




Óglaigh na hÉireann




DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

Defence Forces Review 2008



1958-2008

50 Years of Peacekeeping

- Kevin Myers
- Robert Fisk
- Declan Power
- Dr. Ray Murphy
- Dr. John Moriarty
- Comdt Rory Finnegan



Óglaigh na hÉireann

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Preface

As Director of Defence Forces Public Relations it is my great pleasure to publish the Defence Forces Review for 2008 on this the 50th Anniversary of Ireland's first deployment to an International Peacekeeping Mission.

On the 28th June 1958 the first Irish Peacekeepers led by Lt Col Justin McCarthy took up duty on the Lebanese/Syrian Border and since then not a single day has passed without an Irish soldier manning his or her post in numerous peacekeeping missions throughout the World. This is a unique record of which the Defence Forces are extremely proud and this issue of the Review is designed to reflect that pride and achievement while at the same time inviting comprehensive critical analysis with a view to learning what lessons we can from that entire experience.

The Editor has assembled a unique group of contributors and I am personally grateful to all of them for the time and energy which they have willingly given in order to produce their essays which will certainly prove informative and challenging for the reader. I am also very grateful to Gerry White, Eugene Power, Donal Vaughan and Amanda Crowley for their valuable contributions to the editing process.

The purpose of the Defence Forces Review is to provide a forum whereby contributors can raise current issues, provoke thought, and generate discussion across the wider Defence Community. I am quite happy that this issue of the Review will achieve all of these goals and I look forward to receiving many volumes of constructive comment as a consequence.

Again, many thanks to all our contributors without whose commitment and generosity the production and publication of this Journal would not be possible.

Billy Harrington

Lieutenant Colonel

Director of Defence Forces Public Relations

*The fact that an article appears
in this journal does not indicate official
approval of the views expressed by the author.*

Editor's Note

On 28 June 1958 Irish soldiers took up international peacekeeping duties for the very first time. In the interim not a single day has passed without a member of the Defence Forces standing guard, manning an observation post, or patrolling a zone of separation somewhere within the world's most dangerous places. This a unique record of which the Defence Forces are very proud and in recognition of that achievement this issue of the Defence Forces Review focuses on Irish Peacekeeping - past, present, and future.

My own article attempts to establish the context within which our contributors will develop their arguments and with Richard Heaslip and Declan Power we commence that process by looking back to our first deployments in Lebanon and the Congo. Kevin Myers then follows with an incisive analysis of what all of that actually meant to the Irish people, while Robert Fisk reviews our contribution to UNIFIL and John Moriarty reflects on his own experience of Lebanon over an incredible twelve tours of duty.

Rory Finnegan takes up the story at this point and turns his attention to the difficulties currently faced by the United Nations organisation in a divided world, and Damien Coakley identifies the major lessons learned from our recent experience in Liberia.

The use of force in UN mandated missions is examined in detail by Ray Murphy, while Mark Hearn and Tony Foley cast a cold eye over the difficulties associated with non-UN mandated missions and current trends in the Balkans respectively.

The concluding section critically examines the UN organisation in the 21st century with Colm Doyle dissecting the reform process, Robert Johansson and Bob Zuber advocating the creation of a UN Emergency Peace Service, and Jean Marc Coicaud addressing the very future of the UN itself.

In this manner we have attempted to explore issues across the full spectrum of International Peacekeeping and I am very grateful to all our contributors for their time, energy, enthusiasm and commitment to the aims and objectives of this journal.

A publication such as this depends for its life's blood on the willingness of contributors to identify relevant issues and then put pen to paper in order to address them. Therefore, an open 'invitation to write' is extended once again to all members of the wider Defence Community and we look forward to reading and publishing your work in the future as Ireland looks forward to building on past peacekeeping achievement in the months and years which lie ahead.

Brendan O'Shea Lt Col

BA. BCL. Dip.IHL(ICRC Geneva) PhD.

Dedication

This issue of The Defence Forces Review is dedicated to the memory of Lt Col Joe Buckley MA, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, who passed away last August after a long illness.

Joe was a thoroughly professional soldier, an experienced peacekeeper, a committed humanitarian, a great friend, and an excellent scholar who passionately believed in the principles of the United Nations about which he wrote and lectured on several occasions.

He also believed in the utility and relevance of this journal and contributed major articles to the first three issues.

Therefore as we publish this special issue of “The Review” which is focused on Ireland’s 50 years of unbroken commitment to international peacekeeping it is appropriate that we remember someone who made a very significant and valuable contribution to that record both at home and overseas and touched the lives of so many people along the way.

Ar dheis Dé go raibh a anam dilis

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Punching Above Our Weight Living, Learning and Leading the Peacekeeping Evolution

Lt Col Brendan O'Shea

When the Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco on the 26 June 1945 it is certain that none of the original signatories had any idea how the organisation they were founding would develop in the years ahead. It's predecessor, the League of Nations¹, had been established in 1920 in order to prevent war through collective security and the settlement of disputes through negotiation and diplomacy, but ended in complete failure as the world plunged into another international war. The omens certainly were not good, and the best any of the delegates could have hoped for was to clearly enunciate their aspirations and lay the foundations of something which might in the fullness of time develop into an international conflict resolution body. No more than the League of Nations, the new United Nations of 1945 could not be classed as anything more than an experiment - and a rather dubious one at that given the brutal events which had just preceded it's foundation.

Nevertheless, the founding fathers set out their hopes and aspirations in Article One of the Charter and remained convinced that there had to be a better way ahead. The aims of the United Nations, no more than those of The League of Nations, were clear and unambiguous... *"to maintain international peace and security, and to that end take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and the suppression of actions of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, a conformity with the principles of justice in international law, and adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace"*.

In order to achieve these goals it followed logically that responsibility for their implementation had to be vested in something other than an unwieldy General Assembly, and so it was that primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security was vested in the Security Council with it's composition, functions and powers set out in Chapter 5², specific duties in relation the pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter 6³, and action to be taken in the event of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression enunciated in Chapters 7 and 8⁴. But right from the outset there was a problem - the word "peacekeeping" was nowhere to be found in any chapter of the Charter, nor was the Security Council specifically tasked with implementing any such concept, and the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie from Norway, quickly found himself faced with a dilemma⁵. He responded by developing the embryo of what we now call 'Chapter 6 Peacekeeping', and before long, in 1948 to be exact, United Nations Military Observers were deploying along the Lebanese/Israeli Border in order to monitor the implementation of an Armistice Agreement⁶. This mission became known as

UNTSO – The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation – and continues to operate in the Middle East to the present day⁷.

However, it was not until 1956 that the concept of ‘Chapter 6 Peacekeeping’ was developed-out when in response to the Suez crisis of that time a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNEF) was raised from member states and deployed into the Sinai Peninsula. Here for the very first time the Blue Helmet and Blue Beret were worn by armed UN peacekeepers in order to identify them on the battlefield and set them apart from the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping doctrine and practice was evolving⁸ and Secretary General Hammarskjöld famously remarked that while peacekeeping was NOT a job for soldiers, in his opinion only soldiers could actually do it⁹. By providing a buffer between those previously involved in the fighting an opportunity was created which permitted diplomatic initiatives and eventually Hammarskjöld managed to convince the Anglo-French forces to withdraw in an orderly manner. Nobody lost face, the conflict was resolved – at least temporarily – and a political and diplomatic solution was agreed. In this manner the theory and practice of ‘Chapter 6 Peacekeeping’ was developed out by Hammarskjöld and Sir Brian Urquhart from the United Kingdom¹⁰.

From this point onwards, the deployment of international peacekeepers, under a UN mandated blue flag, would become a regular event, notwithstanding the fact that on several occasions the mandates themselves would not be completely clear, the parties to the conflict would not always welcome the peacekeepers, and the blue helmets themselves would not necessarily have sufficient combat power to enforce their will. These were the negative aspects of early peacekeeping initiatives and unfortunately many of these difficulties were destined to persist for a very long time.

And so it was into an evolving political, diplomatic, and military world that Ireland made its first contribution to the cause of peace when, in response to a call from Secretary General Hammarskjöld, fifty Irish Officers commanded by Lt Col Justin McCarthy took up duty with the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) on 28 June 1958. Serving in the region for six months these officers were based along the Lebanese/Syrian border and their duties included monitoring border crossing points, recording border violations, and determining whether or not infiltration was taking place. In tandem with this, they also interacted with local villagers and this approach quickly became part of the way Irish peacekeepers went about their business albeit that there was never any official national directive to adopt such a policy. The reality was it just made sense to treat people with the dignity and respect - a very simple philosophy totally in keeping with the principles of the United Nations.

When the UNOGIL mandate was terminated in December 1958 its operations were merged with that of UNTSO and ever since Ireland has had an unbroken record of service with the UN which continues to the present day. Throughout that entire period not a single day has passed without an Irish soldier manning some UN post across the world and it is a legacy of which the Defence Forces are extremely proud given that in all probability several thousands of lives have been saved as a consequence. From this small beginning Ireland’s participation in UN Peacekeeping operations was destined to expand quite quickly and on 27 June 1960 the 32nd Infantry Battalion departed Dublin bound for the Congo. By August two battalions were deployed in theatre as numbers swelled to over 1000 and a coming of age was underway. It

was now clear to all observers that Ireland could indeed play a major role on this international stage and the Defence Forces fully embraced the opportunity. Hard lessons were learned and 26 lives were lost but even before the Congo mission had concluded Ireland was again asked to contribute troops to a new UN force then being generated for deployment on the island of Cyprus. In March 1964 the next contingent of Irish peacekeepers deployed in-theatre and the learning curve has continued ever since all over the world: Pakistan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Iraq, Iran, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Kuwait, El Salvador, Eritrea and East Timor. Additionally members of the Defence Forces have also served with the European Union, NATO PfP, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and have been seconded to several Non-Governmental Organisations working in difficult places such as Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, Congo, Georgia and Russia.

In the course of this service Irish soldiers have gone about their business in an impartial, professional, neutral, dedicated and humanitarian manner in order to improve the lives of whole communities ravaged by both international conflict and internal civil wars. But this success has come at a price. Over the past fifty years 85 members of the Defence Forces have paid the ultimate price in the service of peace. This was been a huge sacrifice given that the conflicts in which they died were not of their making and all they were attempting to achieve was peaceful resolution and reconciliation.

When John F. Kennedy addressed the joint Houses of the Oireachtas on 28 June 1963 he stated that *“from Cork to the Congo, from Galway to the Gaza Strip, from this Legislative Assembly to the United Nations, Ireland is sending its most talented men to do the worlds most important work – the work of peace.”*¹¹ High praise indeed but not a lot has changed in the interim save the international context within which UN Peacekeeping Operations are mounted. What we now call the “operational environment” has been transformed from ‘Chapter 6 Peacekeeping’ in places like Lebanon to far more complex crisis management operations in places like Liberia and Kosovo, and this has required adjustment in doctrine, training, and application in order to permit Ireland to continue playing a leading role.

The first peacekeeping missions were set in the era of the Cold War when intervention alone seemed to be good enough. Then during the 1980’s as Russia and the United States began to exert some pressure on their former clients the employment of UN troops to oversee the implementation of actual Peace Agreements became the norm. Today, conflict resolution has evolved further and often involves robust inter-positioning between the warring parties who may not have concluded a agreement at that time. It also involves negotiating comprehensive settlements once the fighting eventually stops followed in turn by a process called DDRR – Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration. This is difficult, painstaking work and often fraught with danger especially when the expectations of the ex-combatants are not matched by progress with the process which in many instances is itself in an evolutionary phase.

Therefore it is fair comment to state that the UN peacekeeping evolution has not always been marked with success and during the 1990’s failed abysmally to prevent genocide in Somalia and Rwanda, and was completely unable to curtail the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia notwithstanding the fact that over 38,000 UNPROFOR peacekeepers were eventually deployed

on the ground¹². These were very bad times. Mandates were weak, international resolution was poor and the main players on the international stage were reluctant to participate lest they begin to take serious casualties themselves. In these conflicts it was clear that ceasefires meant little or nothing to the local warlords, the civilian population were considered to be legitimate targets and the civilian and military members of UN peacekeeping missions were in many instances considered to be simply fair game¹³. Equally, and for several years the world witnessed harrowing scenes nightly on TV screens across the globe as snipers displayed NO compunction whatsoever in targeting UN soldiers and taking their lives with impunity in places like Sarajevo, Mogadishu and Kigali. Sadly, the blue helmet counted for very little.

This state of affairs simply could NOT continue and in response to demands for far more robust rules of engagement the United Nations itself conducted a root and branch review of its own operations in 2000 in order to find a way forward. The product of this work emerged in something called the Brahimi Report which concluded essentially that in the new millennium when UN troops deployed they would do so in force and with sufficient combat power to ensure their own protection, the protection of other UN personnel, and the protection of the local civilian population.¹⁴ This represented a seismic shift in UN peacekeeping doctrine but one which was universally welcomed by troop contributing countries. It also enabled the Defence Forces to move on significantly in terms of training and practice.

In 2003 Ireland deployed over four hundred soldiers to a Chapter 7 peace enforcement mission in Liberia with a very clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. Working side by side with a Swedish Unit, Ireland provided a highly trained, well equipped, armoured Quick Reaction Force capable of protecting itself and making an impact if and when required. There is general agreement that this contribution was in no small way responsible for the success of that mission which within a very short period led to the disarmament of the warring parties, demobilisation of child soldiers, rehabilitation of the community through the implementation of quick impact humanitarian projects, and the reintegration of the warring factions into something resembling normal civil society.¹⁵ It was in many ways fitting that as UNMIL approached it's desired end-state the Irish-Swedish QRF took on the additional task of securing the International Court at Freetown, in Sierra Leone in order that the war-lord Charles Taylor could be returned from exile in Nigeria, arraigned before the court, and then transferred to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁶ With this task complete a high degree of closure was achieved. Mission accomplished - it was time to come home.

Then in 2006, and again at the request of the UN Security Council, Ireland was invited to return to Lebanon in the aftermath of the Summer War between the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah.¹⁷ Returning to a country where Ireland had made a valuable contribution for twenty-three years it was for many a very frustrating experience to witness the scale of destruction which had been unleashed by the parties to the conflict who were again unable to curtail their ambitions and respect international law. By the time the fighting stopped the new border called 'the Blue Line' which General James Sreenan and four other Irish officers had helped to delineate in 2000 was effectively left in tatters.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Irish soldiers returned to South Lebanon again, this time in the company of a Finnish Engineering Unit, and together they commenced the difficult task of de-mining and reconstruction. Notwithstanding

attacks on Spanish UN troops in the region and the consequent difficulties which ensued, the Defence Forces continued with these essential operational and humanitarian tasks before withdrawing in 2007 and again leaving South Lebanon in better condition than which they found it. Sadly there will be further conflict throughout that region, of that there is no doubt whatsoever, but from an Irish perspective there was more pressing work to do elsewhere.

In the first instance there was the matter of Ireland's commitment to the European Union's Nordic Battle Group Concept, where together with units from Sweden, Finland, Norway and Estonia the Defence Forces undertook to place 100 personnel in a permanent state of high readiness for rapid deployment on peace support and crisis management operations.¹⁹ Organised by the European Union and mandated by the United Nations the concept of sub-contracting to regional organisations is something which again emanates from Brahimi, but such arrangements are actually to be found in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. So while at first glance all of this might appear to be a new departure it was in fact contemplated and provided for back in 1945 - and certainly gives credence to the old maxim that 'the more things change the more they stay the same'. The difference this time is reflected in the 'regional' composition of the Battle-group, the robust rules of engagement which apply and the fact that a diverse group of countries have pooled their resources in order to conduct a comprehensive range of peacekeeping tasks. This is the way forward and Ireland is at the forefront of modern peacekeeping developments in this regard.

Additionally, and with effect from 1 August 07 Brig Gen Gerry Hegarty took command of NATO PfP's KFOR Multi National Task Force Centre in Kosovo and assumed responsibility for units from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, Finland, Latvia and Ireland. This represented another very significant departure for the Defence Forces as it was the first occasion that an Irish Officer commanded a multi-national unit within a NATO led, UN Mandated, peacekeeping operation.²⁰ In the past this for many people would have been an unthinkable development, but life has moved on, international peacekeeping has changed, and the Defence Forces have kept pace with that change and adapted to it. In today's world, peacekeepers utilise a comprehensive range of military skills. They protect human rights and ensure observance of humanitarian law, and as a result of clearly defined strategies they are able to identify the desired end-state even before the missions themselves have commenced. We are no longer in the business of trying to keep peace where there is no peace to keep. We have learned from mistakes made in Lebanon and elsewhere and our peacekeeping doctrine has evolved and developed in partnership with the United Nations, the European Union, NATO PfP²¹ and the International Governmental and non-Governmental Community. Integration is now the key to success and all partners involved in peacekeeping operations are clear that success must be planned, managed and measured, and an end-state must be delivered.

In the early days, Ireland's contribution was probably marked by enthusiasm, humanitarianism and a certain naïveté. However, the opportunity to work alongside other nationalities and to learn from our shared experience has ensured that as we move towards 2010 and beyond we are very well placed to lead peacekeeping missions, as well as just participating in them. This is evidenced by the fact that the Operational Commander of the new EUFOR mission to Chad and the Central African Republic is Lt Gen Pat Nash, that Irish officers also hold several key appointments in both the Operational and Force Headquarters, and the Defence Forces

will deploy a mechanised unit of over 430 troops thus becoming the second largest troop contributor.²² Life has indeed moved on and the UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Jean Marie Guehenno clearly identified this when he said... *“the issue today is how best international armies can work together in effective multi-lateralism in order to advance the cause of peace and global security”*.²³

From the Defence Forces’ perspective it no longer matters whether command in a peacekeeping operation is exercised directly by a UN Force commander or as part of a regional arrangement. The reality is that today’s Irish peacekeeper can be successful in whatever situation he or she find themselves. They are well trained, well equipped, highly motivated and professionally capable of fulfilling the full range of military tasks while at the same time retaining that sense of compassion and fair play which has been the hallmark of Irish peacekeeping down the years. The “duty to protect” is now enshrined in International Human Rights Law but it was something Irish soldiers always inherently understood²⁴.

The former American Defence Attaché to Ireland, Colonel John O’Sullivan, once remarked that *“Ireland punches above it’s weight when it comes to International Peacekeeping”*²⁵. This is explained by the facts that we have an unbroken sequence of service with the United Nations which dates back to 1958; we have learned from our experiences; and we have identified those lessons and adjusted our posture in order to participate in modern complex peace support operations. But most of all we have achieved credibility amongst our international peacekeeping colleagues which in turn has ensured continued demand for Irish soldiers when it comes to raising forces for new missions. In this regard Col Paul Cummings, former British Military Attaché to Ireland, was asked on one occasion for his view on why Irish soldiers were successful peacekeepers. He replied... *“the key to Irish peacekeeping is that it has always been a force for good, Ireland is seen internationally as being an honest broker with an ability and determination to deliver military peacekeeping capability in an equitable, open and just way”*.²⁶

On 21 February 2008 Ireland had a total of 474 personnel serving overseas with 18 different Peacekeeping/Crisis Management operations. Of this figure 439 personnel were serving in UN Mandated/Triple Locked missions while the remaining 35 were distributed between OSCE field offices and staff appointments in Brussels, New York and Vienna²⁷. When the EUFOR Chad mission becomes fully operational in June 2008 Ireland will deploy another 400 personnel bringing the total number deployed overseas at any one time back up to previous levels and in line with Government policy.

An Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, has stated that Defence Forces participation in overseas peacekeeping missions is a key element in Ireland’s foreign policy, and has been an important dimension in meeting Ireland’s international obligations as a member of the UN and EU. He went on to say that *“Irish foreign policy is directed at supporting cooperative arrangements for collective security through the development of international organisations especially the United Nations. This approach continues to define Irish priorities within the UN system and Ireland remains willing to play a full role in contributing to the security of Europe and the World”*²⁸.

It is therefore clear that on both political and military levels Ireland places the United Nations at the centre of our core activities and will continue to do so in the future. In this context the triple lock system - UN Mandate, Government decision and Dáil approval - is not an impediment to any contribution the Defence Forces makes to international peace and security, either now or in the future. In fact it is a distinct advantage to have such a system in place because it anchors our activities within very clearly defined parameters and ensures that when we deploy our soldiers in difficult and challenging peacekeeping operations we do so for the best of reasons and give them the highest priorities.

Having chaired the Security Council on three occasions²⁹, provided ten Force Commanders and one Operational Commander³⁰, served in 52 countries, and completed in excess of 65,000 individual tours of peacekeeping duty, Ireland's contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping has been immense given the size of the Defence Forces and the national population from which it draws. In this context Col O'Sullivan is absolutely correct when he states Ireland punches above it's weight in international peacekeeping and he can rest assured that this practice will continue well into the future. The men and women of today's Defence Forces look forward to the challenges ahead reaffirmed in their commitment to the very same values which are enunciated in the UN Charter, and which were confirmed by the International Community all those years ago in San Francisco - on 26 June 1945. The operational environment may have changed but Ireland's commitment to justice and humanity will assuredly remain the same as international peacekeeping doctrine and policy evolve further in order to keep pace with 21st century political and military demands.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The League of Nations was an international organization founded as a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919–1920. The diplomatic philosophy behind the League represented a fundamental shift in thought from the preceding hundred years. However the League lacked its own armed force and so depended on the Great Powers to enforce its resolutions and they were often reluctant to do so. The League did not, in the long term, succeed. The outbreak of World War II was the immediate cause of the League's demise, but there was also a variety of other, more fundamental, flaws. Economic sanctions, which were the most severe measure the League could implement short of military action, were difficult to enforce and had no great impact on the target country, because they could simply trade with those outside the League. Ultimately, Britain and France both abandoned the concept of collective security in favour of appeasement in the face of growing German militarism. The final meeting of the League of Nations was held in Geneva on April 18, 1946. Delegates from 34 nations attended, and a motion was made to close the session, with the resolution that "The League of Nations shall cease to exist except for the purpose of the liquidation of its assets." The vote was 33-0 in favor, with Egypt abstaining. At 5:43 pm Secretary Carl J. Hambro of Norway stated, "I declare the twenty-first and last session of the General Assembly of the League of Nations closed."

² Charter of The United Nations, Chapter 5, Articles 23-32

³ Charter of The United Nations, Chapter 6, Articles 33-38

⁴ Charter of The United Nations, Chapters 7 & 8, Articles 29-54

⁵ Trygve Halvdan Lie was born on 16 July 1896, in Oslo, Norway. On 1 February 1946, Mr. Lie was elected the first Secretary-General of the United Nations. He was formally installed by the General Assembly at its 22nd meeting on 2 February 1946. The General Assembly on 1 November 1950, continued Mr. Lie in office for a further three years from 1 February 1951. He resigned as Secretary-General of the United Nations in November 1952.

⁶ Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement July 20, 1949: The 1949 Armistice Agreements are a set of agreements signed during 1949 between Israel and its neighbors Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The agreements ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and established the armistice lines between Israel and the West Bank, also known as the *Green Line*, until the 1967 Six-Day War.

- ⁷ UNTSO has been commanded on three occasions by Irish Army Officers – Col Dick Bunworth, Maj Gen Karl Dodd, and Lt Gen Bill Callaghan. Ireland currently has 14 Officers deployed with this same mission working in Israel, Lebanon and Syria and thus maintains a direct link with the very first UN Peacekeeping Mission ever mounted - but UNTSO was then and remains today an Observer Mission
- ⁸ Handbook on UN Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, „DPKO, UNNY, December 2003, Introduction, p.1.
- ⁹ Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General of the United Nations from 10 April 1953 until 18 September 1961 when he met his death in a plane accident while on a peace mission in the Congo. During his terms as Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld carried out many responsibilities for the United Nations in the course of its efforts to prevent war and serve the other aims of the Charter which included: continuing diplomatic activity in support of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States and to promote progress toward better and more peaceful conditions in the area; organization in 1956 of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and its administration since then; clearance of the Suez Canal in 1957 and assistance in the peaceful solution of the Suez Canal dispute; organization and administration of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and establishment of an office of the special representative of the Secretary-General in Jordan in 1958.
- ¹⁰ Sir Brian Edward Urquhart KCMG MBE is a former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations. He served in the British Army during World War II, as an intelligence officer. Urquhart is well-known for his attempts to persuade the planners of Operation Market Garden to modify or abort their plans, in light of crucial information obtained from aerial reconnaissance and the Dutch resistance. Urquhart was a member of the staff involved in the setting-up of the United Nations in 1945, and has advised every Secretary-General of the United Nations since its inception. His main fields of interest and operation at the UN have been conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Urquhart organized the first peacekeeping force (in Egypt after the Suez crisis). To differentiate the peacekeepers from other soldiers, the UN wanted to have the soldiers wear blue berets. When that turned out to take six weeks to make, Urquhart proposed the characteristic blue helmets, which could be made in a day by painting over regular ones. As Undersecretary-General, Urquhart's main functions were the direction of peace-keeping forces in the Middle East and Cyprus, and negotiations in these two areas; amongst others, his contributions also included work on the negotiations relating to a Namibia peace settlement, negotiations in Kashmir, Lebanon and work on peaceful uses for nuclear energy. His autobiography is called *A Life in Peace and War*.
- ¹¹ Dáil Debates, 28 June 1963. Also available on the website of the JFK Museum, at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/j062863.htm> (24 February 2006).
- ¹² UNPROFOR Maximum Strength: 39,922 including 38,614 military personnel, 637 United Nations military observers and 671 civilian police, plus civilians and local staff. Authorized force was 44,870, plus 2,500 international staff and 3,000 local staff. Fatalities: 167 (3 military observers, 159 other military, 1 civil police 2 int'l civilian staff and 2 local staff. Cost: 4.617 billion US\$. Source <http://www.pkops.net/unops.htm>
- ¹³ Sreenan, James, *Doing the World's most dangerous Work – From Cyprus to Liberia*, This paper was originally presented to the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, on 18 November 2005, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Ireland's accession to the UN and cites the statistic that between 1982 and 2005 two hundred and ten UN civilian employees were killed in unprovoked acts of aggression.
- ¹⁴ Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (New York, 2000). - http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.(21 February 2006).
- ¹⁵ A total of 101,495 combatants (22,370 women, 8,523 boys and 2,440 girls) disarmed; 28,314 assorted weapons, 6,486,136 small ammunitions and 33,604 heavy ammunitions were collected and destroyed. Some 65,000 demobilized combatants have so far benefited from reintegration and rehabilitation opportunities through projects funded by the UNDP Trust Fund. Approximately 37,000 ex-combatants are still waiting to be placed in reintegration programmes. UNMIL continues to collect and destroy remaining weapons and ammunition, willingly surrendered or discovered through cordon and search operations. From such efforts so far, 462 weapons, 59,972 small arms and ammunition and 671 heavier munitions have been collected. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has begun the implementation of a Community Arms Collection for Development Programme, which provides community projects in exchange for weapons in Grand Gedeh, Lofa and Nimba counties. Source: <http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=history>
- ¹⁶ BBC News, Tuesday, 20 June 2006: Liberian ex-President Charles Taylor has arrived in the Netherlands where he is to be tried on war crimes charges. For security reasons, the UN-backed tribunal in Sierra Leone moved his trial to The Hague from Freetown where he has been in jail since his capture. Mr Taylor faces 11 charges after allegedly backing rebels in the decade-long Sierra Leone civil war. Last week, the United Kingdom offered to host any jail term he may serve, paving the way for his transfer. The government of the Netherlands agreed Mr Taylor's trial could take place there, as long as he is imprisoned in another country if he was convicted.

- ¹⁷ Statement by the Minister for Defence, Mr. Willie O'Dea, T.D., in Dail Eireann on 11 October 2006 concerning decision of the Government in relation to UNIFIL. "On 3 October, 2006, the Government authorised me, as Minister for Defence, to despatch a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force, for a period of one year, for service with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established on 19 March, 1978 under UN Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in accordance with its enhanced/additional mandate as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006".
- ¹⁸ O'Shea Brendan, Lebanon's "Blue Line": A New International Border or Just Another Cease-fire Zone? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 27, Number 1, January-February 2004, pp. 19-30(12)
- ¹⁹ Statement by the Minister for Defence, Mr. Willie O'Dea, T.D., in Dail Eireann on Wednesday, 5 April 2007. "Joint training of the Nordic Battlegroup elements, including field manoeuvres, will take place in Sweden in September/October, 2007, for a period of approximately 3 to 4 weeks. The full operational capability of the Nordic Battlegroup will then be assessed and the Battlegroup will be on standby from January 2008, for a period of six months".
- ²⁰ SHAPE News 3 August 2007. "An official MNTF-C TOA ceremony took place in Camp Vile July 31, 2007. COMKFOR Lieutenant General Roland Kather presided over the ceremony in which Brig. Gen. Berndt Grundevik passed on the symbolic flag signifying the end of his tour of duty to incoming commander, Brig. Gen. Gerry Hegarty".
- ²¹ Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) project aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union; 23 nations are members. It was created in 1994, soon after the collapse of the former Eastern bloc. Ten states which were members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) have since joined NATO. On April 26, 1995, Malta became a member of PfP; it left in October 1996 in order to keep its neutrality intact. As of March 2008, Malta is applying to rejoin the PfP. During the NATO summit in Riga on November 29, 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were invited to join PfP after which they joined PfP on 14 December 2006. Ireland joined PfP on 1 December 1999.
- ²² European Union Force Chad/CAR, also EUFOR TCHAD/RCA after the French, is the European Union mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, authorized in late 2007. EUFOR Chad/CAR was authorized under the same United Nations Security Council resolution that mandated MINURCAT, a UN force tasked with training police and improving judicial infrastructure. The European Union Force's mandate includes "to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic"] to protect civilians, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel. The EU operation commander, Lt. General Patrick Nash, announced on 5 November that this force will be 4,300 troops strong, expected to begin deployment in February 2008. Out of these, 3,700 troops will be deployed in the area of operations, and a strategic reserve of 600 troops will be stationed in Europe. The military operation was approved by the Council of the European Union on 15 October. Current confirmed contributors include (with number of troops committed): France 2000 troops, 10 helicopters, 500 person logistical support / Ireland 450 troops / Poland 400 troops / Sweden 200 troops / Austria 160 troops, 50 special forces / Romania 120 troops / Belgium 100 troops, 22 special forces / Spain 80 troops / Finland 40 troops / Slovenia up to 15 troops / Netherlands 60 troops.
- ²³ United Nations, 'Remarks of Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, to the fourth committee General Assembly', (New York, 20 October 2005), <http://www.un.org.Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/articles201005.htm> (21 February 2006) quoted in Sreenan, James, *Doing the World's most dangerous Work – From Cyprus to Liberia*.
- ²⁴ Buckley Joseph. Lt Col, *R2P Combat Operations for Humanitarian Reasons; Policy Implications fro Ireland -Rramifications for the Defence Forces*, The Defence Forces Review Vol 3, 2006, p89.
- ²⁵ Signal Magazine, Vol 2, Issue 2, Spring 2004, p53, *London Calling*
- ²⁶ Signal Magazine, Vol 6, Issue 1, Summer 2007, p9, *Interview with An Taoiseach*.
- ²⁷ Official Department of Defence statistics as on 21 February 2008.
- ²⁸ Signal Magazine, Vol3 Issue 2, Winter 2004, *Our Man in Dublin*, p25.
- ²⁹ Ireland has secured non-permanent membership of the security Council on three occasions 1962, 1981-1982 & 2001-2002
- ³⁰ Force Commanders: Lt Gen Sean McEoin ONUC (1961), Col Dick Bunworth UNTSO (1973), Maj Gen James Quinn UNFYCIP (1976), Col Bill Cahhalhan UNTSO (1978 & as Lt Gen in 1986), Lt Gen Bill Callaghan UNIFIL (1981), Maj Gen Michael Minehan UNFYCIP (1992), Maj Gen David Stapleton UNDOF (1997), Maj Gen John Vize UNIKOM (1999), Brig Gen Jim Sreenan UNIFIL (Acting Force Commander 1999), Maj Gen Karl Dodd UNTSO (2002), Lt Gen Pat Nash EUFOR Chad (2007).

Ireland's First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment¹

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INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-first century, peacekeeping has become an accepted concept, usually associated with conflict management and resolution. In Ireland, for most people, it is a term, which is now synonymous with United Nations (UN) operations. In fact, peacekeeping may be considered a by-product of the UN's use of military resources in conflict resolution, and it arose from a pragmatic response by the organisation to a perceived threat to international peace and stability in the first decade of the Cold War.

In the early years of the organisation's history, it deployed unarmed military officers from its member states to Palestine and Kashmir as independent international witnesses to observe and report on the conflicts in these regions. These first ventures into 'peacekeeping' were at one end of the military conflict-resolution options tried by the UN. The other extreme of that spectrum of military options saw the UN engage in the Korean War. Those early years of the UN coincided with the emergence and intensification of the Cold War. The Cold War placed an added emphasis on the strategic interests and reach of the superpowers, who also had the power of veto in the Security Council, with consequential limitations on the UN's freedom of action. Nevertheless, the requirement for the use of an agreed limited, international, military response option remained. This was especially apparent after the 1956 Suez Canal debacle, when it was in the superpowers' interest to stabilise a major international flashpoint. To police this disputed post-conflict zone, a lightly armed, UN-led, military force drawn from non-aligned and neutral states was deployed in November 1956. This force was mandated by the Security Council to conduct operations aimed at ensuring peace throughout its area of operations. It was designated the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This type of force together with the deployment of UN unarmed observers thereafter became a blueprint for the UN's approach to containing other potentially destabilising conflicts.

As the UN evolved its approach to conflict resolution, Ireland remained outside the organisation. It did not gain membership until December 1955 and therefore did not contribute to the early UN observer missions. However, Ireland was a member of the UN when the concept of armed UN peacekeeping started to emerge. Even at that early stage, Ireland displayed some interest in these matters but it did not get directly involved until 1958 when it provided officer observers for an observer mission in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Ireland's involvement in UN peacekeeping is now more widely remembered for, and incorrectly dated from, the Defence Forces' participation with troops in the 1960 Congo operation, referred to in UN terms as *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC). It is posited in this paper that popular and academic opinion have both undervalued and often ignored the Irish contribution to the UN

military observer missions in the Middle East. In this region, Ireland, through the commitment of officer observers to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), initiated its involvement in the peacekeeping process that continued through the follow-on contribution to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). From those first steps in the unarmed observer missions, there was a direct connection also to Irish participation in the armed UN force in the Congo, a connection that appears to have been equally forgotten.

In this paper, the intention is to correct this view and argue for the UNOGIL and UNTSO missions as the genesis of Irish engagement in international peacekeeping.² Colonel Justin McCarthy led the Irish Defence Forces officer observer group on these international military missions. He had a central role in projecting the capabilities, professionalism and contribution of Defence Forces officers, but his contribution has been forgotten in the passage of time. This oversight too will be addressed, with a view to emphasising the importance of his formative contribution to the Defence Forces' *modus operandi* on overseas missions. The paper will also discuss the background to the decision to participate in UN peacekeeping and will highlight the lessons learned by the Irish government from this initial experience with UNOGIL and UNTSO. In this way it is proposed to provide insight into the important contribution of these missions in the Middle East to Ireland's preparation for, and involvement in, the armed troop mission in the Congo.

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL)

The story of what would become Ireland's first involvement of Defence Forces personnel on service outside the state begins in Lebanon with the Irish Honorary Consul in Beirut. In 1958 this was Sir Desmond Cochrane, who as part of his consular duties was actively engaged in submitting routine reports on developments in the region. His report for May 1958, submitted to Dr Eoin MacWhite at the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, outlined a deteriorating situation in Lebanon and accurately forecast the subsequent intercommunal violence.³ The Lebanese government attributed this violence to interference from Egypt and Syria, then functioning as the United Arab Republic, and requested UN support. On 11 June, the UN Security Council authorised the dispatch of a UN observer group, which was designated UNOGIL. On 23 June 1958, UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld requested Irish participation in this mission. Eamon Kennedy, Irish charge d'affaires at the Permanent Mission to the UN, dispatched a coded cable to this effect at midday Eastern Standard Time.⁴ The Irish government's positive response was dispatched from Iveagh House at 12.08 hours on 24 June.⁵ Overnight, the entire spectrum of national decision-making was activated and Ireland agreed to provide five officers for the UN mission in Lebanon, and the Defence Forces set about selecting them.

IRELAND'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN UNOGIL

In investigating the background to this very prompt decision, it transpires that it was the culmination of almost 18 months of deliberation on possible Irish involvement in UN military operations. The Department of Foreign Affairs' files held at the National Archives of Ireland show that the state's interest in possible Irish involvement in UN military conflict management dates from the very formation of UNEF in November 1956.⁶ UNEF was the first of its kind, a lightly armed, international force under UN command deployed to peacefully contain the explosive potential of a Cold War flashpoint. This force was interposed between the Egyptian

and Israeli forces in Gaza at the conclusion of the Suez Canal War in 1956. Ireland was then less than a year in the organisation and Costello's coalition government was in power. The Secretary to the Department of Defence, Peadar McMahon, wrote on behalf of his minister to Sean Murphy, Secretary to the Department of External Affairs, with a specific request. In this correspondence, dated 20 November 1956, he sought information on a range of issues affecting possible Irish participation in such a force.⁷

From November 1956 onward, the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York was very proactive on these matters. The experimental nature of the UNEF mission and the newly emerging concept of 'peacekeeping' was the focus of their attention. They considered Indonesia's intention to withdraw its contingent from UNEF as an opportunity for possible Irish involvement. This situation arose in July 1957. At this stage, de Valera's Fianna Fail government was in power when *charge d'affaires* Kennedy sought guidance from Dublin on the possibility of Ireland's participate in such a UN force. In Iveagh House, Conor Cruise O'Brien was handling the file and he canvassed the views of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Defence. The military input into the Department of Defence reply outlined a range of issues inhibiting the possibility of such participation, including the low strength of the Defence Forces and the requirement to amend the Defence Act. The Department of External Affairs then prepared a memorandum for government on this issue.⁸

The government noted these difficulties, but nevertheless, in its decision of September 1957 directed the Department of Defence to begin preparation of the amendments to the Defence Act in anticipation of any future UN request for Irish troops. From this point onward, the process was firmly in train to prepare for the possibility of involvement in UN peacekeeping initiatives. This was the point from which the government's 'decision in principle' to participate in future UN military activities can be dated. The Cabinet meeting of 18 March 1958 again addressed the issue and decided to accept the Department of Defence's proposals for amendment to the Defence Act but put further preparation on hold until an actual opportunity to participate arose.⁹ Therefore, since November 1956, from the birth of armed UN peacekeeping, successive governments were positively disposed to Defence Forces participation in UN military missions. The invitation to participate in the 1958 UNOGIL mission was the first opportunity that presented itself. This Lebanon mission had an added interest because the numbers requested were low and participation was limited to officer observers. Politically too, the issue was unlikely to be contentious for de Valera's government given the interest of Costello government the previous November.

SELECTION OF OFFICER VOLUNTEERS

On the military side, to support the decision made on Wednesday morning 24 June 1958, there was a requirement to select personnel for a mission without precedent in the Defence Forces' short history. The Chief of Staff, Major General Mulcahy and the Adjutant General, Colonel Hally, shortlisted twelve officers for consideration and ordered them to report to Defence Forces headquarters at 1000 hrs on 25 June 1958.¹⁰ Within the military, a peremptory summons to the Adjutant General's Office is out of the ordinary and usually has adverse disciplinary connotations and so each officer was fearful as to why he was required there at such short notice. These fears were only allayed at the appointed time when Mulcahy and Hally informed them of the UN request and the government's positive response to it. The

officers were also informed that five of those present would leave in two days for observer duty in Lebanon. Based entirely on this scant information volunteers were sought. With no time to consult their wives or next of kin, all did so. Five were then selected and Lieutenant Colonel Justin McCarthy was nominated to lead the group. From the very beginning McCarthy featured prominently in correspondence between Dublin and the mission in New York. Born and educated in England, he joined the Defence Forces in 1932, was commissioned in 1934 and was a Lieutenant Colonel by 1945. He later completed the British army staff course at the British army staff college, Camberley, England and held a range of important appointments before his selection for UNOGIL.¹¹ Unusually for an officer of his time, he was a fluent French speaker. It is likely that this, together with his completion of the British army staff course, and his performance in a variety of demanding career appointments all combined to mark him as the best candidate to lead the group on this historic assignment, the first foreign deployment of Irish military personnel on operational duties.

IRISH OFFICERS IN UNOGIL

Following the completion of a minimum of military administrative formalities and a meeting with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera on 26 June, the McCarthy group left for Lebanon on 28 June 1958.¹² Soon after they joined the mission, the operational situation became much more complicated for UNOGIL. A republican coup toppled the regime in Iraq, which threatened to destabilise the region. The Lebanese and Jordanian governments both felt threatened by the coup in Iraq and sought military assistance from the United States and Britain. The United States deployed marines to Beirut, and Britain deployed its troops to Amman. While these military deployments appeared to contain the situation, the entire Middle Eastern region, and Lebanon in particular, remained tense from July to October. Eventually, all the issues, which had made the region the focus of international diplomatic and military attention, were resolved. This was achieved diplomatically through the good offices of UN secretary-general Hammarskjöld. In October, the United States and Britain withdrew their forces and UNOGIL, having first expanded to over 600 personnel, was eventually downsized and withdrawn in December 1958.

In addition to the original five, the Defence Forces subsequently provided 45 other Irish officers in four separate deployments.¹³ All of these officers went through a nomination and selection process identical to the original five. They each received orders to report to Defence Forces headquarters and were then presented with the option of making themselves available as volunteers. They all choose to volunteer despite the limited knowledge of the mission, its hardships or dangers. Many felt they had voluntarily enlisted in the Defence Forces and consequently were available for whatever deployment was required of them.¹⁴ In this manner, and out of this experience, the Defence Forces' commitment to the 'volunteer' concept of overseas service was established and has survived to the present day.

Beirut, in July and August 1958 was a highly sensitive, complicated, Cold War flashpoint. UNOGIL was required to walk a tightrope between the conflicting demands of the host government interests and those of an occupying superpower. There was also the prevailing threat from the United Arab Republic, a belligerent adjoining state. In this confused operational cauldron, McCarthy, after only one month in the mission and at the request of his UNOGIL superior, was promoted to full colonel status and appointed deputy to UNOGIL's Norwegian

commander Major General Odd Bull. Taking over the reins at UNOGIL headquarters was an endorsement of McCarthy's professional ability, diplomacy and impartiality. This was a real coup for the Irish, coming as it did so early in the mission and especially given that Ireland had no previous record in UN missions. It is contended here that this event is comparable to Lieutenant General Sean McKeown's achievement in the Congo a few years later. However, despite all of this, it went unnoticed at home and inexplicably was not recognised as the historic event that it was for the Irish state and the Defence Forces.

