followership through education and training. This can be achieved by promoting followership through DF media and incorporating a more substantial section on followership in Leadership Doctrine. Followership should also be introduced on Leadership courses and utilised in training exercises and workshops to create scenarios requiring ethical decision making.

‘The Sword and the Mind’ The Utility of Psychological Operations in the Modern Battlespace

ABSTRACT

Warfare in the 21st Century necessitates a complete shift in the way we think and the way we fight. More than ever, the use of non-lethal and non-kinetic effects is having a profound impact on conflict and the ways and means of prosecution. Much of today's battlefield is in the minds of the public, shaped by the spoken word, cyberspace, media, and other means of strategic communications, as well as by our physical actions. The versatility and flexibility of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) throughout the continuum make it a combat multiplier and a complementary non-kinetic weapons system. The purpose of PSYOPS is to create in neutral, friendly or hostile foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or desired behaviour that support the achievement of the military mission. Consequently, utilising PSYOPS with physical operations may very well be decisive in military operations.

The methodology employed a qualitative research model to generate a wider outlook of interviewees' viewpoints and to explore the nuances and relevance of each of the themes identified in the literature review.

The findings indicate that, although PSYOPS measurement models may be theoretically and intellectually valid, they are too complicated and of limited use in the field. Nevertheless, interviewees claim that PSYOPS is effective, important and valid and should always be incorporated into the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) in conjunction with kinetic operations.

The study recommends the development of a user-friendly, practical and valid measurement model which can be utilised at the lowest level. PSYOPS does require proper resourcing to become more mainstream in teaching and education. Also PSYOPS must be more closely planned and nested with other physical actions and effects for optimum results. There is an opportunity for the Irish Defence Forces to develop a PSYOPS capability and develop an expertise in the area for overseas service.

Exploring Dissent in Civil-Military Relations

ABSTRACT

This study explored dissent in Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in order to understand how the military leader balances the requirement to adhere to the principle of civilian control while also executing the professional responsibility to provide military expertise.

CMR is an environment that every officer will be required to operate in with increasing levels of engagement as they advance in the Defence Forces, as a fundamental requirement of the strategic leader is the ability to relate military means and ways to political ends. The concept of dissent is not a comfortable one for the military to consider, but it is critical that it is fully explored and understood. This understanding ensures the interests of the Defence Forces can be represented as strongly as possible without crossing the boundary of acceptable behaviour. This can only be achieved if there is clarity on where the boundary between disagreement and dissent lies.

The research was conducted from a post-positivist, qualitative research position utilising the phenomenological approach. In depth interviews were conducted with individuals who could provide rich descriptions of their experience of the phenomenon of dissent, based on extensive experience of the CMR environment at the strategic level both at home and overseas.

The findings indicate that the fundamental principle of democratic civilian control of the military underpins the civil-military discourse in Ireland and the legitimate statutory control of the Minister for Defence is clearly and absolutely accepted. There is less clarity regarding agreement of the position of the civil and military entities below this level however and a lack of definition leads to differences in terminology and precise understanding of roles, ultimately leading to tension in the discourse. The research finds that CMR should become an integral aspect of the professional education of military officers in order to develop civil-military skills and competencies.

In light of the findings, a number of recommendations are made that emphasise the importance of CMR in the professional development of the military officer in preparation for operating at the civil-military interface. These include the development of a robust curriculum for professional development courses and the consideration of a formal Defence Force position on CMR.

Great Expectations: The Effect of Organisational Changes on the Psychological Contract of Enlisted Personnel in the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

This study set about exploring how certain aspects of organisational change affect the psychological contract of enlisted personnel. Organisational change is complex and difficult at the best of times. When an organisation has such a large change to the degree the Defence Forces has experienced over the last two years, the impact throws up many and varied challenges. By viewing how organisational change has affected the psychological contract of the soldier, one can have a clearer understanding of the needs of our most important asset, our personnel.

The study set out to define academic research in respect of the psychological contract and focussed on gaining an understanding of the impact of organisational change on the psychological contract of enlisted personnel. Through the use of interviews and focus groups drawn from a cross section of personnel who were affected by organisational change the research highlighted a range of reactions from frustration and anger to satisfaction and contentment at the entire process of change. Results showed that the breach of one's psychological contract had a significant effect on one's job satisfaction and intention to remain in the DF. Additionally, there was a significant interaction between psychological contract breach and the outcomes of psychological contract breach. When employees experience a breach of their psychological contract, the effect of breach on perceived organisational support and organisational citizenship behaviours varies depending on what aspect of organisational change affected them.

I explore what the DF could do in order to manage change effectively so it has a minimum effect on the psychological contract of enlisted personnel. It will not always be possible to avoid breach of the psychological contract but soldiers are more likely to be forgiving when employers explain what has gone wrong and how they intend to deal with it.

‘Quality Teaching – A *Sine Qua Non* of a Quality Learning Culture.’ Can Military Instructor Participation in Higher Education Teacher Training Programmes enhance Defence Forces Teaching and Learning?

ABSTRACT

Defence Forces instructors have, over the last number of years, participated in external Teacher-Training Programmes (TTPs) in the Higher Education (HE) sector. This study aims to establish if Defence Forces teaching and learning can be enhanced as a consequence of this participation.

The literature found that participation in TTPs is directly linked with classroom enactment of approaches and skills acquired, increases student-learning outcomes, can transform classrooms into places where teachers and students are deeply engaged in learning, directly affects the quality of learning and they can be of benefit to the individual, college or organisation. Research also found that while major attempts have been made to develop Defence Forces instructor training and promote academic best practice in teaching and learning, the reality is that Defence Forces instructor training policy has not been updated since 1999.

The methodology took a post-positivist, qualitative research approach in order to capture a wider perspective from interviewees and to explore the benefits TTPs could bring to Defence Forces teaching and learning. Case study methodology has been employed together with semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts from the HE sector and Defence Forces Training and Education.

The findings indicate that participants on TTPs view these activities as greatly enhancing teaching and learning in the Defence Forces by providing instructors with expert

knowledge on new pedagogical methodologies, teaching techniques, assessment of students' learning and use of ICT. However, some argue that they only have a partial role to play and that the Defence Forces should take what is considered best practice from TTPs and further develop in-house instructor-training in the Defence Forces. If TTPs are to benefit Defence Forces teaching and learning in the future, it falls on Defence Forces management to implement guidelines and develop policy which will make sure that any knowledge gained as a result of participation is transferred throughout the organisation.

The Defence Forces needs to capture the experiences, knowledge and expertise of TTP participants. Instructors need to be retained in training appointments for an extended period of time so that the Defence Forces gains significantly in the long-term. Another solution is to set up a Defence Forces Centre for Teaching and Learning (DFCTL). This CTL would have a mix of academics and military instructors who can conduct courses that meet the training needs of the Defence Forces.

‘Never Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth’ A Study of the Decision-Making Process of the Horse Purchase Board, The Army Equitation School

ABSTRACT

The Irish Army Equitation School's (AES) mission is to advertise the Irish Sport Horse through participation in International competitions at the highest level. The Purchase Board (PB) is the body within the AES responsible for the selection and purchase or lease of these horses. Although considerable research has been conducted on decision making, there is little research into understanding how the members of the Purchase Board decide what horses to purchase for the Army Showjumping Team. The aim of this research is to examine the decision making processes that are employed by the PB to determine what horses it will try to secure. The research was conducted from a post-positivist position using a phenomenological approach to the collection and analysis of data. Semi-formal interviews were conducted with four previous and one current member of the PB. The study indicates that multiple theoretical frameworks namely naturalistic decision making theory, recognition primed decision theory, heuristics and biases theory and expected utility theory need to be combined to model the decision making process (DMP) used by the PB. The PB has evolved and developed a complex, detailed and sophisticated system for assessing the horses presented to them. This process is totally reliant on the skills and competencies of the individuals that make up the PB. In the current fiscal environment, with limited financial means available, it is essential that the PB continues to make accurate assessments and prudent purchases. To achieve this, the AES must understand the DMP and the skills and competencies required by the members of the PB to complete this important work. The AES, it is suggested needs to put measures in place, to ensure its unique skills and systems are understood and retained.

Will.They.Serve.Germany? A Successful Advertising Campaign in the Making?

ABSTRACT

In 2011 Germany suspended conscription and broke an over fifty year old tradition. Up to that most of the new recruits in the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) were regenerated through conscripts. All of a sudden and within a short period of time a need arose to consider a new recruitment strategy. Therefore the Bundeswehr implemented a new human resource management organisation and a new advertising strategy whereby one of the main issues can be found in the relatively new slogan “Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.” (We.Serve.Germany.)

This research explores the question if the Bundeswehr advertising campaign can be considered to be a success in order to draw conclusions initially for the Bundeswehr but also in a second step to find implications useful for any military organisation.

A review of literature reveals those publications which look at recruitment nowadays, the effects of media and advertisements, Employer Branding as well as the media behaviour of the youth. Subsequently all measures taken by the Bundeswehr are examined. Finally a comparison to the Irish Defence Forces, which underwent a similar examination, is given.

The methodology employed was post-positivist in nature. Three different methods to collect data were used: structured e-mail interviews, a semi-structured interview and an online-questionnaire. Due to the fact that the Bundeswehr advertise for three different military careers and three different civil careers a case study in regard to the officer campaign was conducted within this paper.

Three central themes were evident throughout the course of this work. As all kinds of media have a huge influence on young people the accessibility of the target group is of high importance for any advertising campaign. The second main theme is Employer Branding as there is the highest possibility for improvement especially for Armed Forces. Finally as this work explores it is difficult to measure effects of advertisements and therefore also effects of whole advertising campaigns but a focus for any military organisation should be on more than just an increased number of applicants in the short term. The special role of the so called gatekeepers, which include parents, family and close friends of an applicant, cannot be neglected here.

This paper comes to the conclusion that the Bundeswehr does a lot of things right and therefore the advertising campaign can be considered to be a partial success. Recommendations for further research are made also. Since young people are looking for values it will be necessary for any military organisation to find and promote values which are unique to the organisation and are something “to be proud of”. This will hopefully increase public awareness and accordingly in the long term result in an increased number of applicants.