While it was operational as a mission, UNOGIL maintained a high-profile presence of unarmed UN military observers called UNMOs in all parts of Lebanon. Across the mission area, the Irish officers were deployed as UNMOs to UNOGIL's five operational sectors (Tripoli, Baalbek, Chtura, Marjayoun and Saida). Each sector had a headquarters controlling the outposts dispersed across the respective sectors. A unique feature of this mission was that it had an air operation element equipped with helicopters and light aircraft. These elements reinforced the work of the ground observation posts, checkpoints and mobile patrols, the combined effort of which contributed significantly to defusing and containing the explosive potential that existed in the rural regions of the country, especially along its borders with Israel and Syria. The Irish provided a number of qualified pilots who conducted the aerial observation patrols and one of these, Commandant Desmond Johnston, also joined the task force assigned to oversee the British withdrawal from Jordan.¹⁵ All across the mission, both in the sector and mission headquarters, Irish officers were invariably selected for, and assigned to, key staff appointments. The Irish officers were selected for these coveted staff appointments by their immediate operational superiors, which was an international endorsement of their ability, training and professionalism.

However, in one area the Irish were poorly prepared for operations overseas: in uniform and equipment. Ireland had equipped its Defence Forces to meet the very basic requirements for operations within the state and any prospect of foreign deployment was never considered. Consequently, the Defence Forces were ill-prepared to equip those departing on the UNOGIL mission and an *ad hoc* approach prevailed. On this basis, the Naval Service provided duffle coats, Millets of Capel Street, Dublin provided something resembling a lightweight uniform and the Fórsa Cosanta Áitiuil provided a 'combat blouse pattern' bulls-wool uniform.

In reality, the UNOGIL mission was a proving ground and a steep learning curve for the Irish state, its civil service and its Defence Forces. In New York, the staff at the Permanent Mission, using the limited communication means of telegram, air mail, diplomatic courier and the unreliable nature of the transatlantic telephone, maintained very effective lines of communication with their headquarters in Iveagh House. The civil servants in the Departments of External Affairs and of Defence adjusted very quickly to the necessity for rapid decision making to meet deadlines imposed by the UN. For the Defence Forces, there was the necessity to respond quickly to government decisions and provide suitable, trained personnel to meet Ireland's commitments.

For the individual officers selected for service in UNOGIL, the mission was an experience beyond their wildest dreams given the normal service expectation of those who had joined the Defence Forces in the 1940s and 1950s. The termination of the mission and their subsequent

return to mundane barrack duties was a huge anticlimax. Sixteen months later on 11 April 1960, after much debate as to national authorisation to wear UN medals, these officers paraded for the first time as a group in Dublin to receive their UN service medal.¹⁶ For those on parade that day, the idea of becoming involved in any further foreign-service campaigns was not a realistic proposition. The medal parade brought closure to this historic first venture into soldiering for peace. Two absent UNMOs were overlooked in the formality of this great occasion, which was the first presentation of non-national medals to serving Defence Forces personnel. They remained on duty with UNTSO in the Middle East.

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION (UNTSO)

When the UNOGIL mission ended, the pressure came on UNTSO to maintain stability across the region. The UNTSO mission was in place since 1947, overseeing the armistice lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours. UNTSO headhunted two Irish personnel, McCarthy and Jordan, who then transferred to UNTSO when UNOGIL disbanded in mid-December 1958. This transfer occurred following the UN secretary-general's request for their services and with the full agreement of the Irish government. In stark contrast to the lack of publicity for McCarthy's promotion and appointment as deputy to Odd Bull in UNOGIL, the transfer of McCarthy and Jordan to UNTSO was widely publicised by the Government Information Bureau in all the national media.¹⁷ McCarthy and Jordan were the first Irish officers to serve in UNTSO. Ireland has since maintained an unbroken commitment to this mission, which remains the longest overseas mission for the Defence Forces.

UNTSO was an unarmed observer mission with a wide ranging mandate deployed to Israel's disputed frontiers. On the Egyptian front, along the Gaza strip area, the UNTSO mission coexisted with the armed UN force UNEF. McCarthy had been strongly recommended by his UNOGIL Norwegian superior, Major General Odd Bull, to the UNTSO Chief of Staff, the Swede, Major General Carl von Horn. On this recommendation and in light of his performance at UNOGIL headquarters, McCarthy was assigned by von Horn to the troublesome Gaza sector.

McCarthy's designated appointment was as chairman of a Mixed Armistice Committee, which on this front was arbitrating between Egypt and Israel. External Affairs in Dublin were continuing to exercise a hands-on approach to these matters and when they became aware of the full nature of McCarthy's appointment they expressed strong misgivings. Dublin perceived possible implications for Irish neutrality in this appointment and informed the Permanent Mission in New York accordingly.¹⁸ The matter was eventually resolved and an important precedent relating to the deployment of Irish officers to an observer mission was established. This was the acceptance that the nature of duties performed by Irish personnel on a UN mission was directed by the head of that mission. From then on, such matters were treated as operational and administrative issues arising in the UN theatre and within the authority and competence of the respective UN chief of staff. They were therefore not a matter for consultation with either national governments or those in the mission area. After this initial difficulty, McCarthy and Jordan settled into the routine of their respective appointments. Jordan served at UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and later in Damascus. McCarthy continued with his brief in the Sinai, until they were both recommended for a further extension of their UNTSO service in December 1959. McCarthy's tenure in his appointment was not without incident. He was commended by Major General von Horn particularly for his handling of

serious incidents occurring in his area, and for the professional and diplomatic manner in which he dealt with the strained command relationship between the respective UN generals with UNTSO and UNEF.

When there was an active large-scale commitment to the UNOGIL mission, the national response at all levels was marked by a very positive, proactive, 'can do' attitude in all government departments. When the mission concluded and the involvement in UNTSO followed, there was a return to a more usual form of civil service bureaucracy. At that point, the unresolved, mundane but important issues were addressed, for example personnel administrative issues such as leave, medical support, conditions of service, pensions, etc., all of which were satisfactorily resolved. Regarding financial matters, the Department of Defence on the prompting of the Department of Finance sought reimbursement from UN sources for expenses arising in the course of its commitment of Irish personnel on UN duty and this amounted to £3,015 9s 11d,¹⁹ Regarding these costs, the permanent mission staff in New York investigated the matter with the UN Secretariat and other contributing nations.

This process established what costs were chargeable to the UN and, based on their research, the staff in New York tactfully suggested that the claim should not be pursued further.²⁰ All of these problems arose from a lack of knowledge regarding UN procedures. Dealing with and resolving command, control, operational and administrative issues gave experience to national administrators and decision makers. This prepared all concerned for the Congolese venture that was to follow one year later.

Other issues arose of particular interest to the military. McCarthy unwittingly drew the wrath of national authorities when he applied for a year's extension to his service with UNTSO. McCarthy, ever the perfect staff officer, had initiated this request in accordance with UNTSO procedures through the UNTSO chain of command to his own national authorities. On receipt of the application at Defence Forces headquarters, it was deemed to have been sought outside national military channels and McCarthy was severely admonished. Having complied with the relevant UNTSO procedure, McCarthy took issue with the Adjutant General's admonishment and sought redress through his UNTSO superior, Major General von Horn. Von Horn's letter, though couched in diplomatic language, went straight to the nub of this issue by reminding the Irish authorities that the correct UN procedure had been applied throughout.²¹ Following this direct involvement by the UNTSO general, the matter was quickly resolved.

The significance of this almost unimportant military administrative event was considerable. It is apparent from von Horn's correspondence that the Irish authorities, particularly Defence Forces Headquarters and the Department of Defence, were unaware of either the real nature or the importance of Colonel McCarthy's duties (for example, his high-profile role as chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, then administering the more volatile of the Israel-Arab armistice lines). Dublin was also unaware of, or overlooked, the orders and administrative procedures applicable to UN missions in general and UNTSO in particular. This was compounded by the terms of the Adjutant General's reprimand of Colonel McCarthy, which also suggests a lack of appreciation of the 'independence' of UN missions and the attendant international status of officers deployed to those missions. This minor hiccup vis-à-vis national relations and communication with the Irish officers in UNTSO was an important

step in awakening staff in Defence Forces Headquarters to the sensitivities of working to international standards.

From this point on, staff officers at national headquarters were alert to how such matters as administrative control should be exercised over personnel deployed to a UN mission. Thereafter, greater care was taken to ensure that communication with those in the field was done through the appropriate channels. This incident also highlighted the requirement to improve direct communication with national elements deployed outside the country, which up to this point appear to have depended on airmail correspondence. It is posited here that this was the driving force behind the necessity for having a reliable, nationally controlled, means of communication available to national authorities for contact with overseas elements. At a later stage, the recognition of this requirement led to the high frequency radio contact established soon after the Congo operation unfolded in 1960.

OPERATION' DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO (ONUC)

The Defence Force officers in UNTSO continued with the routine of their duties into 1960. On 30 June 1960 the Republic of the Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent and within days erupted into a paroxysm of violence. Belgium dispatched troops to restore order and protect its nationals without the approval of the new Congolese government. The Congolese government responded by seeking military assistance from the UN, which was sanctioned by the Security Council on 14 July. The advance elements of what was to become ONUC were deployed to the Congo on 16 July 1960.²² At the outset, Ireland was requested by Hammarskjöld to provide other officer observers for the new force and then on 16 July a formal request was submitted for an infantry battalion. This was later increased to two battalions, a total of 1,200 men. Once again, Ireland responded promptly and the request was acceded to on 19 July with the advance elements reporting to the Congo on 22 July. As UNTSO was always the immediately available pool of trained UN military personnel, it was called upon to provide Major General von Horn to act as force commander for the new UN force in the Congo. On arrival, von Horn sought the assistance of Colonel McCarthy from UNTSO to function as his chief of staff.²³ Dublin agreed to this request and McCarthy was redeployed from Jerusalem to Leopoldville. Interviews with McCarthy's former UNOGIL colleagues suggest that McCarthy's experience in establishing UNOGIL and his ability to get things done in a mixed international military staff were the attributes that made him ideally suited to the unprecedented task facing ONUC's force commander.²⁴

In just over 25 months, Ireland, having initially committed five officers to the unarmed UNOGIL mission in June 1958, had now committed in excess of 1,200 personnel to an armed peacekeeping force many thousands of miles away from home. McCarthy had been the senior officer in charge of those first Irish UNMOs and now, on reporting for duty with Major General von Horn's staff at ONUC headquarters in Leopoldville, he became the Irish link to three UN missions: UNOGIL, UNTSO and now ONUC. He gave himself completely to the demands of his extensive duties in ONUC headquarters and, in the performance of these duties, he died in a tragic car accident in Leopoldville on 27 October 1960. Subsequently, following a commendation by Major General von Horn to the Irish national military authorities, he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.²⁵

This ended the distinguished career of Colonel Justin McCarthy. He was the first Defence Forces officer to lead an overseas deployment of Defence Forces personnel to a UN mission and the first to serve in three different UN peacekeeping operations. Tragically, he was also the first Defence Forces officer to give his life in the performance of UN peacekeeping. To date, he also remains the most senior of the 85 Defence Forces fatalities on UN operations.

McCarthy's death preceded by ten days the tragedy of the Niemba Ambush, when nine Irish soldiers lost their lives, and was understandably overlooked in the scale of that catastrophe. However, these deaths so early in the ONUC mission were a harsh coming-of-age for the nation, as Ireland became aware of the cost that was to be borne in the cause of peace. Participation in UNOGIL established Ireland's place 'amongst the nations of the world', UNTSO continued a tenuous engagement in peacekeeping, for Ireland. The experience contributed to the state's learning process about peacekeeping, and participation in ONUC followed. At that critical juncture in Cold War world politics, Ireland established itself as a reliable member of the UN peacekeeping 'club' of neutral and non-aligned states. Involvement with the UN and other organisations in the cause of peace has continued since then and has now become an accepted dimension of Defence Forces service and of Irish foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Since joining the UN, Ireland has participated in over 30 peacekeeping missions dispersed over the five continents. Being without colonial baggage and remaining uncompromised by superpower affiliations or influence, Ireland also established an enviable reputation as an impartial 'honest broker' over this period. It has, through its involvement in peacekeeping, lived up to the expectations of those for whom participation in and commitment to the UN organisation was the grand strategy to establish Ireland's place on the world stage. This achievement is now a matter of historical record and one to which the Defence Forces peacekeeping operations have made a significant contribution. The genesis of that Defence Forces involvement in peacekeeping operations remains UNOGIL, closely followed by UNTSO, the mission in which the Defence Forces have retained a continuing unbroken presence since December 1958.

Upon reflecting on the significance of the UNOGIL, UNTSO and ONUC missions, there is a requirement for proper recognition of the path-finding role of Colonel McCarthy and his 49 Irish UNOGIL colleagues. At a personal level, their 1958 experience of foreign soldiering in the cause of peace infused 50 Irish participants with a personal confidence in their professionalism. They also had confidence in their training and a belief in their ability to hold their own on the international stage. In the first instance, these officers were dependant on, and sustained by, the national military training that they had received. Deployed to an international organisation run by a multinational military staff, they found their training compared more than favourably with other military officers from more combat-experienced armies. Considered from the UN perspective the quality, strength and flexibility of these resources provided by Ireland was impressive, as was the speed with which they were deployed to the mission area. This positive performance from a first-time participant in peacekeeping marked Ireland as being eminently suitable for the 'peacekeeping club' of reliable, neutral and non-aligned nations. Having proved itself in these early unarmed missions, Ireland and its Defence Forces undoubtedly became a future contender for early consideration for challenging peacekeeping missions.

From the national perspective, the role and performance of its UNMOs in this first mission was recognition of the calibre of the respective Irish officers and validation of national military training and expertise. The early weeks of UNOGIL tested and forged Ireland's ability to react quickly and positively to an emerging international security challenge. In turn, this contributed to national confidence regarding peacekeeping matters, thereby facilitating a positive response by the government in July 1960 to the secretary-general's request for Irish troops for ONUC. In addition, participation in UNTSO, together with the instructive lessons that this provided for national civil and military administrations, was instrumental in preparing all concerned for the major escalation to participation in armed troop missions, which emerged with the problem in the Congo in 1960.

At a more functional level, participation in the 1958 Lebanon mission also raised the public profile of the Defence Forces with the publicity and media coverage it generated, ensuring the unparalleled success of the Defence Forces' 1958 recruiting campaign.²⁶ Those recruited during this campaign became the trained soldiers of 1960 and from this trained resource the battalions and companies for ONUC were drawn, which were in turn commanded, staffed, trained and led by many of the UNOGIL veterans.

FOOTNOTES

¹ This paper was originally presented at the conference 'The United Nations anniversary – Looking forward', held at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 18 November 2005, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Ireland's accession to the UN. © Royal Irish Academy. Reprinted by kind permission of the RIA from *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Volume 17, 2006 (31-42). www.ria.ie/publications/isia

² See also Richard E.M. Heaslip, 'UNOGIL and UNTSO: 1958-60. The pre-Congo origins of Ireland's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping', in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds), *Obligations and responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations 1955-2005. Essays marking fifty years of Ireland's United Nations membership* (Dublin, 2005), 79-116. The paper presented at the conference 'The United Nations anniversary – Looking forward', on 18 November 2005, was based on this article.

³ National Archives of Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter cited as NAI DFA), 305/329/1, Political situation in Lebanon, Cochrane to MacWhite (letter), 17 May 1958.

⁴ NAI DFA Permanent mission to the United Nations New York (hereafter cited as PMUN), 222/13/1, cables from PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, 23 June 1958. The cable of 23 June contained the following message. 'Most urgent for Secretary General's Office has inquired today on telephone if we could urgently provide five officers of quote Major or Captain rank unquote to join UN Observation Team in Lebanon stop will cable further details after visit headquarters this afternoon uneireann' [sic]

⁵ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, the Department of External Affairs to PMUN (clear cable), 24 June 1958. The government's response from Iveagh House was as follows, 'Please inform Secretary General Government Agreeable in principle stop details being settled and will wire later stop request no publicity until details being settled' [sic]

⁶ NAI DFA PMUN, 185PK/5Vol 1, UNEF file [sic]

⁷ NAI DFA PMUN, 185PK/5Vol 1. The Department of Defence correspondence to the Department of External Affairs, 20 November 1956 with attachments to the Department of External Affairs, 22 November 1956 and PMUN, 17 December 1956.

⁸ NAI DFA, 305/173/1 Pt1, United Nations Emergency International Force file with enclosure 'Memorandum for the government', 27 August 1957.

⁹ NAI, Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet files 2/18, 21 March 1958.

¹⁰ Patrick Lavelle, 'UNOGIL silver jubilee, 1958-83', *An Cosantoir*, June (1983), 189-93:189.

¹¹ Military Archives, biographical notes (extras from personal file) 0/4530 Colonel Justin McCarthy.

¹² NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, paper and photo clippings, 27 June 1958. The event was a major national news item and the subject of very favourable comment.

- ¹³ The second group (five officers) departed on 4 August, the third (ten officers) on 28 August, the fourth (eleven officers) on 28 September and the fifth (nineteen officers) on 4 October 1958. Based on Lavelle UNOGIL p 193, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Furlong, Bray, Co. Wicklow, 15 February 2005 and interview with Colonel Colm Cox, Milltown, Co. Kildare, 25 February 2005.
- ¹⁴ Interview with Colonel Colm Cox, Milltown, Co. Kildare, 25 February 2005. Cox, who served as a military observer with UNOGIL in 1958, stated in the interview that this opinion was widely held by the Defence Force officers of that time.
- ¹⁵ Interview with Major General Fergus O'Connell, Dublin, 24 March 2005. O'Connell served as a military observer with the UNOGIL mission in 1958 and provided the information on Johnston's service with the UN task force deployed to Amman.
- ¹⁶ NAI DFA 305/329/3, award of medal to Irish officers in UNOGIL file. This file contains a copy of the Defence Forces' Ceremonial Order 3/1960 dated 6 April 1960. It also gives insight into the protracted correspondence regarding national authorisation for wearing UN medals. In this first Defence Forces United Nations medal parade there was also a further unique historic dimension in that the Taoiseach Mr Sean Lemass was presenting a UN medal to his son-in-law Captain Jack O'Brien (Cavalry Corps) who had served in UNOGIL.
- ¹⁷ 'UN chief asks for two Irish officers', Irish Press, 16 December 1959
- ¹⁸ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, Department of External Affairs to PMUN, 6 January 1959; PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, 7 January 1959 and PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, 23 January 1959
- ¹⁹ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, Department of External Affairs to PMUN, Department of Defence correspondence, 9 February 1960. This correspondence outlined a claim for reimbursement for a special clothing allowance and the additional equipment issued to each officer, plus an 'entertainment allowance' issued to McCarthy. The claim totalled £3,295 0s 0d, less the cost recovered from coats and medical kit returned to stores - £279 10s 1d., thus requiring £3,015 9s 11d to be paid. In effect, the state's first venture into UN soldering cost £3,015 9s 11d.
- ²⁰ NAI DFA, 305/329/4, Iveagh House copy of PMUN letter to the government
- ²¹ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, memorandum from Hammarskjöld to PMUN, 9 July 1959.
- ²² United Nations Operation in the Congo (July 1960 – June 1964), 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm> (15 February 2006).
- ²³ Carl von Horn. *Soldiering for peace* (New York, 1964), 184.
- ²⁴ Interview with Brigadier Patrick Dixon, Athlone, Co. Westmeath, 18 February 2005. Dixon served as a military observer with UNOGIL in 1958. During this service he served at UNOGIL headquarters and observed the regard in which McCarthy was held by the entire headquarters staff.
- ²⁵ Military Archives, Orduithe gnathaimh ginearalta an Ard Aidiunach (hereafter cited as OGG), General Routine Order 10/1967, signed by Major General Collins Powell on 30 May 1967, notifying that the Minister for Defence had awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (Second Class) posthumously to McCarthy.
- ²⁶ Minister for Defence, Kevin Boland, moving the estimates for his department on 29 April 1959, stated that the 1958 recruiting campaign for the Defence Forces was the most effective since 1950, due to the high profile for the Defence Forces from United Nations service, Dail Debates, vol, 174, col, 1273 (29 April 1959) and comment in 'Dail Report', Irish Press, 30 April 1959.

Lessons from The Congo

Declan Power

INTRODUCTION

Looking back at the Congo now, and comparing the Irish troops who were deployed there as part of the ONUC (Organisation Nations Unies Congo) force with those preparing to go to Chad with EUFOR, it seems like a millennium has passed in terms of army development. Uniforms, personal equipment and attitudes, both within and without the army, have undergone huge transformations. But this is not something about which we should be complacent because many issues remain about how and why we deploy troops overseas.

This essay will address certain aspects of the Congo mission that were problematic for both Irish and other contingents, and these can be divided into a number of areas: force construction; manner of deployment; interaction between ONUC and the Congolese government; preparedness for overseas operations; leadership of ONUC – who was to command and how; intelligence deficits; Niemba as a product of intelligence deficit; the Jadotville equation; and the long-term psychological impact of Jadotville on the Defence Forces.

FORCE CONSTRUCTION AND MANNER OF DEPLOYMENT

Considering the problems some people have nowadays about Irish involvement in international peace support operations, it seems that our confidence in these activities largely depends on who's running the show. Recent debate about our involvement in the UN-mandated EU Battle-Groups initiative gave opportunity for those amongst us who prefer the hand-wringing option, accompanied of course by moral angst as the preferred form of daily aerobic exercise. But when one considers that the basic idea of the Battle-Group is to give the UN a mechanism by which it can stabilise conflict situations with a well-trained interoperable force capable of functioning in an integrated fashion with other nations, it actually makes sense. Then think about this initiative in the light of lessons learned from earlier overseas deployments - like the Congo for example - and it seems imperative to take the integrated Battle-Group approach.

Although UN troops were speedily deployed to the Congo, landing there only two days after the UN Resolution was passed, they were by no means a cohesive force. As a basic military force in the field ONUC was not just unwieldy, it basically did not function and a position paper on the Congo from Waterloo University in Ontario, Canada points out some of the special rules which the Secretary-General developed for the mission but which in turn seriously curtailed the scope of the entire operation:

1. The force was to be under the exclusive command of the Secretary-General, responsible only to the Security Council.
2. It could not take orders from the host government and it had to be separate and distinct from the activities of any national authorities.

3. The UN could not become a party to internal conflicts. UN troops could not be used to enforce any specific political situation.
4. The force was supposed to have freedom of movement throughout the Congo.
5. UN troops could use force only in self-defence and could not exercise any initiative in the use of armed force.
6. The composition of the force would be decided by the Secretary-General, although the views of the host country could be considered.
7. National units in the UN force would take orders only from the UN and not from their home governments.

Additionally those troops who arrived in the Congo were lightly armed. They were equipped and briefed for what could best be described as a police-type action involving the restoration of law and order and dealing with recalcitrant members of the mutinous ANC. By 15 July, more than 1,200 troops were on the ground, and within a month the total had soared to 14,000 drawn from 24 states. In terms of the numbers involved, and the scope of the mission, this was a force of unprecedented magnitude but in order to have any prospect of success clear mission objectives with defined command, control, and communications systems were required. Whether the United Nations could actually control such a force was distinctly unclear.

INTERACTION BETWEEN ONUC AND THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT

However, the root of post-deployment difficulties lay in the erratic personality of Patrice Lumumba. In 1960 there seemed little doubt that Lumumba was under the influence of Communist advisors. Even UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld believed this to be true and the Prime Minister showed little interest in cooperating with the UN in its efforts to restore order and deal with the secessionist province of Katanga where President Moïse Tshombe, with the assistance of Belgian officers and civilian advisors, had established an oasis of relative tranquillity.

Tshombe persistently refused to admit UN troops, while Lumumba demanded that the UN expel the Belgians from Katanga and compel Tshombe to end his secession. Hammarskjöld could not do this without violating all of his own ground rules and while he personally led the first ONUC contingent into Katanga in a move to establish the UN's right to freedom of movement, this did nothing to resolve the political impasse.

The ONUC force comprised troops from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. Cultural, linguistic and economic factors were to become major issues when it came to leading and administering such a force and the situation was compounded by the attitude of the host country who the UN were supposed to be assisting.

Documents compiled by Canadian staff officers at the time show that while the Congo government invited the UN to come into their country in order to establish law and order and restore economic life, the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues quickly became

antagonistic to white troops in particular and to the UN force in general. The Canadians stated that it was becoming more obvious with each passing day that a police state was in the making and that pressure from the UN was the only deterrent.

IRISH PREPAREDNESS FOR OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

By 1960 Ireland had already seconded troops to the UN but this was in the low-profile capacity of unarmed observers to UNOGIL (United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon) mission in 1958 and thereafter to UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) in the Middle East. Therefore, when the request arrived from UN Headquarters in New York to supply a full infantry battalion to ONUC, military planners at Defence Force Headquarters in Dublin knew it would be a watershed in Irish military history. To appreciate fully the magnitude of what was being asked of the Irish Army, one must understand the state of the Irish military in the late 1950s. In the words of Noel Carey, then an enthusiastic young lieutenant and platoon commander, the Army was “*run down, lacked financing and direction, and its mission was not clearly defined*”. Military duties consisted of ceremonial activity and limited Aid to the Civil Power in the context of the IRA border campaign which was beginning at that time. Carey recalled that he spent a three-month period on the border where his soldiers were carrying out essential duties such as setting up roadblocks and patrolling with the Gardaí. The work was interesting and demanding but once back in barracks the tedium was worse than ever. “*Sport was very important to me and helped to keep me motivated*”, he said, “*however, there was a distinct lack of adventure in the army at this time*”

Carey’s words sum up what, for many soldiers, was reality at that time. For some the army was simply a staging post, a chance to earn and save money before they left for pastures greener in the US or Australia. For others it was simply a straightforward way to keep a roof over their heads and feed their families – but a glorious career it was not. At this point very few serving soldiers had seen active service and only a small number of senior officers had seen some form of action in the War of Independence and during the Civil War.

LEADERSHIP OF ONUC – WHO WAS TO COMMAND AND HOW?

Following initial confusion about who was to be the senior ONUC military officer Major Gen Carl von Horn from Sweden was the one who took the reins of leadership. However the main problem he faced was rooted in the fact that the ONUC military leadership was hamstrung by the ONUC civilian leadership who insisted on taking operational decisions which they were ill-equipped to make. ONUC was composed of both a military and civil wing with the heads of both operations subordinated to a Special Representative, Dr Ralph Bunche, who reported directly to Secretary General Hammarskjöld. This created major problems for von Horn who upon arrival at Leopoldville found the military side of the mission in total chaos with ONUC and its military staff planners completely incapable of filling the vacuum created by the quick departure of the Belgian government. It was clear there was an intense need for an international force to restore order but in a subsequent book on his peacekeeping experiences, *Soldiering for Peace*, von Horn confirmed all of his difficulties particularly the poor facilities and lack of communications.

Even his transfer from UNTSO in the Middle East had difficulties. The aircraft flying him to Africa broke down and arriving on 18 July he immediately objected to decisions already made by the UN political leadership which he felt were degrading his force's ability to conduct military operations. So strongly did he feel about this that he threatened to resign on three separate occasions in the month following his arrival. The first occurred when Hammarskjöld turned down a request for a larger force to implement the mandate. The second crisis erupted when von Horn discovered that all of his communications were being filtered through a civilian sieve before reaching their destination at UN Headquarters in New York. But the straw that nearly broke the camel's back, and consequently was to cause morale and operational problems for the ONUC troops on the ground, was the political decision to return arms previously seized from ANC units in UN raids.

Added to these complications was the increasingly erratic and hostile attitude of the Congolese government to ONUC forces. A state of martial law was declared in August with demands that all UN personnel, civil and military, carry ID and produce it on request to the Congolese authorities. While this could be interpreted as the fledgling state simply trying to assert its authority, it also seriously impeded the conduct of ONUC operations.

Canadian staff officers at ONUC Headquarters reporting on the situation stated that ONUC was primarily a civilian organisation with a military component. Having started with a handful of UN officials under Bunche, and a small group of officers (mostly Canadian) borrowed from UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) in Sinai and UNTSO, the organisation had mushroomed into an awesome establishment, but lacked cohesion, know-how and any real practical authority. The Canadians stated that *"for weeks, civilians, officers and other ranks have been pouring in from all over the world; people who have little in common and who are tied by strings which prevent or restrict their use. This rapid expansion of HQ ONUC, seemingly without any plan, has resulted in most of the effort being directed at their own administration to the detriment of the 18,000 troops spread over a territory as large as the whole of Ontario but without its means of communications. This situation, together with an almost total lack of telephonic communication between offices and an impossible accommodation set up has caused intolerable delay, confusion and frustration right from the start and the end is not yet in sight."*

By late 1960, von Horn had fallen into ill health and had withdrawn more and more from operational decision-making. His senior staff officers were now despairing and in December von Horn returned to UNTSO when a new ONUC force commander was appointed to take his place - General Sean McKeown from Ireland¹.

While McKeown's main problem was stabilising the Congo he also had the added difficulty associated with the politically sensitive nature of his planning staff. The officers a commanding general has to assist him are crucial in the formulation of strategy and implementation of policy. Staff officers are the general's hands, eyes and ears and normally will have been assembled over a number of years. They are usually bright up-and-coming officers who, in addition to being professionally competent, will also be attuned to the personality and nuances of their commander. Such cohesion in times of stress can be the difference between operational success and tactical failure.

When McKeown arrived he had to accept a number of people on his staff who were there purely to satisfy political demands and agendas and while there were some Canadians, a few Irish, and a number of well-regarded Indian officers, there were also a number of others whose military education and poor English made for very difficult communication. There were also a number of other officers who privately questioned McKeown's judgement by citing his lack of previous war service.

OVERALL INTELLIGENCE DEFICITS

One of the first tenets of any military operation is the provision of good intelligence without which the commander cannot carry out any realistic estimate of the situation or appreciation of the ground. And aside from purely military applications, it gives a commander an understanding of things such as enemy morale, local civilian morale and prospective cultural interpretation of his own military strategies. But more importantly, good intelligence acts as a force multiplier in areas such as devising or countering propaganda or psychological operations and used in such a fashion it may often achieve objectives with minimum blood-loss. Therefore intelligence must be examined from both strategic and tactical points of view and then employed correctly as commanders like McKeown devise operations, and subordinates on the ground execute them. But what was the UN's intelligence-gathering capability in ONUC? Commenting on a report produced by Swedish Colonel Jonas Waern in which he examined the situation in Elisabethville Connor Cruise O'Brien recalled that Waern referred to several items of information as having been "*gleaned from my spies*".

This touches on a particularly sensitive point because while individual countries supporting the UN operation did maintain intelligence networks, the UN itself did not. Hammarskjöld actually referred to this on one occasion at a meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee. He admitted that this was a serious handicap but justified the situation on the grounds that the UN must have clean hands. O'Brien rightly observed that trying to institute such a service would have been fraught with difficulties where in attempting to observe the necessary tight security between so many different nations there would have been the added practical difficulties of language not to mention the traditional perception that intelligence gathering essentially involved lying, bribery, blackmail, theft and so on. The UN also agonised over the belief that any UN intelligence service would be subject to infiltration by agents of national services – which in fact provides an argument for not having a UN force committed to any area of conflict to begin with. In any case Hammarskjöld's "clean hands" aspiration (with corresponding lack of intelligence) frequently resulted in bloodied peacekeepers and butchered civilians and many UN personnel, both military and civilian, despaired of such international innocence, and the trivial manner in which such an important military function was treated.

O'Brien later recalled that "*we infringed the 'clean hands' doctrine to the extent of employing in Elisabethville one Greek ex-policeman with an imperfect knowledge of French who was already—as we later found from captured documents—known at the headquarters of Tshombe's Gendarmerie by the proud title of 'Chief of the United Nations Intelligence Services in Katanga'. The rest of the said services consisted of a few Baluba houseboys who, sometimes for money but more often out of sheer political zeal, would bring scraps of information, usually alarmist gossip, from time to time*".

This is what Col Waern meant when he referred to “*my spies*” and O’Brien later rightly described the intelligence gathering, particularly what intelligence professionals call handling or running agents as having been bound to become a little comical. Frankly, it beggars belief that Gen McKeown, much less O’Brien himself, was expected to operate a complex civil-military operation with such a set-up.

NIEMBA – THE PRODUCT OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIT?

A number of incidents involving Irish troops took place some months after their arrival in the Congo. The most infamous, and the one which had the greatest impact in the minds of the Irish public, was the Niemba massacre on November 8, 1960. Niemba was an isolated trading post on the river Lukuga in Katanga and was of no real tactical importance. However, nine Irish soldiers, including platoon commander, Lt Kevin Gleeson, while on patrol in the area were slaughtered south of Niemba by marauding Baluba tribesmen in an unprovoked and ferocious attack.

A primitive tribal people, the Baluba had been regularly terrorised and abused by the mercenary-led forces in Katanga with many of their number having already fled to Elisabethville, where ironically they were being protected by Irish and other UN forces. It likely that the attack itself was a knee-jerk reaction by a primitive people who had already been terrorised by white soldiers - but in the aftermath both the Katangans and the Balubas constantly blamed the UN for siding with one or other faction. The Irish troops had been instructed to go out and remove roadblocks that had been set up by the Balubas and it was while they were doing this that they were set upon. Studies and reports in the aftermath acknowledged that had there been greater intelligence available to ONUC at the time, it would have been clear an attack was imminent.

If proof were needed that ONUC HQ had no general or regional intelligence pictures, and little real understanding of the complex environment into which their troops were being deployed, then Niemba proved that point. After the massacre instead of trying to discover what had provoked the Baluba ONUC simply withdrew from the area as newspaper stories about the arrow-pierced bodies of the troops recovered after the ambush fed into the mindsets of the general public. As far as the Irish people were concerned, our troops were fighting a savage but ignorant force armed with stone-age weapons and our soldiers had died because they did not want to intimidate or take aggressive action. The reality, however, was distinctly different.

THE JADOTVILLE EQUATION

And then there was Jadotville. I do not wish to go back over the details of the battle that took place at the mining village in September 1961, but rather I want to look at some of the things that led its strategic failure. The battle itself was a tactical success - a company of 150 Irish troops well dug-in and defending their ground successfully against a mercenary-led force that at one point numbered up to 3000. The fact the Irish troops of A Company, 35th Battalion were able to hold out for a week in the face of a numerically superior force with support weapons and airpower should be a matter of pride to all of us who have worn the uniform. However, many of the mistakes made were to come after the battle and they were largely made through lack of information at all levels in both the Irish and ONUC command structure.

The besieged Irish troops had managed to fight their opponents to a stand-still and agreed to a ceasefire after four days. In agreeing to the cease-fire, the Irish had given much and received little, not even the water they had been promised. Comdt Pat Quinlan, the company commander had made decisions based on the promise of UN jets being deployed to support the besieged defenders. The initial mention of this seemed to sway negotiations in Quinlan's favour, but then when the jets didn't appear it undermined his bargaining position.

Unfortunately he found himself and his troops becoming cogs in a UN apparatus that couldn't make up its mind whether it was a war machine or a peace force. The Katangans had simply exploited the UN's lack of focus and unwillingness to apply military force - a piece of classic asymmetrical warfare, long before Al-Qaeda had even reared its head.

Firstly, the UN could not decide whether it was on a war footing to stop a province seceding or merely conducting a police action. Then, it decided to engage in actions that its forces were plainly not equipped for. Why wasn't air support sought in the early stages. One jet could have made all the difference for Quinlan and his men. Having said that, one series of well-aimed radio broadcasts at the population in the Jadotville area could also have had an impact.

However it was obvious that neither Conor Cruise O'Brien, nor the various military officers running operations, had any grasp of the gravity of Quinlan's situation. Had they been monitoring his radio traffic, the news of the surrender would not have come as a surprise. As it happened the bluff in relation to provision of air support merely served to speed up that inevitability. It is obvious that this is at least one lesson we have learned from the Congo and recently we have seen Lt Gen Pat Nash use it to good effect in his preparations for the EUFOR deployment to Chad. General Nash was clear there would be no deployment of troops until the necessary resources were put in place on the ground to support them.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFICITS OF JADOTVILLE FOR THE ARMY

While much has been written about the benefits of the Congo mission for the development of the Irish army, there were some initial negatives. I believe the Jadotville story illustrates some of these negatives which show an understandable insecurity within the state in general and the army in particular when it came to confronting any negative information. The fact that the troops at Jadotville ultimately had to surrender wasn't the issue. They had achieved their mission even though the objectives given to them were unclear. Newspaper reports after their capture were quite respectful of the Irish troops. Peter Younghusband of the Daily Mail wrote "*these justly proud Irishmen are now VIPs, Very Important Prisoners of Katanga*".

In writing this, Younghusband articulated two salient points of truth - firstly, that A Company had fulfilled their duty and had nothing to be ashamed of, and secondly, that their captivity was a major asset to the Katangans as leverage to grind the UN military machine to a halt given that as propaganda they could show the world how the supposed bullies of Tshombe really treated their prisoners. In other words, the Irish troops were not at fault, but the system that had deployed them there, in spite of advice coming from the ground, most certainly was.

Despite this, the rot was setting in. A Company had surrendered, and it didn't make the Irish feel good about themselves. It wasn't that the Irish Army needed to convince the world that Jadotville had been a defensive operation against overwhelming odds. It was more that they needed to convince themselves. As Lt Carey and his comrades settled back into routine at 'The Farm', as the Irish Battalion HQ in Elisabethville was called, they began to sense an attitude of hostility amongst some of their comrades. Carey recalls that "*after a honeymoon of a week, a well-earned rest, and being re-supplied with weapons, a certain animosity began to develop between some members of the Battalion and A Company because of the surrender.*"

Irish Times Journalist, Cathal O'Shannon, agrees that "*there was a palpable sense of shame*" within the Irish contingent after Jadotville. This can only be put down to the Army's inexperience with overseas operations at the time, but then again this was the formative period for the army's peacekeeping tradition - and mistakes were bound to happen. This in turn led to frustration in the years after Jadotville, forcing some to speak out and give their side of the story. In the 1960s, former Army officer and Independent TD, Jack McQuillan, claimed there was a bloodlust mentality in the country and the men would have been recognised as heroes if they had died.

The conduct of the Irish troops and their officers at Jadotville deserves the highest commendation. They showed common sense, intelligence and integrity. Had they not displayed those characteristics, a further 50 or 60 young Irishmen might have been killed. Fianna Fáil TD Lionel Booth paid tribute to A Company in the Dáil in 1963... "*Everybody - officers, NCOs and men - were magnificent and, when they were involved in further combat operations shortly after they had rejoined the main force, they showed that again*". Perhaps these politicians were aware that within the Army, the term "Jadotville Jack" had now become a term of derision. Nevertheless the Congo chapter broke new ground for the Defence Forces albeit that it was completely unreasonable to expect that the operation would be concluded with a clean slate.

When that did not happen the tendency was to quietly consign the problematic parts to the dusty shelf of history, and for too long afterwards what happened at Niamba and Jadotville was not examined properly nor seen in the correct light. Any faults and mistakes regarding those operations lie largely with an inept UN leadership and their vision for the whole ONUC operation. The Irish officers and soldiers had not experienced anything like this before. Certainly, errors were made, but the essential thing was that they were made in good faith. The fact is that the fall of Jadotville called a halt to any further fighting by the UN to end the Katangan secession. This failure gave heart to the Katangan forces and enabled them to present an image to the world of the underdog barking back and calling the bluff of the UN.

For years Ireland's contribution to the Congo operation has been tinged with a sense of shame and little about Jadotville has been recorded in the history books, Irish or international. But this shame was then and continues to be misplaced. The biggest 'crime' Quinlan committed was to be outmanoeuvred by the cease-fire. The Katangans undermined his position bit by bit and played on the fact that directions he received from higher up his chain of command served only to confuse the situation further.

The biggest mistake the Defence Forces made in the interim was to consider all of this a blot on their collective copy book and quietly hope the incident would go away. In reality Quinlan and his soldiers did extremely well at Jadotville. However, there were many others within in the ONUC chain of command who bore huge responsibility for their inability to take hard decisions, and support their troops on the ground when the most needed it².

FOOTNOTES

¹ When Ralph Bunche arrived in the Congo he immediately and clashed with the professional military advice of his Force Commander, Gen Carl von Horn. This was compounded by the fact that intelligence gathering and public perception management as tools of peacekeeping or enforcement were ignored. Having UN Headquarters in New York influence operational decisions on the ground, as in the case of insisting on troop deployments to certain regions caused numerous problems. While some of the problems von Horn faced were later abated, there were still considerable obstacles of this nature facing General Sean McKeown when he was appointed ONUC Force Commander.

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At-Tiri, or Bosnia Avoided: The Irish in UNIFIL 1978 – 95

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By my calculation, it is just over 1,280 miles from Tibnin to Sarajevo. In the geopolitical world of the United Nations, it must seem further, but the mileage interests me because, as a journalist based in Beirut, I am repeatedly having to cross and recross the old Ottoman Empire, from Lebanon to Bosnia and back, from the centre of the Islamic Arab lands to the very edge of the Muslim world in Europe, from international involvement to international despair. It is an odd journey. One week I will be walking through the street of the village of Shaqra with an Irish army commandant, noting the mortar fragments in the sides of houses, the control which the tiny UN interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) maintains over its area of operations in southern Lebanon, and then, a few days later, I will be watching the French Foreign Legion of the Ukrainian Army humiliated in the Bosnian capital, their vehicle searched or stolen by Serb gunmen, their food rations confiscated, their positions mercilessly shelled.

No one can claim that UNIFIL has fulfilled its mandate. Indeed its mandate has subtly changed over the years, an unpublished transformation to take account of its own failure. Unlike the United Nations protection force in the Balkans (UNPROFOR), UNIFIL was formed in the days of the cold war, in another era, at a time when the United States still supported UN peacekeeping as a means of avoiding overseas military commitments by its own forces which would risk a super-power confrontation.

UNPROFOR was put together when the Americans no longer feared such a war, when the UN – far from being a means to avoid American casualties – had come to be regarded as an expensive and impotent institution whose very weakness might suck American forces into a conflict in which it has no national interest. UNPROFOR then slid into a massive civil and ethnic conflict.

It is also true that UNIFIL was placed in southern Lebanon to prevent war between two parties – the Israelis and Palestinians and by extension, the Syrian military forces inside Lebanon. UNIFIL arrived in Lebanon in March 1978 as a direct result of an Israeli invasion. This in turn had been set off by a Palestinian attack on Israel which had killed more than thirty Israeli civilians, the latest in a lamentable saga of revenge and retaliation between Palestinians and Israelis in both directions across the Lebanese border. The Israeli invasion was a failure; the Palestinians withdrew into the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani River.

Nevertheless, there are parallels to be drawn and, I suspect, operational lessons to be gained from comparing UNIFIL – and specifically the Irish battalion of UNIFIL – with the misfortunes and, some would say, the disgrace of UNPROFOR. For this reason my focus will largely be

upon the early years of the force in Lebanon, upon the initial events that have led the Irish army to suffer the highest casualties of any UNIFIL unit, and upon a village which most people in the world would never find on a map, but which many of you will know intimately, a village called At-Tiri.

It seems to be the fate of UN peacekeeping forces that there is always one world wrong in their title. No one in UNPROFOR any longer agrees with the word 'protection'. Some would say that UNOSOM should never have included the 'Somalia' bit, on the grounds that Somalia no longer existed as a nation state. And there's not doubt that the problem with UNIFIL was that one world 'interim'. The very first Irish officer to enter Lebanon with French UNIFIL forces in 1978 ended up under a UN truck with me in the Lebanese Army barracks at Tyre within twenty-four hours of the UN's arrival. With bullets flying over our heads, he made the weary remark which I still remember well: 'I think we could be here for a long time, Bob'. And I remember saying: "well hold on a moment it's meant to be an *interim* force", to which, wisely, he didn't reply.