COMDT BRENDAN LYONS

‘A Quiet Priest Never gets a Parish’

An Exploration into Career Self-Management Activities of Defence Forces Officers

ABSTRACT

The nature of the external careers’ environment has changed fundamentally in recent times moving, in many cases, from relational to transactional contracts. The military career has incurred similar changes moving along a continuum from an institutional to occupational model, mirroring the relational/transactional external trend. This has instigated changes in the way careers are managed from a predominantly organisation-led focus to one where the individual is responsible for self-managing.

This thesis investigates the nature of career self-management within the Defence Forces to elicit attendant behaviours and activities. In doing so, it attempts to explore the interrelationship between organisational objectives, values and supports and individual responses to managing their own career.

The careers’ literature is drawn upon to assist in the development of a conceptual framework, which incorporates the primary determinants of self-efficacy and proactive personality; the activities/processes of organisational career management and career self-management; while exploring the mediating role of organisational justice in aligning Defence Forces career management with its espoused values.

A qualitative methodological study is employed drawing on individual officer's reflections and experiences and comparing them with official Defence Forces Human Resources perspectives, both contextualised by the United States military's career management policy.

The findings unearth tensions between individual officer expectations and organisational supports. They also demonstrate self-management activities consistent with thematic areas from within the careers’ literature, although with significant variations. These organisational variations provide insight into the thought-processes underlying Defence Forces career self-management, which shed light on weaknesses within its talent management systems.

Recommendations emanating from the research include: the implementation of career advisory systems; enacting of formalised mentoring programmes or improvement to existing informal ones; as well as suggestions for the nascent promotion competency framework currently in production.

Carrot or Stick?

Factors Influencing Physical Activity Maintenance in the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

Increased international recognition of the importance of physical activity (PA) to global health has come into focus in recent years with international and national policy developments and initiatives aimed at encouraging lifelong PA patterns in the population. Despite the increased recognition of the necessity to motivate and obligate military personnel to participate in effective (PA) and healthy behaviour in daily life, there is currently a limited understanding of the factors that influence PA maintenance in the Defence Forces (DF).

The aim of this study is to explore what factors influence PA maintenance among DF personnel. In doing so, the study examines important contextual and personal factors by adapting the PA maintenance (PAM) model to gain a robust and holistic perspective.

The research was conducted from a post-positive position using a qualitative case study methodology. Three main methods including semi-structured focused interviews with a purposeful sample of seven mid-career personnel, a focus group with the DF Physical Education Working Group (PEWG), and document analysis were used in data collection. This was followed by a thematic data analysis based on the adapted PAM model identified in the literature review.

The research indicates that it is not sufficient for the DF to rely on a 'carrot or stick' approach to influencing PA maintenance, or to focus solely on performance-related fitness. A more holistic participatory approach is needed that actively encourages and promotes self-determined PA behaviour, develops goal-setting ability, and PA self-efficacy among personnel. The provision of a PA environment that supports these personal factors is central to long-term PA maintenance efforts. This requires the establishment of PA management structures, allocation of resources to support PA maintenance, and a policy of linking into wider national PA maintenance initiatives.

‘All at Sea’

What are the Perceived Benefits and Relevance of the “Excellence Through People” Award to the Irish Naval Service?

ABSTRACT

In response to a whistleblower highlighting a problem with sexual harassment and bullying in the Defence Forces there was a root and branch overhaul of Human Resource Management within the Defence Forces. It was then decided to benchmark the Defence Forces against ‘Excellence Through People’, the Irish National Human Resource Development standard. As a result the Irish Naval Service was assessed in 2007. The aim of this thesis is to explore if the introduction of Excellence Through People has been beneficial to the Irish Naval Service and to identify its relevance to the members of the INS.

The use of qualitative research methodology facilitates the active participation of the researcher and suits the exploratory nature of the research question. Using a phenomenological methodology and conducting semi-structured interviews with members of the Irish Naval Service ranging from the senior officer in the organisation to an individual who is in his first rotation to sea, as well as a retired officer, the research attempts to capture the perceived benefits and relevance of Excellence Through People to the Irish Naval Service.

This study indicates that the perception exists that the National Human Resource Development standard, Excellence Through People award, is beneficial to the Irish Naval Service but in particular to an external audience. The study found a combination of poor communication, resistance to change, culture and motivation lead to non-acceptance and a lack of integration. As a result, the relevance of the Excellence Through People award to the members of the Irish Naval Service is no more than a *Plaque on the Wall*.

COMDT BRYAN MCGETERICK

The Irish Defence Forces and Jointness: Where Do We Stand?

ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that, if the Defence Forces is to engage in meaningful transformation, it must embrace the concept of jointness. The literature on jointness in the last 30 years has largely focused on the experiences of Canada and the United States. There is a gap in the literature in terms of the applicability of jointness to small forces such as the Irish Defence Forces, and this study contributes to filling that gap. Principles and models of jointness are analysed, and the experiences of Canada and the United States are explored. The literature suggests that there is a fine balance to be achieved between the integration of separate services, the maintenance of service cohesion, and the management of interservice rivalry.