From the start, what was wrong with UNIFIL was a mandate which stated that the force would 'proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decision of the Security Council'. Now this was a very lofty assumption indeed. The insertion of UNIFIL into southern Lebanon, it was believed in New York, would embarrass the Israelis into leaving the far south of the country. No one in the initial force deployment believed for a moment that Israel would want to stay. And because of this extraordinary miscalculation, because the UN should have appreciated that the Israelis had for two years been arming and funding their own proxy militia in the south of Lebanon – Major Saad Haddad's so-called 'south-Lebanese' army (SLA) – UNIFIL headquarters, rather than being based at the oil terminal at Zahrani, was set up at Naqoura, actually inside the Israeli-occupied zone.

The Irish, who were originally to have had their battalion headquarters at Bint Jubayl, found this village now buried deep inside the Israeli zone, and thus repaired to the old crusader town of Tibnin, high enough on the Golan foothills to afford magnificent view of Irish forward position, and low enough to be in the line of sight of any Israeli or Haddad tank which chose to fire at them.

The Irish deployment contained a number of interesting, even quaint, features. In common with other UNIFIL units, the Irish envisaged the fulfilment of the mandate and thus maintained observation posts inside the Israeli-occupied zone, cut off from the area of operations. An inevitably, the occupants of these vulnerable observation posts – at Ras, Blida and Mahabeb – would become hostages if relations deteriorated between the UN and Israel or its proxy forces. Furthermore, the Irish found themselves facing a largely undisciplined force of Lebanese militiamen, paid and commanded by Israel but ostensibly under the orders of a cashiered Lebanese army major whose psychotic personality could veer sharply between cloying goodwill and ferocious anger. If Irishbatt were to fall foul of the majors' temper, they would have to appeal to Israel which could – if it chose – bring Haddad to heel. Israeli promises to 'exercise their influence' on Haddad became one of the more fascinating psychological experiments in southern Lebanon at that time. If Haddad stopped harassing Irish troops, the

Israelis could be thanked for exercising their now famous influence. If Haddad continued to oppose UN forces, then the Israelis could say that they had failed to restrain the man whose men were armed, fed and uniformed by Israel itself.

From the start, therefore, the Irish found themselves, in microcosm, in a situation uncannily similar to that in which UNPROFOR – on a far greater scale – was to sink fourteen years later. It is not difficult to see the dangers posed to Irishbatt's early hostage outposts as a forerunner to the humiliating and numerically far greater UN hostage-taking in Bosnia. It is even easier to draw a parallel between Haddad and the equally ruthless and unstable Radovan Karadjic whose promises of safe passage for UN personnel and convoys were regularly broken. Haddad thought he was 'commander of Free Lebanon'. Karadjic claimed he was living in a 'Serb Republic'. And just as UNIFIL had to appeal for Israel's help in restraining Haddad, UNPROFOR now had to seek the help of Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic to exercise 'restraint' over Karadjic.

The parallels are not exact, but for the UN, they are curiously apposite. In Lebanon in 1978 the Lebanese government – largely powerless in a capital under shellfire as Christian and Muslim militias fought each other – repeatedly asked UNIFIL when it was going to fulfil its mandate by ensuring that the sovereignty of the Beirut authorities was extended down to the Lebanese-Israeli frontier. In Bosnia, another government, also largely powerless, living in another divided capital, Sarajevo, asked why UNPROFOR could not protect the Bosnian Muslims from their aggressors. And just as Haddad claimed that UN soldiers from Christian Ireland should be able to understand why his Christian Orthodox and Shi'ite militiamen were fighting Muslim 'terrorists' as he put it, so the Serbs several times expressed their incomprehension as to why European UNPROFOR troops could not identify with the Greek Orthodox Serbs against what they described as Muslim 'fundamentalists'.

But let us return to south Lebanon in 1978. If UN headquarters in New York failed to comprehend the realities on the ground, UNIFIL commanders did at least understand the terrain. The Norwegians were deliberately located in a mountainous region that look not unlike their native Norway. The Fijians were put on a coastline similar to the Pacific shores of their own island. And the Irish were given a series of largely poor villages amid a series of brown stony hills that appear at dusk remarkably similar to the hills of Mayo or Galway. Irish troops could therefore, geographically at least, identify with the land in which they would live, patrol, risk their lives and – far too often in the years to come – die.

Their initial mission was simpler than it was to become in later years. There were only two parties involved: the Israelis and the SLA on one side, the Palestinians on the other. The UN's desire for neutral acronyms sometimes stunned visitors who found it hard to think of Haddad's gunmen as a 'de facto force' or Palestinian guerrillas as such harmless phenomena as 'armed elements'. But Haddad's men were ill-equipped in those early years; they and the Israelis had yet to build the huge compounds which they would later construct along the ridgeline to the south of Irishbatt's area of operations. Haddad's men operated what were called 'controls' but Irish troops which followed the initial 43 Infantry Battalion operated foot patrols in the wadis between At-Tiri and Rashaf, set up night-listening posts in Wadi Seluqi and served under instructions that permitted them to return fire if they received what were called 'firings close',

rules of engagement that were abandoned in 1985. As many of you will know, returning fire is now the prerogative of a UNIFIL soldier only if there is a threat to his or a comrade's life.

If the rules of the participants were simpler in those first two years, however, this did not make Irishbatt's life any less dangerous. Throughout the remainder of 1978 and into 1979, there was growing resentment between Haddad's militia and the Irish, possibly because the Irish battalion was perceived to be firmer in its response to harassment, and perhaps because Irishbatt's area of operations was spread across one of the main invasion routes into Lebanon, a route which was indeed used by the Israelis in 1982. Irishbatt's initial control of half of Bayt Yahum – due south of Tibnin, straddling the Bint Jubayl road to the north – was clearly resented by Haddad who, presumably with Israel's encouragement, proceeded to attempt a gentle push forward from its roadblock parallel to the village, eventually leapfrogging the Irish UN checkpoint there.

UNIFIL headquarters staff feared that the Israelis, discontented with the UN presence which they had accepted in 1978 wished to provoke instability in southern Lebanon and suspected that the Israeli army's northern command were contemplating a reoccupation of southern Lebanon, something which a determined UN force might be able to frustrate. That the Israelis were behind the harassment of UNIFIL – especially Irish – troops was confirmed for a large number of UNIFIL staff by the presence of Israeli military intelligence officers who were liaising with Haddad's men in the occupied zone. These Israelis included Lieutenant Colonel Yoram Hamishrashi, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Gal and Major Haim, one of the more sinister Shin Bet operatives operating out of Marjayoun. Haim was later to specialise in the extortion of money from villagers after the 1982 invasion in order to pay for Haddad's much enlarged militia. Another, darker figure in the occupied zone was an Israeli officer who used the code name 'Abu Shawki', a Shin Bet agent who was active in Bint Jubayl in 1980 and who, seven years later, would help to run the brutal interrogation centre at Tyre.

It was in this context and at this period of heightened tension between Irishbatt and the Israelis in February 1980 that Brian Lenihan, who was then foreign minister of the Irish Republic, chose to acknowledge on a visit to Bahrain 'the role of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in representing the Palestinian people'. The Palestinians, he went on, had the right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state in Palestine. Whether or not Lenihan reflected upon the effect this statement might have on the Irish battalion's principal antagonists in southern Lebanon – a statement which today seems as self-evident as it is now innocuous – it accompanied a campaign by the Israelis to portray Irish UN troops as drunk and disorderly. A now notorious incident in which some of Haddad's men held out a bottle of whiskey to an Irish Platoon as a 'peace-offering' after a confrontation near Bayt Yahum was – with the help of a photograph taken of the staged event on the instructions of an Israeli intelligence officer – turned into a propaganda campaign against the Irish. The Irish battalion were referred to in the Israeli media, with as much disregard for geographical as for factual accuracy as the 'Johnny Walker Irish'.

Several weeks followed in which Haddad's men increased the harassment of Irish troops, often using children to throw stones at UNIFIL personnel in the hope of provoking the Irish to fire into crowds of civilians. Preposterous as it may seem, Irish troops sometimes found

themselves obliged by the rules of minimum force to respond to these provocations by throwing stones themselves, a picture which – once it was captured by photographers – did nothing to discourage the Israeli claim that the Irish were undisciplined.

The events that led to the battle for At-Tiri and the details of what must be regarded as a week-long military action between Haddad's militia and the Irish 46 Infantry Battalion in April 1980 have been recorded at length, along with the cruel events which followed them. Nevertheless, the significance of this battle and the strange not to say disgraceful effect which it was to have on UNIFIL headquarters staff, has not, to my knowledge, been placed on the public record before. I think it is time that it was.

The attempt by Haddad's SLA militia to take over At-Tiri was to last until April. It began and ended in some of the worst violence UNIFIL was to endure in its seventeen years in Lebanon. When the SLA initially broke into At-Tiri, the Irish fought back with their fists and refrained from returning fire when the pro-Israeli militia used mortars, tank and small arms fire against them. As one of the Irish soldiers present was to recall later;

"They tried to storm right into our post, and it was like riot control, pushing and shoving, with people pulling the pins on grenades and putting bayonets on weapons. At one point, a gun was put to the head of one of the de facto forces men, and he was told a bullet would be fired into his head if he didn't order the men and kids back".

Sustained sniping caused Ireland's first casualty of the month when Private Stephen Griffin was hit in the head. He was subsequently evacuated from At-Tiri under fire and with great courage by two Irish officers, the desperately wounded Griffin lying on a stretcher made of rifles and belt-webbing. Griffin was to die from his wounds in an Israeli hospital on 16 April. It was at the end of the week of fighting, on 12 April, that the Irish battalion effectively retook At-Tiri, moving through the streets in what amounted to a company attack and killing at least two of Haddad's men. In this battle, a Fijian soldier was also killed by Haddad's militia. At-Tiri thus returned to the full control of the Irish battalion although the cost of this action was not to become evident for another six days.

The first and most sinister result of the retaking of At-Tiri was a warning to the UNIFIL force commander, Major General Emmanuel Erskine, from Major Haddad, who announced: 'because of firing by UNIFIL troops at At-Tiri, I will not be responsible for the safety of UNIFIL soldiers or for acts of reprisal that might be carried out against the force'.

However, of much more immediate concern, according to my own information, was a decision then taken by General Erskine. For, to their surprise and disgust, Ireland's 46 Infantry Battalion learned that the UNIFIL force commander had decided to hold a court of inquiry into the events at At-Tiri, a court which would in effect hold the Irish to account for the violence which cost the lives of at least two of Haddad's men. Here, we may indeed identify at UNIFIL headquarters the genuine spirit of ignominy with UNPROFOR was to inflict upon itself in its dealing with the Serbs of Bosnia twelve years later. Although Irish troops in the forward observation posts were effective hostages of Haddad and although one Irish soldier

had already suffered fatal wounds, the Irish UN contingent had stood up to Haddad in its first real test of force; if it had not done so, At-Tiri would not exist today. Yet here was UNIFIL headquarters about to punish 46 Infantry Battalion for its success.

Worse was to come. The court of inquiry was called by Erskine and would be presided over a Canadian Officer from the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan (UNDOF). But it was then learned in Tibnin that on the board of that court would be none other than the psychopathic Major Saad Haddad. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Kissane, commanding officer of 46 Battalion, took the only honourable step available to him by stating that no member of the Irish battalion would take part in the inquiry.

Thus far did UNIFIL go to appease its tormentors. At-Tiri was now relatively quiet, though visited by a two-man UN truce supervision organisation (UNTSO) team – Team Xray – comprising a French officer and an American, Major Harry Klein. The Irish were now faced with the task of resupplying their isolated ‘hostage’ observation posts behind Haddad’s lines, fully aware of the fact that Haddad had already formally warned Erskine that there might be ‘reprisals’ for the killing of his militia men at At-Tiri, a threat that presumably prompted Erskine’s shameful proposal for a court of enquiry.

On 18 April three Irish soldiers, Privates Thomas Barrett, Derek Smallhorne and John O’Mahoney, set off for Observation Post Ras in the company of the two man UNTSO Team Xray led by Klein and Steve Hindy, a reporter from the American Associated Press News Agency. The group, all unarmed, were supposed to have been met at Bayt Yahum by one of Haddad’s minions Abu Iskandar. Klein said that Abu Iskandar wasn’t there: Abu Iskandar said later that he was. In any event, Klein decided to continue the mission without the Haddad escort, a decision which in the circumstances, was extremely rash. Shortly afterwards, the six were ambushed by gunmen and taken to Bint Jubayl where the three Irish soldiers were beaten up. O’Mahoney shot in the back, thigh and foot, managed to escape. Klein was pushed around but not badly hurt and later watched as Smallhorne and Barrett, white-faced with fear, were bundled into a car and driven away.

Within about an hour, the two Irish soldiers were stood against a wall and machine gunned to death. Mohamed Barzi from the village of Blida was believed to have done most of the shooting, although UNIFIL later heard that ‘Abu Shawki’, the Israeli Shin Bet agent in Bint Jubayl, attended the execution. Five years later I met ‘Abu Shawki’ when he questioned me in the early hours of the morning in a Tyre hotel. When I asked the Israeli if he was with Barrett and Smallhorne – without further identifying the two soldiers or mentioning their murder – he replied to me: ‘you are dirt’. Klein later told me that he kept asking himself if Smallhorne and Barrett would be alive had he, Klein, done more to prevent their abduction in the car. ‘If I had grabbed a gun, would they dared to have shot an American?’ Klein asked. But, as one of my colleagues told me, he chose not to do so.

In the Irish area of operations that night, there were murderous thoughts although none were publicly expressed. Indeed, the only open evidence of anger came in response to an unnecessary and demeaning message from Erskine asking the Irish battalion not to retaliate. My notes record that Lieutenant Colonel Kissane made the following statement: ‘we are a

disciplined and professional army, and we will behave like one'. Nevertheless, in the days that followed the murders of Smallhorne and Barrett, Irish soldiers could be seen wearing their blue UN berets but with their black regular army berets clearly visible hanging from their pockets. The meaning was clear, harassed once more and the Irish might exchange their UN badges for the berets of their national army and fight as Irish rather than UN troops in a foreign land.

UNIFIL officially deplored the murders of Smallhorne and Barrett, and UN troop-contributing nations subsequently held a summit in Dublin which warned, on 2 May, that without adequate international protection, UNIFIL might be withdrawn. In the following weeks, Irish troops were forbidden from entering the Israeli occupation zone. They could only enter and leave force headquarters at Naqoura by helicopter. One Irish officer who found himself in Jerusalem had to return to Tibnin by road through Damascus and Beirut. The Irish had to wait many more months, however before they were to learn of UNIFIL's longterm response to the deaths of Barrett and Smallhorne. For when the UN official history of the events of April 1980 was published, the events of At-Tiri were heavily censored, and all mention of the murders of Smallhorne and Barrett was expunged from the record.

The relevant volumes, written by Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Ou-Prempeh of the Ghanaian Army, Major S.R.S. Wirkkula of Finland and Sergeant C.J.E.D. Delawrence of Ghana, delete all mention of the Irish retaking of At-Tiri of 12 April 1980. They make no reference to the death of at least two of Haddad's men in that action, thus removing the reasons for the killing of Barrett and Smallhorne. Even more disreputable however, was the decision of the UN authors to censor out the very murders of the two Irish soldiers. Indeed the UNIFIL volume records the destruction of four UNIFIL Italian helicopters at Naqoura, and actually states that 'the most serious consequence of shelling and snipping (sic) on Saturday 12 April was the loss of medevac capacity'. On another page of their report, the UNIFIL officers record the assault on the Naqoura headquarters, in which the helicopters were burned, as 'the most inhuman attack on a UNIFIL unit since the establishment of the force'. If this resume is to be believed, then the loss of four helicopters mattered more to the UN than the murder of two Irish soldiers, whose names and terrible end have simply disappeared from the text. Indeed, it may be noteworthy that the annex which lists the deaths of UNIFIL troops – and from which Smallhorne and Barrett could scarcely be censored out yet again – initially records the cause of their deaths as 'murder'. In later volumes, however, this has been changed 'killed in action'.

It was UNIFIL's sense of reality that was killed off in this extraordinary history, a symbol of the dichotomy which has plagued and diminished UNPROFOR and which remains unresolved in so many UN operations to this day; the competing demands of troops on the ground whose lives are in danger, and the political element in the UN's command which is almost always going to regard military action, whatever its causes or purpose, as an intrinsic failure of peacekeeping. Thus, when the UN Secretary General addressed the Security Council on 17 June 1980, he emphasised UNIFIL's 'restraint' rather than its determination, its need for protection rather than its need for defensive action. Kurt Waldheim – who, of course, knew a little about guerrilla warfare himself, though we didn't know it at the time – believed that UNIFIL provided 'a vital mechanism for conflict control' and referred to the UNIFIL troops who had been killed as having 'given their lives in the cause of peace'.

By then, of course, Major Haddad had turned up at Bayt Yahum with his second-in-command and two Israeli officers – apparently on the orders of Yitzhak Shamir, the then Israeli Foreign Minister – to meet the Irishmen whom he had so often derided. One of the Irish soldiers present at this extraordinary gathering recorded for me what Haddad said. ‘I have been instructed by Mr Shamir’, Haddad began, ‘to make peace with the Irish. We are Christian, you are Christian – why can’t we be friends?’

At-Tiri, it turned out, had proved a vital point, even if UNIFIL headquarters didn’t want to acknowledge the lesson. An attempt to discredit the Irish battalion had taught the UN’s antagonists to respect it. Force could be answered with force if this was necessary, and even the subsequent murders of Smallhorne and Barrett provided sufficient international anger and embarrassment for the Israelis to exercise their quaint ‘influence’ upon Haddad’s militia. It was an event which the Irish were able to build upon in the coming years, the knowledge that potential militia opponents could face gunfire rather than compromise if they pushed too far. With this example in mind, UNIFIL itself could show resolve, even at great risk to its personnel. UNIFIL soldiers would not allow their armoured vehicles to be examined, either by Haddad militiamen, Israelis or Palestinian guerrillas. When UNIFIL was told by the Israelis that Haddad need to give permission for UN helicopter medical-evacuation flights across southern Lebanon, the Israelis were informed that UNIFIL was taking its wounded out of the area of operations where and when it chose, and that Israel would be held to account for any attack by Haddad’s forces on a UNIFIL helicopter.

In retrospect, this provides a startling contrast with the later UN operations in the Balkans. From the start of its mission in Bosnia, UNPROFOR gave the Serbs permission to search its helicopters, to stop and search its armoured vehicles, even to take personnel from the vehicles. Once you have made those compromises, they cannot be unmade. And I suppose that the lesson is a simple one: when a UN mission goes wrong at the start, it’s doomed to go wrong for the rest of the mission. Too late did UNPROFOR show its teeth; by 1994, after two years of procrastination and pretence that Sarajevo was ‘strategically disadvantaged’ rather than surrounded, air strikes were a disaster. Faced with the taking of their own soldiers as hostages, UNPROFOR backed down again. For UNIFIL, the battle of At-Tiri, though puny compared to the titanic war in Bosnia, came early enough to have a seminal effect on the mission in southern Lebanon.

In Israel, the campaign against the Irish continued for several months after the At-Tiri conflict. Israeli newspapers suggested that Irish troops were anti-semitic, recalling the 1905 Limerick Pogrom against its Jewish citizens, the brief popularity of O’Duffy’s Blueshirts in the 1930’s and deValera’s 1945 visit of condolence on the death of Hitler to the German Minister in Dublin. The Irish, it was frequently said, allowed PLO infiltrators through their checkpoints: they were accused of being pro-Palestinian, a remark which contained the hidden code that the Irish supported what the Israelis called ‘terrorism’.

In fact, an examination of the non-accidental casualties in Ireland’s thirty five Infantry battalions over the seventeen years of their service in UNIFIL suggest that the Irish have suffered in equal proportions from all parties to the conflict in southern Lebanon. Although the UN does not provide such statistics – nor I think does the Irish army – my own figures

show clearly that of the fourteen Irish soldiers killed in action or murdered in cold blood, seven were killed north of the SLA-UNIFIL ridge-line and seven to the south. Six Irish soldiers were killed by Haddad's militiamen, one by the Israelis – this was Corporal Dermot McLoughlin, killed by Israeli Merkava tank round on 10 January 1987 – five by the Hizballah and two by Palestinians. Of the five who died at the hands of the Hizballah, four were killed by landmines, the fifth Corporal Peter Ward, by a Hizballah militiaman at Al-Jurn on 29 September 1992. These details would suggest that Ireland suffered half its combat/murder casualties at the hand of Israel and its allies and half at the hands of Israel's Palestinian and Hizballah enemies – grim but persuasive proof, I think, that the Irish battalions did not take sides in the south Lebanon war.

If the murders of Privates Smallhorne and Barrett have still not been fully explained, the killing of Private Hugh Doherty and the presumed death of Private Kevin Joyce at their checkpoint at Sultaniyah on 27 April 1981 remain even more of a mystery. There is no doubt that they fell victim to Palestinians from one of Yassir Arafat's PLO factions, although the motives for their deaths – which, barring evidence to the contrary, might be called murder – is much less clear than those for the killings of Smallhorne and Barrett. Initial reports suggested that PLO men had attacked the two men in order to steal their rifles. Private Docherty was shot in the back as he tried to reach his radio. Joyce disappeared. Over the coming months, those of us living in Beirut heard conflicting stories of what happened next. The PLO were every day facing the threat of the Israeli invasion which was eventually to come on 6 June 1982. The Palestinians, we were told, had kidnapped Joyce as a possible future bargaining chip, should PLO forces be surrounded by the Israelis in southern Lebanon. He was being held in Beirut, so the rumour went. Then separate enquiries by myself and by an Irish diplomat suggested that Joyce has been taken not to Beirut but to an underground cell in the Ein el-Helwe Palestinian camp in Sidon, only to die there when the bunker in which he was imprisoned was bombed by an Israeli jet in the early days of the 1982 invasion. Arafat promised to find out what happened to Joyce, but it is my understanding that he in fact made no such attempt.

An internal Irish military enquiry produced what must be the most persuasive evidence of Joyces fate. The Palestinians may have believed, at least from a distance, that the two Irish were the officers commanding the incoming and outgoing Irish battalions who were due to meet at Sultaniyah that afternoon. Joyce had been taken from the checkpoint, it was decided, and murdered a few hundred yards away, his rifle stolen and his corpse thrown down a well. A year later, after Israel's occupation of the whole UNIFIL area of operations, Israeli troops had learned that a body had been thrown down the disused well and had disinterred human remains on the suspicion that the dead man might be an Israeli soldier. On concluding that this was not the case, the Israelis reinterred the remains and they were subsequently ploughed into a field. Bone fragments that were later found there by Irish personnel were sent for examination to Sweden but did not reveal the identity of the dead man. The PLO never acknowledge their guilt for these murders; but it seems likely that the remains of the one Irish fatality whose body never returned to Ireland may lie in the soil of southern Lebanon.

Not long before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, I asked the then force commander, General Bill Callaghan, what he would order his men to do in the event of an Israeli attack. 'Wait and see' was his reply, although Norwegian troops had already told me that their instructions

in the event of invasion were to go to their bunkers and stay there. General Callaghan said that he believed what he called ‘the force of international opinion’ would prevent the Israelis driving through UN lines. But we didn’t believe this, and nor, we suspected, did General Callaghan. He knew, just as we did, that if the Israelis chose to smash into Lebanon, the only international opinion that would count was that of the United States – and America was not going to oppose Israel.

So the Irish came to spend three years under Israeli occupation, forced to permit Israeli troops and Shin Bet operatives to pass unhindered through checkpoints whose instructions still forbade the passage of arms in the UNIFIL area of operations. Because the Hizballahs resistance activities were concentrated further north on the barren hills around Marrakeh, it fell to the French battalion, then headquartered there., to confront the worse elements of Yitzhak Shamir’s so called ‘iron fist’ policy of assault against the villages deemed sympathetic to the Shi’ite Muslim guerrillas. Just as Irish troops had fought Haddad’s men with their fists at At-Tiri, the French fought them with their fists in Marrakeh.

My only reflection on this period of 1982-5 is on the wisdom – or lack of it – which permitted Israeli Shin Bet men to be given UNIFIL permission to pass, armed, through their checkpoints. It might be said that there was no alternative. Plainclothes Israeli intelligence operatives could pass through with Israeli military patrols if they wished; indeed they sometimes did so. But making specific exception for these men was a disturbing precedent. Their activities inside the area of operations – particularly in Frenchbatt – often involved conflict with the local populations, undercover arrests and, as we quickly realised, unexplained shootings. Some of these killings were accompanied by evidence that they were not more than extra-judicial killings; what might perhaps be described as war crimes.

Should UNIFIL have given these men access to the area of operations? Should they have been given cards by UNIFIL – as they were on several occasions – that gave them this access? Amal were later given similar documents, but this scarcely approximates to the papers that cleared Israeli general security duties (GSS) men through the UN checkpoints. In this context, it is worth quoting the words of a Hizbollah member in conversation with an Irish officer only a few months ago;

“I was in Tibnin when the Israeli general security services came for me. UNIFIL made no effort to stop me being arrested. The general security services could come and take me out. They had UNIFIL cards. They took me through UNIFIL checkpoints, and the UN did not stop them. This formed my view of UNIFIL.”

If those cards had not been issued, would there be easier relations today between UNIFIL troops and the Hizballah? Since UNIFIL headquarters persist to this day in trying to build up the bankrupt political prestige of Amal at the expense of Hizballah, perhaps not. But I have not met an Irish soldier who does not believe those cards were a mistake, a dangerous slide away from UNIFIL’s neutrality. UNIFIL, I believe, should never have given the GSS such access.

With Israeli withdrawal from much of southern Lebanon, the Irish battalion found itself on a more complicated mission. Whereas it had, prior to the invasion, tried to prevent Palestinian infiltrators passing north and south through the area of operations, it was now faced with the prospect of living with Hizballah men who operated from their home villages within the Irish battalion area. The men with the guns were no longer migrants from the north but the very men whose property and families were supposed to be under the Irish battalions protection. The very mandate had to be questioned, If the Irish had, in the words of the mandate, to 'ensure that the area of operations is not utilised for hostile activities of any kind', how could this be squared with the recognition by the Lebanese government – on whose invitation UNIFIL is in southern Lebanon – of the right of every Lebanese to resist occupation?

In accepting the latter right – as UNIFIL does on the ground, if not in New York – it can do little when the Israelis bombard the UN area of operations, as they do so brutally in July 1993 killing at least 120 civilians in the whole of southern Lebanon, nineteen of them in the Irish battalion area alone. One of the worse atrocities – an Israeli helicopter attack on a Mercedes containing women and children – took place only metres from the Tibnin bridge. The Irish, like the Finnish battalion to the east attempted to put vehicles into villages under fire as a deterrent. They rescued the 'mukhtar' of Tibnin from his home. They helped save countless lives by allowing Lebanese civilians into their shelters and bunkers. But many UN officers believe today that much more could have been done to stop the slaughter within the UNIFIL area of operations. There should have been more UN vehicles on the roads. General Trond Furuhoide should have made UNIFIL far more visible and made his force far more mobile. The bombardment of July 1993 was not a happy week for UNIFIL, and the results of that week have still not been fully analysed.

Does the UN mission in Lebanon – or does the UN as a whole – need to be taken to pieces, deconstructed and rebuilt with a new system, a new set of values? I cannot help reflecting how UN units in southern Lebanon today – and this includes the Irish battalion – are now talking of new tactics and operating procedures to take account of the new realities on the ground. What is the point of maintaining checkpoints when armed men cannot be denied passage on the ground that they have the right to resist the occupying power? What is the point in maintaining a controlled area of operations if the entire area can be bombarded by Israel at will?

There is talk now of an abandonment of checkpoints and a retreat to the village by UNIFIL, maintaining high ground only for observation. At the risk of offending military minds, I would have to say that my own experience of Lebanon and Bosnia suggests this is wrong. Checkpoints are never abandoned in Lebanon, they change hands. An abandoned Irish UN checkpoint will become a Hizballah checkpoint or an Amal checkpoint, or a checkpoint fought over between Hizballah and Amal, but a checkpoint nonetheless through which UNIFIL will itself have to negotiate passage. And a retreat to the villages will carry its own message to Israel and the SLA which is now led by General Antoine Lahd. The abandoned checkpoints will allow the Israelis to claim that UNIFIL no longer controls the land between the villages, and this land will then become a free-fire zone. The villages themselves will be seen by their occupants as safe-havens', every bit as illusory and dangerous as the 'safe havens' that the UN proclaimed so deceitfully in Bosnia.

The Irish battalion can remember today both moments of contentment and moments of wretchedness. Among the latter must surely be the murder of Privates Burke and Murphy and Corporal Morrow by Private McAleavy on 27 April 1981, all three men finished off on the ground with a shot to the head. Among the former, I can only quote an Irish commandant who has served for three tours in Lebanon. 'The best times' he said, 'are when you prevent the de facto forces going into villages, when over a period of time you can sense the development of normality in southern Lebanon, see the people in the fields and the kids going back to school. That gives you a sense of achievement, that and taking the 'mingy man' for a ride'.

It would be nice to think we'll see a happy ending in Lebanon, a fulfilment of what the Americans like to call the 'peace-process', and an Israeli withdrawal from Golan and southern Lebanon, a symbolic move by UNIFIL to the International frontier before its mission is formally terminated. I would have to say, however, that I don't think the current Israeli-American peace is going to work. I don't think Arafat will survive. I don't believe the Israelis will give back East Jerusalem, and I don't see any reason to believe the Jewish settlements will not remain in occupied Arab land. I don't see President Assad of Syria settling for anything less than the whole of Syrian Golan returned to him, and I don't think most Israelis want to hand it all back. If they don't – and there's no peace with Syria – then there's going to be not peace in southern Lebanon. I do see the continued disenchantment of Muslims with a peace which has no international guarantees and which so deeply favours Israel at the expense of Arabs. And many of these Muslims are giving expression to their anger in southern Lebanon, indeed inside the Irish battalions area of operations.

In the event, I think any peace will have to be recommenced on the basis of UN security council resolution 242, 338 and 425. But that is going to take a long time. So I'll make a sad bet with you today, that in ten years' time UNIFIL will still be in southern Lebanon and 95 Irish UN Infantry Battalion will be in Tibnin.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article in *The Irish Sword* in 1996 and is re-published here by kind permission of the author who has been a good friend to Irish soldiers serving in the Middle East for many years. His prediction was almost completely correct. UNIFIL remains deployed in Lebanon in 2008 and looks likely to continue its operations for a very long time to come. And in 2006 Irish soldiers returned to Lebanon with the 34 Infantry Group to occupy a new headquarters on a hill overlooking Ebel es Saqqi near Marjouné.

Healer of the Nation

Kevin Myers

Nations are not natural, spontaneously-generated things: they are the bondings of groups of people around common loyalties and shared affections which, one way or another, have to be created. This act of creation requires a mental effort, whether deliberate or otherwise. The Ireland which joined the UN in 1955 was remarkably short of both common loyalties and shared affections, as bitter memories of the Civil War endured amid the chronic poverty and ruins of what was effectively a failed state. It is my belief that the service in the UN, especially the Congo, had a central role in creating a revitalised and modern sense of pride in being Irish. In that sense, the Army really did help build the Irish nation that we know today. Less positively, UN service – and the generally warm feelings it has evoked – has diminished the popular understanding of what the Defence Forces are in existence for: though of course, the only definition one needs is in the name.

The Army first had some limited experience of foreign service in Beirut. It was a useful lesson, for it was here that the 50 Army officers on Lebanese duty began to discover for the first time that though their equipment was obsolete, and their island was provincial and backward, as soldiers they were at least the equal of their fellows from other countries. The author is not knowledgeable enough to identify every factor which was responsible for the quality of this military culture, but it would be hard not to give some credit to Richard Mulcahy, in the Army's early days, and more latterly, to the awesome Mickey Joe Costello, whose martial rigour and intellectual energy reverberated within the Army for decades after he departed in 1945.

It is almost impossible for us to understand today, as one of the richest countries in the world, what the Congo experience meant to little Ireland then. By 1959, insane economic policies had reduced us from being in the top twenty richest countries of the world in 1911 to around the 70th. Newspapers of the time carried weekly reports on chartered emigration-ships leaving Dublin, Cork and Galway, bearing thousands of passengers away for ever. Not merely was the country in a state of economic ruination – culturally, it had reversed into a cul-de-sac of philistinism and ignorance. By 1956, the Minister for Justice was able to boast to the Dail that the state had banned more than 6,500 books; by 1959, the figure was over 8,000.

This isolationism profited Irish culture not a whit. Irish music was just about dead: incredibly, until 1958, it was impossible to buy any recordings of Irish music at all. That year Gael Linn issued its first six records – and in recognition of the technology of Irish homes, they were all 78 rpm singles, for playing on wind-up gramophones. Guinness still delivered its stout by horse-drawn dray to Dublin pubs. In Kerry that year, the second Rose of Tralee opened – “bigger than ever” declared the newspapers – with all of nine contestants. One of the highlights of the festival was a children's-tricycle competition. Another was a tug-of-war; a third was a round-the-houses cycle race. Ireland really was the model for Craggy Island.

In this unique experiment in 20th century self-inflicted, democratically-approved poverty, there was cross-party support for a reduction of the already tiny Defence Forces budget. Mr Manly (Fine Gael) said it should be cut from £6 million to £5 million. Mr Casey (Labour) went one better, saying that any money spent on “defence” was simply unwarranted in Ireland.

And then the Congo crisis erupted, across the world’s media, with centre-stage in the coverage, almost from the outset, the soldiers of his bizarre and backward little island in the Atlantic. Clearly, the first mission in Lebanon had impressed UN officials, and Dag Hammerskjold, the UN Secretary of General, was emphatic that he wanted as much of the Irish Army as possible under UN Command.

Even today, we would be proud at such a distinction; but the Ireland of 1960 was simply electrified. Nothing like it had occurred in the nearly forty years of independence; and by sublime coincidence, the newly elected Chairman of the UN was the Irish representative, Freddie Boland. It was too good to be true: and as things turned out, indeed it was.

Modern soldiers will recognise some of the political responses of the time as being typical of how politicians do not understand the UN. The sky-blue helmet is UN headgear, and he (or she, today) who wears it, serves the UN, not their country of origin. This was clearly not grasped by Noel Browne TD, who asked in the Dail that in order to preserve our neutrality, the aircraft taking Army contingents to the Congo should not be American, and that preferably our own aircraft should be used. But of course, the Air Corps did not have any such aircraft (and, scandalously, still does not); and nor did Irish International, (as Aer Lingus was known then) – the first of its three Boeing 720s was right then being flight-tested in Texas. Mr Sherwin (Independent) declared that the Irish contingent should be known as the Casement Brigade, in honour of Sir Roger Casement’s great work in the Congo, as if it was serving as an Irish force. (It must be said that this failure to grasp the concept of the extinction of national identity upon donning the blue beret lives on: a far more recent Minister for Defence refused to fly in a UN aircraft because of its RAF origin and aircrew).

Most readers will be vaguely aware of the almost comical material discrepancies between the Irish in the Congo and their counterparts from other countries. Simply, we did not live in the same world as they did. Our soldiers did not even have proper UN berets; instead they wore blue US helmet-liners as substitutes. Pictures of the time of soldiers leaving from Baldonnell look as if they come from 1914: the same gaunt, toothily cheerful faces, the same smiling sweethearts, the same flat caps, and unbelievably, almost the same Lee Enfield rifles.

And when the soldiers got to the Congo, by USAF C-133 Globemaster or the first of the C-130 Hercules, they remained in a different world. They did not have sheets to sleep under in the tropical heat, only heavy serge blankets. They wore the famous bulls-wool uniforms, which would sooner or later have killed them. They exchanged those in due course for a mad selection of Burma-style left-over battle-dress from the Second World War, some made in Canada, some in Britain, and all of it ludicrously ill-fitting. The Canadians, meanwhile, had shorts and light shirts, and the Swedes – of course - arrived with a full range of tropical gear made at home. Despairing at anything useful being sent from Ireland, the Irish battalion ordered some shorts from a local factory in Brazzaville.

The Irish food matched the Irish uniforms. The 33rd battalion survived for weeks on “tinned sandwiches”, whatever that might mean, bully-beef and hard biscuits. And needless to say, pay matched food and clothing in awfulness. The Irish were probably the worst paid of any contingent in the Congo. They earned 4 shillings (about 20 cents) a day from home and 6/- (30 cents) a day from the UN, which was worse than that being paid to the Ghanaians, Ethiopians, Tunisians and Moroccans. As if that wasn’t enough, before Congo duty had begun, married NCOs who usually lived at home rather than in barracks, had been paid 3/9 (18 cents) a day for not eating at Army expense. But this allowance was forfeit in the Congo: so, with 4/- overseas allowance, these men netted just an extra three pence a day for their UN duties: about a cent.

Red tape and bureaucracy ruled in every regard. Families at home were desperate to know how their men were enduring life in the Congo, but mail was unaccountably held up. Phone-contact was impossible. Journalists accompanying the Army were able to make communications with a radio ham (an amateur enthusiast) by short-wave in Dublin. And though words were exchanged with the Army Chief of Staff who made his way to the ham’s home in Booterstown, Department of Posts and Telegraph regulations prevented the journalists from filing copy via the radio: and this was a regulation which the newspapers dutifully, if cravenly, obeyed.

Yet the UN appetite for more Irish soldiers told another story: their equipment might be medieval, but these men were good. They had the traditional 3-D Irish martial qualities: discipline, duty, and dogged good humour, in evidence from Fontenoy through to the Crimea and Ypres. At home, the Irish audience – starved of good news - seemed to revel in the very Irish triumph over a very Irish adversity. But a clue as to what lay ahead came with the death of one of the most outstanding soldiers of his generation, Colonel Justin McCarthy, in a traffic accident. A star of the earlier deployment in Beirut, he had been appointed chief of staff to the UN Commander, the Swede Van Horn in the Congo. About to take over as force-commander from Van Horn, exhausted by overwork, and incredibly, without a driver, he lost control of his car and was killed.

Suddenly, the silver lining that was the Congo was developing a dark cloud; and it grew darker still with the Niamba ambush. I do not propose to discuss that here, not least because the broader details are known to most readers. But I would hazard the almost unpalatable opinion that seldom have the deaths of any Irish soldiers had such extraordinarily beneficial effects on their country. Because after that disaster, Ireland knew that there was a price to be paid for being a grown-up country; there was a price to be paid for soldiering; and the price was not just in the blood of brave young men, but also in political steadfastness in adversity.

Curiously enough – and I do not believe this has been remarked on before – what we may call the unionist community (which still existed, though without ever explicitly and openly using that term about themselves) responded very rapidly and warmly to the creation of a fund by the Irish Times (at that time, still a largely Protestant newspaper) to support the families of the men killed in the Niamba ambush. They, of course, still remembered the Great War in a way nationalist Ireland did not. Foreign sacrifice lay in their blood. The Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin was one of the first to contribute, with £10: a lot of money at that time. Lady Brooke gave £10. The High School Old Boys also gave £10, as did the Earl of Mountcharles. Many other titled grandees did likewise.

At a more modest social level, the Royal Irish Regimental Association donated 15 guineas - £15.75, or about 20 euros: four times the average weekly wage - to the Niamba fund. Contributors called O'Brien and O'Toole gave five guineas: and since the two most active members of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers Association at the time were Denis O'Toole and George O'Brien, I suspect that donation was really from the Association. A few days later, the address by the Reverend Gough Cooper, at the Remembrance Sunday service in St Patrick's Cathedral, perhaps for the first time in its history, focussed as much on the dead of the Irish Army as it did on the Irish dead of the two world wars, and with no less pride. And there was something appropriate about this: the band of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, in kilts and drums, had serenaded the first Congo-bound Irish troops when the latter stopped off at Tripoli in Libya, some months before.

That winter of 1960-61, the entire country – without social or religious exception - rallied around the Army, perhaps as never before in the history of the state: if there was any doubt about the Irish nation as a single nation, it had perished at Niamba. Moreover, the Army began to learn fast. The next contingent of troops were hastily equipped with Carl Gustav sub-machine guns, while the first orders were made to FN for the FAL rifle, and henceforth, the farewells at Baldonnell were grimmer than before. Troops in the Congo not merely asked for Linguaphone records in French and Irish (which had proved to be a very secure means of radio communication) but – quite as importantly - they also learnt Swahili, most especially the words (preferably yelled) meaning: “I am not a Belgian”.

And when Colonel Harry Byrne told the press out there that the Irish were “the best damned solders in the Congo,” no-one in Ireland doubted him. All the divisions within Irish society – and there were many, between Civil War adversaries, between Protestants and Catholics in what was then a profoundly sectarian society, and between the classes, simply vanished. Service with the UN in the Congo – a self-evidently virtuous duty, one in which the Irish were providing the second largest contingent – became a bond that was further intensified when General Sean Mac Eoin was appointed the senior UN general in theatre.

The storming of the stoutly-held Tunnel by a contingent of Irish soldiers under “Bull” Callaghan, and directly after a truly horrifying flight from Ireland, instantly entered the annals of Iris and UN military folklore, where it has remained as an example of what Irish soldiers, well-trained and well-led, in almost impossible circumstances, can do. Moreover, the Congo showed the stark reality of what badly-led soldiers are capable of. An Indian battalion of UN troops under fire from Congolese gendarmes ushered 43 prisoners into a room in front of the house that they were holding, and then left through the back. None of the prisoners survived the subsequent attack by their friends.

The Irish relationship with the UN was consummated with the murder of the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, by a bomb in his plane. Killed with him was his personal bodyguard, Garda Sergeant Francis Eivers, of Ballybay, Athlone, who had, just a couple of weeks before, married Marie Bills of Dublin. He had postponed his marriage by several months to attend to his UN duties.

I have given the Army's experience in the Congo as much space as this because it is a vital episode in the evolution of its relationship with Irish society. A lesser Taoiseach than Sean Lemass – and, by God, Ireland has had a couple – might have shirked the unpromising opportunities and the awesome risks involved. His decision to deploy was vital and liberating, both for the Army and the Irish nation, and I don't believe you can understand how the Irish people view themselves in the world today without the Congo, and the sacrifices it called for.

However, there has also been a negative aspect to all this. It has entered the political culture of Ireland that service with the UN is the primary duty of the Defence Forces, and that all UN service is good. Neither is true. The Army is the sworn defender of this Republic. That is its primary duty: to defend it against internal terrorist subversion, and from external threat: and though it has shown itself more than willing when asked (but not asked often enough, in my view) to tackle subversion, it has never been sufficiently equipped to deal with any kind of foreign threat. This fundamental weakness is only possible within a political culture which forgets the primary duties of the Defence Forces: and the distraction of UN service has compounded that problem.

For when the PDF was serving with the UN, other participant countries would give us the lift which we denied ourselves. Thus even today, as one of the richest countries in the world, our Defence Forces have no transport planes or heavy-duty helicopters. The shocking truth is that the debilitating dependency on the UN as a means of defining ourselves militarily has blinded us to the harsher realities of life. Before the arrival of the present mini-fleet of helicopters (still far too few), how could we possibly have rapidly transported a large number of Rangers to deal – say - with an airliner hi-jacking in Shannon? By calling in the RAF, perhaps, as we had to call it in so often to help in air-sea rescues, and upon which we were totally dependent after the Air India terrorist bombing in 1985? (An occasion, I might add, on which members of the Naval Service showed outstanding physical courage in recovering bodies from shark-infested waters, a devotion to duty which the Indian government greatly appreciated, even if we in Ireland - as a whole - did not).

The UN has also allowed us easy routes, in which inertia became the “logical” option, both for soldiers on effortless overseas pay, and for a political establishment which refuses to face up the requirements of a real state to defend its land, its waters and its airspace. Thus the Lebanon fixation was allowed to develop. I do not make light of the courage and sacrifices of the soldiers who served there during the early days of the mandate: in every sense, they were real, and lasting, and I am sure that some men remain traumatised and crippled because of their terrible experiences there. But in time, Lebanon – which I had the misfortune to visit during some of those earlier travails – later became a relatively cushy number for an entire generation of soldiers, who would return to the same village, year after year, where they knew everybody, and everybody knew them. This was not real soldiering, but holidaying in a familiar resort, but with a rifle. Worse still, some soldiers became thoroughly politicised by their chummy Lebanese experiences.

All in all, I believe that the length of the Lebanon mandate did some serious harm to the Army. But the harm was not permanent, and meanwhile other missions were causing our better soldiers to refine their many other skills. Bosnia – another country which I reluctantly

had cause to visit on a number of occasions, and to leave with no reluctance whatsoever – was where our soldiers, with their intelligence, their resolution and their dauntless courage, proved they were the match for the officers of any army anywhere. East Timor provided another theatre with different challenges and different skills. A browse through the Army's website will reveal a deeply gratifying list of UN missions, where the men – and later, women – of the Defence Forces have measurably improved many people's lives, and saved uncountable others.

Thus the international identity of modern Ireland, for good or ill, was forged upon the anvil of the Army's UN service. The good is clear. We have a cadre of officers and NCOs who are the match of the best anywhere. But on the other hand, our political classes, in particular, have come to see the UN as the primary instigator of the deployment of our soldiers. Which might make us feel very good and pious: but a dependence upon the UN to authorise the use of lawful violence is not the true definition of national sovereignty. For as the UN has given the Defence Forces an opportunity to soldier in ways that would be impossible in the Glen of Imaal, so has it, in the same breath, given our political classes the excuse not to ask the big questions about why we actually have the Defence Forces, and why they are so named.

Because if those political classes were to present themselves with such difficult questions, they would then have to answer them, if rather uncomfortably, thus: that to defend ourselves unassisted, against even a modest enemy, at home or abroad, we would have to possess long-range transport and serious helicopter capacity, plus artillery, armour, anti-aircraft ability and various unpleasant devices intended to end human life. And that last bit is really what armies are all about, though our relationship with the UN, alas, has allowed Irish politicians – and the very large bien-pensant constituency which exists in Irish life – to believe that the Army is basically composed of armed social workers.

It is not. It is composed of soldiers, real soldiers, and most of all, and best of all, Irish soldiers, the finest people this country has produced down the generations since independence, and probably the only group which both understands and embodies the true meaning of the word "patriotism". Which is perhaps the reason why, in all their inner certainties, they never discuss that word, and also why politicians always look uneasy standing alongside them. And so they should.

'Bullets, Bacteria and Boredom' A Peacekeeping Memory of Lebanon - November 1978 – November 2001

Dr. John Moriarty

Morning's warmth was beginning to banish the winter chill. It was November 13th 2001 and I stood at the highest point in Camp Shamrock, just outside the hospital. To the west, the port city of Tyre was visible in the crisp sunlight; to the east, snow-capped Mount Herman, Northern Israel and the Occupied Territories. The Lebanese Mountains rose to the North. At 7.30 sharp, the bugle salute wafted upwards on the breeze, fluttering the tricolour as it descended the mast to be replaced by the Ghanaian national colours. Honours were rendered. The pipe band played. The final Irish battalion began to march out of Camp Shamrock and onto the waiting buses – destination Beirut International Airport and into the twilight of an odyssey that had begun 23 years previously...

As I passed through Tibnin on that last journey, I looked to my right and saw the ruins of the old Camp Shamrock, with its medical compound beside Jack's Store. All around were many landmarks that had changed little over the years – the "UN Tailor for Soldiers" sign, Caltex and Tibnin hospital right at the end of the town. There, the local people waved goodbye. A mixture of sadness and incredulity could be seen in some faces. My thoughts wandered as I recalled other trips over the 23 years. We passed through the t-junction at Tibnin Bridge, that bridge of sighs and sadness for the Irish. Right for Al Jurn and left for Bir as Sanasil. Asultanigah. Kafr Dunin. Shaebia. And finally the coast road and the Tyre/Beirut auto route.

We crossed the Litani River to Sidon and eventually arrived at the airport. There, an honour party of the Lebanese Army bade us farewell on the tarmac. We boarded the waiting Airbus with a crown on its tailfin. The sun glowed a golden orange in the western sky and electric lights began to twinkle their way up the city's heights. Our plane left the runway and banked right over the Cornice. There was joy in the air, joy tinged with sadness. We were finally going home – destination Dublin. I started to slumber and my mind entered dream mode. My sleep was disturbed by a mantra – bullets, bacteria, boredom, bullets, bacteria, boredom...these are dangers encountered by every soldier on a mission away from home. But they are of particular concern to medical officers. These are what we have to be ever ready to do battle against. They were my fears, even as I slept. However, on that day, as I finally left the Lebanon, my sense of fear abated and was eventually replaced by calm. And then it was another November day, in another decade, another century and another place...

November 12th 1978 in Gormanstown Camp and the day was damp and dreary. One of our group, a fellow Kerry man, was apprehensive about travelling. I spoke to him and he decided to go. Little did he realise he was voicing fears we all shared. Our buses departed at 5.30pm

and it was dark as we approached Dublin Airport. There, we were met by the General Staff. We boarded our Aer Lingus jumbo, with a shamrock as its livery, at 7.30pm. We were soon airborne, heading east into the unknown.

For many of us, it was an adventure. Most had never been outside of Ireland before. Mid-flight, we watched a film called 'Turning Point'. How fitting as this journey was to be just such a turning point in many of our lives. Five hours later, we touched down in Tel Aviv – at 4.30 local time. It was warm despite the darkness and I witnessed my first Middle Eastern dawn. I checked to make sure everyone was well and within two hours, we had started our journey north for Tibnin.

My first impression was one of war. There was the sheer level of the military presence in Israel and the memorial to the Holocaust and more recent wars, echoes of other conflicts.

As we crossed the border at Rosh Haniqra and through Naquora, we stepped from one civilisation into another, from a country of the first world into a country torn by war and poverty. The signs of conflict were everywhere. The beauty of the place was pockmarked with shellfire. We were ushered through checkpoints, first by the Christian Phalangists and then the PLO, whose football game we disrupted as we passed through. Beauty and carnage lived side by side. We drove along roads that were carved into white cliffs. Just before Tyre, as we turned for Tibnin, I saw a lone man with a donkey and three camels and in the distance some shepherds with their goats. But the sounds of gunfire and the signs of shrapnel were never far away.

Then we passed through Qana, that village of ancient miracles and modern massacres and munificence. A place where in recent wars all sects were slaughtered and yet a sense of community spirit lived on to the extent that one religious group facilitated the other to worship in their temple while theirs was being rebuilt. It didn't matter to them whether they were followers of the prophet from Nazareth or the prophet from Mecca. They worshipped the same deity. Yet neither their God, nor the UN, could shelter them from the anger of God's chosen people. Finally, after passing through Harris, we arrived in Tibnin, a town dominated by its castle built by the Crusaders. This place was to become a home from home for the Irish.

Our first day was one of simply trying to comprehend where we were and why we were there. Mundane things were done; some mild ailments dealt with. After lunch, a call from C Company informed me that a large Lebanese lady had suddenly lost consciousness in the village of Bir as Sanasil. My first humanitarian mission: as I left the ambulance, I felt once again just as I did as a newly qualified doctor; the only difference being that this time, I was on my own. The woman was surrounded by a curious crowd. Given her large girth and the lack of any other signs, I diagnosed a case of hypoglycaemic coma or low blood sugar. I injected intravenous dextrose and some other medicines. The result was dramatic. Within a minute, she shook her head, got up and walked. I heard the words 'Shukran Hakim' for the first time. I'd passed my first test. There were to be many more.

Such humanitarian duties were to be an integral part of the life and work of the medical corps over the 23 years. Looking back, I think it would be reasonable to say that during our time there, we treated in excess of 150,000 people – some 6,000 or so every year. Not all of these cases were to be as dramatic as my encounter with the unconscious lady. We ran medical

and dental clinics from the medical centre in HQ three days a week and we also held twice-weekly clinics in some of the surrounding villages. Here, we encountered people of all ages with all kinds of ailments. Most were mild but some were challenging. We always did the best we could with the resources available. We would send patients to hospitals further afield if we couldn't treat them. Their fees were often paid by the Battalion's Humanitarian Fund. During the summer of 1981, a young pregnant woman from the village of Harris arrived at the medical centre well after darkness. She needed immediate specialist care so off we went into the night, with tracer fire from the "Iron Triangle" illuminating the way, we arrived in Tyre. There, she delivered a lovely baby girl.

On our return to HQ, we were again shadowed by tracer fire. But, as the tracer disappeared that evening, so too did my memory of the event. That was until the evening of my final departure from Lebanon. My company sergeant called me saying there were civilian patients to be seen. I was surprised as we had stopped our civilian clinics a few days previously. In any case, I decided to see them. It was a sick baby, his mother and grandmother. After examining the infant and diagnosing a minor ailment, I heard – in Tibnin English – "Hakim, you don't remember me". She explained that she was the woman whom I had brought to Tyre all those years ago. She introduced her now grown-up daughter, the proud mother of the baby boy. In reality, they had come to thank me. I had forgotten: she had not. I walked with them to the camp entrance where she handed me a gift – a prayer mat. It was a token of thanks that I wouldn't forget.

Stories didn't always have such happy endings. I remember the approach to Christmas that first year. I spent the evening of the 23rd with C Company, singing songs and making music into the night. As I was going to bed, word arrived of a serious crash. Two men had been badly injured. We rushed into the night and when we arrived, the more seriously injured of the two was in a bad state. His pupils were unequal and not reacting. We transported him by helicopter to Naquora but he died in transit. He was my first UN fatality. Little did we know it at the time but the pilot and doctor (both Norwegians) who assisted me on that trip would also soon die, while engaged in another medical mission of mercy at Qana, in February of the following year.

The following day's Midnight Mass was special. We were invited to hear it in the local Lebanese Maronite Church. I was asked to read from the Prophet Isaiah – a reading about God the Eternal Father, Prince of Peace, which was both hopeful and appropriate. After the mass, the Irish contingent sang 'Silent Night' and 'Adeste Fideles' and were invited to a local house for Christmas celebrations. There, we drank lemon tea, ate cakes and sang more carols. It was a true celebration of Christmas; an occasion where the entire community in this mixed village of Muslims and Christians came together and extended their welcome to us.

After Christmas, there was a lull in the fighting. Welcome as it was, it was to reveal another hazard of life in the Lebanon. At any stage during a tour, the infamous 'black dog' could bite and it could bite anyone – irrespective of rank. I discovered that this psychological marauder was especially prevalent during the middle period of a tour.

This was a time when people got lonely. This loneliness could become overwhelming, destroying a person's ability to communicate and enthusiasm for work. Everyone has a role

to play at such junctures. If this malignant boredom, appearing as acute listlessness, severe anxiety and despair, is not checked, it can culminate in the ultimate tragedy. At such times, the aware friend is so important. The soldier can be gently guided towards the person who can help most. The mask of acute boredom can take on many faces from the talkative and high-spirited extrovert to the listless and sleepy introvert. I found that early intervention with often simple techniques successfully solved the majority of cases.

Early in December 1978, I had my first such case. He was a young piper and it took me eight long weeks of intensive work to bring him back to full mental health. Part of his treatment involved playing music at as many occasions as presented themselves. During the early battalions, one tried very hard not to resort to repatriation. Thankfully, I never had to. My main tools were psychotherapy allied with psychotropic drugs in various combinations. Over the years, various commanders were a little bemused by my methods of treatment. However, I can say that not one of the 12 I had the honour to serve under interfered with my treatment or my decision. At times, I had to deal with people who should never have travelled overseas, their condition having been known at home. It is one thing to deal with an unstable personality with all the back-up available in Ireland, however it becomes a much more difficult and fraught situation to have to deal with in the isolation that can be south Lebanon.

In the same, but much less serious, vein, some people have a genuine fear of flying. During the early tours, the snifter was my recommended medicine. A shot of brandy or vodka would do the trick. For very good reasons, alcohol was eventually stopped on flights to and from the mission area. I had to resort to prescribing sedatives such as benzodiazepine. However, in October 1981, I discovered the medicinal orange. My simple recipe was some lush ripe locally-grown oranges tangentially injected with the best Russian vodka. Put in the deep freeze overnight and brought on the flight as large organic capsules of medicinal vitamin C, I handed them out to encourage slumber and dispel fear. They worked a treat. My concoctions were eventually discovered so I stopped the practice. I unfortunately never patented the idea – the original vodka in orange. It could well have been the first alcopop.

There was boredom and there were carefree times but most of the time, there was the threat of bullets. May 9th 1979 was a day of tension and fear. The camp was on the alert for shelling. The Force Reserve had been called up. Troops were gathering and Tibnin Main Street began to take on the appearance of a WWII film set. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were massing at Shaqura. They decided to confront the Irish and demanded to search our area. They were refused access but the refusal angered their commander, Brigadier General Ben Gal. He stated that if he was not allowed through, he would call down 1,000 shells on various villages in South Lebanon, seemingly not caring a whit about women or children or innocent civilians – collateral damage. Our position was guarded by small arms and a single Panhard AML 90. In General Ben Gal, we were up against the might of the Israeli army. However, our officers stood their ground and told the IDF that if they advanced one step further, the UN Forces would open up and that there would be casualties on both sides. There was a standoff but the Israelis eventually retreated. It was the first time I had witnessed such a flagrant disregard for international law.

Worse was to come two days later. We were getting ready for dinner when Ground Hog was called. As everybody went to ground, I received a call for an ambulance and doctor to proceed to Brashit 6:42. Two mortar shells had landed in the village. What I saw on arrival was pathetic – three mutilated elderly Arabs tattooed with shrapnel alongside a dead lamb. They'd been dead for about 30 minutes. While transmitting back to headquarters, another mortar exploded about 30 metres from our soft-skinned ambulance. We ran for cover as another round exploded to my right. For the next 40 minutes, we struggled to shelter from the 30 or more explosives that screamed to ground around us.

After a lull, we ventured out again and proceeded to Brashit camp. There, we set up a dressing station and tended to the wounded. It was my first time under direct fire and the first time I realised how vulnerable our ambulance was. We needed an armoured one – something that would take 20 years to arrive. But the fighting wasn't all on the Israeli side. One day, in late April 1981, the Irish were to learn this to their cost. At the listening post in Dynatar, two Irish soldiers, one from the 48th and one from the 49th battalion, were attacked by PLO elements. Private Hugh Doherty was shot and killed on the spot and Private Caomhan Seoighe was taken. He has never been found since although the UN has never given up looking for him. Throughout our 23 years there, we continued to search and hoped to find his body – sadly, to no avail.

Not only did we have to beware of bullets and boredom as doctors, we were also in constant battle with bacteria. In Camp Shamrock, it was the medical officer's task to oversee the hygiene team and to make sure that everything met the highest possible standards. If we didn't do this, the resulting fallout would be devastating. An entire formation, section, platoon or even company could be rendered useless. Despite our vigilance, the bacteria sometimes won the day. We once had a salmonella outbreak when one egg led to more than 100 personnel being sick for days on end. At such times, the medical team are under great stress, working non-stop to ensure that everyone survives and makes it back to full health as soon as possible.

There are other times when the bugs take a more insidious route. One officer came to me with what seemed to be a minor flu-like ailment. It did not respond to treatment. He eventually required evacuation to Naquora and from there to the Rambam Hospital in Haifa – one of Israel's top medical facilities. What had started as a simple sore throat turned into a serious illness that left him hospitalised for months. However, he made a full recovery – thanks in part to the help Professor Maurice Abrahamson who was my teacher at the College of Surgeons and had retired from Ireland to run his own hospital in Israel. While we were in the Lebanon, he was of invaluable help to us Irish doctors on many occasions. He gave of his time. He gave a second opinion. He used his influence to help us. He was so respected in the county that at this time, he was the personal physician to the President of Israel. Professor Abrahamson never accepted any remuneration in return for his work. He saw such actions as his contribution to his native country. I thank him for his total and selfless kindness.

As a doctor, you encounter illness and disease every day. You realise that they can hit anyone at any age and at any time. I saw much sadness during my 23 years in South Lebanon. However, fate was to keep one of its harshest experiences until the very end. There was a young soldier with whom I was friends. He was one of the most cheerful people I knew. He came to me

complaining of a lump in his side. It looked and felt innocent but we sent him to Naquora to be sure. They referred him to Sidon where the lump was removed. Everything indicated a simply benign lesion. However, when I visited him in hospital, I could see that he was not healing. I began to worry. I arranged to have him sent home early for further tests. What they discovered in Ireland was that he had one of the rarest and most aggressive forms of cancer. It presented itself as a simple lymphoma but it killed my friend within a year – a soldier and a father in his early thirties who always smiled and never complained.

December 1988 was the start of a time of vengeance. Jiwwad Kasfi was captured by Israeli Special Forces in Bayt Yuhan, which was just inside the border of the Irish-controlled area. Kasfi was a high-profile armaments expert who made and primed anti-personnel bombs. A member of one of the leading Muslim Anti-Israeli groups, he had been held responsible for the deaths of many South Lebanese, Israelis and at least one Irish officer. His brothers in arms wanted to blame someone for his capture. And because he had been captured in our area, they decided to blame us Irish. This led to a terrifying sequence of events which were based on the age-old doctrine of an eye for an eye.

Firstly, our camp came under attack. It was surrounded and live ammunition was fired directly into it. In fact, the dentist Fiachra McGinley and doctor Kevin Roberts were in the medical centre discussing the Geneva Convention (of all things!) when bullets passed right between them. So much for respect for international law. Later that evening, three Irish soldiers were hijacked from 6-48 at Tibnin East. They were told they were being brought to spend time with their fellow countrymen – captives Keenan and McCarthy. Thankfully, this never came about. They were freed with the help of Amal and brought back to the medical centre to recover. One of them was to go home, never again to return, but the other two chose to stay.

Honour remained to be satisfied and so to the morning of March 21st. Our battalion was preparing to go home. I was engaged in morning surgery when I heard what I thought was a sonic boom. With so many Israeli jet fighters flying overhead, this was not unusual. However, unusual it was to prove to be. The phone rang and I was asked to proceed immediately to 6-42, where there had been a suspected roadside bomb, exact details unknown. We travelled in the direction of the telltale brown mushroom cloud in the distance. Carnage awaited us and it was obvious no one could have survived. We lost three fine soldiers that day – Privates Mannix Armstrong and Thomas Walsh and Corporal Fintan Heneghan. We might have lost many more. Just before departing C Company HQ, Commandant Martin Coughlan took six off that fatal detail, six soldiers who would almost certainly have also been killed.

And, after the incident was investigated, it became apparent that the perpetrators had hoped for greater bloodshed as their revenge for Kasfi. Not alone were the truck and its personnel to be targeted, the rescue personnel were supposed to have been targeted too. Another bomb should have gone off when we came to give assistance. I well remember the Irish lament by the piper as the mortal remains left for Naquora and the memorial mass in the village officiated by the Bishop of Tyre. What a price to pay for honour to be satisfied. What a price to pay for peace.

Bullets of a different kind were shot in November 1992. It was a quiet day and had all the appearances of a quiet evening. I had just finished my evening meal and was looking for some entertainment when I was ordered to proceed to Haddatha. An event was unfolding in the enclave. On arrival at 6-38, the temporary armoured ambulance with crew was already there. What was happening was still unclear. Eventually, an armoured convoy headed up and over hill 880 and down to Attiri 6-44. We were still unsure of the situation.

With me in the ambulance were the Padre and the medical team. At the water hole, we met CS Jerry Dineen and Captain Gus McNamara. I examined Michael McCarthy who was dead. He had been shot about 300 metres away, near the cemetery, around the spot where the four waddis meet below the brown mound – one of the most beautiful spots in the south.

I was told that the medic and another wounded soldier had been taken as prisoners to SLA regional HQ at Safa Al Howa. We placed Michael's body in the rear and took the other two survivors into the front of the ambulance and proceeded into the night, the sounds of mortar and shellfire exploding in the distance. I was still unclear about what had happened. Why? And how? As I proceeded up Tracer Alley lined with olive and pine trees, I could sense a great amount of fear and also a great amount of what I might call the fog of conflict. The personnel at 6-44 were seriously shocked. The position had come under sustained fire and they were lucky to have escaped with their lives. I now had Michael's dead body and three seriously psychologically traumatised soldiers in my care. There were two others at Safa Al Howa. I did not know the extent of their injuries or even if they were still alive. What had happened that evening? I feel the full story is still shrouded in the cloud of conflict.

While we were still at 6-44, Team Victor, the UNSTO observers, made contact to tell us that our prisoners would be released to my care. In their company, I proceeded up the Snake Road and into the SLA medical complex. There I met that psychopath – Gal Both, the customs man from Byat Yuhan. He was baying for blood and wanted our lads killed. I noted what good care had been taken of our wounded. One had been shot in both knees and had a very deep bullet graze on his back. The other had less serious injuries. I thanked their doctor who told what he understood had happened. The story started to take on more clarity. It seemed the SLA attachment at the brown mound misread the situation, thinking it was a Hezbollah incursion and ambush. They opened fire, killing three of their own – Lieutenant Joseph and two others – as well as Michael and wounding many on both sides.

We left Safa Al Howa to the sounds of mortar and the rat-tat-tat of gun fire which broke the silence and darkness of that eerie night. We returned, after what seemed an inordinate time, to our own operational area and to the medical centre. There, the medics tended, with great care – as always – to the mortal remains of Michael McCarthy. The Padre and I administered to the survivors into the night. They were truly wounded people – in ways both physical and psychological. What had seemed to be a peaceful and quiet evening proved to be anything but.

September 11th 2001 was a clear day in South Lebanon. We were approaching the end of our final tour in the area. I walked to the highest point in the village where there was a monument under construction to the Irish who paid the ultimate price. I was almost back at the camp when I heard on my transistor radio that a small aircraft had crashed into one of the Twin

Towers in New York. Back in the medical centre, I was just in time to see the second plane crash into the second tower. The reality of what was happening began to dawn on me. I wrote in my diary that evening – “Today I feel the world was changed at about 15.30 Middle Eastern time. God help us all.”

Finally, we started to say our goodbyes. On Sunday, November the 11th, the local people unveiled a plaque on the gable wall of their church in memory of the Irish. As the Bishop of Tyre said, “how could we forget the numerous sacrifices endured by your courageous army, especially your 46 martyrs who offered their lives to deliver peace to our holy land?” And eventually, our last day arrived – November the 12th. As I prepared to leave, the last thing I packed was the prayer mat I received from the woman whose baby I delivered all those years ago. The circle was closing. I was going home.

On reflection, I experienced every human emotion – joy, anger, despair, love, hate and forgiveness – at different times and, at some times, simultaneously, during my 23 years in the Lebanon. My sanity and impulse to keep going were severely tested. On occasion, I felt a sense of achievement or progress only to have it dashed by some other grotesque happening or event. This has been a land of constant and rapid change, a place of conflict through nearly all of recorded human history. Over three millennia, it has experienced golden ages but more often it has been a place where man’s inhumanity to himself has been enacted with ever-increasing viciousness. Belief against belief, national against nation, tribe against tribe and family against family, Christian, Muslim, Jew and Heathen – all have fought here. During my brief time here, I feel it was the companionship of colleagues, helping and being helped, giving and receiving kindness that made it all worthwhile. Assuming that one has the essential skills and qualities of one’s craft; everyone needs to approach life imbued with what I call ‘the four hs’ – humanity, humility, honesty and humour. Without wishing to sound sanctimonious, if you do your work with these ‘four hs’ in mind, you will do no harm.

As a doctor and medical officer, you hope to do more than that. You hope you contribute in some little way to the improvement of the place and the people you come into contact with. To leave and be able to say you left it a better place than when you arrived – even if after a short period, your contribution is once again wiped out in another political adventure motivated by hate, power, money or all three. I say, let there be change. Heraclitus of Ephesus asserted the essence of existence is change. Change in itself is inevitable and fundamentally good, provided in change there is also conceived consistency.

To end, I would ask you to reflect on one of the adages of Horace. “Quid sit Futurum cras fuge quaerere” – forbear to ask what tomorrow may bring. One must not always be preoccupied with tomorrow’s storms lest one forgets to enjoy the sunshine of today. So yes, let us take comfort and pride in the Irish contribution to the Lebanon – this beautiful but shadowed land.

The Nobel Lecture - 9 January 1989

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I should like first of all, to once again thank the Norwegian Nobel Committee for the award they have made to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Their decision has been acclaimed all over the world. I take this opportunity also to express once again my deep gratitude to the countries which have contributed troops or provided logistical support to these operations. It is to their willing cooperation that we owe the success of this great experiment in conflict control.

Peace - the word evokes the simplest and most cherished dream of humanity. Peace is, and has always been, the ultimate human aspiration. And yet our history overwhelmingly shows that while we speak incessantly of peace, our actions tell a very different story. Peace is any easy word to say in any language. As Secretary-General of the United Nations I hear it so frequently from so many different mouths and different sources, that it sometimes seems to me to be a general incantation more or less deprived of practical meaning. What do we really mean by peace?

Human nature being what it is, peace must inevitably be a relative condition. The essence of life is struggle and competition, and to that extent perfect peace is an almost meaningless abstraction. Struggle and competition are stimulating, but when they degenerate into conflict they are usually both destructive and disruptive. The aim of political institutions like the United Nations is to draw the line between struggle and conflict and to make it possible for nations to stay on the right side of that line. Peacekeeping operations are one very practical means of doing this. What we are trying to create in the United Nations is a world where nations recognize at the same time the ultimate futility of war and the collective responsibility which men and women everywhere share for ensuring a decent future.

All human experience seems to show that in international, as in national, affairs, the rule of law is an essential ultimate objective for any society which wishes to survive in reasonable conditions. We now recognize that all humanity - the whole population of this planet - has in many respects become, through the revolutionary force of technological and other changes, a single society. The evolution of, and respect for, international law and international authority may well be decisive in determining whether this global society is going to survive in reasonable conditions.

We have come a long way in the forty-three years since World War II. With the creation and ratification of the United Nations Charter it seemed that governments had, at last, learned the lessons of two world wars. However, in the forty years of ideological strife, tumultuous change,

and evolution which followed, the initial enthusiasm for the Charter largely evaporated. Even the possibility of an orderly international future began to be questioned. The Cold War paralyzed the United Nations, which was founded on the assumption that the great powers would be unanimous in dealing with matters of international peace and security. Regional conflicts defied the authority of the world organization. The arms race proceeded at full speed at all levels.

In spite of these discouraging developments, the basic will to peace of the world community survived. A third world war - which at times seemed imminent - was avoided. The UN played an important role in preventing regional conflicts from escalating into an armed confrontation between East and West. Improvisations, including new techniques of peacemaking and peacekeeping and a large expansion of the role of the Secretary-General, to some extent filled the gap caused by the absence of great power unanimity. In this process, a practical reassessment of the realities of international peace and security has gradually emerged. Sixteen peacekeeping operations and countless good offices missions by successive Secretaries-General have been the backbone of this effort.

In the last eighteen months a new and mild international climate has relaxed the rigors of the Cold War and calmed the storm of regional conflict. The prospect of realizing the dreams of 1945 seems better than at anytime in forty years. At last we have an opportunity to assess our situation, to consider the revolutionary changes that have taken place to cooperate in making plans for a better future. This opportunity has not come a moment too soon. Modern warfare has become a lethal and unacceptable anachronism. Even the most powerful states are finding that preparations for modern warfare are prohibitively expensive. An improvement in the way the existing system of international stability and security operates is urgently needed, and may now at last be within the bounds of political reality.

But, there is another compelling challenge to the community of nations - a challenge which will not respect nor wait upon the disputes and disagreements of nations. We are now encountering a new generation of global problems which can only be faced effectively through an unprecedented degree of international cooperation. Our capacity to face these problems will determine the nature and conditions of life on this planet in the next century. Clearly this task requires outstanding leadership and an extraordinary concentration of resources and political energy. We shall have to study our existing international mechanisms and decide in what way they need to be strengthened and coordinated.

In dealing with both sets of issues-peace and stability, and global problems - the key question will be the extent to which collective responsibility and international authority can be exercised and respected. We now have a world of more than 160 independent sovereign states. This is a new situation which clearly demands an acceptable, but effective, degree of international authority in matters of common concern. The nature and evolution of this authority will be the key to building a better world and dealing with the global threats we now face.

Forty-three years ago the international organization was primarily preoccupied with international peace and security. The evolution of thinking and practice on this essential question may give some clues as to the basis upon which international authority may rest in the future.

As regards international peace and security the United Nations Charter sets out a process which, in its first stage, is based on the renunciation of force in international relations and on the peaceful settlement of disputes. If these principles are rejected, the Charter provides for collective enforcement action by the world community through the Security Council. Such action ranges from various forms of sanctions and embargoes to the use of military force by the Security Council. In the political and military conditions of the post-war world, forceful international action has not proved to be a practical proposition. Sanctions and embargoes have rarely been agreed on, and military enforcement action never, apart from the exceptional case of Korea. Instead the Security Council and the Secretary-General have pioneered a different route - the route of consensus, conciliation, good offices, diplomatic pressure and non-forceful, cooperative peacekeeping.

This last concept - peacekeeping - was honored this year with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. This was a recognition not only of the architects and the soldiers of peacekeeping, but also of an extremely important idea. The evolution of peacekeeping may provide a useful practical indication of how international authority, and respect for it, can be built up.

Before considering the evolution of peacekeeping, however, I would like to say a word about its opposite, enforcement. Chapter VII of the Charter, the enforcement chapter, was a recognition by the authors of the Charter that the failure of the international community to deal with the aggressions of the 1930s had inevitably led to World War II. They were determined that the international community should not make this mistake again.

In the period since World War II aggressors on this scale have, mercifully, not emerged. The measures of Chapter VII have thus not been invoked in order to take forceful action against aggression. The Security Council, in its wisdom, has never seen fit or been able to agree on the full-scale use of Chapter VII. Instead, international disputes and threats to the peace have been, for the most part, dealt with by non-forceful means. That should not mean that Chapter VII should be forgotten. It is all well and good to evolve a design for international peace and security based not on forceful techniques, but on cooperation and persuasion. But we cannot say for certain that the world will never again be threatened by irrational aggressors. The capacity to react forcefully, and in time, to such a contingency must therefore be maintained, while we pursue the option of peacemaking and peacekeeping as the normal approach to international disputes or threats to the peace.

The essence of peacekeeping is the use of soldiers as a catalyst for peace rather than as the instruments of war. It is in fact the exact opposite of the military action against aggression foreseen in Chapter VII of the charter. Although the arms race continues, it would seem that the majority of nations have, in practice, opted for the rule of international authority and law in their relations with each other. The only sanction for this authority is usually persuasion, the moral force of international authority and diplomatic pressure. In addition, international authority can be symbolized in conflict areas by non-fighting soldiers, the UN's peacekeepers.

These are soldiers without enemies. Their duty is to remain above the conflict. They may only use their weapons in the last resort for self-defense. Their strength is that, representing the will of the international community, they provide an honorable alternative to war and a

useful pretext for peace. Their presence is often the essential prerequisite for negotiating a settlement. They have, or should have, a direct connection with the process of peacemaking.

The peacekeeping and peacemaking route has been pioneered even as governments also follow the course of armaments and military alliances. I have a feeling that self-styled experts and realists, who are not always farsighted, have tended to regard the UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts rather patronizingly as something of a sideshow. Certainly, some major powers, including the Soviet Union, were for many years highly sceptical of - and even actively opposed to - UN peacekeeping operations.

Recent changes in Soviet policy on peacekeeping, as well as on other important matters, mean that for the first time there is virtually a unanimous international constituency for promoting the concept of international authority through consensus and joint action, by the non-forceful techniques of peacemaking and peacekeeping. What are the practical prospects of making this approach to international peace and stability effective? It is perhaps worth recalling how, in nation states, the evolution of civilian police as the guardians of public safety and the symbols of the law helped many states to cross the line from lawless violence and tyranny to civil authority and respect for the law in the common interest of all citizens. When they were first introduced, the police were often resented or not taken seriously. They were the butt of many jokes and demonstrations. When however, they gained the support both of the governmental establishment and of the vast majority of the populace, they became a trusted and indispensable institution. They were an institution which did not depend on physical force but on the support of the authorities and the people and on the majesty of the law.

Some of the factors which allowed the emergence of the police as guardians of the law and protectors of public safety may have begun to be present in the international world of today. There is a widespread weariness and disgust with violence and a heightened consciousness that the use of force seldom solves, and usually exacerbates, problems. Our powers of destruction have increased to the point where it is madness to use them. The necessity of the rule of law in our crowded, interdependent planet is becoming increasingly evident. It is clear that if we fail to act together on many matters, we may lose the capacity to act at all. At the superpower level we are seeing the first practical steps of disarmament - a recognition of the undoubted fact that war is no longer a practical instrument of national policy.

These factors would seem to indicate that the way to peace and security might in future generally be based on consensus and cooperation rather than on the use of force. Peacekeeping operations would be an important visible symbol and monitor of such a system, although, as I have said, we must also preserve some collective capacity to deal with aggression.

The basic prerequisites for the success of the peacekeeping technique are now present to a far greater extent than before. Successful peacekeeping requires a strong and supportive international consensus, starting in the Security Council. I must add that this support must include the necessary financial and logistical support. The cost of peacekeeping is usually infinitesimal by comparison with the cost of war, destruction and disruption. Nonetheless, the sums involved are considerable by diplomatic standards, if not by military standards. The present uncertain situation about financing is deplorable. It puts an intolerable burden

on the countries which provide the troops, and is also harmful to the essential principle of collective responsibility. It sends a feeble and wavering message, when what is required is confidence and strong support. Collective governmental responsibility for the financing of peacekeeping operations is an essential basic principle. However, if governments decide that the financial burden is too heavy for them to bear alone, other means of financing may have to be considered. In some cases, those who benefit financially from the results of a peacemaking and peacekeeping operation might be asked to share in the costs. A reserve fund for peacekeeping emergencies has also been suggested. A more far-reaching idea has been floated, embracing the concept of using some of the money spent on war to pay for peace through an appropriate international levy on all overseas arms sales. This money could be used to build up such a fund. As long as, regrettably, the arms trade continues, we would at least be robbing war to pay for peace. It is an interesting coincidence that the figure of 1.5 billion dollars, often mentioned as the possible bill for peacekeeping in 1989, is almost exactly one percent of the official arms exports for 1987 - 164 billion dollars.

A peacekeeping operation must have a workable and realistic mandate fully supported by the international community. It must also have the cooperation, however grudging, of the governments and authorities in the area of conflict, and their understanding that the operation serves their long-term interests, no matter what their short-term political difficulties may be.

A peacekeeping operation needs disciplined and broadly representative contingents and an effective integrated command. The operation must be guided at all times by the Secretary-General and kept on course with the objectives of the Security Council.

The nonviolent nature of peacekeeping must be understood by the soldiers and respected by the parties to the conflict. A peacekeeping force that uses its weapons for purposes other than strict self-defense quickly becomes part of the conflict and therefore part of the problem. It loses its essential quality of being above the conflict. These essential conditions seem to be present to a far greater extent than any time in the past forty years. Indeed we have come a very long way since 1948, when Secretary-General Trygve Lie's suggestion of "a small guard force" for Palestine was dismissed without serious discussion.

The situation in the Security Council is particularly encouraging. For the first time the permanent members seem to be becoming a collegial body working together with the non-permanent members and with the Secretary-General to evolve common approaches and solutions for problems of international peace and security. This development opens up new possibilities of a more general nature in arms control and disarmament and in the settlement of international disputes, as well as in the development and use for the technique of peacekeeping.

Here the change in the Soviet attitude is particularly encouraging. New Soviet proposals, both as regards the future development of peacekeeping and the wider use of such operations, indicate that a major obstacle to progress has been removed. The Soviet proposals aim at seeing "the positive experience and practice of United Nations peacekeeping operations consolidated and further developed and put on a more solid legal and financial basis" so that they can be used "more extensively for the implementation of Security Council decisions as well as for the prevention of emerging armed conflicts".

This new consensus behind peacekeeping comes at a time when important operations are imminent - in Namibia and Western Sahara¹, for example. These operations should provide a practical testing ground for strengthening the foundations of this important technique.

The long-term aim remains what it has always been - to evolve a collective system of international peace and security, reliable and strong enough that governments in trouble or under threat will choose to bring their problems to the United Nations rather than trying to go it alone in unilateral efforts which usually end in disaster. To achieve this goal the member states of the United Nations should make deliberate and practical efforts to foster the growth of collective responsibility, international confidence, operational capacity, and respect for the decisions and operations of the United Nations. Such an effort could give the phrase "international peace and security" a reality which it has so far lacked.

In a larger perspective, we must work towards a time when war will cease to be an acceptable option of national policy or a possible means of settling disputes, and when a reliable and respected international system will take its place. In this perspective the development of international peacekeeping has an essential place. Just as the concept of civil police was essential to the development of the rule of law within nation states.

When we talk of peacekeeping we are, at the present time, referring to one area of international activity. But the principles and techniques involved in peacekeeping may be applicable and relevant to other areas and other problems: the principles of impartiality and objectivity; the symbolic representation of international authority; the process of securing compliance through cooperation; the providing of pretexts for conforming to international decisions; the capacity for fact-finding; the monitoring of the implementation of agreements; the developing of a capacity for preempting disasters or preventing conflicts. These are all essential elements of the peacekeeping technique which need further development. They may also prove to be an important basis for dealing with the global problems which now present an urgent challenge to the international community.

I hope that the attention now being given to peacekeeping, which is symbolized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, will not only strengthen our capacity to conduct the affairs of nations in a more peaceful and just manner. I hope it will also stimulate a wider effort to consider the new means and the new institutions which we shall need if we are to ensure our common future.

Boots on the Ground and the Complexity of Modern Peacekeeping

Dr. Mike Cosgrave UCC

INTRODUCTION

Since the first mission to Lebanon in 1958, (UNOGIL) the experience of Irish peacekeepers has been varied and disparate. The Defence Forces have put boots on the ground from Cyprus to Timor to Namibia to El Salvador. The number of troops deployed has ranged from as low as one in some missions to many hundreds in Congo and Lebanon. The range of tasks undertaken has varied from simple observation, through classic inter-positional peacekeeping to election observation and humanitarian assistance, like rebuilding roads, schools, hospitals and wells. In spite of the diversity of the Irish experience of peacekeeping, there are some issues which appear regularly, and some themes about which we may usefully generalise.

In almost every operation which Irish troops have participated in, there have been critical locations which serve as focal points for the mission. Identifying the centre of gravity of the mission area, and understanding why certain locations are significant is important. In many cases, these are key points in the communications network. These are important not only as a means to control the mobility of the UN force, the flow of supplies or the movement of journalists or refugees but also a critical part of the legitimacy game for the various actors.

In the Congo, distances were huge – the new state was the size of western Europe. While the river and railways were essential for moving goods in bulk, the UN depended on air transport to get around the Congo. Elisabethville Airport was Katanga's main link with the rest of the world. Initially the Katangese sought to prevent ONUC personnel from landing there at all. Throughout August 1960, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's efforts centred around getting permission for any plane carrying UN troops to land there. After ONUC crossed that hurdle and established itself in Katanga, the Katangese made several efforts to regain control of the airport or to control the routes from the airport into the city. A key mistake was made by the Katangese when they sought to assert their right to mount checkpoints on routes to the airport, and effectively confine ONUC to its bases. In so doing, they challenged the UN force which by then had a strengthened mandate which permitted the peacekeepers to use force to maintain their freedom of movement, to a round of fighting which exposed the hollowness of the Katangese forces when deprived of the core of mercenaries which had formerly stiffened them¹.

In Cyprus, the key port of Famagusta was a major issue in the first days of the operation². The port was the main entry point for bulk cargo for the island. Closure of the port not only posed problems for imports, but was also provided an early example of the 'CNN effect' with Archbishop Makarios' inability to control the Greek Cypriot side being held up to scrutiny against the photogenic background of the walls of the old town. Since Greek and Turkish

workers had formerly worked side by side on the docks before the Turks had fled to their homes in the Old Town, it was diplomatically important for the Greek Cypriots to get it back open on that basis again in order to avoid being seen to be in wrong³.

In Lebanon, while Beirut airport was outside the UNIFIL area of operations, its functioning was a key indicator of the power of the government – as long as the fighting in the city did not close the Airport, and diplomats and journalists could get on regular flights, the government could legitimately claim there was a degree of stability. In other operations, like Somalia, security of food aid through the port at Mogadishu was central to the UN operation, until events moved the focus onto the person of General Aideed. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and Chad, ports and airports similarly become central to the success or failure of the operation. In fact, since many ‘second generation’ peace operations take place in lesser developed states, the very poverty of the infrastructure is often a contributor to the crisis. If there is only one major entry-point into the state, the single major city forms around it and whatever ethnic group happens to live at the wrong end of the state, farthest from the port or airport, is isolated and economically disadvantaged.

If the major urban centre holds the major entry port, it is also usually home to major government offices and broadcast media, such as it is. Possession of the government buildings and the radio station, while they might count for little in terms of real power, are important symbols of political legitimacy. In this, the value of terrain in peace support operations differs considerably from the worth attached to the same terrain in conventional military operations.

In the Congo, as long as Tshombe could hold on in Elisabethville, living in the official presidential residence and broadcasting his version of events, he could claim to be the government. As soon as he fled from the city, and lost control of the symbols of governance, his regime collapsed⁴. The speed of this collapse, and the lack of any concerted resistance thereafter exposed how hollow the Katangan Government was. In Cyprus, when the crisis came to the Security Council, limitations on Turkish Cypriot access to the public meetings of Security Council to present their case during the debates on Resolution 186 allowed them leverage to argue against the legitimacy of UN actions when it suited them. In Lebanon, the complexity of the states powersharing constitution meant that there are a number of offices which allow different groups to accumulate political capital.

It is not uncommon across many cultures for possession of political office to count for ‘nine-tenths of the law’. In some states, this simply means generally allowing the respect due to the office to rub off on the office holder, and allowing him or her the benefit of the doubt. In other cultures, possession of political office is seen as conferring ownership of the state. The UN is an organisation of states, and while that position may be evolving, it still means that possession of the appearance of political legitimacy confers advantages on a party to a conflict in a failed or weak state.

Even though the phrase ‘Second Generation Peacekeeping’ is usually taken to refer to peace operations in such ‘failed states’ in the post cold war period, most operations involve elements of ‘second generation’ challenges, especially during the deployment phase.