The research was conducted from a post-positivist position using a case study approach to the collection and analysis of data. In-depth interviews were conducted with three key senior strategic leaders from the Defence Forces, a senior policy advisor from the Department of Defence and a leading member of Academia.

The study reveals that the organisation's strategic leadership is in favour of jointness, and that the development of the Defence Forces' capabilities would benefit from the adoption of a joint approach to operations. There has been a deficit of understanding of the air and maritime domains at Defence Forces Headquarters level, and this has effected interoperability between the services. The manifestation of interservice rivalry is experienced around the area of promotions and appointments, and will have to be carefully managed if jointness is to be pursued.

The findings indicate that the transformation challenges facing the Defence Forces are fundamentally no different than those faced by larger military organisations. The main difference being the requirement for the Irish Defence Forces to achieve equilibrium between the land, air and maritime domains.

‘The Only Thing Harder than Getting a New Idea into the Military is Getting an Old Idea Out’ A Study of Implementing Operational Changes in the NS

ABSTRACT

This study carries out a comprehensive exploration of how large Operational Changes have been introduced in the NS over the past decade. The issues investigated were the 6-week Patrol Cycle and the introduction of FORST and how they changed previous operational practices.

The methodology employed was a post-positivist, qualitative case study through the use of semi-structured interviews. Findings revealed that change theories and practices were employed by the ‘Change Agents’ and that Leadership and Communication were in fact central to the success of these Change Initiatives.

COMDT THOMAS MCGUINNESS

Accommodation or Avoidance? The Relationship Between Humanitarian Non-Government Organisations and Private Military Security Companies

ABSTRACT

The end of cold war saw a proliferation of both PMSCs and NGOs. Market demand for private military services grew as states reduced their military inventories. The requirement for humanitarian aid also increased as the instance of states failing increased.

My experiences in the Middle East and Africa allowed me to witness first hand PMSCs and NGOs and to recognise the extent of the cultural differences that exist between the two groups. This recognition became real for me when my presence at a meeting caused a 'walkout' by an NGO in Góz Béida, Chad. My learning experience turned to confusion when I witnessed some NGOs working with and interoperating with PMSCs.

This confusion is the inspiration behind the research question I wanted to ascertain what is 'the relationship between NGOs and PMSCs' and if 'Accommodation or Avoidance' is the appropriate course for humanitarian NGOs. It behoves the Defence Forces that its commanders have a clear understanding of all parties that we are likely to encounter in complex crisis situations.

The study shows there are security implications for humanitarian NGOs given the linkage between PMSCs and the non-principled NGOs. PMSCs are increasingly contracted to support reducing state military resources and NGOs will always aspire to deliver aid to those in need. Ignoring each other will only lead to more difficulties and perhaps casualties.

The study recommends that a mechanism to help each group de-conflict each other's activities is a necessity. This can be done using only a modicum of common sense and without diminishing or diluting the core values or principles of the NGO groups and it would also have benefits for the PMSCs in gaining increased understanding of their role in conflict zones. There must also be a completion to the regulation process for PMSCs and circumstantial clarity in the body of international law.

It is an area that the Defence Forces must become aware of, as we like other militaries have contracting resources, and we must understand the complexity in the relationship between PMSCs and NGOs in order to command in a modern crisis area.

COMDT DAVE MCNAMARA

Knowledge Management and the Mobility of Officers in the Defence Forces:

Is the Defence Forces Capturing its Corporate Knowledge?

ABSTRACT

The mobility of officers through appointments, or job rotation, is a recognised feature of life in the Defence Forces (DF). Officers acquire considerable corporate knowledge as they serve in various appointments throughout the DF. The DF Information and Knowledge Management Strategy (DFIKMS), published in November 2012, notes that the capture of valuable corporate knowledge can enhance DF capability. This thesis explores how Knowledge Management (KM) and officer mobility interact and asks if the DF is capturing its corporate knowledge as officers move around the organisation.

The research critically reviews literature on KM and Human Resource Management (HRM); both in other militaries and in civilian organisations. Current DF strategy and policy documents applicable to both areas are also reviewed.

The research adopts a post-positivist, qualitative research methodology, utilising a phenomenological approach to the collection of data. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with key personnel involved in KM and HRM in the DF. Semi-structured interviews are also conducted with serving officers, at the Comdt rank, to get the perspective from the ground.

The findings highlight that the DF approach to the introduction of KM into the organisation conforms to that suggested in the literature. The findings highlight that there are a number of factors contributing to job rotation, which present a particular challenge for HRM in the DF. The significance of the thesis emerges from the findings that DF members do not feel the DF is fully capturing or transferring its corporate knowledge.

On the basis of the findings a number of recommendations are suggested that will assist DF KM and DF HRM in ensuring that the organisation succeeds in capturing its valuable corporate knowledge.

“Missing in Action: When Should Society Stop Searching for its Military Dead?”