ONUC is generally accepted to have been a ‘second generation’ operation of the Cold War era – it took place in a weak or failed state with periods when there was no legitimate or effective host government and left the UN force stuck in the middle of what was effectively a civil war. The lack of discipline among the Armée Nationale Congolaise, and the presence of various non-state armed forces and foreign mercenary fighters are all part of the ‘second generation’ landscape’. Since ONUC was seen as problematic at best, and branded an outright failure by many, the UN sought to steer clear of similarly complex situations and stick to classic ‘interpositional’ peacekeeping during the Cold War⁵.

Cyprus is generally regarded as a classic interpositional peace operation but in the early years it certainly bore many of the hallmarks of second generation operations. While the UN was formally invited in on the request of the government, that government had clearly broken down, and not only did it no longer command the respect of the Turkish Cypriot community, but there was a question-mark over the ability of Archbishop Makarios to control, or even to know what members of his government were planning. While the Greek Cypriot National Guard was, at least nominally organised, and uniformed, they were only barely subject to the normal chain of command and were supplemented by armed civilians in every village. On the Turkish side, most of the fighters were irregulars, many of them apparently university students who had come over from the mainland to join the fighting⁶. Repatriation of fighters on both sides back to their respective home countries, restoration of basic infrastructure and working out a modus vivendi between the two communities took several years. It was not until the end of 1968⁷ that the situation stabilised into its present shape, with the UN force holding a line between the two communities, effectively freezing in place a situation which still awaits a political situation.

In Lebanon, of course, the procession of factions, militias and armed groups is so chaotic as to defy clear description. PLO, PLFP, Amal, Hezbollah, DFF, AE, LAUI, SLA – the catalogue is without end. UN reports, striving to be neutral, tried initially to refer to all of these as ‘Armed Elements’ (AE), a label which means different groups from time to time, which makes deciphering UN documents on the conflict more complicated. While there was a *de jure* government in Lebanon at the time UNIFIL was established, it was in the throes of a civil war and had limited real powers. The ostensible reason why the Government of Lebanon appealed to the Security Council – the need to secure Israeli withdrawal and provide an interpositional force along the border – was a clear ‘first generation’ mission in the manner of many other forces in the region. The reality however was that right from the start UNIFIL was a second generation mission, operating in an environment with weak central government, multiple armed factions in conflict and a resulting humanitarian crisis which ebbed and flowed throughout the mission.

A common thread running through these operations is the centrality of ethnic divisions. This is quite obvious in Cyprus and Lebanon, but perhaps less so in the Congo. In the Congo, the ostensible division was between those who favoured a strong central government and those who advocated a federal constitution. Those political labels can however be peeled away like the layers of an onion. The division between centralists and federalists generally matched a left-right split on the political spectrum, with advocates of strong central government tending to be at least slightly left of centre, and very much so in the case of Lumumba and

his followers, although US assertions that they were puppets of Moscow were unfounded. Behind the political theory, however, there was an economic issue – while the centralists wanted to redistribute the nation's wealth to further economic development throughout the Congo, the federalists were identified with the provinces which were richer in natural resources and wanted to retain as much of their wealth in the provinces as possible. Not surprisingly, they were often closely associated with western mining interests who advised and bankrolled their political activities. Within the most troubled provinces – South Kasai and Katanga – the ‘federalists’ were, in fact, identified almost entirely with particular ethnic groups or tribal coalitions, and they did seek to exclude other groups from power and access to resources. Thus, in Katanga, the Balubas, who mostly lived in the poorer, northern end of the province, were the losers. Their political arm, BALUBAKAT, lost out to Tshombe's mostly Tchwoke CONAKAT, and his provincial government used force against the Balubas. In the north, Balubas assumed that all white military personnel were part of the mercenary force which formed the core of Tshombe's Gendarmerie while in Elisabethville itself, ONUC had to protect Baluba refugee camps from the Gendarmerie. At the heart of the matter, in Katanga, it is possible to generalise that political positions were adopted not out of ideological beliefs but because of ethnic divisions.

The Congo, Cyprus and Lebanon are problematic because all three states are badly designed relics of nineteenth century colonialism. The Belgian Congo was created by the ‘Great Powers’ at the Congress of Berlin in 1885 as a gigantic buffer zone in Central Africa. It was never a positive state, but was always a negative space, neutralised because no one wanted to take the risk that some other power might gain control over it. It was handed over to Leopold of Belgium as the largest private estate in history because he, like little Belgium, was mostly harmless. Its borders were drawn, not on the basis that they represented any meaningful unit, but simply because they represented the limits of what the other powers had already grabbed in the ‘Scramble for Africa’

Lebanon had some minimal historic identity as a region, and there had been revolts against the Ottoman Empire in some parts of Lebanon which had nodded in the direction of nationalism, but it was never a cultural or ethnic unit with a clear national identity. It did include two groups – the Maronite Christians and the Druse – who would certainly disappear in a Greater Syrian state. Both of those groups did possess a sufficiently distinctive history and culture to have a clear identity. Most importantly, they were able to win the favour of the French colonial regime – indeed France, living up to her former role as the most Catholic nation, had actively intervened to protect the Maronites in the eighteen-sixties. France was therefore willing to foster the development of a Lebanese state which would include the Maronites and the Druse, and unfortunately, since the ethnic geography was not simple, a significant Muslim minority. To make this work, the French devised a power-sharing constitution which was excellent in theory but which could only work in practice with goodwill on all sides. Even as the Vichy French generously granted Lebanon independence in 1943, local politics were already beginning to unravel.

If the French were happy to get out of Lebanon and Syria in 1943, Britain was certainly happier to hand over its Cyprus problem to the UN in 1964. Cyprus, part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571, was ruled by Britain since 1878 and has clear, distinctive Greek and

Turkish communities with strong national identities. Prior to formal independence in 1960, the Turkish minority had been favoured under both Turkish and British rule. Both communities had national aspirations for political union with their respective mother countries, aims which were clearly incompatible. Like Lebanon, Cyprus was given a power sharing constitution which was the fairest possible theoretical solution to giving both communities a fair share in government. In practice, it proved impossible to operate – in fact, it was never fully implemented because provisions for a multi-ethnic army and police, and the appointment of officials in proportion to the size of the communities, became the immediate source of countless minor disputes.

In classic peace operations, it has become the convention for the UN to request troop providing nations to provide battalion sized contingents which usually function within the force as independent entities. Other states who do not provide ‘front line’ contingents provide logistic support units. However, in many cases the practice has not been as neat as the theory, and as a result, Irish units have gained through peace support operations varied experience of functioning as part of multinational units at several levels.

In ONUC, because of the size of the force which peaked at the equivalent of almost 2 Infantry divisions, and the distances involved, it was necessary to organise the force into what were effectively multinational brigades. While in some cases this practice was simply administrative convenience, it was often materialised into an operational structure – Irish, Swedish and Indian battalions held brigade level meetings at which operational plans were approved⁸. On the other hand, in Rumpunch and Morthor, units seems to have focussed on their own patch, while it also appears that in some of the later fighting at Elisabethville, and during the mopping up in Katanga, battalions from different national contingents teamed up and worked together informally, either working both sides of a road or leapfrogging each other to maintain the pace of pursuit against the fleeing Gendarmes⁹. Nationalities also worked together at sub-unit level. Several Irish Cavalry Squadrons worked with other nationalities in Stanleyville, while in Katanga Irish mortar platoons provided fire support for other contingents from time to time¹⁰. In Cyprus, co-operation with police contingents from other nations became the norm for Irish battalions, while the 40th Battalion even had to pleasure of taking a squadron of British Life Guards under command for a period¹¹. In Lebanon, Irish troops provided training for other contingents while Irish Military Police and EOD teams worked with contingents from different nations frequently and easily.

CONCLUSION

It has now become all too common to talk of ‘statebuilding’ and ‘nationbuilding’ in ‘failed states’ as if the two terms are casually interchangeable. It is also common to toss out the term ‘failed states’ without recognising that for some states, failure is the norm which was briefly papered over for a generation during the Cold War. In many cases these states failed because they were the heirs to a colonial legacy which bound several nations in one state. What is remarkable is how often there was an effort to resolve these problems by creating complex constitutional mechanisms which proved unworkable in practice. It has also become commonplace to identify ‘second generation’ peacekeeping as almost entirely a post-cold war phenomenon and to assume that peacekeepers prior to 1989 went on tidy interpositional missions in neat battalion groups¹². What I have tried to suggest here is that a more complex

multinational response to multi-ethnic conflicts has long been part of UN Peace Operations and the focus on the novelty of the post-Cold War environment meant that many lessons from the preceding years were disregarded. After 1989, all may well have been changed, but it was not by any means changed utterly in the small wars of peace.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Unit History, 35th Infantry Battalion, pp 20-22, 36th Infantry Battalion, pp 1-4 3 Unit History, 40th Infantry Battalion, pp 38-39
- ² Unit History, 40th Infantry Battalion, pp 29-37
- ³ Unit History, 40th Infantry Battalion, pp 38-39
- ⁴ Unit History, 39th Infantry Battalion, p 1
- ⁵ Diehl, Paul 'International Peacekeeping, p. 97; Hillen, p 172, James, Alan, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (London, 1990) p 296
- ⁶ Unit history, 5th Infantry Group, pp 24-25
- ⁷ Unit History, 21st Infantry Group, p. 7
- ⁸ Unit History 36th Infantry Battalion, p 4, Unit History, 38th Infantry Battalion, p 80
- ⁹ Unit History, 38th Infantry Battalion, pp 71-80
- ¹⁰ Unit History, 2nd Armoured Car Squadron, p. 2; Unit History, 3rd Armoured Car Squadron, Unit history, 38th Infantry Battalion p 2
- ¹¹ Unit History, 40th Infantry Battalion, p 22
- ¹² Diehl, p 183, Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace A/47/277 – S/244111 17 June 1992 – see Paras 2,3 and 47-50 which assert the novel nature of the post-Cold War environment.

United Nations in a Divided World¹

Comdt Rory Finnegan

On June 6th 1945, 50 world leaders gathered in San Francisco to sign what remains a remarkable document. Born of months of painstaking negotiations, even as the Second World War still raged, the charter of the United Nations called upon countries “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”

The United Nations as an institution, which superimposes a rule of law on the relative anarchy of international relations, is now more than 50 years old. It was once said that the UN, was created not to bring us into heaven but to save us from hell. This hormonal epoch of the UN’s life stimulates a plethora of implications, inherent to the change process, the fundamental one inherent to “the change”, being reform or die? In recent times the UN has been subjected to harsh criticism and fierce bludgeoning from many sources. In 1945 it sought a new world order, guided by the principle that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest,” or in self-defence. Harry Truman, US president, believed something profound had taken place. “What a great day this can be in history!” he told an audience of 3,500 people, but he added some prescient words. “No one claims that this is now a final or perfect instrument. It has not been poured into a fixed model. Changing world conditions will need readjustment of peace and not of war.”

TIME ECHOES SENSE

There is much on the positive side. Its membership has expanded nearly four-fold. It is now truly universal – the member states exceeding the League of Nations, the first such organisation of states in history. It has become the centre of a family of other, more specialised organisations, which promote international co-operation, and it has set norms for many areas of international behaviour. For over half a century it also provided the framework for decolonising up to 100 states, but the sands of time have witnessed much change on the Geopolitical stage. The Cold War split, in conjunction with the veto power of each of the permanent members, meant that, for half a century, the core organ of the collective security system, the Security Council, never functioned as originally intended as an effective world authority. Prior to engaging in any form of analysis with respect to a possible UN renaissance, we must bear in mind that the UN was “made in 1945”. We live in a world of mutation and in this respect, a new world organisation has to be built on the foundations – not the ashes – of the former, keeping the name but changing many of its operational procedures and its guiding concepts.

When the Cold War ended it seemed the council would at last begin to play that role. At the beginning of the 1990’s the UN had achieved a higher profile and prestige than it had enjoyed for decades, but with it came equally higher expectations. The end of the Cold War, coupled with the perceived effectiveness of the UN’s participation during the first Gulf War, led to high hopes for the organisation’s role in promoting international peace and security, manifested in

a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations.² But it soon became evident that in the euphoria after the Cold War, the UN had taken on more than important member-states were willing to properly support or pay for. There were no agreed rules for handling cases such as Somalia³, Bosnia⁴, Rwanda and Kosovo at the start of the 1990's. In particular the US realist national interest post Somalia, not to "cross the Mogadishu line", whereby the US was resolute its troops wouldn't be involved in the Rwandan UNAMIR mission may arguably though unintentionally have been a contributory factor to the subsequent genocide, as under its influence the Security Council minimised the UN involvement in UNAMIR.⁵ If 1992 was the golden era for the UN, the failure of the Rwandan UNAMIR mission was the nadir of the organisation. The kernel of the problem was that the UN system had acquired many new peacekeeping functions involving a wide range of uses for the military under UN command, yet it lacked the necessary resources to successfully perform the new roles and where a rigid and arguably incorrect interpretation of the mandates curtailed the operational freedoms further constraining these missions by self imposed restraints. In the ether it seems to have been forgotten that on a hierarchy the UN charter has always been the "higher authority," followed by international law, before any specific mission mandate. The facts surrounding these campaigns will always generate great debate, and certainly while the organisation could have handled the situations better, these accusations of UN failure might more accurately be targeted elsewhere. The high profile of these missions rendered virtually unnoticed the excellent work done by the UN over this time in Namibia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Liberia and others. This is evidence that the UN has developed a critical PR deficit, where even in the failed operations, the consequences of those failures are arguably less than might otherwise have been the case without UN involvement.

The missions deemed as failures further exemplified the dilemma of the "UN paradox." While more and more demands were being made on the body, the objectives of the founders and the constitution of the organisation, the UN Charter may be seen to have acted as a constraint. The perceived paradox of the various UN missions was that peacekeepers were faced with the impossible situation of how to provide safety for a population under threat when the terms of engagement are no intervention – and no risk to the lives of the peacekeepers. The large-scale peace-enforcement operations of the 1990's demonstrated the limitations of the UN's role and the need for an effective peacekeeping structure. This led to the Brahimi Report, which examined the structure of UN peacekeeping operations and how they should be streamlined and reformed to achieve greater effectiveness.⁶

WORLD METAMORPHOSIS

Secretary General Koffi Annan remarked in Tokyo in 1997 that the original UN design is outdated, in the *UN Handbook*, he asserted that the "global agenda has never been so varied, so pressing or complex." To further complicate matters, globalisation is challenging the world as it becomes more homogenous. Its impact is immense, transcending every possible realm, from economics to the environment and social movements. Globalisation is not rendering the state obsolete, it does however jeopardise the state-centric assumption that states are the most important actors in world politics.

When the United Nations was first conceived, its founder's primary concern was conflict between powerful states and their allies. Today, that concern remains but the focus has shifted

to a new problem: the proliferation of failed or rogue states, which become breeding grounds for disease, offers havens to non-state terrorists and encourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Few believe that current international institutions the UN among them are sufficiently well equipped to meet the challenge. Brent Snowcroft, former US national security advisor posits, “almost all our institutions are structured for a world that has departed,” but the recent war in Iraq has shattered the illusion of a new post cold war consensus and in the process highlighted the weaknesses of the UN. The Security Council fractured over the invasion; and an effort to involve the UN in Iraq’s reconstruction was sharply curtailed by a bomb attack on its Baghdad headquarters, killing the chief of the UN mission. Elsewhere, the UN’s inability, or unwillingness to stop daily killings in Darfur in Sudan⁷ – which the US has deemed a genocide – and the limited impacts of its efforts to tackle terrorist financing and illegal arms dealing have reinforced international scepticism about the body’s effectiveness.

The war in Iraq however highlighted two more fundamental criticisms of the concept of an organisation such as the UN. One is that in the words of Noel Dorr, former secretary general of the Department of Foreign Affairs, is that the UN is ‘pacific’ but not pacifist. We know now that sanctions against a tyrant can hurt his innocent victims. The second criticism is the unrepresentative, or undemocratic character of many UN member states. It is true that many UN member states, which serve their turn as members of the Security Council, are not democracies; and some show little regard for human rights. So the UN today reflects very imperfectly the ideals of a charter, which begins: “We the peoples of the United Nations.” But it does reflect the world as it is. It is true that the world has changed greatly since the UN was founded, perhaps more than in all its previous history. Humanity is now divided into some 200 separate ‘sovereignities’ but it is also united and interconnected as never before through globalisation.

WE THE PEOPLE?

So the UN patently needs further reform. A first step would be to stop speaking of it as an entity detached from its member states, it always has been the sum of all its parts. It is best seen as a structure available for them to use. It is important therefore to realise that the UN is in essence two things. First, it is a “meeting room,” where states come together and debate their problems. When they agree on how to tackle a problem, the world unites and takes ‘legitimate’ action. If they do not agree, there is little that can be done, other than invoking the principle of “Uniting for Peace,” a concept adopted by the UN in 1950’s whereby in the event of the Security Council being unable to adjudicate adequately on a matter than the SC can refer it to the General Assembly who in turn can authorise a peacekeeping Mission under the aegis of Chapter 6 of the Charter, a non-enforcement peacekeeping mission.

Secondly the UN is a Corps of international civil servants led by Mr. Annan and charged with implementing the tasks given by the states or helping organise others to do so, in essence a “concert of nations,” - namely the UN - which ultimately has the legitimacy and pulling power to bring states together and foster effective action against the biggest global threats. So the UN faces two broad questions, how to best organise the “meeting room” and reform the bureaucracy so it can effectively fulfil the mandates established in the meeting room. The question of the meeting room leads to the fraught and vexed question of Security Council enlargement. It is widely felt that the UN’s main law-making body needs to represent the shape of today’s world if it is to get wider support.

A fundamental flaw in the UN system has always been that it attempts to institutionalise and fuse two distinct traditions. The Peace Project tradition, which asserted that rules would be impartially applied to all, thus bringing international relations into the realm of law rather than power, and the alternative Concert of Europe approach, which held that the Great Powers would consult and coordinate policy on issues of “common interest,” was weighted towards the interests of the great powers themselves. The present day UN system clearly represented a hybrid of both traditions. Many failures of the UN system can be explained by the influence of these potentially conflicting doctrines. In effect the system only works properly when the traditions coincide, but even this does not guarantee a successful outcome.

THE FORK IN THE ROAD

In September 2003 Kofi Annan realised his organisation was facing a moment of truth and he himself said that the organisation had come to a “fork in the road,” no less decisive than in 1945. In essence could the UN reassert its legitimacy and make itself effective enough to convince nations that it is actually capable of making the world a safer place. As a first step Annan appointed a veteran 16-person panel of politicians and diplomats from across the globe.⁸ The panel was asked to assess the greatest challenges facing mankind, consider how collective action might address them, and advise on how the UN should be reformed to make this possible. The work of the Panel was brought to the fore in the immediate backdrop of the US led invasion of Iraq, but also transcended, the specific issues posed by the Iraq war. Kofi Annan himself described 2004 as the organisation’s *annus horribilis*, the “oil-for-food” saga, and evidence of gross misconduct by peacekeepers in the Congo. All added to the picture of an organisation in turmoil.

From the beginning it was inevitable that the report was expected to identify a host of global threats to security, interpreting this in its broadest sense, not just ‘hard’ threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and biological weapons but also ‘soft’ threats such as disease, poverty and climate change. Dovetailing with this a separate group of 250 development experts prepared and then reviewed the UN project to halve primary poverty by 2015 by achieving the millennium development goals (MDG’s). These linkages were both conceptual and political, and were symbiotically encompassed together in Annan’s comprehensive reform package entitled “*In Larger Freedom; Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*,” which was launched in March 2004. Annan argued that the fork in the road for the UN was an issue of whether the organisation took the route towards ‘indispensability’ or ‘marginalisation.’ The kernel of the project is a deal whereby the developing states accept the security, disarmament, anti-terrorist and human rights agenda and the developed states correspondingly commit themselves to the MDG’s. In essence a “grand bargain.”

In his March 2004 Annan offered a raft of sensible proposals, calling for the developed world to commit 0.7 per cent of gross national product to development, ease trade barriers and slash debt in exchange for a commitment by the developed world to implement good governance and get serious about ending support for terrorists and weapons proliferation. It was a high summit to reach, diplomats whittled away at draft after draft. Throughout the process much of the developed world was stuck in an apparent time warp of the 1960’s, arguing for the legitimacy of terrorism in liberation struggles, undermining the urgent need for UN management reform and pathetically unable to agree on how to expand the Security Council.

The strongest opposition to reform came from a collection of retrograde states including Pakistan and Algeria, and increasingly Russia and China, which have opposed any perceived intrusion on state sovereignty. The US also blocked progress. It was fighting against its own ideological “hot buttons,” such as the Kyoto Protocol to climate change and the International Criminal Court. The US also, though immensely powerful by any conventional measure of strength and influence, had come to feel, in Annan’s own words, “uniquely vulnerable” to ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ threats. The result of so many political tectonic plates crashing together was a convoluted draft, so what is left when the tide of publicity has receded?

POISON CHALICE?

Kofi Annan himself declared, “our biggest challenge, and our biggest failing, is on nuclear non-proliferation – this is inexcusable.” He vehemently argued that the failure to agree on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and to drop the subject altogether was a “real disgrace.” Without it he fears a “cascade of proliferation,” arising from tensions between the peaceful and military use of nuclear energy. The current crisis over Iran has focused this fear. A resolution was adopted forcing countries to ban terrorist acts and “deny safe haven” to anyone suspected of doing so, but the declaration failed to provide even a partial definition of terrorism as attacks against civilians – as originally hoped – following demands by some countries that such language be balanced by a recognition of legitimate national struggle. A new human rights watchdog was agreed to replace the current Human Rights Commission, which has been widely criticised as an irrelevant body that is powerless to stamp out abuses because its members include some of the worst offenders and it had no mandate to punish violators. The new Human Rights Council, whose 47 members were chosen on May 10th 2006 by a ballot of the UN General Assembly, replaces the discredited Human Rights Commission. One of the biggest differences between the former Commission and the new Council is that members of the Council will themselves have to submit to a review of their record in human rights. However the US notably refused to take part in the Council elections because it said that it was still too easy for states with a history of abuse to get elected. The Council due to meet three times a year had its first meeting in Geneva on June 19th. A peacekeeping commission is to be set up to help countries emerging from conflict; but whether it should report to the Security Council of the General Assembly is left unresolved and it does not deal with conflict prevention. Annan also described as a “good start,” a deal reforming the way in which the UN ran itself and dealt with economic development, human rights abuses and terrorism. “For the first time you will accept unambiguously, that you have a collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – you will be pledged if another Rwanda looms.” It is in this area in particular in coming years that historians may reflect upon what was achieved at the Summit, which in effect promises part of a new doctrine, called the responsibility to protect (R2P).⁹

This reflects a profound, indeed a paradigm shift in international law, whereby a growing sense of global responsibility for atrocities is increasingly encroaching upon the formerly sanctified concept of state sovereignty. While possibly never more than a convenient fiction, sovereignty has been the bedrock of international relations for 350 years, and the guiding framework around which the United Nations is organised. It remains deeply important to most UN members as a touchstone issue. That meant that any efforts to interfere in domestic affairs have traditionally been given short shrift, and continue to face strong opposition from

countries such as China and Russia. But it was the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia and most recently the killings in the Darfur region of Sudan that have created a growing tidal wave that sovereignty should no longer remain inviolable when the worst abuses take place. It meets a prime objective arising from the international community's profound failure in Rwanda, Bosnia and, more recently Darfur. The argument now stands even if no formal obligation to intervene has as yet been agreed, and Aid groups such as Oxfam International contend that the UN declaration in this regard is only the latest manifestation of an emerging principle of "the right to protect," and is the most important tangible result of the summit.¹⁰ But in reality it reaffirms the principle of the responsibility to protect that was always enshrined in the Charter and now requires a reconceptualisation of this principle into a modern coherent effective doctrine for the 21st century.

IN LARGER FREEDOM

In assessing this outcome the key issue is whether the original conceptual and political linkages between security and development, which were envisaged and conceptualised *In Larger Freedom* have been broken. It is a question of whether the glass is seen as half full or half empty; one diplomat remarked that the outcome was "not as good as it might have been, but better than it could have been." Arguably this will always be the UN's epitaph. The United Nations holds up a mirror to its members, given the intense haggling about other major reforms, such as the Peace-building Commission to assist countries emerging from conflict and the new Human Rights Council, the failure to agree precise means looks more typical of how the UN works in practice. The central objective of this ambitious exercise was to create a systematic and sustainable linkage between the international development agenda and international security. Politically, however tenuous, that key relationship has been established, even if the links are weak. This balance of attitudes and interests must now be grown into a new and more effective multilateralism. These linkages between security and development can survive. But ensuring they do so in future depends on political action by citizens as well as diplomatic action by states.

For the UN, flawed as it may be there is no other comparable source of international legitimacy. It is no accident that American led coalitions in both Afghanistan and Iraq operate under UN mandates. It is a mistake to concentrate attention on its manifest weaknesses and its record of comparative failure and frequent helplessness, its problems are not its inherent weaknesses but its member states continuing propensity for status preservation and aggrandisement. This was most noticeable in the ongoing crisis in Lebanon where the US and France clashed openly over the syntax and nuances of a proposed UN ceasefire before Resolution 701 was finally passed. During which time the IDF and Hezbollah engaged in bitter conflict with little or no regard shown by either side as to civilian casualties, a ceasefire remained elusive during this period, with bloodshed the only certainty. How this still simmering conflict will affect the greater Middle East Geopolitically remains in flux.

The UN faces three great challenges during the coming decades. The first is to prevent the fight against *jihadi* terrorism from becoming a clash of civilisations with Islam, where a 'crusade' on one side calls forth a 'jihad' on the other. A very viable development in this regard would be the incorporation of a permanent Islamic member to the Security Council. There are 1.25 billion Muslims in the world and Islamic perspectives have not been equitably represented

in key authority structures, which help account for the impression of an anti-Islamic bias in addressing controversial issues on the global agenda. The second is to promote the further spread of freedom and democracy. The third is to accommodate the peaceful rise of emerging great powers, notably China and India.

A NEW MOON?

With the end of the Annan era at the UN, the South Korean Ban-Ki-moon has in his first year committed tireless energy as the new UN General Secretary, but has struggled to raise the profile of the much criticised body. Climate change and the ongoing crisis on Darfur are at the top of the agenda, but for Ban-Ki-moon, while seen by his own staff as a workaholic has suffered from communications problems, in comparison with the suave and elegant manner of his predecessor, Ghanaian Kofi Annan. Chosen over six rivals with strong support from the US and China, he came to office vowing to restore trust in the UN secretariat and raise ethical standards. This was widely seen as a slap in the face at the previous administration over its handling of the administration of the \$64 billion oil-for-food programme for Iraq.¹¹ On the positive he championed the 190 nation climate change conference held in Bali, Indonesia in Jan 2008, which ended with negotiators speaking of a historic breakthrough and heralding urgent action. How the evolving and developing peace-keeping mission for Darfur will evolve and develop in the face of Machiavellian manoeuvring from the Sudanese government will be a key litmus test for his stewardship of the world body. Ban's Middle East policy has also drawn criticism when in May 2007 his Middle East envoy, the Peruvian Alvaro de Soto quit in what he perceived as an organisational premium being put on good relations with the US and Israel. Ban will not be the first UNSG to have to tip-toe through the minefield of the non-aligned majority who constitute the majority of the world body and the rich countries, who feel as they pay the bulk of the UN bankroll that conversely they should call the tune.

The state of the UN reflects deeper fault-lines within the international system and genuine conflicts of interest and value among member states. The defining theme of this essay has been to explore and inform on the complexity of the reform process within the UN. The UN destiny is more complex than reform or die. To properly appraise the organisation, demands the long-term perception of what it might become. The UN survived its teething phase and turbulent teens. The thirty something period left it unscathed, so why should a mid life crisis seal its fate. The UN has not yet neared the autumn let alone the winter of its life.

FOOTNOTES

¹ This article is dedicated to the memory of my friend Lt. Col. Joe Buckley (R.I.P.) who had made a broad yet incisive study of the new paradigm of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) in PSO & how they will impinge on Defence Forces doctrine/operations. I remain indebted to his views and willing help in writing the original abridged version of this article which first appeared in SIGNAL magazine (Vol. 5 Issue 1, Autumn 2006). Before his untimely death Joe had been about to embark on writing the first Doctrinal Manual on Peace Support Operations for the Irish Defence Forces in the 21st Century. *Is Fíor nach mbeidh a leithéid ann arís.*

² In reality the operations in the Gulf were led primarily by the USA, with the UN actually playing a very minor role, while the SC was unsuccessful in undertaking a last minute peace initiative with Saddam Hussein. There were only three peacekeeping operations created between 1966 and 1988, but this increased to nineteen between 1988 and 1992.

³ Following collapse into catastrophic clan warfare in 1991, the UN unsuccessfully applied for foreign intervention.

It was media provoked public opinion in favour of intercession that led to intervention. Despite UN calls for United Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) to adopt an uncompromising position in dealing with armed gangs, the US adopted a position of high profile but minimum contact with the militias. The militias brazenly exerted their disdain towards the peacekeepers. Immediately after the deaths of 18 US Rangers, portrayed in the book & subsequent film "*Blackhawk Down*", bowing to the same media informed public opinion, the Clinton administration pulled out, in so doing ensuring the collapse of the UN effort in Somalia. The actions and inactions that dominated & determined the pace of events in Somalia were more critical on the US side than on the UN, yet the perception has always been of the UN. This is a clear example of a situation where the combination of national & international responsibilities for the support & control of troops, actually impeded the UN & prevented it from ultimately fulfilling its mandate.

- ⁴ At Srebrenica in 1995, the 400 strong Dutch contingent watched helplessly, as some five thousand Bosnian men & teenagers were massacred. Again the Dutch government through their MOD intervened, bypassing the UN chain of Command, their main concern that their contingent lost none of its equipment. Ryan in his book "*The United Nations & International Politics*," states that the UN peacekeeping force were viewed by the Serbs as "toy soldiers," and were seen as no threat by the militia or ultimate impediment. UN troops on the ground were scathing of the "no fire first," rules of engagement. The Serbs were careful not to directly target UN troops. The undeterred attacks on "safe havens" not only rendered the policy a complete farce, but also led to fundamental questions of the mandate, which was simultaneously wrongly interpreted as being unable to deter Serb aggression, but also denied the Muslims, the arms to defend themselves.
- ⁵ UN SC resolution 912 to send 5,500 troops failed at the hands of the US and a similar resolution 918 likewise withered on the vine, as members were not forthcoming with troops. The UN High Commissioner sought 147 observers but got only one – no transport, budget or staff. Belgium ordered its troops out, against the advice of its officers in Rwanda, after ten of its Paratroopers were butchered. The Canadian Force Commander, General Dallaire in his book "*Shake Hands with the Devil*," estimated (when the death toll was still in five figures), that he could curb it with the addition of 5,000 crack troops, which while optimistic would arguably have made a significant difference. Both the US and UK refused to recognise that a genocide was taking place, as to do so under international law would have 'obliged' the international community to intervene. London and Washington adopted the official line that the killings were merely "tribal hatred," a "breakdown of the cease-fire," & even "black on black" violence best left to sort itself out. The Carlson Report on the UN's own performance, is highly critical stating, "the UN failed the people of Rwanda." A French intervention later in the genocide, *Operation Turquoise* while an ostensibly humanitarian effort, was in fact designed to aid the evacuation of their Hutu protégées many of whom were inextricably linked to the killings.
- ⁶ The Brahimi Report was commissioned by the UN Secretary General & carried out by a high level Panel. It constituted a thorough review of the UN peace & security activities, addressing a number of issues related to the need for more urgent policy development standards & support for realistic mandates, a capacity for information management & strategic analysis, improved mission guidance & leadership, rapid deployment standards & "on-call" expertise, & the enhancement of Headquarters capacity to plan & support peace operations. The report contained recommendations to assist the UN in conducting such activities better in the future. It was presented to the General Assembly & the Security Council in August 2000. However as emphasised in the report, the willingness of member states to commit troops & financial support, the performance of the UN in PKO's would not improve.
- ⁷ The international torpor in dealing with the Darfur crisis is illustrated by the Chinese relationship with the Sudanese regime, which supplies an estimated 7% of its petroleum needs. In return China provides the Sudanese regime – who the US charges with genocide in Darfur - with billions of dollars in revenue, diplomatic support & a wide range of armaments. The diplomatic cover was in evidence in Sept 2004 when China threatened to cast a veto in the SC over a resolution calling for sanctions against Sudan for the killings taking place in Darfur. A more tepid resolution was passed instead. For more on the Darfur crisis see Comdt. Bernard Markey's article "In the World's Dark Places," published in the Summer 2005 issue of SIGNAL.
- ⁸ This included Yevgenii Primakov, former Russian Prime Minister, Brent Snowcroft, former US national security advisor, & David Hannay, former UK ambassador to the UN.
- ⁹ A Canadian concept, one clear outcome of the new R2P doctrine is that it significantly alters in the broadest sense, the description of peacekeeping & peace support operations that has been used in the past by journalists, diplomats, academics & others. Arising from the new R2P doctrine, the Defence Forces (DF), needs to explore the extent, if any, to which it may need to modify its "strategic effect" capability & in this regard the level that the DF may be obliged to deliver in an R2P "combat for humanitarian context." The attendant change in military posture from "referee to player," will have significant implications for the DF participation in future peace support operations. Decisions taken by the commander in a PSO environment are now viewed as "effects based decisions," as to how they will impinge on human rights *inter alia* the protection of same. *Ergo* in any future DF deployment the

concept of protection of human rights - R2P - must be included in the mission statement. In other words it is now an obligation as opposed to an ambition. It cannot be over emphasised that this represents a dramatic conceptual emphasis on heretofore.

¹⁰ Ed Cairns, a senior policy advisor with Oxfam, says R2P now provides a powerful new tool for lobbyists. "I can remember the terrible times...in April & May 1994 (The Rwanda genocide)...banging on doors & just getting hand-wringing, semantics about whether it was genocide or not, when everybody knew what was happening...that would be more difficult now, but at the end of the day, will right to protect make a real difference when it comes to saving lives? The honest truth is that none of us know, it'll be put to the test when the next crisis comes. It is at least possible that in 10 or 20 years we will look back on this week & think that while the summit as a whole was a damp squid, there was one thing that did come out of this. It's more likely than not over the years it will save many lives." Simon Chesterham, an international legal expert at New York University, says its adoption was remarkable. "What we're seeing is a progressive redefinition of sovereignty in a way that would have been outrageous 60 years ago."

¹¹ Worsnip, Patrick "*Ban-ki-moon lacks vision and has a closed governing style, say critics.*" The Irish Times, Dublin, January 03rd 2008.

Lessons from Kosovo

The Use of Force by UN Mandated Forces

Dr. Ray Murphy

At the time of writing, Ireland has two major commitments overseas, as part of KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic ('CAR'). The security situation in respect of both missions is volatile and unpredictable. Kosovo has declared independence and there is significant unrest among the Serb population in the region.¹ As the long awaited deployment of the EU led mission to Chad/CAR gets underway, much has been made of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the ability of EUFOR to respond 'robustly' to any attempt to prevent it carrying out its mandate.² Both the *Brahimi Report*³ and the report on events that led to the fall of Srebrenica⁴ question the traditional response of UN forces to the use of force, each advocating the formulation of a more robust doctrine. This article examines the situation that led to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in March 2004 and attempts to draw lessons for the challenges confronting KFOR today, and by analogy, other relevant UN mandated forces.

The prohibition on the use of force, other than in self-defence, is an essential characteristic of traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and is based on practical and doctrinal considerations.⁵ However, the traditional classification of UN mandated operations in terms of Chapter VI and VII of the Charter may not have the significance that is sometimes accorded such classification. The UN Secretary-General's Report on Threats and Challenges has referred to the characterisation of peacekeeping missions in terms of 'Chapter VI' or 'Chapter VII' operations as somewhat misleading.⁶ It acknowledges that there is a distinction between operations in which a robust use of force is integral to the mission and those that involve more 'traditional peacekeeping' in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be used. However, in peacekeeping cases- as much as peace enforcement- it is now the usual practice to adopt a Chapter VII mandate. An obvious exception is the 2006 mandate for the reconstituted UNIFIL force in south Lebanon.⁷ Recent UN military operations have blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement, and a broad interpretation of self-defence to include 'defence of the mission' may amount to permitting enforcement of the mandate, even when the operation is authorised under Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII of the Charter.

The basic rules for the use of force were established during the first stages of the UNEF I (1956-67)⁸ operation and these set a precedent for several later peacekeeping operations.⁹ The Secretary-General then envisaged that the basic precept of UN operations would always include 'a prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force', while at the same time permitting a response with force to an armed attack, including attempts to make UN troops withdraw from positions that they occupied under their mandate.¹⁰ After the controversy surrounding the operation in the Congo (ONUC 1960-64), there was extensive discussion

about the use of force.¹¹ However, there was a significant evolution in the guidelines since UNEF I¹², and it was the arrangements for UNEF II (1973-79)¹³ that marked a turning point in the official UN language, where the authority to use force in self-defence was deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate. This significantly broadened the definition of self-defence, giving considerably greater latitude to Force Commanders than previously was the case, and became the precedent for all major UN peacekeeping operations thereafter, including UNIFIL.¹⁴

In the past, the policy adopted by UN member states effectively allowed the Security Council to assign peacekeeping forces almost any task, however ill thought out or unrealistic, in the expectation that it could use force under the guise of self-defence and still retain its peacekeeping status. During the Bosnian war, the political imperative to be seen 'doing something' led to the creation of 'safe havens', but ignored the wider military implications of the duty to protect those havens.¹⁵ It was not a role that could realistically be undertaken by lightly armed peacekeepers. Although Resolution 836 (1993) delegated the power to member states, acting individually or through regional arrangement, to take military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect safe areas, it remained unclear who should decide when force should be used and for what purpose.¹⁶ The UN will only acknowledge such a duty if member states agree to provide requisite support and means. The experience of UNIFIL shows that this has also been a difficult problem for traditional peacekeeping operations.¹⁷

Events in Kosovo, especially during early 2004, show that this is not an easy matter to deal with in practice. The roots of the problems confronting UNMIK and KFOR can be traced to the weak policy adopted in the early stages of deployment which, in turn, was based on flawed analysis and fear of taking forceful measures to deal with extremists on all sides. Central to this was a policy of eschewing the use of force in favour of a kid gloves approach that contributed to the breakdown of law and order. Consequently, the protection of vulnerable groups and the creation of a secure environment were not achieved. A worst case scenario presented itself in March 2004, whereby the failure of international security forces to resort to force to protect the minority population was an abdication of their responsibility and a failure to implement the mandate. A combination of factors led to the outbreak of violence. There was the growing frustration among the Albanian population arising from the ambiguous constitutional status of Kosovo itself, and disillusionment with the UNMIK administration.¹⁸ UNMIK came to be viewed as an inept and even corrupt international neo-colonial presence that has done little to stem the widespread crime, unemployment and poverty. In addition, respect for KFOR was severely undermined by its uncoordinated response to the outbreak of violence in 2004.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNMIK AND DEPLOYMENT OF KFOR

The legal basis for the establishment of an international military presence in Kosovo is Resolution 1244(1999).¹⁹ This sets out the mandate of KFOR and very broadly outlines the responsibilities of the international security presence. These include:

- Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced person can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transition administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.
- Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take

- responsibility for the task; and
- Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of KFOR itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.
- Deterring renewed hostilities.
- Demilitarizing the KLA and other armed Albanian groups.

In effect, Resolution 1244 created an international protectorate. Provision of a secure environment in which to allow UNMIK perform its multiple tasks was an integral part of the operation. This assignment fell to the some 40,000 to 50,000 NATO and other troops deployed as part of KFOR. This was a NATO led international security presence, supposedly under a unified command structure controlled by the commander of KFOR. While KFOR's responsibilities were not as broad as those delegated to the civilian authorities, the mandate to establish 'a secure environment' for refugees and displaced persons in particular, left ample scope for NATO to resort to whatever means were necessary to achieve this goal. Although this mandate was intended to apply primarily to Kosovo Albanian refugees, it provided the basis for KFOR's significant role in protecting minorities, especially the Kosovo Serbs.

From the outset, there were security problems in Kosovo and accusations that KFOR was not doing enough. Although it did have initial success in the de-militarization of the KLA and in preventing a civil war, KFOR's initial policy was soft on attacks by Albanian extremists on Serb minorities. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) found much of the violence to be 'following a systematic pattern, organization and careful targeting of individuals,'²⁰ yet the excuse given by United States military and diplomatic staff was that such attacks were to be expected in the circumstances.²¹ Despite the evidence that the KLA were responsible for much of the violence, UNMIK and KFOR and other internationals continued to deal with its leaders. This had the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing the impression that these were key players which, in turn, marginalized more moderate leaders. Part of the reason for this may have been fear of the KLA. An unforeseen consequence of this policy was that it enabled extremist elements to carve out control of territory and economic assets and, therefore, fueled the black market and organized crime. Despite a strongly worded warning from then Secretary-General of NATO, George Robertson, that NATO troops would not stand idly by and watch Albanians banish the remaining Serb minority from Kosovo, the assaults on Serbs and other minorities continued.²² Human Rights Watch and other organisations have been very critical of UNMIK's and KFOR's failure to protect the minorities and, in particular, of their inconsistent responses to abuses committed by the majority Albanian population.²³ On 27 October 1999, an Albanian mob of around one thousand attacked a KFOR protected convoy of Serbs leaving Kosovo. The fact that the Serbs were leaving in the first place is clear evidence of the failure to provide a secure environment.²⁴ It is not surprising that there were calls for KFOR to adopt a more robust interpretation of the mandate and to provide adequate protection for minorities in all parts of Kosovo.²⁵

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)²⁶

The problem in Kosovo in March 2004 derived from both the actual ROE and the lack of any unified policy for their application. The KFOR ROE, as outlined on the soldier's card, covered a number of issues (relating to proportionality/minimum force) in addition to outlining when a soldier can open fire. Permissive ROE allow a military commander to choose the weapon of choice, unless expressly prohibited, tempered only by proportionality and discretion.

However, in the case of KFOR, the ROE were of little value. Although KFOR forces are said to operate under NATO command and control, and ROE, the reality is different and more complex. Each contingent has its own set of ROE based on the KFOR ROE and standard operating procedures. In this way, they possessed modifications reflecting national laws and policies. In 2000, when the Force Commander of KFOR, Major General Wirth, was asked about the ROE of national contingents, he said that each has its own 'limitations' and was free to define its commitments, within NATO doctrine and standard operating procedures.²⁷ For this reason it is essential for a brigade commander to know each contingent's ROE. An international brigade commander can deliberately select and commit a foreign contingent with more flexible engagement constraints than other contingents.²⁸ The Scandinavian contingents, for example, use dogs in crowd control situations. This is not permitted under Irish ROE. Similarly, the Irish ROE do not permit the use of CS (tear gas) or similar gas, or rubber/plastic bullets. One senior Irish officer described how he had never heard of the KFOR ROE. There was no mention of these during pre-deployment training in Sweden, and he had not encountered them while on duty in Kosovo.²⁹ The prevailing situation is that each contingent applied its own national ROE during a wave of anti-minority violence that took place in Kosovo in March 2004 and the overall result was chaotic. Moreover, to designate force protection as the main pillar of your ROE has been described as military cowardice that encourages an overly defensive and non-deterrent posture.³⁰ Ultimately this encourages the more extreme elements to test the parameters of what is acceptable behaviour.

The difficulties associated with the military integration of multinational forces are significant, but no real effort was made to ensure uniform adoption and application of ROE among KFOR contingents. It is clear that ROE can be different from one nation to another. It is as if NATO has a catalogue in which are listed all the ROE. Finding the lowest common denominator is not enough as there will always be times when a state makes national reservations based on political or similar concerns.³¹ Sometimes, differences in interpretation of ROE are more semantic than substantive.³² General Tieszen, a former military commander in Kosovo, commented that one difference between the United States ROE and others was that the United States emphasized the right of self-protection quickly, without hesitation. They also emphasized the use of direct fire and only that fire necessary to defend life. Use of lethal force was also permitted to protect certain designated critical persons other than a member of the American forces which were usually kept classified, and certain designated critical facilities and property.³³ The American contingent was also very constrained in their use of warning shots because of the belief in the propensity of such action to escalate quickly into direct firefights. Some national ROE permitted liberal resort to warning shots, and such behaviour, while complying with the relevant national ROE, making other contingents in Kosovo nervous.

The German contingent with KFOR also encountered difficulty with its ROE and was widely criticized for the way it reacted to the March 2004 riots. At the time, German soldiers were supposed to be able to defend Serbian-Orthodox religious structures only if attacked themselves by the perpetrators of pogroms. In the wake of the riots, a review was conducted which called for a change to the German ROE. Subsequent adaptations to the rules permitted the issuance of tear gas and riot gear, and cleared up ambiguities to ensure that the troops felt able to act forcefully before lives became directly threatened.

The *Brahimi Report* states that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate.³⁴ It recommends that ROE should 'not limit contingents to stroke by stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at UN troops or at the people they are charged to protect'.³⁵ In particular, dangerous situations should not force the UN to cede the initiative to attackers. In essence, the *Brahimi Report* advocates the adoption of a more robust doctrine and realistic mandates, that should specify an operation's authority to use force.³⁶

MARCH 2004 RIOTS

There was a creeping erosion of the authority of KFOR almost from the first days of deployment. In March 2004, the long simmering tensions beneath the surface in Kosovo boiled over into large scale civil unrest and violence. In this case the target of the Albanian groups was not just the minority Serb community, but also the UN personnel and equipment. Rioting mobs of youths were responsible for nineteen deaths and over nine hundred injuries, as well as the displacement of some 4500 people.³⁷ In addition, sixty five international police officers, fifty eight Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers and sixty one members of KFOR suffered injuries. The implications for the future of Kosovo remain serious. The UNMIK and KFOR response showed a lack of resolve, and the lessons of these events were not lost on extremists in Kosovo and the neighbouring region.

The French were criticised for their failure to act appropriately in attempting to prevent Serb demonstrators from attacking Albanians, an assessment the French forcefully rejected.³⁸ The argument was made that protecting property is not a priority of the KFOR mission and that, for this reason it would have been wrong to use deadly force for this purpose. The French interpretation of the mandate and ROE was narrow and controversial. The contingent's priority in Mitrovica was force protection, protection of the local population, and protection of KFOR installations and equipment. KFOR ROE appear to allow, under certain circumstance, the use of force against civilians engaged in demonstrations or riots or who commit or threaten to commit serious crimes in the presence of KFOR forces, or who pose a threat to the security of individuals or property of persons connected with KFOR or the international civilian missions in Kosovo.

Many international workers were critical of a perceived unwillingness by French KFOR troops to provide them with sufficient protection (their facilities and vehicles in particular had been the object of attack). In a thinly veiled criticism of KFOR, the head of the UNHCR operations in Kosovo asserted that international workers should not be 'sitting ducks' and threatened to withdraw if UNHCR continued to be targeted by the local population.³⁹ UN police were also often critical of the lack of support they received in carrying out their policing duties.

The level of violence was increasing steadily since the end of 2003. Under pressure to show some progress in the overall political situation, UNMIK and KFOR facilitated the creation of an illusion of normalisation.⁴⁰ Despite this, the outbreak of violence over the two day period from 17 to 18 March 2004 did not come as a surprise. It was said that in at the time KFOR and UNMIK very nearly lost control of Kosovo. UNMIK established a Crisis Management Review Body to examine how it dealt with the situation and determine how it might do better. But allegations of a cover up quickly emerged.⁴¹ Members of the minority population were

evacuated, but their homes and property were then destroyed. KFOR was unable or unwilling to respond appropriately; there were no apparent standard operating procedures or contingency plan to cope with the situation that arose. The use of force ROE proved unworkable and KFOR failed to provide the secure environment it was charged with creating and maintaining.

There was a failure to anticipate the trouble, despite evidence that individual military and police officers could see what was coming. In addition, no reinforcements were sent to support those deployed at key flash points and the so-called chain of command failed to function. Sheer numbers were also a problem: KFOR had been reduced from around 45000 to 17500, with further troop cuts planned, and so fixed positions such as checkpoints had been replaced by less labour intensive mobile patrols. Moreover, many duties formerly undertaken by UNMIK police were delegated to the Kosovo Police Service, which was just not ready for the job.

Numbers were also asserted to have played a part when it was widely reported that French KFOR troops failed to protect the village of Svinjare, a few hundred metres from their logistical base.⁴² Despite having received a two hour warning, the French subsequently claimed that they had too few troops to respond; as a result, Serb property was either looted or destroyed. In Prizren, German KFOR troops were unable to prevent the Orthodox churches, seminary buildings and monasteries from being laid waste. Individual Serb houses were also destroyed. The nature of many of the locations targeted did make them exceptionally difficult to protect, whereas the village of Svinjare could have been defended with relative ease. It seemed that the rioters knew exactly how far to go without provoking the German soldiers into shooting. In the Irish area of responsibility, members of minority communities were given reassurances by KFOR troops and stayed put. In this instance, KFOR did fulfil its mandate to protect such communities. These developments compromise the long-term impartiality of KFOR.

The legacy of the March 2004 violence was not just the loss of credibility by UNMIK and KFOR, but also the bitter recriminations that followed between the various branches of the UN operation. There was reference made to the 'Srebrenica syndrome' amongst KFOR troops to the effect that if you do not have enough troops you just give in instead of standing your ground. This begs the question, what military commander ever considered he or she had sufficient troops or resources?

KFOR lost face in Kosovo and in the eyes of the international community as a whole. In response to intimidation and the threat of violence, the international security presence relinquished a significant amount of its authority to the extremists. Another consequence of the March rioting and the failure to respond appropriately is that KFOR was left a less unified force.

The vulnerability of KFOR was exposed. UNMIK and KFOR operate in a quasi-hostile environment. KFOR was shown not to be able to protect the Serb minority and a 'humanitarian intervention' by Serbian forces to protect this group must be considered a future possibility. There was a significant contrast in the policy adopted by different contingents. The British contingent adopted a flexible, but aggressive no nonsense approach. They worked on the ground in small units, an approach that maximises visibility amongst the local population and confers a degree of autonomy on relatively low ranking personnel, enabling them to respond immediately and appropriately to whatever situation arises. This concept of operations retained

the option of deploying a stronger, more concentrated force when necessary. In contrast, the French have a reputation for inconsistency. When they decide to respond to situations of tension or crises, they are generally effective; however, they are often too eager to return to the status quo, even if premature to do so. They have acted against demonstrators, but they have failed to halt harassment of minorities by Serbs in northern Mitrovica and have notably failed to take action against the local 'bridge watchers' who act as vigilantes to prevent non-Serbs returning to former homes or entering the Serb controlled area.

KFORs problems in Mitrovica, of course, extend beyond the French. American forces observe the classic military doctrine of placing the highest priority on the security of their own force. They also deploy overwhelming, and occasionally effective, force. However, such tactics are often inappropriate when a threat is relatively small and involves minor actors. It is also a blunt instrument with which to deal with civil disturbances and riots. The British contingent, possibly due to the lessons learned from mistakes in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, appears to have adopted the best overall approach.

The difference in philosophies has been compounded by command and control problems which have beset KFOR from the outset in the broadest sense. Resolution 1244 made the military and civilian components distinct but equal partners in the international community's efforts to create a functioning democratic administrative structure in Kosovo. It requires the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as overall head of the civil presence, to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner. The responsibility of KFOR expressly includes supporting as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international presence. This is the only guidance on the nature and extent of the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR. Although established under the auspices of the UN, it is not a typical UN peace support operation. It is not subject to the Secretary-General or his representative in Kosovo, and it does not have the command and control structure of other UN operations.⁴³ This may have appeared to be a good idea on paper, but the practical implications for an operation as complex as that in Kosovo were not considered in full. The language of mutual cooperation between UNMIK and KFOR may read well in Resolution 1244, but the consequences for achieving the overall objective of the mission are still being felt on the ground. This supposedly symbiotic relationship has not facilitated accomplishing the mission and created serious challenges for UNMIK and KFOR.

Moreover, even if one were to leave the UNMIK-KFOR dichotomy out of the equation, different military doctrines, cultures and styles have worked against the attainment of a cohesive and unified approach to implementing the mandate within KFOR itself. The German commander of KFOR, General Klaus Reinhardt, expressed his view of this problem rather bluntly when he said, 'one of the most important things that I have learnt in Kosovo is that the man who is KFOR commander, in fact doesn't have anything to command'.⁴⁴

Over the course of the two day period in March 2004, the security forces in Kosovo i.e. KFOR, UMMIK and the Kosovo Police Service, almost lost control of the province. The rioting and attacks on the minority community was spontaneous yet organized. In many locations every single Serb, Roma and Ashkali home was burned, while ethnic Albanian homes alongside

these remained untouched. This can only be described as a complete failure by the security forces to enforce the mandate and provide the required level of security. French, German and Italian KFOR troops merit special criticism. Career conscious commanders were afraid to make decisions that could impact negatively on personal future advancement. The fact that Conventional military tactics are useless in a security environment such as exists in Kosovo also contributed to the problem. In addition, there is an obvious need for troops and a police force trained for crowd control and riot situations in order to address the threat to the minority communities and to the security forces themselves. Moreover, while there was little likelihood of an invasion prior to the March violence, the failure to adequately respond to it may provide the Serbian authorities in Belgrade with an excuse and some encouragement to intervene in the future. The situation was summed up by a senior UNMIK official when he said:

We always knew that Kosovo would not be invaded. KFOR is in Kosovo to protect from civil violence, civil disturbance and ethnic violence. They don't need tanks, but riot gear and shields, and soldiers trained in dealing with public disorder. If KFOR was not prepared for such civil disorder, then why the heck not? What did they think they were in Kosovo for?⁴⁵

Armoured fighting vehicles are almost useless in situations of civil disturbance. As KFOR does not have sufficient numbers, the very least in can be provided with is adequate equipment and training for the mission. There is need for a complete review and overhaul of the security structures currently in place in Kosovo. Conventional armies are reluctant to adopt a role in quelling riots and similar internal security matters. Nevertheless, this is the primary threat in Kosovo. As a result, the training, role and mission of KFOR are in need of special attention. KFOR must also put in place standard operational procedures common to all contingents and Brigade areas, and national governments must not be allowed to dictate policies that ultimately undermine the unity and cohesion of KFOR. Relations between KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service, which were not good in the first place, were ultimately further undermined. Human Rights Watch called for KFOR 'to develop a unified command structure and a common response system to violence in Kosovo, abandoning the decentralised structures and disparate national doctrines that contributed to the chaos of March 17 and 18'.⁴⁶

The final paragraph of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council for the period in question thanks KFOR; it also expresses gratitude to NATO for the swift deployment of additional troops and to UNMIK for commitment and professionalism in carrying out their duties.⁴⁷ While the British deserve credit for the prompt and effective deployment of the Over the Horizon Forces, such diplomatic language is otherwise farcical in the context of the abject failure of so many elements to perform their missions and fulfil their responsibilities. A special internal report more accurately portrays a mission in crisis. Many on the ground in Kosovo believe that if the rioting had lasted an additional day, the mission would have collapsed.⁴⁸ In fairness, a number of measures have been taken to address the inadequacies evident after the March riots. Local and minority involvement in the security process is now being facilitated through Local Crime Prevention Councils established at municipality level, and the Kosovo Security Advisory Group at the central level.

There is now better co-ordination between UNMIK and KFOR. Joint contingency plans have been created and joint operations to improve communication, command and control have taken place. KFOR also established small mobile liaison and monitoring teams for each municipality. These are the eyes and ears of KFOR on the ground, and reflect a tactical change from static positions to less predictable and more responsive patrolling involving special focus on liaison with local communities and monitoring vulnerable areas. An essential element in their job is establishing contact with local religious, political, and village leaders, police, and similar persons. Having observed these operating in the Irish area, they proved highly effective. The Kosovo Police Service is now better equipped and trained to deal with crowd control and public order, and special units have been set up for this purpose. The police now have inter-ethnic officers appointed to police stations, and Minority Issues Officers to regional police headquarters. Although all of these have yet to be tested in practice, there is a realisation that the events of March 2004 must never be allowed to reoccur.

CONCLUSION

The litmus test for determining the nature of a UN operation, i.e. peacekeeping or peace enforcement, remains the ability and willingness to resort to the use of force. Despite this, the dividing line between the use of force in self-defence on traditional peacekeeping operations, and that on peace enforcement operations is not so clear in practice. Much will depend on subjective variables that are difficult to predict; and these may influence the way in which a mandate is interpreted and applied.

In a more contrite view in the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General noted that, in some cases, peacekeeping forces are delegated tasks that 'can on occasion exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations of peacekeeping force contributors'.⁴⁹ It would appear that the Secretary-General's analysis that peace enforcement is a viable option for coalitions of the willing, but not UN controlled missions, is a realistic assessment of the political and military reality of UN peace support operations.⁵⁰

Consent and co-operation of all parties to a conflict remains a fundamental characteristic of traditional peacekeeping operations. Linked to this is the need for impartiality in all UN operations. The *Brahimi Report* has noted that while this means adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate, it is not the same as equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to appeasement.⁵¹ In situations of contemporary conflict, local parties may 'not consist of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force, but morally compelled to do so'. Genocide in Rwanda was able to go as far as it did in part because of a failure of the international community (through the auspices of the UN) to oppose obvious evil. Ethnic cleansing of the remaining minority population in Kosovo must be prevented. However, permitting one country to determine the nature and extent of the use of force is not likely in the best interests of the UN, and allows a degree of 'limited liability' for that country in the event of things going wrong.⁵² When this happened in Somalia, the United States extricated itself with relative ease, while the UN was used as a scapegoat for the manner in which events unfolded.

The recommendations of the *Brahimi Report* are commendable, especially the need to provide mission leadership with strategic guidance. But this is a high reaching goal, given the fact that UN controlled forces are generally not even given adequate capabilities to intimidate or enforce. Another UN report is unlikely to change this historical fact. The British 'Wider Peacekeeping' concept is one of the more lucid explanations on the use of force and permits its initiation in circumstances other than in self-defence.⁵³ However, it must be proportional, applied impartially, and have the consent of a majority of the significant parties.⁵⁴ It must also contribute to the accomplishment of the mandate in the longer term.

In the course of the UN operation in the Congo in the 1960's, the principle of the non- use of force except in self-defence was applied.⁵⁵ In that instance, some critics concluded that the emphasis on self-defence was too rigid in view of the functions of the mission and that, in practice, it could not be followed.⁵⁶ During the operation, the Secretary-General was criticised for his failure to appreciate the essential link between the right of self-defence and the right to freedom of movement. The ground rules for the use of force in the Congo changed as the mission progressed and in this way it could be described as the first instance of 'mission creep'. The right to use force was extended, but the exact limitations on it were unclear. However, despite authorisation to use force in the prevention of civil war 'as a last resort', and in the apprehension of foreign mercenaries, the UN still considered itself bound by respect for state sovereignty.⁵⁷

The UN Secretary-General has overall responsibility for the conduct of UN commanded peacekeeping missions and as such he has to be mindful of the views of the troop contributing states.⁵⁸ Without their support in the first instance, it would not be possible to field or maintain a UN force on the ground.

The Secretary-General's report on the fall of Srebrenica concluded that the cardinal lesson of that awful sequence of events is that 'a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means', and it accused the UN of 'pervasive ambivalence... regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace; [and] an institutional ideology of impartiality when confronted with an attempted genocide'.⁵⁹ This view is consistent with the robust doctrine advocated in the *Brahimi Report*.

The violence in Kosovo and the killings of members of both communities highlights the deficiencies in the security environment provided by KFOR. The actual ROE provide ample opportunity and legal justification for resort to force when necessary. What is needed is the will to do so. Had a firm and consistent policy been adopted in the early stages of deployment by UNMIK and KFOR, many believe the violence and ethnic tensions endemic to Kosovo could have been reduced significantly. The separate KFOR brigades are controlled like independent fiefdoms, with little or no central command, and significant variations in policy and procedures. There is no real effort to subordinate the military operation to NATO procedures or command. Even within brigade areas there are no common standing operations procedures, and national policies take precedence. Deploying conscript soldiers with little experience and inadequate training for the situation in Kosovo is part of the problem. Some contingents should not be there, and those that are must have proper training and equipment. Deploying lightly armed peacekeepers like UNPROFOR creates expectations that cannot be

fulfilled. It is also risky for the peacekeepers and for those who seek their protection. The European Union played an important role in the status process and is preparing to play a significant role in post-status Kosovo. A Planning Team for possible future operations in Kosovo was established to prepare for possible takeover of selected tasks from the current UN administration in the province.⁶⁰ The international community's and EU's future role in Kosovo is closely attached to the post-status arrangements where UNMIK will transfer its authority of Kosovo over to the Kosovo authorities.⁶¹

Progress in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) should not be measured just in security terms but in creating an environment in which EU standards of justice, political, economic and cultural norms can apply. The EU and UN have chosen not to support an integrationist solution to the problems of Kosovo. This may prove a mistake in the long term. Many obstacles will have to be overcome especially in the fight against organised crime and the corruption that exists throughout the Balkans in particular. A failure in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo would be a serious setback for the future of ESDP. Perhaps it can be best summed up by the first High Representative to BiH, Carl Bildt:

It is sometimes said that the success of ESDP should be measured by its achievements in the Balkans. While being too limited a view of the tasks of ESDP - with the ESS [European Security Strategy] a far more ambitious agenda has been set - it is nevertheless true that a policy that is seen as failing here will have a hard time making itself a success elsewhere.⁶²

The question of Kosovo's future status has been decided.⁶³ The outbreak of civil disturbances in March 2004, including ethnic cleansing of Serbs, has added to the uncertainty and tension in the region. In Serbia, the government has reacted negatively and Russia has hinted that it will reject any solution that is not acceptable to Serbia. Montenegro has already separated from its "Solana imposed" union with Serbia.⁶⁴ A reciprocal demand by the Republika Srpska, supported by Serbia, remains a possibility. Should KFOR be tested again as happened in 2004, then NATO, the EU and the UN must ensure a co-ordinated and effective response to the protection of all vulnerable groups.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Andrew Purvis, 'Serb Rage at US over Kosovo', *Time*, 23 February 2008. 'Serbia is warned by Europe to Deter Embassy Attacks', *New York Times*, 22 February 2008. N. Pejic, 'Kosovo: Will Divorce From Serbia Be Better Than Forced Marriage?', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 22 February 2008.

² Lt Gen Dermot Early, Chief of Staff, Defence Forces, 'Irish soldiers deploying to Chad will continue our proud tradition', *Irish Times*, 21 February 2008, p. 16. Lt. Gen. Pat Nash, Operational Commander, Eufor, Interview, *RTE Radio 1*, 29 January 2008. Alistair Thompson, Chad calls for EU deployment as rebels regroup, *Mail and Guardian*, 7 February 2008.

³ Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report,) UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 23 August 2000.

⁴ See 'Lessons for the future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica, General Assembly Doc. A/54/49, 15 November 1999, esp. paras. 502 and 505.

⁵ See M. Goulding, 'The Use of Force by the United Nations' (1996) 3(1) *International Peacekeeping* 1-18; F. T. Liu,

United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force (New York, International Peace Academy, 1992), p. 11; and G. van Hegelsom, 'The Law of Armed Conflict and UN Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement Operations' (1993) 6 *Hague Yearbook of International Law* 45-58.

⁶ 'A more secure world: our shared responsibility', Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, 2 December 2004, paras. 212-214. See also S. Chesterman, 'The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations', External Study, Best Practices Unit (UN DPKO, 2004), p.6.

⁷ Originally, UNIFIL was established in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 in 1978 to confirm the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area. Following the July/August 2006 crisis, the Council enhanced the force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons - Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). It is noteworthy that neither resolution referred to Chapter VI or VII of the Charter. ugust 2006

⁸ UNEF I was the first United Nations peacekeeping force and it was established by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly which was held from 1 to 10 November 1956. The mandate of the Force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. UNEF was withdrawn in May-June 1967, at Egypt's request.

⁹ H. Wiseman, 'United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview' in H. Wiseman (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York/Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 19- 58, esp. p. 33. For a more general discussion on the use of force see A. James, *The Role of Force in International Order and United Nations Peacekeeping*, Report of a Conference at Ditchley Park, (16-19 May 1969), Ditchley Paper No 10 S u m m a r y Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 179. See R. Siekmann, *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces* (2nd edn, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), p. 53..20, Ditchley Foundation, Oxfordshire.

¹⁰ Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para. 179. See R. Siekmann, *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces* (2nd edn, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), p. 53.

¹¹ A. James, 'The Congo Controversies' (1994) 1 *International Peacekeeping* 44-58, esp. 51-52; D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces* (London, Stevens, 1964), pp. 200-205; M. Harrington Gagnon, 'Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent' (1967) 21(4) *International Organization* 812-836; A. Eide, 'United Nations Forces in Domestic Conflicts' in P. Frydenberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Experience and Evaluation – the Oslo Papers* (Oslo, NUPI, 1964), pp. 251-252; N. T. Kassar, 'The Legal Limits to the Use of International Force Through the United Nations Practice' (1979) 35 *Revue Egyptienne de Droit International*, pp. 163-234, esp. 195-218; and C. F. Amerasinghe, 'The Use of Armed Force by the United Nations in the Charter Travaux Préparatoires' (1965) 5 *Indian Journal of International Law* 305-333.

¹² T. Findlay, 'The Use of Force in Self-Defence. Theory and Practice' in A. Morrison, D. Fraser & J. Kiras (eds.) *Peacekeeping With Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (Clementsport Nova Scotia, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1997), pp. 51-75 at p. 55.

¹³ UNEF II was established on 25 October 1973 with the mandate to supervise the implementation of Security Council Resolution 340, which demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. The Force was tasked with using its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting.

¹⁴ UN Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978, para 4. The paragraph dealing with the use of force stated: 'The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defence. *Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council* (Italics added). The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council'. See T. Findlay, 'The Use of Force in Self-Defence', p. 55.

¹⁵ Y. Akashi, 'The Use of Force in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate' (1995) 19 *Fordham International Law Journal* 312-323. See also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 - The fall of Srebrenica, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 November 1999.

¹⁶ D. Sarooshi, *The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999), esp., pp. 72-75, 83-85, and 254-263.

- ¹⁷ R. Murphy, 'UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force' (1999) 6(2) *International Peacekeeping* 38-63; and N. D. White, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (2nd edn, Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 241.
- ¹⁸ Letter dated 17 November from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/932 30 November 2004.
- ¹⁹ Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 10 June 1999.
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- ²¹ W. O'Neill, *Kosovo – An Unfinished Peace*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, Lynne Rienner (2002), p. 46.
- ²² Reuters, 22 October 1999.
- ²³ See for example, Human Rights Watch, *Abuses Against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo*, (August, 1999). On 27 October 1999, an Albanian mob of around one thousand attacked a KFOR protected convoy of Serbs leaving Kosovo. Many were injured, and KFOR failed to protect those fleeing as required by the Resolution 1244. The fact that the Serbs were leaving in the first place is clear evidence of the failure to provide a secure environment. See also Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo* (March, 2004).
- ²⁴ International Crisis Group, *Who's Killing Whom in Kosovo*, Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999, p. 14.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17. There were also calls by the ICG for KFOR to clamp down on the remaining structures of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and to monitor closely the KPC.
- ²⁶ See generally 'Peace Support Operations' in the International Committee of the Red Cross, *Model Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, (Geneva, ICRC, 1999), paras. 2024-2027; G. Bowens, *Legal Guide to Peace Support Operations* (US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1998), pp. 185-202; J. Simpson, *Law Applicable to Canadian Forces in Somalia 1992/93: A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia* (Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), pp. 35-39; P. Rowe, 'Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents' (2000) 5(1) *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 45-62 at 59; *Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Judge Advocates*, Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), 1 May 2000; *Operational Law Handbook 2002*, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocates General's School, US Army, (2002), 67-100; and T. Findlay, 'The Use of Force in Self-Defence', 51-75, at 52 and 55.
- ²⁷ UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/263, 2 June 2000.
- ²⁸ See *Towards a European vision for use of land forces? Multinationality and interoperability within the framework of operational missions ranging from high to low intensity (from combat to peace support)*, (France: CDES Doctrine Forum, 2001), p. 18.
- ²⁹ Personal interview, senior Irish officer, Dublin, September 2004.
- ³⁰ Analysis of the March 2004 events by military officer present titled "What went wrong and why it will happen again", anonymous, 2004.
- ³¹ See comments by General Gaviard, *Towards a European vision for use of land forces?* CDES Doctrine Forum, 2001, p. 47.
- ³² See Col. C. Dunlap, 'US Legal Issues in Coalition Operations', pp. 3-4.
- ³³ See comments by General Tieszen, *Towards a European vision for use of land forces?*, CDES Doctrine Forum, 2001 p. 48.
- ³⁴ *Brahimi Report*, part 2, para. 49.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ There were 730 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes damaged or destroyed, up to ten public buildings, and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed. UN Doc. S/2004/348, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, para. 3.
- ³⁸ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica*, Balkans Report No. 96, 31 May 2000, p. 10.
- ³⁹ Reuters, 'U.N. Agency Threatens to Suspend Operations in Kosovo Area,' *New York Times*, 4 May 2000.
- ⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004, p. 17.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19
- ⁴² See Jean-Endes Barbier, 'Smouldering Serb village in Kosovo gutted in sight of NATO peacekeepers', *Agence France Presse*, 21 March 2004, N. Wood, 'Kosovo Smoulders After Mob Violence', *New York Times*, 24 March 2004, p. 10.

- ⁴³ D. Marshall and S. Inglis, 'The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo' (2003) 16 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 107-146 at 108.
- ⁴⁴ *Die Welt*, 19 June 2000.
- ⁴⁵ Senior UNMIK official quoted in Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo*, March 2004, p. 1.
- ⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo*, March 2004, p. 2.
- ⁴⁷ UN Doc. S/2004/348, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, para. 62.
- ⁴⁸ See C. Jennings, 'NATO peacekeepers 'unable' to keep lid on violence in Kosovo', *The Scotsman*, 2 September 2004.
- ⁴⁹ *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (New York, United Nations, 1995), para. 35. For an analysis, see M. Reisman, 'Peacemaking' (1993) 18 *Yale Journal of International Law* 415.
- ⁵⁰ D. Daniel, 'Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable Peace Enforcement' in A. Morrison, D. Fraser & J. Kiras (eds.), *Peacekeeping With Muscle*, pp. 1-15, at p. 10.
- ⁵¹ *Brahimi Report*, part 2, para. 50.
- ⁵² The term was first used with reference to 'superpower' support for peacekeeping by N.A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Lebanon and Sinai*, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1984), p. 84.
- ⁵³ See United Kingdom Army Field Manual, *Wider Peacekeeping*, (5th Draft Rev. 1994).
- ⁵⁴ See D. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clementsport Nova Scotia, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), pp. 50-54.
- ⁵⁵ R. Higgins, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1980), pp. 44-53, 57-61, 348, 384-387..
- ⁵⁶ D. W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, pp. 200-205. G.I.A.D. Draper, 'The Legal Limitation upon the employment of weapons by the United Nations Force in the Congo' (1963) 12 *International Comparative Legal Quarterly* 387-413 at 406.
- ⁵⁷ Kassar, 'The Legal Limits to the Use of International Force', 208.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.* See also B. Skogmo, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988* (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 131-162; and Sarooshi, *The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security*, p. 69.
- ⁵⁹ See 'Lessons for the future', in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 – The fall of Srebrenica, General Assembly Doc. A/54/49, 15 November 1999, paras. 502 and 505. (Hereafter 'Report on Srebrenica'.)
- ⁶⁰ EUPT Kosovo established by EU Council on 10 April 2006.
- ⁶¹ On 16 February 2008, the European Council decided to launch the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo- "EULEX Kosovo".
- ⁶² C. Bildt, "The first five years (1999-2004)-Actors and Witnesses", *EU Security and Defence Policy*, p. 142.
- ⁶³ Based on the plan or recommendations put forward by UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. S. Kobar, "Europe's approaching train wreck", *International Herald Tribune*, 22 March 2007. See also International Crisis Group, "Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan", Europe Report N°182 , 14 May 2007 and International Crisis Group Media Brief, "Serbia's New Government: Turning from Europe", Belgrade/Brussels, 31 May 2007.
- ⁶⁴ Solana brokered the Belgrade Agreement of 14 March 2002 that dissolved Tito's Yugoslavia and created the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This policy was opposed by a majority of Montenegrins who wanted to be independent of a maligned and impoverished Serbia. See Keane, "The Solana Process in Serbia and Montenegro: Coherence in EU Foreign Policy", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 11, No 3, (2004), p. 491-507

Balkan Dilemma

Anthony Foley

The great tragedy of the Balkans is the abject failure, or indeed refusal on the part of every outside power that ever became involved there for any reason to understand the complexity of the region. For the purposes of this article, I propose to examine the region of the Balkans previously comprising of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. While we are all aware to some degree of the horrendous conflicts that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia, many of us remain ignorant of the underlying causes of these conflicts and indeed if one were to attempt to examine these causes, one would have to attempt to do so in a far more detailed manner than a short article such as this permits. I propose omitting some aspects of the peace process in which I was involved, including the exhumation process, a subject that merits an entire study in itself and instead attempt to give a mere taste of the Balkans and in particular of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I also propose ignoring in large degree the separate but most important question of post communist transition, an area often overlooked completely, but which merit's a separate study and an article such as this is not a suitable forum.

I believe that it is true to say that the involvement of any foreign power in the region of the former Yugoslavia has only served to make matters worse, regardless of the reasons for that involvement. Down through the centuries, no foreign power ever left this region in a better or more stable state than that in which they found it. In short, the region has always suffered as a result of foreign interference. This failure to even try to gain an understanding of the complexities inherent to the region has carried on right down to the twenty first century and the result has contributed greatly to the tragedy. This lack of understanding encompasses an apparent refusal to comprehend the underlying tensions brought about by history, ethnic and religious differences, the legacy of communism and the legacy of the entire region having been a pawn in colonial feuds. Since the early 1990's, Yugoslavia made the transition from being a federal state to becoming a region divided into six separate republics and indeed as I write, it would appear that a number of States now recognise a seventh republic, following on the unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo – but more of that later.

In the wake of conflict anywhere, it appears to me to be absolutely necessary for any peace keeping entity to gain an understanding of the history of the place in which such conflict has occurred. There is little point in adopting one's own interpretation of history, social and political values or ethnic or religious differences. One must try to get to the roots of all of these aspects of any theatre of conflict and any failure to address this properly and honestly is bound to result in the eventual failure of any peace process.

Historical complexity may well be found to be confusing; however such complexity often throws up seemingly very contradictory elements in relation to the Balkans. Examples are to be found throughout the history of the region. How many people realise for instance, that even

if one returns to the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, one will find that it was not simply a battle between the Serbs and the Turks, but that Prince Lazar was able to depend on the support of a large contingent of Croatian knights under the command of Vuk Draskovic. How many will realise that the Muslim dominated region of Bihac was the only Muslim region to engage in armed rebellion against the Ottoman Empire and indeed was to pay a high price for their efforts. The apparent contradictory actions of Bihac do not stop there, however; in the 1990's Firket Abdic, a Muslim with some thirty thousand followers openly opposed the Bosnian State. In many minor ways, one also encounters what appear to be contradictions which illustrate historical complexity. For instance, I remember in the 1990's that many elderly men would claim to have been 'in the Brigade' if asked about their experiences in World War II. This reply went unnoticed by many, but it is interesting to note that 'the Brigade' in question was a Brigade of the army of the NDH (Croatian Independent State), the autonomous Croatian State that allied itself with Axis Forces. Of course, in itself it is not surprising that veterans of World war II might admit that they had been members of a Croatian Brigade; however, many foreigners might have wondered a little when a Muslim admitted that he too had been 'in the Brigade. Of course what most outsiders did not realise is that there had been in fact two brigades, both fighting side by side for the NDH; one brigade was distinguished by the fact that its troops wore the Croatian 'seslija', or 'checkerboard' insignia on their uniforms; the brigade insignia worn on the uniforms of troops of the other brigade consisted of the Muslim Crescent on a green background. Troops in the Muslim Brigade would have described themselves simply as Croat and the fact that they happened to be Muslim was incidental. Indeed, until constitutional change in Yugoslavia in 1974, Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have described themselves as being either Croat or Serb; the fact that they were of the Muslim Faith did not change that. From the late sixties, Alija Izetbegovic, wartime leader of the Muslim faction in the 1990's and a member of the Joint Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-war years, had pressed for the recognition of 'Musilmani' as a distinct ethnic group and he succeeded.

From 1974, people could describe themselves as being Croat, Serb, Musilmani, Yugoslav, or 'Other'. Some people had a problem with this, including some Muslims. Sometime in 1996, before the expiry of the EU mandate I was asked to meet a Muslim orthopaedic surgeon who required help with a legal problem concerning his right to return to a Croat controlled area. In speaking to the claimant, I used the term 'Bosnjiak' rather than Muslim, as I wished to avoid offending him and 'Bosnjiak' was the term preferred by many of the Muslim politicians (even though the people tended to use the term 'muselman'). When I used the term, the good doctor verbally attacked me and said that the term offended him, as it had been coined by Izetbegovic in the early 1990's. He went on to remind me that he was a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who simply happened to be of the Muslim Faith and he could see absolutely no logic in affording any religious group ethnic recognition. It seemed that every time he heard either the term 'Bosnjiak' or the term 'Muselman' used in an ethnic sense, he felt offended. Of course, he was not the only citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who felt this way.

If one examines the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the world's reaction to it, one cannot help but wonder at the mistakes that were made and this poses the question as to whether the ensuing conflicts might not have been prevented, or at least whether the sheer scale of these conflicts might not have been minimised. It defies logic that a country in such close

geographical proximity to the European Community (now the European Union), could have fallen apart so quickly and so bloodily as did Yugoslavia. It is as if all the previous mistakes on the part of European Imperial powers and indeed the Ottoman Empire suddenly came back to haunt us all. It seems incredible that a country that appeared to be reasonably stable until the 1990's could erupt in such a way. In my mind, there is little doubt that Yugoslavia would have broken into a number of separate states in any case, given the historical background of that country. The manner in which it happened, however, does not appear to have been anticipated by most Europeans and for Europe to have a conflict of the type that ensued right on its doorstep must have surely given rise to a form of international *dejavu*. I do not think that anybody who went to the region in the 1990's could have anticipated the shock they would experience at seeing a hereto reasonably "normal" European country in the state in which we found the region we had known as Yugoslavia. I remember entering the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina one evening in the spring of 1996 and travelling along the frontline that divided that city and not quite being able to grasp the fact that I was still in Europe. I remember thinking to myself that the scene before me was something out of a different time; it was like being catapulted back in time to what I imagined the aftermath of the Second World War to have been in so many parts of Europe. To me this could not be any part of Europe in the closing years of the twentieth century.

Very quickly, I learned that any understanding of the conflict in the Western Balkans would not be gleaned from briefing materials, or from the simplistic analysis that seemed to be so much the order of the day within the International Community. I learned that one had to see way beyond the conflict and its perceived immediate causes. It became clear to me rather quickly that the animosities that allowed the intensity of the Balkans conflicts to translate into something reminiscent of the darkest periods of European history had to be understood. The problem was, of course, that an understanding with the depth necessary was not possible given the constraints of urgency attendant on the peace keeping process. It soon became obvious that the animosities that gave rise to the conflicts had never been examined properly by anybody from outside the region and at best these animosities had been suppressed not alone by the various foreign actors down through the centuries, but also by the communist regime since the end of the second World War. The problems of the region had never received anything like the attention they merited and the result of continuous inept dealing on the part of so many interests had brought about a situation where conflict was probably inevitable and where extremism could flourish. There is little point in offering an analysis of this now; the fact is that there was conflict and nowhere was that conflict more devastating than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What falls to be examined is how the world reacted to that conflict and to pose the question as to whether that reaction was effective or whether it was simply yet another holding exercise.

Leaving aside any reservations about the ways in which the international community addressed the situation in the Balkans and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, what of the actual peace process? Prior to the deployment of the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had been something of a failure and the mandate of UNPROFOR had been such that any possibility of their succeeding had become impossible. Many people will be familiar with the attempts on the part of UNPROFOR to establish effective 'safe havens' for the victims of the war and their subsequent failure.

Following the air strikes against Serb positions and following the signing of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords in 1995, it became obvious that only the deployment of an effective military force could possibly work in the region. While many may have grave reservations about the deployment of a peacekeeping force under the command of a military alliance such as NATO, there is little doubt that this was the only effective way of securing a rapid response to the situation and the introduction of such a large effective military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Few will argue that it worked. The mandate of IFOR was not perfect and had many shortcomings, but its commanders tried their utmost to ensure effectiveness. Later, when IFOR was replaced by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 1997 with a slightly improved mandate, this policy was continued. In short, the military elements of the peace process succeeded in fulfilling their purpose within the confines of their mandates. The deployment of an effective military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred too late in the day to prevent the worst events of the war in that country. If it had been considered possible to deploy such a force earlier and if such a force had been deployed, then the toll extracted by the war on the people of the region might have been far less and a far better solution might have been reached without the appalling loss of life which occurred.

The Dayton/Paris Peace Accords were defective in many respects, and it is my view that this truth will eventually emerge. Far from being an acceptable solution, the Accords may be viewed more correctly as a holding measure. While it is true that military hostilities ceased, it is also true that none of the warring factions saw the accords as satisfying their aspirations. This is true in particular in regard to the Croats and the Serbs, neither of whom actually wanted to be part of the political entity which the accords seemed to copper fasten. The accords are flawed for many reasons, but the mere fact that two of the principle signatories to the Accords (the late Dr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia and the late Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia) represented entities outside Bosnia and Herzegovina is, in itself, indicative of the background to Dayton/Paris. Of course it is also true that their involvement was viewed as necessary to the success of the Dayton negotiations and that both the Croats and the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw their involvement as being crucial to the protection of their respective interests.

None of this detracts from the very real impression one gets that the Accords were very much based on an artificial consensus that was forced on the warring factions by the international community and at best both the Croat and Serb elements viewed the result to be something of an interim measure at that time. Any agreement, the basis of which is founded on forced consensus, will inevitably fail to satisfy everybody. It is against this background that it was sought to implement the peace process. It is somewhat doubtful that the former warring factions had any great faith in the Accords and having witnessed negotiations leading up to many subsequent local agreements, this view is not without basis.

Prior to Dayton/Paris, the European Union had been involved directly from the very early days of the conflicts in former-Yugoslavia in the form of the European Communities Monitor Mission (ECMM, now the European Union Monitor Mission, EUMM) and from 1994 in the form of the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM). ECMM probably had the greatest collective knowledge of the region and also probably had the greatest rapport with a very diverse range of interests. EUAM was established by the European Union to

undertake the re-unification of the City of Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina. At the time of the establishment of EUAM, Mostar was firmly divided between Muslims and Croats, with a small remaining community of Serbs. Fighting in this area of the city had been very intense, not only because of the Serb offensive, but also during the conflict that erupted between the Muslims and the Croats. Effectively, EUAM was charged with the unification of the city and its various components. This process was in many ways experimental and included the reconstruction of the war torn city. EUAM was to remain for two years and as it happened it remained in the form of the EU Office of the Special Envoy (EUOSEM) for a further six months until the end of 1996 when a number of remaining functions were passed to the United Nations in the form of the Office of the High Representative (UNOHR) based in Sarajevo. The experience of EUAM is interesting from a peacekeeping point of view in that it added a new dimension to peacekeeping. Those deployed by the European Union (many being members of ECMM) were faced with what appeared to be an impossible task in a city that remained in the throes of conflict. Much has been written since about this period in an effort to explain the processes by which EUAM worked. The remit of this team included the establishment of joint institutions, including a unified police force, the reconstruction of war damaged or destroyed buildings and the facilitating of free elections (the first free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the war). For half the period of its existence, EUAM operated against a background of open conflict and while open conflict ceased following the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords, EUAM continued to operate against a background of hostility and sporadic violence between the factions. Agreement on most matters was only achieved painfully and after protracted negotiation; nonetheless, EUAM managed to rebuild much of the city. It also managed to set in place a situation within which the former warring factions could deal with each other and it managed to facilitate the holding of elections. Nobody who was part of EUAM will claim that we achieved perfect success, but given the background against which we operated, EUAM can claim quite a lot of success. What distinguishes EUAM in many ways was its ability to operate in a way whereby it managed to form a rapport with all sides and to gain the respect of a great many people. People came to realise that members of EUAM had no negative agendas and of course, from a European point of view its members proved that cohesion between individuals from various European member States was not just possible, but in most respects it was also effective. In Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, this continued when members of EUAM/OSEM were seconded to UNOHR to allow a reasonably smooth transition of responsibility from the European Union to OHR.

It was at the point of the transition of responsibility from the EU to the UN over a much larger geographical area that one was able to view the peace process in a more global manner and indeed to identify the shortcomings inherent in the process. In short, it became obvious that there was something of a culture clash between those of us who had been attached to the European Union of those who were an inherent part of the United Nations. The one thing that did not change was the good relationship with NATO and if anything this relationship became stronger. It would not be possible to provide an analysis of all aspects of the peacekeeping process as it effected a region such as Herzegovina, which remained the principal area of responsibility (the AOR of OHR South included areas of Bosnia both within the Croat-Muslim Federation, the Republika Srpska and included cities such as Banja Luka, Tomislavgrad and Livno). It was at this point that the implications of the Dayton/Paris Accords became more evident and it is better to examine a number of specific aspects of the process, such as refugee

returns, attempts at political cohesion and of course the whole question of war crimes and exhumations. In many respects these areas will serve to demonstrate the real nature of the situation following Dayton/Paris and my reaction to these areas of responsibility are based on my own direct involvement.

Before any examination of the specific areas I have mentioned, it is necessary to examine the *real politik* of the situation as it was in the 1990's and in particular to consider the attitudes of the ordinary people of the country. It is perhaps well to remember that the vast majority of people had suffered in some way during the conflict and it must be remembered that feelings continued to run high. Loyalties also presented a problem and even in such matters as passports, it was obvious that many Croats and Serbs did not feel any loyalty to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most Croats held passports issued by the Republic of Croatia and most Serbs held passports issued by Yugoslavia, i.e. Rump Yugoslavia, by that time effectively consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. Many people continued to hold out for a further solution to their dilemma and neither Croats nor Serbs seemed willing to cooperate wholeheartedly with developments arising out of Dayton/Paris. The Muslim faction also had their own agenda. In short there remained a great deal of mistrust and indeed fear.