ABSTRACT

Throughout time soldiers have gone to war and not returned alive. Some never returned at all, their last resting place unknown or they may occupy a grave marked “Known unto God.” The numbers are overwhelming. At the best of times armies are able to claim their dead and bury them in military cemeteries near the battle sites or eventually transport them home to their families. At the other extreme, when fighting surges back and forth and over protracted periods of time, bodies can be lost or left exposed to the elements.

Despite commitments by nations to “never leave a man behind, dead or alive” their countries have stopped searching, with the notable exception of the United States. The review of the available literature supports the necessity to continue to search.

This thesis explores the question of when we should stop searching for our military dead, if ever. A post-positivist philosophy is utilised and this is coupled with the qualitative research methodology of narrative inquiry, the use of semi-structured interviews, and the documentary analysis of the memoir of the author's father who was a searcher with the Missing Research Enquiry Service in World War II. This allows analysis of the views of both searchers and a recognised journalist through the lens of a number of common themes developed from the literature available.

The research analysis establishes that there is a disconnect between the searchers and the theorists, indicating that we should not continue to search forever and that there is indeed a time to stop. This timeline for the termination of searching has been established as when there are no immediate living relatives alive and in the case of the present day we should not be now searching for the missing of World War I.

Barriers to the Integration of Intuition and Rationality in Naval Vessel Asset Management Decision-Making

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores decision-making in the management of Naval Vessels. In particular it focuses on how disparate information is sought, gathered, weighted, evaluated and integrated in order to improve decision-making about the ownership, maintenance and disposal of Naval Vessels.

A review of the literature available identified four themes of intuition, rationality, information and the organisation as important to this study. The research employed a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology based on semi-structured interviews conducted with civilian and military personnel within the Defence Organisation who have been involved in making these decisions. It seeks to echo the research aims by examining the research data in intuitive and rational ways using content analysis conducted manually and using a software aid. Analysis of research data identified a fifth theme that was significant enough to be developed as a theme in its own right. This will be referred to as stovepiping in this research.

In the absence of a robust decision-making structure Naval Vessel Asset Management decision-making within the Defence Organisation is largely individualistic. When confronted by either an absence of rational information or an overwhelming quantity of it all interviewees reverted to their intuition and experience. They were universally comfortable with having to rely on intuition and did so in preference to developing systems that would improve their access to information.

The key, and unexpected, finding is that the impact of organisational factors on decision-making is paramount in this case. The structure of the Defence Organisation is such that it significantly impacts on the access of decision-makers to information, on their ability to interpret that information and on the dissemination of their decisions once made. The Defence Organisation is also predisposed to avoiding making decisions to act because of interaction of each of its two halves and their capacity to place a brake on the ability of the other half to act.

MAJ PATRICK STONE

A Woman's Place is in... Special Operations and Female Engagement in the Human Domain Mór-Ríoghain Abú

ABSTRACT

In the unknown battlefield of the future the human domain may present “the key determining factor in conflicts” according to some of the US Military's top generals in a recent white paper discussing the United States National Security Strategy¹ (Hoffman M., 2013b). The focus of this research is to explore the role women have in the human domain and how the emerging human domain is shaping the roles of women in special operations. Four main themes emerged from the study; 1) there is a lack of doctrine in the field 2) women are making a difference as part of special operations teams while engaging in the human domain 3) women do not have the disruptive effect on morale, readiness, or cohesion some would suggest and 4) the change [to integrating women] must be done properly, for the right reasons, and in the appropriate capacity. The analysis presented here demonstrates that women can make a distinct contribution to special operations in current and future conflict in the area of the human domain as members of special operations units specialising in engagement and intelligence collection.

¹ The National Security Strategy is a document prepared by the executive branch of the United States Government for Congress that outlines the major national security concerns for the United States and an administration's plan to deal with the concerns.

“Even the Mightiest Get Fatigued” An Invisible Enemy. Operational Fatigue in the Naval Service

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore the influence of organisational culture and environmental factors on Irish Naval Service bridge watch-keepers capacity to endure operational fatigue. No research has been conducted within the Naval Service focusing on the physiological and psychological factors that affect NS watch-keepers operational endurance. This study intends to investigate the causes of fatigue applicable to Naval Service maritime defence and surveillance operations within the context of prevailing Defence Forces organisational culture.

This research was conducted using a post positivist, qualitative, phenomenological approach to the collection of data. This methodology was chosen to control this author's bias, as the most appropriate method to convey the participants' understanding of the phenomena and to satisfy ethical concerns. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 17 Naval Service watch-keeping officers. Six participants had dual experience of the merchant navy which provided comparative data between organisational structures.

The study indicates there is a direct correlation between organisational culture and fatigue. The primary causes being operational tempo and administrative burden. The Defence Forces healthy lifestyle policies, although inconsistent in application, combined with the organisational ethos and core values, imparted a degree of resilience to fatigue. Group cohesion fostered strong social bonds but also generated a reluctance to admit any weaknesses due to a perception of potential negative impact on career progression or ostracism from the group. Implementation of a Crew Endurance Management Programme on Naval Service ships is recommended to enhance operational endurance.