Propaganda often seemed to rule the day and the media of the country continued to one degree or another to foster the mistrust and fear. In fact, the quality of broadcasting to which people were subjected was so bad that many admitted to listening to all sides in the hope that they might thus be able to decide on what the truth actually might be. In time, of course, the level of propaganda reduced or at least became more subtle and less bitter. Another important factor was that there was little support for the concept of the return of refugees on the part of any side and while both Serbs and Croats openly opposed returns into what they saw as their territory, the Muslims openly supported the concept, but effectively prevented returns; nobody seemed to really be committed to the return of people from other ethnic groups to their pre-war homes.

The rationale underlying opposition to returns seemed to be often based again on fear and mistrust and sometimes this fear and mistrust was not always without foundation and often when agreement was reached on the return of displaced people, the political actors ensured that such returns were accompanied by a degree of overt triumph which was calculated to incite reaction. For the most part neither Croats nor Serbs demonstrated any great wish to return to areas controlled by Muslims and while Muslims professed to wish to return, those who did never seemed entirely comfortable with the idea, especially areas which had been badly effected by the war. Underlying this fear and mistrust was the very real memory of what had happened during the conflict; the war had been waged with unrelenting brutality by factions on all sides and many found it difficult to forget this.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was waged in a way which was reminiscent of the worst excesses of World War II in the region. It is also well to remember that casualties levels, while appalling, were less than those claimed by the international media and a realistic figure is probably in the region of one hundred and twenty thousand fatal casualties and not the two hundred and fifty thousand claimed; the actual casualty levels may never be determined.

During the entire conflict there appears to have been a very real problem with the whole concept of command and control. In many wars command and control presents a problem at some stage and in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the end of the conflict the existence of the International Criminal Court at the Hague was high in the minds of many former combatants. There is no doubt that events occurred during the course of the war which went far beyond the pale of accepted military behaviour in wartime. Having said this, it must be remembered that all sides engaged in activities which were reprehensible and even if many who took part behaved in a manner which in no way could cause them to be accused of war crimes, there were those who did.

War crimes have always posed a problem whenever and wherever the question of war crimes has arisen and there is general agreement internationally that war crimes ought not to go unpunished. Some war crimes are so obvious that there will be little doubt as to either the nature of the crime or as to the identity of those responsible. Responsibility appears to be the key issue and this has been a major cause of argument for a very long time. Following World War II and the trials at Nuremberg and more particularly following the trials conducted by the Far Eastern Commission, the whole question of command and control has been a major issue with lawyers and it remains a question yet to be resolved in any satisfactory manner. A further problem that became obvious in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the capacity of political actors to use the issue of war crimes to accuse people at random; in effect the issue became a weapon and unfortunately neither the UN nor anybody else countered this in any effective manner.

Many people will readily agree that there ought to be an international forum to try those indicted for war crimes, but the question arises as to how this may be best approached. My own view is that there ought not be a permanent forum, but rather that there ought to exist the mechanism to establish such a forum from time to time. I also believe from experience that the whole question of war crimes ought to be very strictly controlled with a view towards ensuring that any mechanism instituted to address the issue must include a further mechanism to ensure that it cannot be used by politicians, media or any other entity as a weapon against anybody. I have long argued that the UN, or indeed any other entity involved in such a process must conduct the process in such a manner that precludes any attempt to confuse the concepts of indictment by due process and actual guilt. Unfortunately, this was not the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina where accusation by anybody seemed often to be equated with guilt on the part of those accused.

Unfortunately, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina included participation not alone by conventional military forces, but also by militias comprising of units that were in reality not subject to control in the conventional sense. Many former commanders with whom I have dealt remain quite adamant that such 'rogue' forces were beyond control and they further point to the fact that the confusion experienced during the conflict often made it impossible for those involved in conventional military activities to effectively control all of those under their command. This argument is not new, of course and has been thrown up for a very long time by military commanders who have stood accused of being responsible for crimes committed by those technically under their command. Command is not always an effective process and many will claim that command and control are sometimes two very separate issues. The situation during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina certainly merits scrutiny

in this whole area, but while the issue of command and control may be an extremely difficult and perhaps impossible one to resolve, there is little doubt that the use of the war crimes process to further political ends or to incite hatred must be prevented in the future.

My own personal experience of the failure of peace implementation to address the abject abuse of the war crimes process relates to an incident involving a Prisoner Exchange Commissioner of one of the former warring factions. At one point in 1997, there emerged a widespread belief that there existed a 'secret list' of forty seven people indicted by the Hague Tribunal. The mere belief of the existence of such a list is obviously going to run counter to any peace process and indeed if such a list existed at any time, it would undermine the fabric of law on the part of anybody responsible for drawing it up. It is accepted that there will always be situations where investigating authorities in any criminal matter may have to work employing an element of secrecy; quite often this will be an integral part of some investigations. In the case of this particular 'secret list', it was immediately obvious that some elements were going to use it to foster their own ends and a leading article appeared in a major Sarajevo newspaper claiming that the Prisoner Exchange Commissioner's name was included on the list and suggesting quite openly that the man was a war criminal. At this point in time, I had recently managed to bring about a situation where the Commissioner in question was cooperating quite well with me in relation to exhumations and from my own knowledge of the man, he had not been involved in the commission of any acts during the conflict that might give rise to an accusation against him. This, however, was not my major concern as it was based purely on my own opinion of the man; my concern was that there had been what was tantamount to a finding of guilt on the part of a newspaper whose reputation for fairness had often been very much in doubt. My response was to openly bring the newspaper to task and demand a retraction based on the fact that the man had never been either accused much less tried by a competent court of law. This was an attempt on my part to try to diffuse the fallout that I fully expected from the newspaper's propaganda. The result was not what I expected and within two days of my calling for a retraction based on the whole question of fair procedures, the same newspaper afforded me front page headlines and accused me of being the "defender of war criminals". Needless to say, my reaction to this particular piece of nonsense was what one might expect and I immediately contacted the International Media Commission based in Sarajevo and made a formal complaint calling for immediate action. Unfortunately, the response of the Commission was silence and to me such silence was not conducive to what we were trying to achieve in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course there was an upside in that there was an immediate and very obvious indication of increased trust on the part of the entity to which the Prisoner Exchange Commissioner belonged and this resulted in a far more cooperative attitude on their part to our work and indeed this had far reaching consequences in other areas. The 'silence' on the part of the Media Commission was indicative of the lack of cohesion between the various elements of the International Community charged with implementing the peace process. Unfortunately, the belief in the existence of a 'secret list' continued for some time and without any denial on the part of the UN. This failure did not help the reputation of the Hague Tribunal with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor indeed did it help to contribute to cooperation with the Tribunal.

Leaving aside issues such as war crimes and other sometimes emotive issues for which there is often no readily identifiable acceptable course of action, it is perhaps important to

consider the UN and the international community in general. One of the great problems with the post-Dayton/Paris Accords was the sheer number of international organisations taking part in the whole peace process. There can be little doubt that the NATO led forces (IFOR and SFOR) and the current European Force (EUFOR) did indeed succeed in their objectives and notwithstanding that their mandates might have had shortcomings, each Force managed to carry out its function in a manner which lends great credibility to the way in which such deployments can work. There will always be some reservation attached to the deployment of forces that belong to a military alliance, mostly in the sense that deployment of such forces will often preclude the deployment of components that may belong to a different alliance. Nonetheless, the deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina worked effectively and often with surprising results. It is very easy for anyone to have preconceived ideas on what will work or indeed on the way in which it is working and there are plenty of anecdotal events that demonstrate that preconceived ideas may often be wrong.

I recall that on one particular occasion it became necessary to deploy troops on the streets of Croat dominated West Mostar. I admit that I was rather surprised when the Commander of the Franco-German division provided Moroccan troops for the purpose. My reservation with this was simply that the deployment of Muslim troops, even if they were under French command might be a mistake, given that they were to have a visible presence in an area where feelings about Muslims ran high. As it turned out, I was wrong and within hours of their deployment, it became obvious that not only were the Moroccans performing their duties in an exemplary manner, but their presence was accepted by the general population and it was quickly evident that a good humoured rapport was established between them and the local people. On another occasion, SFOR decided to try to gauge the popularity of troops from various countries in Eastern Herzegovina which formed part of the Republika Srpska. I remember stating quite openly that I expected that French would probably emerge as the most popular (partly for historical reasons and very much because French troops seemed to be more acceptable to the Serbs); again I was wrong and the Spanish Brigade emerged the flavour of the hour. This was surprising, as the Spanish Brigade were viewed by many people of the region to be pro-Croat. I hasten to add that the Spanish always behaved in a fair and impartial manner, despite the contrary view held by some. Around the same time as the Spanish gained this accolade from the Serbs, there was a strong rumour going about that they were to be replaced by Ukrainian troops and the subject was broached with me by a colonel in the VRS (Vojna Republika Srpska - the Army of the Serb Republic). He asked me if there was any truth in the rumour and as I knew that there were no plans to replace the Spanish, I told him so. His response was simply that he would very much regret the replacement of the Spanish, as they had a very good relationship with the people. Small indicators like these go towards demonstrating that even if many viewed peacekeeping forces as being occupation forces - and this was a term often used - it was nonetheless possible for people to accept them. The same was not quite true of other components of the peace process.

The number and diversity of people and organisations involved in the immediate post-war period in Bosnia and Herzegovina often seemed to pose a problem and added to the normal confusion which is evident following any conflict. It became quite difficult to avoid noticing that different organisations had their own agendas and that very basic essential aspects of peacekeeping or peace implementation, such as the sharing of information, was not as it ought

to have been. With the military components, the problem did not arise as much and this was true in particular because of degree of cooperation which existed between the NATO led forces and UNOHR (and earlier between NATO and the EU). Cohesion is vital in the implementation of any peace agreement, but if there exists a situation where individuals or organisations are unable or unwilling to enter into a cohesive relationship, then problems inevitably arise to the detriment of everybody. Unfortunately there was quite a noticeable element of this in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990's. To an extent, part of the problem existed within the UN, where there were politically motivated people with views that were far too inflexible; the same was not true of the EU. A peace process is something that must be both flexible and pragmatic and those who wish to be effective must be able to recognise mistakes and more importantly they must be able to recognise the necessity to change their modus operandi without losing sight of the bigger picture. Unfortunately, the Sarajevo based non-military UN did not seem to have a complete grasp of the wider picture and sometimes adopted a somewhat naïve approach that did not help matters. Whistle stop tours are fine in countries accustomed to peace, but the travelling circus has no real place in an immediate post war situation, especially when the possibility of renewed conflict exists at all times and where a pragmatic approach is more often called for to ensure that this does not occur.

While Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the focus of this article, one must remember that it is impossible to consider Bosnia and Herzegovina in isolation, as it formed part of Yugoslavia. Prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia the six republics that formed the Federal State had interacted for quite a long time. It may be feasible to examine other States in isolation, but this will not always give a clear picture. Yugoslavia was often pulled between centrist Serbia and Croatia which always aspired towards more autonomy and one must bear in mind that Serbia and Croatia were the major players in Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina is something of a melting pot and it seems likely that international actors did not give sufficient credence to the nationalist aspirations of the ethnic groups within that State. While there is no doubt that the military aspects of the peace process in the country have worked, the political elements may only form a patina over the reality. Nationalist aspirations remain strong in Bosnia and Herzegovina and while I have noted in my various visits to the region in recent years that while there is an apparent stability, this may not represent the long term reality of the future of the country. Many would assert that an initial division of the country into three entities, rather than two might have been the better course. It may be that the international community have refused to look carefully at the reality and this may prove costly in the interim to long term.

Prior to unrest in Kosovo, it might have been that Bosnia and Herzegovina could have plodded on for a sufficient time to allow for the inception of real stability. In 2008, however, we have seen the recognition of a unilaterally declared independence for Kosovo. This 'independence', if it gains momentum, will obviously lead to a division of Serbia with all the potential for subsequent unrest and even the possibility of conflict and almost certainly civil unrest. Serbia will not relinquish Kosovo easily and it may be argued that there may be a very good case for not supporting a division of Serbia. Regardless, however, of any arguments as to the advisability of dividing a European country and accepting the establishment of a new state that has no real historical basis, there is another potential consequence and this relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that country, both Croats and Bosniacs (Muslims) are carefully watching for what will happen in Kosovo. From my own knowledge of the country,

I am aware that the Croats are waiting to see how the Republika Srpska will react and of course there is an argument that if Kosovo is recognised and allowed to establish itself as an independent state, then why not Republika Srpska? The Croats, in turn and in particular the Croats of Western Herzegovina will pose the same question and it will not matter very much to them that a somewhat artificial Federation exists which many of them see as having been imposed on them. This possible scenario is not theoretical, but actually represents the thinking of nationalists in both the Republika Srpska and Croat nationalists. The interesting point here, of course, relates to the fact that the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina may well be quite willing to remain within some form of federal state, but they will almost definitely want the security of having their own constituent republic within that State; the Serbs may not be as accommodating. Right now, it may well be too late to re-think the position regarding the recognition of Kosovo, but if Kosovo Albanians succeed in attaining a separate state, then the consequences not alone for Serbia, but for Bosnia and Herzegovina could well be far more serious than proponents of an independent Kosovo might have had cause to expect. The problem is almost upon us now but there remains the opportunity to avert any form of conflict even at this late hour. Right now we all have to 'wait and see' in regard to the possible spin-off effects of the Kosovo problem.

While it is easy to be negative about the Balkans, not everything was dark and sometimes, the people of a post-war region can put war behind them to some degree without any assistance from anybody other than themselves. I will finish by relating a short account of such an instance. During the course of 1997, I was travelling on the road from the town of Stolac, in Western Herzegovina on route to the town of Lubinje in the Republika Srpska. When we reached the Inter Entity Boundary Line (at that time effectively a border between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska), I noticed two automobiles parked on the roadside. I was surprised to see that one automobile had registration plates from the Republic of Croatia and the other had registration plates for the Republika Srpska; I wondered vaguely what dealings the occupants of these cars might have had with each other. Within about two weeks, a market had sprung up on that same stretch of road; the market was mainly for the sale of agricultural produce, including cattle, sheep and vegetables. Of course the market was illegal, as many members of the international community, including the UN International Police Task Force pointed out to me. People reminded me that it was part of my function to prevent the establishment of such markets. I had no intention of interfering with the market, my view being that if people were trading with each other, they were far less likely to fight. Within about two months the market stretched over about seven kilometres of road and was frequented mainly by Serbs and Croats and by now a number of ramshackle café bars had been put in place and small numbers of Muslims had started using the market and were even selling goods there. My view was that as long as the facility was not used in order to deal in arms or drugs, then why interfere; people were showing that it was possible to try to return to some form of normality. At this point, the General Officer Commanding the France-German Division expressed reservations to me in view of the fact that the presence of the market might impede the rapid movement of troops and especially armoured vehicles on the route if it became necessary to deploy forces into Srpska. This French officer, General Pierre Lang was a man who was always more than willing to help as much as he could and he always recognised the importance of the long-term objectives of the peace process and he agreed to allow matters to rest. Within a couple of weeks, the people responsible for the

establishment of the market commenced widening the road and the generals fears were allayed. This market was the first indication that peace might just be working and I noted that the market was also frequented by troops from General Lang's Division; people in the market informed me that the troops came regularly to buy local cheese and that their visits were both appreciated and welcomed.

'New' versus 'No' World Order Non UN Peacekeeping and the implications for Conflict Resolution in the 21st Century

Commandant Mark Hearn

"There is no such thing as the UN."
(John Bolton, Former US Ambassador to the UN)

A 'NEW WORLD ORDER?'

The 'new world order' presaged by George Bush Senior in his speech to Congress on the 6th of March 1991 following the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War created expectations of greater potential for preventing or resolving international conflicts through multilateral cooperation. This first Gulf War was launched by an ad hoc American - led coalition legitimised by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 678. The stage appeared to be set for greater support to the UN by powerful members states in the maintenance of international security and order. Traditional peacekeeping which had heretofore been restricted to post conflict UN led Observer and Troop missions due to the reluctance of the opposing Cold War Blocs to alter the status quo could now embrace complex security challenges with more robust intervention mechanisms.

Tragic events in the mid 1990s, however, began a sequence of actions undermining these expectations. The failed interventions by international actors in the Balkans, Somalia and Rwanda and the inability of the UN to adequately mobilise in the face of genocide, dashed the optimism of the early 1990s. The unilateral action by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and by the US led coalition in Iraq in 2003 despite strong opposition from within the UN, suggested that its institutional authority had been substantially eroded. Over the last decade regional organisations such as NATO, the European Union and the African Union have provided intervention forces into conflict areas in situations where traditionally a UN mission would have deployed. New forms of asymmetric warfare required agile flexible responses that the unwieldy institutions of the UN were incapable of providing. The attack on the UN building and the killing of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, in Baghdad in 2003 indicated a degradation of its influence within the Middle East. Finally, derisory comments from within the USA, the pre-eminent global power, typified by that cited above by John Bolton (who elsewhere premised that the UN would be no worse off if it lost the top ten floors of its headquarter building), further undermined the UN authority in global affairs. These events implied that the UN and its traditional form of peacekeeping would push to the periphery of global conflict resolution and that non-traditional non-UN forms would move centre stage.

Fifty years after the Irish Defence Forces' first foray into the arena of peacekeeping the landscape of international conflict management has evolved considerably. An analysis of the current situation is worthy therefore, not just because of an auspicious landmark anniversary for Irish peacekeeping, but because it is important to understand the environment which provides a central plank of Irish Foreign and Defence policy. Is the UN in decline? What if any are the changes in the conduct of peacekeeping operations? How will this impact on Ireland and on the Defence Forces? This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions by examining the current status of the UN with regard to peacekeeping and in relation to the principal non-UN organisations engaged in peacekeeping.

In the interest of clarity it is important to establish what 'non UN Peacekeeping' means. There has been much debate regarding appropriate definitions in the field of conflict intervention. I do not propose to engage in that debate because it has been comprehensively addressed elsewhere (Bellamy et al; 2005, Tardy; 2003). In the context of marking the 50th anniversary of Irish UN peacekeeping this paper analyses 'non UN peacekeeping' as those interventions that are multilateral in character, but not executed directly by UN forces, with the purpose of dealing with the threat to international security as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.

CELTIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION -IRISH PEACEKEEPING

Ireland is committed to cooperative security arrangements mandated by both the Foreign Policy (1996) and Defence (2000) White Papers. This commitment has legal status in the so-called triple lock arrangement, which requires Government and Dail approval plus UN Security Council approval for any Irish participation in a cooperative security mission abroad. Members of the Irish political opposition have criticised the 'triple lock' as excessively restrictive regarding Irish participation in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions (Mitchell, 2003). A significant concern is that by depending on the UN Security Council, the government is effectively handing a veto over Irish participation to any one of the five Permanent members.¹ The triple lock is a matter of government policy and the function of the military is to abide by such policy. But it is fair to comment that adherence to the triple lock will not overly confine Defence Force participation in overseas peacekeeping missions. In practice the non-UN lead operations that we participate in, compose of like-minded nations who either explicitly or implicitly seek legitimacy for their actions through sanction by the UN Security Council. Whether through a NATO partnership arrangement such as in SFOR or KFOR or through an EU initiative such as our current commitment to the Nordic Battle Group (NBG) or the EUFOR Tchad mission, it is unlikely that Ireland will be at odds with prospective partners over the requirement to have operations sanctioned by a UNSCR. The Irish legal requirement will therefore, most likely be matched by a principled requirement on their behalf.

How will Ireland's participation in peacekeeping outside of UN Missions manifest itself in the future? Wiharta & Soder (2008) identify fifty-nine 'multilateral peace operations' currently active throughout the world. If we subtract the twenty directly supported by the DPKO (as indicated below), which leaves thirty-nine operations conducted globally by non-UN organisations. These organisations include the EU, NATO, the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and various ad hoc coalitions. Although Ireland has contact to

some degree or other with all of these organisations, three stand out as having immediate relevance to Ireland's commitment to the pursuit of cooperative security. These three are the OSCE, NATO and the EU. Analysing the future direction of conflict management in these three organisations will indicate not only their impact on the role of the UN but also on possible future trends in Irish peacekeeping operations. But first a brief review of the UN and peacekeeping sets an appropriate context for such analysis.

'OLD WORLD ORDER?' THE UN

The UN came under severe criticism for its catastrophic failure in the 1990s in interventions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. These interventions failed not only in protecting international order but also in providing physical security to the hundreds of thousands of mortal victims of these conflicts. Criticism has not been limited to external sources. The UN has produced some frank and self-critical reviews of peacekeeping practice. In 1999 former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan commissioned an independent inquiry team - headed by former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson to examine the Rwandan genocide, which produced a damning indictment of the UN's handling of the crisis. Subsequently the Brahimi Report (2000) reviewed peacekeeping practices highlighting the critical shortcomings of the UN to address the maintenance of international order and provided a framework for ongoing institutional transformation to confront the challenges posed. Brahimi identified twenty recommendations to strengthen the UN's capacity to address the complex challenges of conflict prevention in the 21st Century spanning a host of planning, doctrinal, organisational and logistical areas.

However, it is far easier to identify inadequacies in the system than it is to deal with them. The realist tradition suggests that states are reluctant to yield sovereignty to multilateral institutions and will obstruct them when intervention threatens their interests. This highlights the difficulty of implementing many of the Brahimi recommendations for greater organisational efficiency. Rupert Smith (2005) suggests that because the UN has no permanent military structure and cannot create a strategic command and it therefore can never offer military force as a serious option to crisis management. For political and financial reasons such a permanent military structure is unlikely to be created in the near future, but is the UN on a downward spiral path to obscurity?

There are a number of important factors that indicate that the UN is unlikely to wither on the vine of international conflict management. Firstly the preconception that the UN's peacekeeping role is in decline is not borne out by the facts. On 31st December 2007, 83,854 uniformed personnel were serving in twenty peacekeeping operations directed and supported by the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (www.un.org). These personnel are drawn from 119 countries and are deployed from the Caribbean through Africa, the Middle East, Asia and into Australasia. The UN remains, therefore, a significant actor in peace operations drawing resources and evident support from a significant number of countries (almost two thirds of global states) and continues to play a significant role in conflict areas throughout the world.

Secondly, despite condescending comments from within the hawkish neo conservative American establishment, the empirical evidence suggests that the US will continue to seek the

international legitimacy for its actions in the international arena. While the Bush administration ultimately relinquished the prospect of UNSC approval for intervention in Iraq, it did so only after a considerable diplomatic offensive to acquire it. Even without formal approval for the war some commentators attempted to justify / legitimise the campaign on the basis of a refined interpretation of prior UN resolutions. Bellinger (2003) suggests that because Iraq materially breached the Weapons of Mass Destruction obligations of the 1991 ceasefire provided by UNSCR 687, which were essential to the restoration of peace and security in the area, the use of force was authorised under UNSCR 678 (the resolution covering the first Gulf War). Furthermore the US administration was quick to seek approval for the continued US presence in Iraq through UNSCR 1546 (Gilmore, 2004). The current sole global superpower, despite its undoubted military and economic capabilities, has and will continue to value the legitimacy conferred on its actions through UN approval. Even hard nosed neo conservatives such as Robert Kagan (2004) insist that the US requires international legitimacy, not only for narrow aims of maximising cooperation but because its absence is paralysing and debilitating for any liberal democracy.

Thirdly the argument that the UN is on a path of inevitable decline is ahistoric as it fails to properly recognise the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the organisation since its inception. During over fifty years of successful operations there have been setbacks, failures and challenges to the UN's authority. Physical attacks on UN personnel and infrastructure are not recent phenomena, rather they form part of the hostile environment in which UN peacekeeping operates. This has been illustrated as far back as 1948 when the UN envoy mediating in the Israeli / Palestinian crisis, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by Jewish activists in Jerusalem.

Finally the UN's handling of the Iraq crisis may have increased its prestige rather than diminish it. Hans Blix (2005) argues that the UN has been strengthened by its refusal to endorse the American led intervention in Iraq. This action demonstrated a commitment to independent action by refusing to bend to the will of its most powerful member. The integrity and independence of the organisation was further reinforced when the rationale for initiating hostilities was subsequently exposed as baseless.

The empirical evidence highlights that the UN role in peacekeeping is not only active but enjoys a functional working relationship with the US. It remains in a position therefore, to continue to play a significant role in international conflict management.

'OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?' THE OSCE

The OSCE originated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the mid 1970s as a forum to ease tension between the Cold War rival blocs. Its broad mandate encompasses a wide range of political, economic and military activities to address security concerns. The potential for increased military security activities arose at the end of the Cold War when it became active in conflict resolution in a number of former Soviet states. However the prospects from the early 1990s of creating a substantial troop heavy capability have not been realised. So for example, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) established in 1994 has no immediate prospect of implementing its mission plan. It was established to conduct operational contingency planning for a possible deployment, by direction of a UNSC Resolution, of a multi national OSCE peacekeeping force into the Nagorno Karabakh area

addressing the conflict over that territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The inability of the organisation to influence the parties to the conflict, however, indicates that this planning has no apparent chance of being realised in the near future. This inability stems from the fact that the OSCE suffers from the same handicap as the UN in that it represents a large amorphous group of states stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok that struggle to reach agreement where member state interests are perceived to be threatened. Organisational cohesion will continue to suffer due to Russian antipathy to the organisation in the wake of critical election and human rights monitoring activities conducted by the OSCE both in Russia itself and in former Soviet states over the last decade. In this environment complex mandates with rigorous enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to be approved and the OSCE is more likely to engage in niche operations for the foreseeable future.

TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION THROUGH NATO

The issues around NATO and peacekeeping are complex. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the predominant threat of the previous fifty years of an attack by massed Soviet Armies. This threat disappeared almost overnight and left the alliance searching for an appropriate role in the post cold war environment. Peacekeeping was an obvious option and when both UN and EU efforts to resolve the Yugoslavia crisis collapsed spectacularly, NATO had found a crisis to deal with. Since the early 1990s the alliance has expanded accepting new member states and partners to cooperate with on agreed projects through the PFP process. It has also been effectively subcontracted by the UN to conduct peace operations in Bosnia (IFOR then SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) as well taking over the running of the UN sanctioned (UNSCR 1386) ISAF Mission in Afghanistan.

Despite the growth of the alliance and the deployment to the distant region of central Asia, NATO is unlikely to assume a lead in global peacekeeping. Success in Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that NATO will continue to lead certain peace operations authorised by the UN, but it will not assume responsibility for interventions in distant regions where no direct threat to a member exists (in the case of Afghanistan the US considered the Taleban / Al Quaida government a direct threat to its national security). There are obvious logistical and cost factors supporting this strategy but there are also a number of other factors at play. First of all the increase in members will make political consensus difficult. At the time of writing the further expansion of the organisation is under consideration. This will further complicate the achievement of consensus something that has been exacerbated by extant internal differences between the US supported by the UK and other European member States. The alliance will not unnecessarily antagonise other regional powers or power centres unless interests are immediately and directly threatened. Finally NATO reflects the UN in that it will act where the direct or perceived interests of powerful alliance members are threatened and unwilling to either over extend itself or take on moral tasks where they are not.

THE EU 'PEACEKEEPING FROM VENUS?'

The European Union has been struggling to assert itself as a player in conflict resolution since the end of the cold war. If altruism initially drove this policy the eruption of conflict in the former Yugoslavia gave it a hard-edged practical significance. The failure to deal effectively with the crisis on a political level indicated how unprepared the organisation was to deal with complex security problems. Since then it has developed a number of mechanisms for dealing

with such issues and has begun to engage in a wide range of both civil and military peace related activities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Thus 'Eufor' missions have sprung up in the Balkans (where NATO went before e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina) and in Africa (DR Congo and Tchad). The EU is also a strategic partner in the road map process for the Israeli / Palestinian conflict. Cynical commentators have compared EU successes and expansion of its participation in peacekeeping as akin to doing the dishes after the big players (the US and NATO) have prepared and eaten the dinner (Kagan, 2002). As much as the emerging mechanisms reflect flexibility in dealing with major crises it could also be argued that they represent the EU's extreme difficulty in adopting and subsequently enforcing common foreign security policy. For example after much fanfare the stood up Nordic Battle Group (NBG) now stands idle in response to the humanitarian crisis in Tchad while an ad hoc Eufor is deployed to deal with it. It is not necessary to analyse the national and organisational policies that created this situation, for this paper's purpose it suffices to point out that there is clearly a disconnect in the EU's strategy / policy process that allows this to happen.

Ireland, who has supported these various developments most notably by providing the Operational Commander and a heavy troop commitment to Eufor Tchad, will be encouraged to continue to support such initiatives with 'boots on the ground.' In some respect it will be regarded as a return on the investment of structural funds and decades of assistance from the EU / EEC as well as recognition of an increased capability of the state to contribute (due to economic growth) to EU activities. It will be difficult to avoid such commitments, as our EU partners are unlikely to disproportionately shoulder the burden of hard security duties. The recent complaints by the US and Britain within NATO over the reluctance of some alliance members to commit troops to the more dangerous operational environment of Southern Afghanistan (Wyat & Robson, 2008), indicate the potential future pressures for EU member states to support mutually agreed peace support security operations with troops on the ground. The Defence Forces can expect to continue to participate in future EU security initiatives. Such activity flows on logically from our cooperation on economic, social and other political matters.

The EU is still only at the preliminary stages of developing a truly common security and defence policy. Until it evolves further the organisation will not be in a position to truly undertake the role of a global player in conflict resolution. The national tensions that dog both the UN and NATO are inherent in the EU structure. Furthermore, despite the expansion of membership to the East, many parties to conflicts in Africa and Asia view the EU as an agent of colonialism and are sceptical about its true intentions in conflict intervention. It is this point of legitimacy that underlines a preference for a UN security presence or at least a mandate from the UN Security Council by participants to conflicts. The UN will therefore continue to play a significant role no matter how the EU develops its conflict management capabilities.

'SOME' WORLD ORDER FOR THE 20TH CENTURY

The 21st Century peacekeeping environment has significantly evolved since the end of the Cold War. The threats to international order manifest themselves differently through terrorism and asymmetric activities but there is nothing to indicate that the root causes of these threats; inequalities in the distribution of power and resources have changed in any way. The UN for all its faults will continue to be the preferred agent to deal with these roots because it

continues to be the acme of international legitimacy. Any attempt to create a 'new world order' cannot afford to ignore it without risking new grounds for conflict. When the major powers sidelined the League of Nations in the 1930s the world slipped inexorably towards global war. It is imperative therefore that the quest for a 'new world order' does not produce 'no world order.'

For logistical, operational and regional sensitivities other organisations will also continue to play important roles in conflict resolution. Some times they will take the lead in missions or provide an element of a hybrid conflict resolution mechanism such as those established for Kosovo and East Timor. However they are unlikely to usurp the UN's special position in international affairs. Ireland (and the Defence Forces) will have to continue to engage with the activities of all of these organisations if it wishes to have its voice heard and if it wishes to pursue the collective security values enshrined in both Foreign and Defence Policy.

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FOOTNOTES

- ¹ The proposed Irish participation in a European mission to Macedonia in 2003 was stymied when China vetoed the required UNSCR due to a dispute with Macedonia over its recognition of Taiwan.

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UNMIL – A UN Success Story

The End Product of UN Reform?

Comdt Damien Coakley

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations was established in the aftermath of World War II, with the prime function of maintaining international peace and security. The vision was to create a system through one of the UN's primary organs, the Security Council, to deal with conflicts or potential conflicts between states.

The Security Council model is based on the power structure at the UN's inception. Kofi Annan in 1997 identified the structure as outdated and said 'the Security Council's composition reflects the world of 1945 and not the economic and political realities of today'.¹ The past 10 years have seen a rise in transnational terrorism, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and shifting global power structures.

The nature of conflict has changed since the foundation of the UN, while the principle organ of the UN has remained relatively unchanged. In 1998 Kofi Annan published a report on the 'Sources of Conflict in Africa' in which he pointed out that the UN was increasingly being asked to respond to intrastate conflicts.^{2,3}

...In which the main aim, to an alarming degree, is the destruction not of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups. Preventing such wars is no longer a question of defending states or protecting allies. It is a question of defending humanity itself.

The traditional method of UN intervention was the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. Typically peacekeeping missions operating under UN mandates acted as armed buffers between the conflict parties such as the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon or the UNPROFOR mission in the Balkans. Cold War peacekeeping operations rested on three pillars, consent, impartiality and nonuse of force⁴. Many of the peacekeeping operations during the cold War were not well planned or resourced but hastily assembled and deployed in response to crisis situations⁵. Some of the UN's peacekeeping operations have resulted in public failures, such as in Rwanda and in Bosnia. Issues that have negatively impacted on the UN's peacekeeping operations have included weak mandates, under funded missions, poor entry or exit strategies, ad hoc force generation, and the absence or lack of a comprehensive deployment strategy to encompass peace building.

The traditionally accepted model of peacekeeping in the 1990s suggests that the aim was to deploy to the conflict zone, stabilize the state and promote rapid return to liberal market

democracies⁶. A comprehensive and strategic plan is an essential element of any successful peacekeeping mission, the absence of such plans increases the chances of failure and a reversion to violence once the peacekeepers have departed. The failure to include comprehensive peace-building strategies also increases the risk of mission failure. Peacekeeping missions were generated in an ad hoc fashion, often in direct response to some crisis after much debate and negotiation. Missions were often seen as independent deployments with UN flagged forces thrust into conflict zones with little effective or strategic planning. Lessons were not learned from the various missions and the UN system was slow to embrace change. The understaffed UNDPKO reflected the stagnant nature of the UN system. Change did come and developed into meaningful and tangible results for peacekeeping. This change and evolution within the UN would greatly impact on UNMIL's deployment and mandate.

CHANGE OR EVOLUTION?

Change is not a new concept in the UN and in 1992 the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced 'An Agenda for Peace' which recognized the need for organizational changes in the UN Secretariat, reforms in peacekeeping and other important areas of UN operations.⁷ The report starkly highlights that between 1945 and 1992 over one hundred conflicts around the world have left 20 million people dead and in many cases the UN was rendered powerless to deal with these conflicts due to vetoes in the Security Council. The report signaled the need for peace building, rebuilding national institutions and infrastructure torn by civil war. Doyle and Sambanis suggest that successful peace operations in the Post Cold-War era were as a result of the UN innovating within the existing capacities and traditions, building on this 1992 strategic UN document. In 1997 'The Challenges Project' was initiated to formulate ideas on how to enhance the planning, conduct and effectiveness of multinational peace operations.⁸ This report involved input from a global network of partner organizations in cooperation with their national peacekeeping training and education facilities.⁹ The report identified that the concept of security was not a static concept and involved military and non-military aspects. It also identified that the UN had found itself engaged in issues of internal insecurity, involving failed states, intrastate conflict and the total breakdown of government institutions often with insufficient resources such as personnel, materiel and finance; in a word the UN has become overburdened.¹⁰

The UN initiated Brahimi Report is perhaps the most significant review of UN 'peace and security activities' undertaken as a result of a number of failed UN peace operations.¹¹ The opening paragraph of the Brahimi Report's executive summary stated in one sentence the central problem with UN peace operations, 'that over the past decade the UN had repeatedly failed to meet the challenge and it can do better today'.¹² The United States Institute of Peace published a special report into peacekeeping in Africa and refers to the Brahimi Report as a damning critique of the UN's repeated failure in its military interventions over the past decade.¹³ The Brahimi Report identified three principles of UN peace operations; conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.¹⁴ Peace building is defined by Rowland Paris in 'At Wars End' as...

Peace building is action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peace-building mission involves the deployment of military and civilian

personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peace-building in a country that is just emerging from a civil war’.

Even since the Brahimi report was published in 2000 the security situation throughout the world has changed. The September 11 attacks, the London and Madrid bombings, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq has had a global socio-economic, religious and geopolitical impact, not alone on the UN, but these events all impacted on individual member states to varying degrees.

The fallout from Brahimi was the development of a more complex and planned approach to peacekeeping operations. Lessons learned would result in more efficient systems being employed during mission planning at both operational and strategic levels. UNMIL was the first major and most complex UN deployment since the Brahimi report. UNMIL was created under UN Resolution 1509 (2003) on 19 September 2003. This mission deployed on Liberian soil on 1st October 2003 and began operations immediately.¹⁵

UNMIL – THE NEXT GENERATION – THE PRODUCT OF UN REFORM?

The UNMIL mission utilized recommendations that were submitted in the Brahimi Report.¹⁶ The Security Council has been more active in authorising the use of force and providing the UN deployed force with sufficient military flexibility through its rules of engagement¹⁷. The UNMIL deployment can be classed as a new generation of peacekeeping forces¹⁸. The Brahimi Reports recommendations, those that have been implemented have been employed in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The UNMIL deployment embraced several key components of the Report including rapid deployment teams’ mechanisms, pre-mandate commitment authority, and strategic deployment stocks and integrated mission task force.¹⁹ These developments were built into the fabric of the UNMIL deployment.

UNMIL Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP) identified 8 Core Goals and 86 Projects based on UNSC Resolution 1509.

- a. Consolidation and Strengthening Peace & Security.
- b. Establishment of Mechanisms and Programmes for Disarmament and Demobilization.
- c. Rehabilitation and Reintegration of all ex-combatants in civil society.
- d. Establishment of the Rule of Law.
- e. Establishment of Safeguards for Human Rights.
- f. Facilitation of, and the functioning and restoration of, State Authority.
- g. Provision of factual information to the public through Public Media Campaigns.
- h. Coordination of UN Agencies.

UNMIL would deploy into Liberia with a more comprehensive and structured mandate to deal with the conflict that was engulfing the country. Liberia falls into the category of failed state. The inability of the government to protect the population, to exercise effective control over all of the states territory, and the existence of armed elements, political or otherwise within the state creates instability²⁰.

The situation in Liberia immediately prior to the deployment of UNMIL is illustrative of the necessary conditions for ethno political conflict. The conditions necessary for intrastate ethno political conflict can be divided into four main points;

- a. Poor economic conditions.
- b. Repressive political system.
- c. Degradation of renewable resources – (not as central as a, b or d).
- d. Ethnic diversity.

Intra-state conflict, as witnessed in Liberia resulted in the collapse of the states institutions and the disintegration of the national fabric.

ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION.

In order to assess the success or other wise of the UNMIL deployment, criteria by which it can be assessed must be stated. The mission can be assessed in two ways; one as an independent UN deployment with mission specific objectives and a tailored mandate and two, as a UN operation encompassing the broader peace building endeavour following on from the lessons of Brahimi. Stephen Stedman²¹ suggested a difficulty score for peace implementation based on eight variables.²²

- a. **The number of Warring Parties.**- The difficulty of implementation increases when there are more than two warring parties.²³
- b. **The absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring parties before intervention and with a minimum of coercion** – intervention without agreement from all parties may lead to increased conflict from parties who do not agree with the peace agreement and value the status quo.
- c. **The likelihood of spoilers** – leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.²⁴
- d. **Collapsed state**- The lack of state institutions and governing capacity.
- e. **Number of soldiers** – Greater numbers of soldiers increases the difficulty with monitoring and demands for verification.
- f. **Disposable natural resources** – If warring parties have access to disposable resources such as gems, minerals or timber then implementation becomes more difficult.
- g. **Wars of succession** – Civil conflict over national sovereignty often revert to all-or-nothing struggles.
- h. **Hostile neighbouring states or networks** – In regions where weak states cannot adequately control their borders, the threat of unwanted external influence can assist spoilers and impact negatively on implementation.

Stedman and George Downs suggest that a reasonable gauge of success is whether peace prevails in the host countries at the moment when peace-building agencies depart.

Rowland Paris argues that the principle characteristic of peace building is to establish the conditions for stable and lasting peace in countries that are just emerging from civil war. The key words here are stable and lasting peace. Stedman and Downs's assertion that peace at the moment the peace-builder leaves is not a suitable gauge to assess the success of a deployment. Paris's view that peace must be lasting, and that success can only be judged when peace remains long after the peacekeepers have left, is the most credible form of assessment in the current situation. Sustained peace and stability assessed over time is perhaps the most appropriate method of assessing a deployment as complex as UNMIL.

The necessity for peacekeeping missions to include a robust mandate coupled with a strong and strategic peace-building ethos is essential if success is to be achieved. Peace building is a necessary component of the peacekeepers exit strategy and in order for peace building to succeed the internal actors must be willing to embrace the environment created by the peacekeepers.²⁵ The peace-building element of peacekeeping operations must have goals, and it is these goals that we can also use to assess and evaluate UNMIL. The Action Research Initiative (ARIA) project was designed to develop, contextually appropriate means for the evaluation of conflict resolution activities. Evaluation should be seen as an integral part of the peacekeeping and peace building structure. The use of broad terms to define mission activities such as 'promoting peace' provided an obstacle to effective mission evaluation. The impact the UN deployment has had on state institutions, the 'reverberation' effect, the impact on micro-level interventions that reverberate to the wider society and the methods of addressing ethnic tensions must be studied as an integral element to the exit strategy.²⁶

An integral part of the UN's new approach to peacekeeping is the evaluation of ongoing deployments. The UNDPKO has since 2001 a Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, which was renamed Peacekeeping Best Practices Section in 2005 and was reformed again in 2007.²⁷ Its role in the peacekeeping framework is to function as a 'learning manager' and develop best peacekeeping practice from lessons learned drawn from all deployments, on an ongoing basis. The UN produces progress reports on its deployed missions and in these reports an update is provided on the situation in that mission area. The reports address the mandate areas and provide updates for member states on the progress of each strand of the mandate, including problems and difficulties. These reports not alone cover peacekeeping activities but other areas of UN involvement in theatre, such as humanitarian activities, human rights and financial considerations. Each report also lists 'observations' that provide an assessment of what has been done, what remains to be done and a reminder to the international community of the continued necessity for support, both political and financial.

To date fifteen progress reports have been produced by the Secretary General for the General Assembly on the UNMIL mission, from 15 December 2003 to 08 August 2007.²⁸

SECURITY REFORM – A KEY ELEMENT TO STABILITY

As laid out in the mandate, security reform is an essential element in the rebuilding of the fabric of Liberia's internal structures. The rebuilding of the state security apparatus is not a case of re-arming and re-orientating ex-combatants. It is necessary to establish a security structure that will behave as security agents of the state whose loyalty is to that state and its citizens. Security involves law enforcement structures, including an effective impartial judiciary and state military forces, all essential components for the effective and reasonable operation of any just state. It must be pointed out that law enforcement and military personnel of the state have very different functions and the establishment of a functioning law enforcement capability, including police, lawyers and judicial system must be a priority.

Charles Tilly highlights in great detail the dangers of state agents being employed by the state to engage in activities that are not in the interests of the citizens of that state²⁹. Any re-introduction of armed agents of the state must be done in such a way that will ensure compliance with the states legal control structures such as the Justice Department or other government institutions.

The UN's quarterly report on the Human Rights situation in Liberia causes some concern. A number of years after UNMIL's initial deployment Liberia's corrections system is still in a state of near collapse. Monrovia's main prison has a capacity for 180 prisoners but during the period under review was holding over 560 prisoners, some of which did not appear on the prison register.³⁰ Many of the Report's recommendations would require considerable investment and despite the UN's enhanced approach to peace building, finance is still a major obstacle.