The findings of this study highlight that fatigue has a complex interaction with NS culture and can have a deleterious effect on the operational performance and physiological and psychological well-being of NS watch-keepers. Naval Commanders must become more cognisant of the detrimental effects of fatigue arising from high tempo maritime defence and security operations in the North East Atlantic Ocean.

“Legal and Ethical Implications Arising from the Development and Deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems”

ABSTRACT

Opinions surrounding the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems are polarised. Some see them as heralding an age of military conflict where machines, not men, will decide over the taking of human life on the battlefield. Others believe that these systems may provide a potentially reliable alternative to human blood lust in conflict. This study evaluates the myriad of opinions by traversing the prominent literature and attempting to parse the sometimes frenetic nature of the discourse. In approaching the subject from the legal and ethical perspectives, the principles of International Humanitarian Law are addressed alongside issues such as artificial intelligence, increased propensity for war and the relinquishment of decisions regarding the taking of human life to machines.

Utilising a modified hermeneutical approach, the research draws upon the thoughts of some of the most eminent legal, scientific and military experts, with a view to eliciting a deeper understanding of certain key areas. By revealing novel perspectives, this study identifies four key findings surrounding supervision of autonomous weapon systems, universal interpretation of International Humanitarian Law and both individual and state responsibility. Ultimately, however, the analysis calls upon the reader to take a conceptually different approach to understanding the future of autonomous weapon systems, where the incremental control of development becomes the focus, rather than the end state.

The findings and analysis of this research bring forward the wider knowledge of the subject and are immediately relevant to the international discourse surrounding the work of the United Nations Certain Conventional Weapons Committee. While the research is of particular interest to legal academics in the area of International Humanitarian Law, military commanders and scientists working with robotics, it has broad application to the development of weapons generally and the overlap between law and ethics.

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS – CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

1. **Lt Col Brendan O'Shea** is the Chief Instructor at the Command and Staff School, The Military College. He holds a BA in History from UCG; A BCL from UCC, a Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, Switzerland and a PhD in History from UCC. He lectures nationally on Modern Irish History and internationally on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. He is the author of *Crisis at Bihac – Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield* (Sutton Publishing UK, 1998); *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995* (Frank Cass UK, 2005); editor of *In The Service of Peace – Memories of Lebanon* (Mercier Press 2001); editor of the *Defence Forces Review 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008*; co-author with Gerry White of *The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913-1916* (Osprey UK, 2003), *Baptised in Blood – The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913-1916* (Mercier Press, 2005), *The Burning of Cork* (Mercier Press, 2006); *Easter 1916 in Cork – Order, Counter-order and Disorder in The Long Revolution*, Ed. Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh, (Mercier Press 2007); and contributing author with Gerry White of *The War for Ireland*, Ed. Peter Cottrell, (Osprey UK, 2009). In 2010, together with Gerry White, he edited and co-produced *A Great Sacrifice- Cork Servicemen who died in the Great War* (Evening Echo Publications 2010).
2. **CQMS Gerry White** is the Barrack Accountant in Collins Barracks, Cork. He is also the Irish Regional Representative, and Chairman of the Cork Branch of the Western Front Association (WFA). He lectures nationally on aspects of Irish military history and is a regular contributor to national and international military journals. He is the co-author with Dan Harvey of *The Barracks, a History of Victoria/Collins Barracks, Cork* (Mercier Press 1997) and with Jean Prendergast of *For Their Country – The Great War Dead of Christ Church Parish, Cork* (Triskel Art Centre, Cork, 2012). Additionally, he is co-author with Brendan O'Shea of *The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913-1916* (Osprey UK, 2003); *Baptised in Blood – The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 – 1916* (Mercier Press, 2005); *The Burning of Cork* (Mercier Press, 2006); *Easter 1916 in Cork – Order, Counter-order and Disorder in The Long Revolution*, Ed. Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (Mercier Press 2007); and contributing author with Brendan O'Shea of *The War for Ireland*, Ed. Peter Cottrell, (Osprey UK, 2009). In 2010, together with Brendan O'Shea, he edited and co-produced *A Great Sacrifice- Cork Servicemen who died in the Great War* (Evening Echo Publications 2010).
3. **Comdt David Foley** was commissioned in May 1992 as a member of the 67th Cadet Class and is currently serving as Officer Commanding Headquarters Support Unit in the Defence Forces Training Centre. He has served overseas on four occasions; including two tours of duty to Lebanon with UNIFIL in 1997 and 2000, one as a military observer with UNMISET in East Timor in 2002 and one to Chad with EUFOR in 2008. He holds a BA in Geography and History from University College Galway, a Masters Degree in Project Management from the University of Limerick and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from the National University

of Ireland, Maynooth. He graduated from the Command and Staff School in 2013 and his submission to this edition of the Defence Forces Review was developed from his original MA Thesis research on his Command and Staff course. The full and complete lists of the Missing Irish, compiled at county level, are freely available by making contact directly with Comdt Foley or through the Curragh Military Museum (email: www.curraghmilitary.museum@defenceforces.ie).

4. **Dr. Myles Dungan** is an historian and broadcaster with numerous books to his credit. These include 'Irish Voices from the Great War' and 'They Shall Grow Not Old', both of which concern Irish involvement in the Great War. His most recent work has been on late 19th century Ireland and includes a biography of Captain William O'Shea and 'Parnell's Rotweiler' which deals with the 'United Ireland' newspaper. Myles is the presenter of 'The History Show' on RTE Radio, is an adjunct lecturer in the Dept. of History and Archives in UCD, has taught at the University of California, Berkeley and has been a Fulbright Scholar. He received his PhD from Trinity College, Dublin in 2012.
5. **Matthew McGinty** graduated from NUIG in 2012 with a B.A. in History and Geography. The following year, he received his M.A. in History from NUIG. His research focused on the development and dynamic of the alliance between Hugh O'Neill and Red Hugh O'Donnell. He won the 2013 *Military Heritage Annual Award*¹ for his paper on *O'Neill, O'Donnell and the Nine Years War*, which is reproduced in this edition of the Defence Forces Review.
6. **Comdt Seán Murphy** is an Infantry Officer with over 27 years service in the Defence Forces. He holds a BA from UCG, an MA (LMDS) and an MA (Military History & Strategic Studies) from NUIM. Comdt Murphy has held a wide variety of appointments at unit, formation and DFHQ level and has served overseas in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans. Comdt Murphy currently serves as a staff officer in Operations & Plans Branch (J3 & J5) in DFHQ.
7. **Capt John F Quinn** was commissioned and posted to An Cheád Cath, Dún uí Mhaoilíosa in 2005. He served overseas in Lebanon as a staff officer in the IRISHBATT Tactical Operations Centre in 2011 and has since then been posted to 28 Inf Bn, Finner Camp. He has completed a number of courses in the Military College and in the NATO School, Oberammergau. He holds a BA from NUIG in History and Legal Science and recently completed an LLB in NUIG which included modules in Public International Law, Law of the Sea and Criminology. This is his first published work.
8. **Cdr (NS) Pat Burke** is a serving professional officer with 28 years service. Commissioned into the Naval Service, he held a number of appointments ashore and afloat, including command at sea, before becoming the Navy's first full time legal officer. He holds honours B.C.L. and LL.M Degrees in Law from U.C.C., a Barrister-at-Law Degree from The Honorable Society of Kings Inns and a first class honours M.A.(LMDS) from N.U.I.M. He attained the Lt.Gen Tadhg O'Neill award for

¹ For further information on this award, see www.militaryheritage.ie.

Best Military Student on the 63rd Senior Command and Staff Course. He was the legal advisor during Operation Seabright which resulted in the interdiction at sea of the largest consignment of cocaine in the history of the State by the Naval Service. He has completed professional courses with the Royal Navy, US Navy War College, UK Land Warfare Centre, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the University of Liverpool. In addition to serving as a Courts-Martial Prosecutor, he has lectured in law of armed conflict and maritime law enforcement in Sanremo, PfP Centre Ankara, U.C.C. and the National Maritime College. He has deployed as Legad to the Force Commander in EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo, during Operation Althea and has also served overseas as Legad to Irish Battalion Commanders deployed in Chad and Lebanon.

9. **Eoin McDonnell** is analyst with responsibility for China and Foreign, Security & Defence Policy at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA). At the IIEA, Eoin's research has mainly focused on the areas of China's leadership politics, regional responses to the rise of China, territorial disputes in East Asia and cybersecurity. Eoin graduated from St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, with an MPhil in Modern Chinese Studies, and holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from Trinity College Dublin. Having completed his studies, Eoin initially worked in the commercial sector, running the office of a major Irish manufacturer in China, before returning to Ireland to work in consultancy roles dealing with export compliance and trade with China.
10. **Cdt John Mahon** is a member of the 90th Cadet Class. He holds a BA in Sociology and Politics from UCD and an MA in Law: International Security from DCU. Prior to joining the Permanent Defence Forces he worked as an English teacher in South Africa, and also taught English as a foreign language in China. He has served in the Reserve Defence Force as a Trooper in the 54th Reserve Cavalry Squadron. He is currently undertaking his Cadetship in the Military College of the Defence Forces Training Centre, and is due to be commissioned in early 2015.
11. **Capt Paul Amoroso** is a technical officer in the Ordnance Corps of the Irish Defence Forces. He was commissioned in July 2004, and was awarded the Cíamh Gas Clitha for best Cadet. He holds a BSc degree in chemistry from NUIG, qualifying with first class honours in 2006. He served as an infantry platoon commander with UNMIL in Liberia before being posted as a platoon commander and instructor to the Cadet School of the Military College. In 2008 he transferred to the Ordnance Corps and qualified with a level 9 post graduate diploma in science in ordnance mechanical engineering, and was awarded the IT Carlow medal for academic excellence as top student. He served as the Battalion Counter IED² officer with the 104th Battalion in UNIFIL in 2011 and is currently completing an MSc in explosive ordnance engineering at Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham.
12. **Lt (NS) Paul Hegarty** joined the Defence Forces in 2000 as a member of the 40th Naval Cadet Class, and currently works in the Fleet Operations Readiness, Standards and Training (FORST) department within Naval Operations Command HQ, with responsibility for navigation standards and systems within the NS. He has held several sea going appointments and has served as Class Officer to the 48th

² Improvised Explosive Device.

Naval Cadet Class. He has completed the Royal Navy International Long Navigation Course at HMS Collingwood, and holds an MPM in Project Management (UL) and a BSc in Nautical Science (NMCI). He is currently completing a Postgraduate Diploma in GIS at UCC and this year commenced PhD research into change management within military organisations through CIT. He is the Defence Forces representative on the NATO/PfP WECDIS Capability Panel and the Commissioner of Irish Lights Technical Advisory Committee.

13. **Lt Col Rory O'Connor** is an Air Corps pilot with a total of thirty-two years service in the Defence Forces. He has served in a variety of command and staff appointments at home and overseas, and is currently Officer Commanding No. 1 Operations Wing, Air Corps. He holds a Diploma in Engineering from ITT (Institute of Technology, Tallaght), an MA LMDS from NUIM and an MA from Kings College, London. His submission for this edition of the Defence Forces Review is taken from his MA KCL.
14. **Comdt David Clarke** retired from the Defence Forces on 18 Mar 14 following 21 years of service, to take up the role as Head of Training in the Irish Prison Service. During his time in the Defence Forces he served as a Platoon Commander, Company 2 IC and Acting Company Commander. He also served in a variety of staff officer appointments including Adjutant, Intelligence, Operations and Logistics Officer within the 6 Infantry Battalion. He served in the Officer Training Wing, Infantry School as an Instructor and as Staff Officer Training and Education in DFTC HQ. Comdt Clarke also served overseas in Lebanon, East Timor, Eritrea, Liberia, Chad and more recently in Afghanistan with the NATO Strategic HQ in Kabul. He has completed an Arts Degree (Economics and Legal Science) and a LLB from NUI, Galway; a MBS in Human Resource Strategy from DCU; a MSc in Human Resource Leadership from Sheffield Hallam University and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUI, Maynooth as part of the Defence Forces' Senior Command and Staff Course.
15. **Comdt Johnny Whittaker** is an Infantry Officer with twenty-eight years service in the Defence Forces. He has served in a variety of command and staff appointments at home and overseas. He holds a BA from NUIG, a Diploma from the National College of Ireland in Management and Employee Relations, an MA LMDS from NUIM and an MSc in HR-Leadership from Sheffield Hallam Business School, UK. Comdt Whittaker is currently preparing to deploy as EO Training Task Force and SIO IRCON 4, EUTM, Mali. His submission for this edition of the Defence Forces Review is taken from his MSc Dissertation.
16. **Comdt Gareth Prendergast** has over 25 years of service in the Defence Forces. He is currently employed as an instructor in the Command and Staff School, where he is President of the Joint/ operational Art Board. He is a recent graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (USCGC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has four operational deployments to Lebanon and the Balkans. He holds an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies and a Masters in Military Arts and Science in Military History from the USCGSC. His paper for this edition of the Review is drawn from work completed by himself and his co-author, Major Stefan Lindelauf of the Belgian Armed Forces, whilst on the USCGSC.

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17. **Maj Stefan Lindelauf** is an instructor in the Belgian Royal Defence College. He joined the Belgian Armed Forces in 1992, and has served in a variety of Command and Staff appointments since that time. His appointments have included service in the Parachute Regiment, the 2nd Commando Battalion and the Commando Training Centre. He has participated in operations in Albania, former Yugoslavia, Benin, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He is a graduate of the Senior Officer Course at the Royal Defense College, and in 2012, he attended the US Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a Master's degree in Political and Military Sciences.
 18. **Lt Col Mark Hearn** is Officer Commanding the 27th Infantry Battalion. He was commissioned into the Eastern Command in 1985 and served there and in the 2nd Brigade until 2007, when he was posted to the appointment of instructor at the Command and Staff School in the Military College. He has completed a BA at UCG, a Postgraduate Diploma in Russian studies in Trinity College, an MA in International Relations at DCU, a Diploma in Russian Studies at the University of Westminster and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies at NUI Maynooth. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff School and of the US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served seven tours of duty overseas, including a tour with the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) in 2012. He was editor of the *Defence Forces Review* for four years.
 19. **Brendan Anglin** is the Course Coordinator for the Management Communication Skills Section of the Masters Programme in International Business in Universidad Internacional de Menéndez Pelayo (UIMP), Madrid. He is also a lecturer on the Macroeconometrics (M3F) masters in CECO (Centro de Estudios Economicos y Comerciales), the Programme Coordinator of the IMS (International Management Skills) certificate in IEF (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales), and the Director of Fresh Ideas International Training S.L. For the past 15 years he has delivered Negotiation Workshops to over 3,000 participants from the private and public sectors, including the Senior Command and Staff Course. He holds an MA in European Integration, a Grad Dip in Business Administration and a BA in Economics and History.