The Liberian conflict involved many armed groups and individuals, which thrived in this failed state. Drug and alcohol fuelled, unemployed and uneducated young men rampaged through the country with no real opposition and operating in anarchic conditions. In order to address the large quantity of weapons in circulation in Liberia it would be essential to conduct disarmament and reintegration of conflict parties and individuals. The use of child soldiers was widespread in Liberia and the integration and education of these combatants would be an important aspect of the reintegration program.³¹ Without effective and sustained reintegration of ex-combatants there is a serious risk of an eventual return to intrastate violence.

FROM DISARMAMENT TO REINTEGRATION – A NECESSITY

'Weapons in themselves do not cause wars. But an excess of arms breeds the suspicion and mistrust that can heighten tensions and lead to violent conflict.'³²

UNMIL's mandate ensured that a process whereby ex-combatants could be Disarmed, Demobilized, Rehabilitated and Reintegrated (DDRR) was given high priority. Virginia Gamba identifies in 'Managing Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization' that the process of removing the weapons is an essential element of post conflict activities and that systems of DDRR must be clear and that the necessary resources must be available to follow through on this process.³³ UN deployments did not always recognise the importance on the DDRR process. It has been identified that DDRR is vital to the success of a peacekeeping mission and this is evident in the timeline identified in a workshop report published in Monographs that DDRR has become a core issue since the early 1990s.³⁴

DDR³⁵ Development Timeline³⁶

1990 to 1998:-	Mandates for DDR were extremely vague.
1998 Onwards:-	Increase in Detail and Scope of DDR
2004 Onwards:-	Extremely Specific DDR Programmes

As is evident from this time line the Mandate for UNMIL adopted on 15 September 2003 incorporated, as part of the Support for the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement a DDRR process that would enable the UNMIL force to immediately initiate this process on deployment.³⁷ The presence of UNMIL would provide the initial stability to begin the DDRR process and the UNMIL Quick Reaction Force (QRF), of Irish and Swedish personnel enabled UNMIL react immediately to any threats to the process or the states fragile stability. The QRF provided UNMIL with a flexible robust instrument, which was identified in Brahimi as an essential component to the new generation of UN peace missions. The demilitarisation of a conflict must be seen as precursor to peace building and the return of stability.

As far back as Julius Caesar the issue of how to deal with ex-combatants was relevant following the defeat of Gallic soldiers. He identified the risk to stability of having large numbers of ex-combatants in the country, so he ordered that the right hand of each ex-combatant be cut off to prevent them function as soldiers again; Caesar had little time for human programmes.³⁸ Even after the Second World War allied soldiers were give a small payout and a suit following conflict.

The withdrawal of military hardware will impact on the ability of groups to protect them-selves and may reduce power bases built on military capability during the conflict. Any surrender of arms must be done in conjunction with other elements of peace building. The conflict groups must be demobilised and cease to function as armed groups or militias.

The symbolic destruction of weapons during the initial post conflict period has been used in Liberia to signal a new beginning. The initial phase of DDRR began on 7 December 2003 with a target of 1,000 ex-combatants.³⁹ Unfortunately the reality is that the acquisition of weapons is not difficult in West Africa, but creating a willingness and a desire to move away from armed action is an essential element of the DDRR process. The failure of the 1997 peace attempts in Liberia have been attributed to the failure to reintegrate and rehabilitate ex-combatants, and some of the 100,000 ex-combatants that were processed through UNMIL's DDRR system in 2003 and 2004, were combatants in 1997.⁴⁰

The current DDRR process in Liberia has experienced financial problems. A funding shortfall of approximately \$25 million was identified in the Secretary General's Eighth Progress Report, which could affect 26,000 ex-combatants.⁴¹ Problems have arisen with some ex-combatants claiming they were excluded by their commanders from the official UNMIL DDRR process and this has resulted in UNMIL having to negotiate with some groups of ex-combatants.

It must be assessed that UNMIL has made positive strides in the demilitarisation of Liberia's armed factions. The three armed groups have been disarmed and demobilised and the ex-combatants are being processed through rehabilitation programs and reintegrated into Liberian society. However, many Liberian's are of the opinion that the Reintegration programme has

failed to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. The majority of ex-combatants are still unemployed and thousands have regrouped for the purpose of illegally exploiting natural resources.⁴² UNMIL continues to collect and destroy items of ordnance, voluntarily surrendered, or discovered during search operations.

CONCLUSION

UNMIL has had a great impact on Liberia since its deployment and the execution of its mandate has been achieved in the broad sense. As the 'latest' generation of UN peacekeeping operations it has encapsulated many of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report. The mission has deployed with greater vision and goals than previous UN operations. The scope of the mandate and the mission objectives provide Liberia with a greater chance for a new stable beginning and the conditions for a sustainable peace.

The issues that still remain as obstacles to success for all UN endeavours are far greater than the restructuring of the deployments, the enhanced DPKO and more robust mission profiles. The issues that still prevent real change are issues that cannot be addressed by committees or reports, but will only change through consensus of all the vested interests. The UN's 192 members have 192 different and individual agendas and self interest will play a part in all decisions. Smaller members can be influenced by larger members and regional relationships will often play a major role in their decision making process. In 1990 Yemen voted against the United States action in Iraq. The United States called this the most expensive no vote in history, and cut off aid to Yemen. When the smaller member states of the UN are treated, as Yemen was, how much impartiality and freedom of member states actually exists in the UN system when the larger members can be in a position to manipulate and pressure smaller more vulnerable states?

The Security Council established at the foundation of the UN must be included in the change processes at the UN. The essentially static nature of the Security Councils structure has had a negative impact on peacekeeping operations, often as a result of the self-interest of UN member states. The existence of the Security Council's veto system must change significantly if the UN is to reform to meet the ever-changing global landscape. It must be accepted that changing the Security Councils structure will be the most difficult task undertaken by the UN, but Global politics and the financial needs of the UN will all influence the pace, if any, of change involving the Security Council.

The financial situation at the UN has resulted in the reduction of necessary funding for projects in Liberia. The sustainability of projects, such as DDRR, must be assured if these projects are to be successful. The peace-building model enables a UN force to provide stability and security, which then facilitates other agencies conduct activities to enhance the chance of sustainable peace and a return to a just society. Many of the UN Progress report highlight shortages in funding for essential programmes. The Rehabilitation and Reintegration of ex combatants has funding difficulties, resulting in many of the disarmed ex-combatants becoming involved in criminal activities. As of 30 November 2007, the member's arrears to the UN's regular budget topped \$735 million, of which the United States alone owed \$688 million or 94% of the regular budget arrears.⁴³

The provision and operation of the State's Security apparatus and the effectiveness and coverage of the state's administration are reflective of the scope of change in Liberia. The last progress report delivered to the Security Council, on 08 August 2007, stated that State Security, State administration and the rule of law in the counties were extremely limited. It was also reported that the weak presence of state authority in some counties, aggravated by poor communications and the lack of livelihood opportunities have contributed to the movement of ex-combatants to areas rich in natural resources, which has caused friction with local inhabitants. Some 'larger communities' of ex-combatants tend to maintain liaison with their former factional commanders.⁴⁴ This is an obvious threat to the stability of the new Liberian State. This risk to stability coupled with the arrest of a former Speaker of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly and a Major General, who was a former Chief of Staff and commander of the Special Anti-terrorist Unit during Samuel Doe's presidency, causes further concern to the sustained stability in Liberia. Both were charged with treason for planning to destabilize the Government.

The UN's ability to function in today's changing global conditions is questionable without meaningful change. United States foreign policy will take precedence over other international institutions.⁴⁵ Some commentators have suggested that if the UN Security Council continues to materially disagree with US foreign policy on critical issues with any frequency, the UN could come to resemble its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations.⁴⁶

The UNMIL deployment to date has had positive results, from both a military and peace building perspective. Recommendations taken from the Brahimi Report have resulted in an enhanced UN capacity to deploy a robust and more cohesive form of military intervention with an integrated mission task force incorporating peace-building strategies.

In order for Liberia to return to lasting normality, cultural issues must be addressed, as must the politicisation of military and state security services, the presence of spoilers (in the form of outside influences and unstable neighbours) and the inherent corruption at all levels. The UN must be in a position to follow through on peace building following the creation of a stable environment by fulfilling the mandate of UNMIL.

UNMIL must be seen as a milestone in the evolutionary development of peacekeeping. If the UN is to deliver an efficient, effective, and evolving peacekeeping capability then change and reform must be a continuous process to ensure that the enhanced peace building concepts of the UN meets the challenges of future conflicts.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Taken from an address given by Kofi Annan, to the United Nations Association of Japan in Tokyo on 13 May 1997, (SG/SM/6236)

² 'Deliver Us From Evil – Warlords & Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict' – Shawcross (2000) London, Bloomsbury, Page 252.

³ Intrastate conflicts accounted for 94% of all armed conflicts in the 1990s. Civil Wars / Intra State Conflict – take place primarily within the borders of a single state and among belligerents who normally reside in that state: see *At War's End* - Paris 2004 page 1 Introduction.

- ⁴ 'Making War and Building Peace' Doyle & Sambanis (2006) New Jersey, Princeton University Press, Page 348.
- ⁵ 'United Nations Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era', O'Neill & Rees (ed) (2005), New York, Routledge, Page 24.
- ⁶ 'At War's End', Rowland Paris (2004), Cambridge University Press, Page 5.
- ⁷ An Agenda for Peace, Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, dated 17 June 1992 (A/47/277 –S/24111) <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html>
- ⁸ The Challenges Project was initiated in Sweden with participants from some 230 organizations and 50 countries during the tenure of the project 1997 – 2002. Titled Challenges of Peace Operations Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2002. <http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/images/pdf/concluding1.pdf>
- ⁹ Taken from the Foreword of Challenges of Peace Operations Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2002 by Anna Lindh Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, April 2002
- ¹⁰ Challenges of Peace Operations Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2002 page 13
- ¹¹ Taken from a letter dated 21 August 2000 from the UN Secretary General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. Brahimi Report can be found at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/
- ¹² Some commentators have suggested that the presence of UN personnel have even prolonged conflicts and led to more violence (O'Neill & Rees in United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War era page 11). Taken from the Executive Summary of the Brahimi Report page viii and can be located in UN document A/55/305 –S/2000/809.
- ¹³ United States Institute of Peace – Special Report – Peacekeeping in Africa page 2. <http://www.usip.org>
- ¹⁴ Page 2, Para II (10) of the Brahimi Report.
- ¹⁵ On 01 October the ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) troops, serving in Liberia were 'rehatted' as blue helmeted UN troops. ECOMIL came from ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) the mission was designated UNMIL (United Nations Mission In Liberia).
- ¹⁶ The Brahimi Report: Four Years On. – 20-21 June 2004, Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies.
- ¹⁷ 'International Law and the Use of Forces' Gray (2000) oxford University Press, Page 144.
- ¹⁸ 'The Military and Humanitarianism; Emerging Patterns of Intervention and Engagement' Cottey & Bikin-Kita (2006), The Humanitarian Policy Group.
- ¹⁹ 'The Brahimi Report four years on' – Geneva Centre for Security Policy. 20-21 June 2004.
- ²⁰ 'When States Fail', Rotberg (2004), Princeton University Press, Pages 54-58.
- ²¹ 'Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers' Stedman (2001) International Peace Academy, New York.
- ²² International Peace Academy IPA <http://www.ipacademy.org/>, Pages 10-11.
- ²³ From 'Civil Conflicts and the conditions for successful international intervention: a comparative study of Cambodia and El Salvador' (Munck & Kumar) Review of International Studies Vol 21 No 2 (1995) pages 159-181. See also 'International Peace building: A theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', America Political Science Review, Vol 94 No 4 (2000).
- ²⁴ Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes – Stephen Stedman. Paper Commissioned by the Committee on International Conflict Resolution of the National Research Council. International Security Vol 22 No 2 (1997) pages 5-53. http://www.iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20634/Spoiler_Problems_In_Peace_Processes.pdf
- ²⁵ The Stimson Center 2001 – UN Peace Operations and the 'Brahimi Report' – William J.Durch, Senior Associate and Project Director for the Panel on UN Peace Operations – page 19.
- ²⁶ From Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology – PCIA project, Pages 185-186.
- ²⁷ www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/ 25 Mar 2008.
- ²⁸ Currently there are fifteen UN progress Reports, the reports are published approximately every 12 weeks. Progress reports on UNMIL can be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/>

unmilR.htm

- ²⁹ ‘The Politics of Collective Violence’, Tilly (2003), Cambridge University Press, Page 132.
- ³⁰ UN Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation In Liberia, Nov 2006 – Jan 2007, Published May 2007.
- ³¹ UNICEF estimates the figure of child soldiers in Liberia to be 15,000. http://www.unicef.org.uk/press/news_details.asp?news_id=182
- ³² Taken from an address given by the Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 30 January 1997. SG/SM/6151.
- ³³ Financial support for DDRR processes are vital, funding in UNMIL is often donor dependent, Page 134.
- ³⁴ Monographs can be accessed at <http://www.iss.co.za/Publications/Monographindex.html>
- ³⁵ DDR is the same as DDRR, the rehabilitation in DDR is associated with Demobilization.
- ³⁶ Timeline taken from Monograph No 106 October 2004 page 9 ‘Evolution of Peacekeeping and DDR in Africa’. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No106/Sec1.htm>
- ³⁷ The UNMIL mandate 1509 (2003), covers DDRR in Para 3, it states in sub para (f) that an action plan for DDRR should be developed as soon as possible preferably within 30 days of adoption of the resolution.
- ³⁸ See – <http://www.nndb.com/people/783/000044651/>
- ³⁹ First Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNMIL S/2003/1175 page 5.
- ⁴⁰ Interview with the Secretary General’s Special Representative in Liberia February 2005.
- ⁴¹ Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNMIL - S/2005/560.
- ⁴² Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary General on UNMIL – S/2007/479 dated 08 August 2007.
- ⁴³ Global Policy forum (UN Finance) – 18 Mar 2008, www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index/htm
- ⁴⁴ Fifteenth Progress Report to the Security Council – 08 August 2007, S/2007/479
- ⁴⁵ National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002
- ⁴⁶ Thomas G Weiss, ‘The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform’, The Washington Quarterly Autumn 2003 PP 147-161.

The Process of Reform in United Nations Peace Operations

Colonel Colm Doyle (Retd)

“It is in the nature of the United Nations that talk of reform and reform itself is a constant. The diversity and complexity of the work of the organisation, its unique status and composition, added to the ever changing international arena in which it operates, demands that this institution continually seeks to evolve, refine its procedures and modify its goals.”¹

These words were addressed by the late Sergio Vieira De Mello² the then Secretary General’s Special Representative in East Timor, to the UNITAR-IPS-JIIA Conference in Singapore in May 2001. The objective of the Conference, was to receive first-hand assessments and recommendations by a diverse group of key stakeholders, most notably those working in peacekeeping missions, the UN Secretariat, regional organisations, humanitarian agencies, national governments, and non-governmental organisations³ which were tasked with implementing the reforms proposed by the high-level panel to undertake a thorough review of peace operations of the United Nations, otherwise known as the Brahimi Report⁴

THE BRAHIMI REPORT

The first step in the reform process was to come to terms with the failures and indeed tragedies of the past. Both Rwanda and Srebrenica cast dark clouds over the organisation and forced the Secretary General to take stock of the realities which emerged from these failures. In November and December 1999 he produced two candid and hard hitting reports which laid bare the genocide in Rwanda and the slaughter of innocents in Srebrenica. Their content enumerated in detail how the Security Council, Member States, the Secretariat and peacekeepers on the ground failed to carry out their tasks properly at crucial points in both conflicts.

In March 2000, with the failings of Rwanda and Srebrenica still ringing in UN ears, the Secretary General convened an international panel to conduct a major study on UN Peace Operations. Chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi⁵, the panel was tasked to conduct a wide-ranging study and analysis over lessons learned from past operations such as those in Rwanda and Somalia, as well as some current missions at the time in Kosovo, East Timor and the Congo. The panel looked at how peacekeeping missions could achieve greater efficiency and success in attaining the key objectives of maintaining peace and promoting reconciliation and reconstruction. It also reviewed the context within which peacekeeping missions took place, the resources and limitations of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) specifically and the modality, efficacy and extent of assistance rendered by the ‘international community’ within the framework of peacekeeping and peace-building in general. The report, which recommended sweeping changes in peacekeeping strategy, doctrine and operations, was submitted to the Secretary General in August 2000. He accepted its findings and had the report transmitted to Member States for consideration, commencing at the Millennium Summit.

The Brahimi Report recommendations reflected the realities of modern peacekeeping in the post cold war era. The majority of missions authorised by the Security Council since the early nineties have encompassed a wide variety of tasks extending beyond the mere interposition of lightly armed peacekeepers between warring factions. The organisation's failure to match resistance offered undermined its ability to achieve mandates and so damaged its reputation.

There was much to be praised and supported in the report, which contained some 57 explicit recommendations and more than 100 implicit recommendations. It was a genuine attempt at identifying the shortcomings of the organisation and it promoted realistic and concrete proposals to improving the planning, preparation and execution of peace operations. It made comment and recommendations on six main areas: UN HQ; Conflict Prevention; Leadership in the Field; Rapid Deployment; Logistics and Peacekeeping. The report was a wake-up call. It was highly critical of UN members and staff. The report concluded that UN peacekeeping operations had for too long been used by Member States as a means to be seen as "doing something" in the face of public outcry, especially when the will to do the right thing had been lacking, or consensus about what the right thing to do had been missing. It stressed that sometimes it was preferable not to deploy at all, if the conditions for success simply did not exist. UN staff had often failed to give hard facts to Member States about the level of resources required and they failed to insist on the realistic amount of forces and resources required to properly carry out a peace mission. In addition, UN staff often accepted Security Council Mandates that were simply unachievable. Brahimi wanted Member States to give clear and specific mandates, obtain consent to the operation by the parties to conflicts and provide adequate resources for a mission. He concluded that DPKO needed additional experienced military and police staff, standby reserves of equipment and forces, as well as added logistics capacity to reduce deployment delays.


The response to the Brahimi Report on the political level was generally quite positive. While 'Western' countries were strongly in favour of the recommended measures others were lukewarm, particularly with concerns about the potential loss of money for development, the issue of transitional administration and complex governance issues. The report was adopted by the Security Council in November 2000 and by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) ⁶ in December of the same year. The Secretary General lost no time in appointing Deputy Secretary General Frachette to providing an implementation plan of action.

Much progress has been made in implementing the changes recommended. These have resulted in a major strengthening of the organisation's planning and staffing capacity, an improvement in its management systems, the development of a capacity for training and deploying civilian police, as individuals and units, to the missions. Reporting to the General Assembly in 2006 on the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations ⁷ the Secretary General outlined a further reform strategy entitled "Peace Operations 2010" ⁸ setting out the policies and procedures to enable DPKO to support peacekeeping over the following decade. The strategy described the five components deemed essential to a responsive and effective department: the recruitment and retention of highly qualified personnel, setting down the appropriate doctrine to clearly define and articulate what it is that UN peacekeeping can and cannot do, establishing frameworks for interactive partnerships, securing the essential resources to improve operations and establishing integrated organisational structures at headquarters and in the field.

HEADQUARTERS MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES

Since the adoption of the Brahimi Report and with the goals of “Peace Operations 2010” in mind there has been a major overhaul of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which has resulted in an increase of the number of posts within the department at headquarters from 450 (approx) in 2000 to 819, with an additional 284 new temporary posts for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. The General Assembly formally established a new Department of Field Support in June 2007 ⁹ The Assembly was acting on reform proposals put forward by the Secretary General at the beginning of 2007 to bolster the organisation’s capacity to “mount and sustain” peacekeeping operations in light of the surge in demand for them and the increasing complexity of those operations ¹⁰ The Field Support Department’s primary task is to provide ‘responsive expertise’ in the areas of personnel, finance and budget, communications, information technology and logistics. While the new department is headed by an Under-Secretary General the incumbent continues to report and take direction from DPKO. Another major initiative, currently in progress, is the establishing of integrated operational teams, comprising a cross section of officials, including military and police officers designed to ensure integrated support to all peace missions. A new Office for Rule of Law and Security has also been established, which is aimed at providing advice and guidance to Headquarters and missions in the area of law and security institutions.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1 July 2007)



THE INTEGRATED MISSION PLANNING PROCESS (IMPP)

An integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level. This strategic objective is the result of efforts by all elements of the UN system to achieve a common understanding of the mandates and functions of the UN presence and to use this understanding to maximize its effectiveness, efficiency and impact in all aspects of its work. The Integrated Mission Planning Process has been designed to facilitate achievement of this understanding by establishing a planning

process that engages the capacities of all parts of the UN system relevant to achieving impact in a given country setting. It is the authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices and agencies. It was effectively utilised in planning for and establishing new peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, Sudan and Chad. Central to the IMPP was the establishment of an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) which would act as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country by bringing together senior management and expert planning, technical and operational staff on a regular basis to promote integration of planning efforts, monitoring of progress and adjustments to optimize impact.

SENIOR LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND INDUCTION PROGRAMME

A major reform of the process for the appointment of senior leaders in field mission was initiated by DPKO in 2006. A policy governing the selection and management was introduced with a view to supporting an open and transparent process to recruit and retain high quality leaders capable of meeting the challenges inherent in managing modern, complex peace operations. To oversee this, a Senior Leadership Cell has been established within the Department of Field Support. In addition a 'Senior Leadership Induction Programme' is conducted annually to acquaint mission leaderships with the functioning of DPKO and peace operations, as well as to help them to acquire critical knowledge and understanding regarding their wider accountabilities in terms of programme, human resource and financial management. It is to be hoped that these initiatives will overcome the serious shortcomings of the selection process due to the inability or reluctance of Member States to recommend quality candidates, political interference, UN bureaucracy and the very controversial 'geographical and gender balance'¹¹. A consequence of these shortcomings is that it is seldom the case of there being a Force Commander in place to be part of the IMPP.

INTEGRATED TRAINING

In 2005 DPKO established an Integrated Training Service (ITS) in response to requests of the C-34, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs (ACABQ) and the General Assembly for more transparency and coordination in all aspects of training delivered by the department. The ITS comprises the Training and Evaluation Service from the Military Division, the Civilian Training Service from the Office of Mission Support and assets from the Police Division. An integrated training strategy and evaluation frame work was established based on Departmental priorities including multi-disciplinary training on conduct for all peacekeeping personnel. Since 2001 much work has been done in the development of standardised generic training modules, which are appropriate to the new demands placed on United Nations peacekeepers and cover the training requirements of military personnel, police and civilian experts. DPKO has also established an integrated team of trainers at its logistics base in Brindisi to support mission training both at the base and through the Integrated Training Centres established in the respective field missions¹²

CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE UNITS

Following incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers and UN staff in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and other missions in 2004-5 the Secretary General requested Jordan's Permanent Representative to the UN Prince Zeid (himself a

former peacekeeper) to develop recommendations that would effectively end tolerance for such crimes, increase reporting of such abuse and produce appropriately severe punishments for any UN personnel engaging in such acts. He presented his findings in March 2005¹³, which were adopted by the General Assembly in 2005. These reforms included developing a permanent capacity in DPKO HQ and each mission to address conduct and discipline issues, including sexual exploitation and abuse, for all categories of peacekeeping personnel. Difficulties have been encountered with some Member States in processing punishments as the United Nations has no authorisation to do so directly for uniformed personnel. This is a national responsibility. In this regard, the organisation depends on Member States to help ensure that contingent commanders understand and take seriously, their responsibilities and are accountable for the action of their troops. This can be difficult to achieve considering the ‘cultural divide’ between peacekeeping Member States.

MILITARY DIVISION

In line with the Brahimi Report the Military Division was restructured in 2001 to consist of the Office of the Military Adviser with four distinct services: Planning, Current Operations, Force Generation and Training & Evaluation with each headed by an officer of Colonel rank. The Civilian Police Unit was moved out of the Military Division and reconstituted as a separate division with an upgraded rank of Civilian Police Adviser. Subsequent changes have included removing the Training and Evaluation Service from the Military Division and renaming it the Integrated Training Service in 2005 (despite the concerns of the Military Division), attaching military officers to the Office of Operations as members of the integrated operational teams in 2008 (also opposed by the military) and the renaming of the Military Division to that of the Office of Military Affairs. There is a concern that, in losing the Evaluation and Training Service and having many military officers attached to the Office of Operations as members of the integrated operational teams, the Military Division will lose its own identity and the military chain of command will suffer, accordingly. It may be interesting to note that while NATO has over 1000 staff in its military planning division alone, The UN has only 57 military officers of which 15 are planners supporting 17 missions.¹⁴

Force Organisation Chart HQ & Police and Military Elements



FIELD OPERATIONS

INTEGRATED MISSIONS

Integration is a basic principle in the planning and execution of complex UN field operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peace building into a coordinated strategy. This requires an interface between the military and other mission components as well as the civilian population. As UN operations have become multi-faceted so there is urgent need for coordination between the different components of missions such as military, political, humanitarian, development, human rights, rule of law, security etc. To this end DPKO is improving the interface between the military and other components of missions. This civil-military coordination seeks to maximise the contribution that the military component can make. This effort includes joint involvement in the organisational structures such as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) and Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC).

JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE (JOC) AND JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS CELL (JMAC)

One of the lessons learned from more recent field missions and identified in the Brahimi Report was shortcomings in the flow of information. The situation was exacerbated by a lack of coordination between the different components of missions. The word 'intelligence' was long avoided as it touched a nerve among some Member States and it was considered unacceptable for the UN to 'spy' on its hosts. However, with UN missions becoming more volatile and, in many cases, more dangerous, particularly in peace enforcement operations, there was the need for a clearer understanding of the situation and the likely consequences of specific decisions. In July 2006 DPKO delivered its policy on Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC).¹⁵

The JOC, which is now established at each mission headquarters, is responsible for the situational awareness within the mission. It provides an integrated overview of the operational situation to support mission decision making, short-term planning and implementation management, which enables the heads of mission components to direct, in an integrated manner, operational activities. The JMAC is responsible for intelligence analysis to support planning, decision making and implementation of mission mandates. It acquires and integrates the information contributions of mission components to produce and provide analytical intelligence products that are timely, accurate and relevant. Both entities provide the Head of Mission (HOM) and the Senior Management Team (SMT) with an effective mechanism for the management of information, analysis and advice through which the decision making process can be effectively harnessed and better supported.

JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTRE (JLOC)

The Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) is a key element of the Integrated Support Services (ISS) organisation in field missions. The ISS is designed to deliver coordinated logistics support services to each mission component, consistent with authorised requirements, irrespective of whether the requirement is for military, police, or civilian staff. The JLOC is an integrated, military, police and civilian organisation that has the primary responsibility for development of support plans based on mission priorities, allocation of resources and tasking

of enabling units. The establishment of the Department of Field Support at UN Headquarters should enhance the procurement, support and accountability of logistics support services to all field missions.

ACHIEVING MORE RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The ability to deploy troops rapidly is a problem that has beset the United Nations for many years and for which no satisfactory solution has been found. While much progress has been made in incorporating the different recommendations of the Brahimi Report, an improvement in rapid deployment has not been one of them. The report gave some attention to this issue and the ensuing Secretary General's Report referred to using *"the timelines proposed by the Panel as the basis for evaluating the capacity of our existing systems to provide field missions with the human, material, financial and information assets that they require"*.¹⁶ However, while attempts have been made to address this dilemma, the majority of initiatives have either been focussed on specific functional areas such as Strategic Deployment Stocks, or they have been so general as to be largely ineffective such as the Standby Arrangement System. The problem has been exacerbated by the need for properly structured, fully equipped, self-sustained and appropriately trained forces the like of which are found in relatively few countries. While there have been no shortage of offers of Infantry units such as Companies and Battalions from Member States, the provision of enabling assets have been very difficult to achieve and in many cases many missions have deployed short of these critical enablers.¹⁷

The United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) has simply not worked. While UNSAS might help identify potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) it is still subject to the standard procedures of force generation. What is needed is a high readiness version on the principle of matching potential TCCs against potential requirements that have been identified, and their placing troops and assets at an agreed state of readiness for a specified period, and receiving reimbursement for that capability. This might eventually lead to meeting the aspirations of coherent brigade sized forces as proposed in the Brahimi Report. This issue is a priority for DPKO both in terms of improved deployment timelines and strategic reserves.

Despite the many shortcomings of the United Nations it continues to act as the only truly global organisation. It has been actively engaged in a vast array of work that touches every aspect of people's lives around the world, often in ways unknown to the average citizen. Despite the many problems in finding the correct number and mix of troop contributors, staffing, logistics and resources for its many and varied peacekeeping operations there have been many successes. A recent Rand Institute Study found that UN peacekeeping efforts have been largely successful. *"UN missions are nearly always undermanned and under funded, with uneven troop quality and late-arriving components. But despite these handicaps, the UN success rate among missions studied- seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic- substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy."*¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ “The Reform Process of United Nations Peace Operations”: Debriefing and Lessons (page 17) published by Kluwer Law International 2001.
- ² Sergio De Mello later became UN Commissioner for Human Rights. He was killed, along with 21 other UN staff, in a terrorist attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, where he was the Secretary General’s Special Representative.
- ³ Of the 45 participants only four were military, including the author, who was School Commandant UNTSI at the time. It was unfortunate that there were so few military officers with peacekeeping experience at this conference
- ⁴ Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations: A/55/305-S2000/809 August 2000: Department of Public Information
- ⁵ United Nations Under-Secretary General for Special Assignments and a former Foreign Minister of Algeria.
- ⁶ Implementation of the Recommendations of The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on UN Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary General: A/55/977: UN department of Public Information.
- ⁷ Resource Requirements for Implementation of The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations: A/55/507: UN Department of Public Information.
- ⁸ Report of the secretary General to the General Assembly on the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 2006: A/60/696: UN Department of Public Information.
- ⁹ General Assembly GA/10602 June 2007: UN Department of Public Information.
- ¹⁰ With the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic of Chad (MINURCAT) in September 2007 the UN has launched a total of 63 peacekeeping operations since 1948. It currently has 102,118 personnel deployed in 17 field missions, covering 4 continents and across 12 time zones. There are 119 TCCs and the approved budget for the year to June 2008 is almost \$6.8 billion. This represents about 0.5% of global military spending: UN Department of Public Information DPI 1634/Rev 79: 2008.
- ¹¹ The Military Division of DPKO was frequently frustrated by these factors, when trying to fill vacancies within the division. This caused totally unnecessary delays in the selection process.
- ¹² Much of the groundwork undertaken on the establishment of the Integrated Training Service was carried out by Lt Col Michael McDermott, who at that time was acting chief of the ITS.
- ¹³ A/59/710: UN Department of Public Information. 2005.
- ¹⁴ “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006” (pagexiii): A project of The Center on International Cooperation.
- ¹⁵ Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres: UN/DPKO/POL/2006/3000/04 July 2006.
- ¹⁶ Military Division’s Draft Report on Achieving More Rapid Deployment: 2004
- ¹⁷ UNOCI, which was deployed in April 2004 was still deficient its helicopter unit in April 2006. Such deficiencies are not only confined to UN operations but other regional organizations as well, ie the EU.
- ¹⁸ “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From The Congo to Iraq”: Rand Corporation 2005

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes against Humanity

Robert C. Johansen

THE NEED

Despite the need at times to move quickly to prevent genocide, “ethnic cleansing,” and crimes against humanity, the United Nations has no reliable capacity to move promptly, even if halting a catastrophe could save hundreds of thousands of lives. Genocide in Rwanda illustrates this incapacity, as do the massive killings of innocent people in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, the Sudan, and elsewhere.

The time has come to create a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service to ensure that the next preventable humanitarian disaster will not occur. If such a service had been established earlier, it could have prevented many of the atrocities that have killed millions of civilians, wounded millions more, forced tens of millions from their homes, destroyed entire economies, and wasted hundreds of billions of dollars. Of course such a service would not be a panacea for security problems in general; indeed it would be designed to complement — not replace — other essential national, regional, and United Nations efforts. Yet an emergency service could provide immediate, full protection in some crises and serve as an advance peace service that would prepare the way for subsequent additional help, if needed, in larger conflicts — a vital function that is not provided by any existing agency. Such a service could also help address extreme environmental and natural disasters in cases where other remedies are inadequate for averting major threats to human life.

THE PROPOSAL

Because a UN emergency service would be permanent, based at UN designated sites, and include mobile field headquarters, it could move to quell an emergency within 48 hours after United Nations authorization. Since it would be individually recruited from among volunteers from many countries, it would not suffer the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units. As its 10,000 to 15,000 personnel would be carefully selected, expertly trained, and coherently organized and commanded, it would not fail in its mission due to lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness, experience in resolving conflicts, or gender, national, or religious imbalance. Because it would be an integrated service encompassing civilian, police, judicial, and military personnel prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse UN operations, it would not suffer for lack of components essential to peace operations or from confusion about the chain of command. By providing a wide range of functions, the UN emergency service would, for the first time in history, offer a rapid, comprehensive, internationally legitimate response to crisis.

THE PLAN OF ACTION

Because governments have not created the necessary UN capability, the responsibility for breathing life into the United Nations Emergency Peace Service now lies with civil society, working with allies in the UN and interested governments. To create this service, a growing number of citizens' organizations and leaders of civil society are determined to: (1) identify interested parties throughout the world to expand the number and diversity of those committed to this initiative; (2) secure agreement on the principles, composition, and financing of a UN emergency service; (3) draw on expert knowledge to ensure that the growing constituency is accurately informed and to write detailed plans for the emergency service and how to establish it; (4) develop a well-organized network of support with a compelling website, promotional materials, list of endorsements, and speakers' bureau; and (5) encourage a wide consultative process among non-governmental organizations, the UN system, and national governments to ensure the implementation of a successful strategy.

PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PEACE SERVICE TO PREVENT GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY¹

THE NEED

Despite the need to be able to move quickly to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity, the United Nations has no capacity to avert such catastrophes, even when prompt action could save hundreds of thousands of lives. The international community's failure to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to avert "ethnic cleansing" occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan a decade later illustrate this incapacity, as do the other massive killings of civilians in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and elsewhere. In recent years, huge atrocities have killed millions of innocent people, wounded millions more, forced tens of millions from their homes, destroyed entire economies, and wasted hundreds of billions of dollars.

After witnessing genocide, everyone promises: "Never again." But mass murder has happened again, and yet again. The time to stop it has come, at least in all those instances where the international community could have a reasonable probability of success. Yet existing international capabilities are simply unable to meet this responsibility. "Too little, too late" has become the rule rather than the exception. As the UN Secretary-General has warned, without serious reforms and institutional innovation, the United Nations will be unable to prevent future human catastrophes². The conscience of every human being should be shocked and aroused by the international community's inability to quell atrocities in Darfur ten years after the lessons "learned" in Rwanda³.

Although many factors cause "too little, too late," a single innovation could address most of them: the creation of a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service to protect those victimized by war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Such a service could save millions of lives and billions of dollars, while also advancing the rule of law against heinous crimes. Of course it would not be a panacea for security problems in general; indeed its purpose is to complement—not replace—other essential national, regional, and United Nations efforts. Yet

such an emergency service could provide immediate, full protection in some crises and serve as an advance peace service that would prepare the way for subsequent additional help when needed — a vital function that is not covered by any existing agency⁴. Such a service might also address environmental accidents and natural disasters where they threaten enormous loss of life and local and national governments are unable or unwilling to avert a severe humanitarian crisis⁵.

The time is finally right to create a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service to ensure that the next preventable humanitarian disaster will not occur. First, a growing number of people are acknowledging that every government's sovereign rights arise from an equally solemn responsibility to protect the people it governs. This duty, rooted in the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility," means a government is obligated to protect its people, to prevent crises that put its population at risk, to refuse to inflict arbitrary death on its citizens, and to bring equitable assistance to victimized people for recovery after a crisis⁶. "It is the peoples' sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty",⁷ that is gaining weight in decision-making today. The state "is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa"⁸. If a state clearly violates its sovereign responsibility, which includes accountability to its people, to its signature of the UN Charter, and to the entire international community of states responsible for compliance with human rights agreements, then the international community has a duty to stop massive death or other large-scale human suffering out of respect for peoples' sovereignty⁹. Indeed, "... the core challenge to the Security Council and to the United Nations as a whole in the next century," declared Secretary General Annan, is "to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights — wherever they may take place — should not be allowed to stand." This is exactly what a UN Emergency Peace Service could do.

In addition, an impressive number of studies carried out by the United Nations, by national governments, and by independent experts conclude that more highly skilled personnel need to be deployed more rapidly during crises to prevent armed conflict, protect civilians, and enforce the law¹⁰. The growing recognition of need for a new UN capability has led to numerous efforts to prepare more readily available national police and military units, regional forces (e.g., NATO), voluntary forms of international collaboration (e.g., the Standby High Readiness Brigade), and *ad hoc* mechanisms (e.g., the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone). The African Union's growing interest in developing a capacity to intervene against war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, and the G-8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations are also important steps¹¹. Yet none of these groups will be *immediately* available. They cannot be deployed quickly because of insufficient readiness or because they require national decisions that in practice have delayed deployments. None possesses the full range and depth of competence needed. And these other forces may, in some cases, lack the legitimacy essential for eliciting financial support and enforcing measures that hold leaders accountable to international law. In short, whether acting within or outside of the United Nations, governments have yet to develop a reliable capability for rapid action to prevent genocide, enforce peace, and transform conflicts to restore law, justice, and civil order to nations torn apart by violence. Despite widespread acknowledgment that the world needs an integrated global effort to prevent armed conflict and to protect potential victims from catastrophes, there is no agreement on what to do

next. As a result, even if the international community speaks through the Security Council and agrees to act in a particular case, it still lacks the tool needed to meet the challenge. The uncertainty on how to proceed in providing a swift and effective capacity can be resolved — if enough people agree on the following proposal to create a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service.

THE PROPOSAL

Most recent humanitarian crises have demonstrated four needs: (1) to take action to prevent war and dire threats to human security and human rights; (2) to offer secure emergency services to meet critical human needs; (3) to maintain or reinstate law, order, penal, and judicial processes with high professionalism and fairness; and (4) to initiate peacebuilding processes with focused incentives to restore hope for local people that their society and economy have a future. The UN Emergency Peace Service proposed here is designed to provide a rapid response to these needs.

It would possess five unique strengths:

- It would be permanent, based at UN designated sites, include mobile field headquarters, and be able to act immediately to cope with an emergency;
- It would be individually recruited from among those who volunteer from many countries so it would not suffer the delays of creating ad hoc forces or the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units¹²;
- Its personnel would be carefully selected, expertly trained¹³, and coherently organized, so it would not fail in its mission due to a lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness, experience in resolving conflicts, or gender, national, or religious imbalance;
- It would be a dedicated service with a wide range of professional skills within a single command structure, prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse UN operations, enabling it to avoid divided loyalties, confusion about the chain of command, or functional fragmentation;
- It would provide an integrated service encompassing 10,000 to 15,000 civilian, police, judicial, military, and relief professionals, enabling it to deploy all the components essential for peace and enforcement operations.

With these professional capabilities, a UN agency would, for the first time in history, offer a rapid, comprehensive, internationally legitimate response to crisis, enabling it to save hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars through early and often preventive action.

Each field unit would contain sufficient strength and versatility to provide robust security as well as the necessary range of skills and services to initiate conflict transformation and the rule of law within their sphere of control while simultaneously addressing human needs. The emergency service might deploy UN protection personnel to prevent large-scale killings¹⁴, a police unit to help provide safety in tense local communities and to protect those delivering humanitarian services to threatened people, and a disaster relief service. Where needed, it could also provide reliable, early, on-site fact-finding, rapid mobility for preventive action to protect civilians at risk, information-gathering for war crimes investigations, humanitarian

assistance, and prompt start-up of peacebuilding operations. The UN service would also include units to re-train and monitor local police, to conduct conflict resolution efforts, and to respond to humanitarian crises growing out of environmental or natural disasters that national governments are unable or unwilling to address¹⁵.

The proposed emergency service would be designed to complement but not to replace existing or expanded peace operations by the United Nations, regional international organizations, and national governments. Protecting people against victimization from armed conflict and gross violations of human rights may at times require more personnel than the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service could provide by itself. Moreover, because peacebuilding often requires extensive and sustained efforts, long-term success in preventing genocides and other crimes against humanity will require support from the wider UN system and complementary efforts by national and regional actors. The proposed emergency service might be viewed as a “first in, first out” response to a crisis, although in particular cases it might continue the deployment of some personnel, such as for training and monitoring local civilian police, after other agencies have arrived to address any needs too large and long-term for the UN Emergency Peace Service to handle by itself.

Fortunately, several recent initiatives provide the essential foundation on which to build the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service. These include the expansion of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the refinement of the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), the development of the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN peace operations (SHIRBRIG)¹⁶, and the new strategic deployment stocks in Brindisi, Italy. For the larger tasks, further implementation of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report and regional efforts, such as those being pursued by African countries and by the European Union, are necessary. The recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change and the Secretary General’s report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*¹⁷, should also be heeded. Implementation of these measures would not diminish the need for the UN Emergency Peace Service. Indeed they would enable it to function more effectively, while it, in turn, would contribute to broader goals for preventing genocide and enhancing rapid-reaction capability.

We commend the proponents of these other initiatives and offer our support for further development of these measures. Nonetheless, many officials in the United Nations and national governments recognize that some inherent limitations in these arrangements point toward the need to take further steps. Although the recent reforms enhance the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping, they cannot and will not provide an assurance of rapid response to fast-breaking crises because they still depend on national deliberations, decisions, and provision of personnel. Such limitations inevitably delay response. Repeated efforts to overcome such limitations have failed, suggesting that they can be overcome only through a new institutional initiative. In short, the existing arrangements are essential and should be expanded, but they are insufficient. They will remain slower than often needed, less reliable and well-prepared than desirable, and understandably less competent than a dedicated force in carrying out delicate, specialized, multiple functions simultaneously. Indeed, the existing agencies would be able to perform their existing tasks and the measures suggested by the High-Level Panel more effectively if these tasks were carried out in tandem with the kind of professionalism

proposed in a UN Emergency Peace Service. In addition, the proposed service could help overcome existing gaps in political will and capabilities.

THE DECISION TO DEPLOY

The Security Council is the first, the most legitimate, and the most likely body to authorize the UN Emergency Peace Service and to clarify the threshold criteria that would justify deploying it. But if the Security Council is unable to act because of a veto, then other forms of authorization may be desirable¹⁸ to prevent war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. The two next best alternatives to the preferred legitimacy of Security Council action are: authorization by the UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution¹⁹, or authorization by a regional international organization for intervention in one of its own member states. Even less widely viewed as legitimate, but perhaps still acceptable, would be authorization for intervention by a regional international organization in a state not a member of the organization, especially if the conflict affects member states, as might have happened when NATO intervened in Kosovo²⁰.

The United Nations could also authorize the Secretary General to deploy the emergency service as a result of his or her own decision, under carefully specified conditions defined in advance by the Security Council or General Assembly. If the Secretary General determined that those conditions were met, then he or she could immediately deploy the UN Emergency Peace Service without waiting for any other body to deliberate²¹. If such authorization did occur, the Security Council could retain its power to withdraw the emergency service by passing a resolution following its normal voting procedures²².

Regardless of the particular form of authorization, six principles, most of which have been recommended by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, provide a useful set of standards for decision-making²³. This framework arises from the norms contained in existing international treaties, including the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the findings of a variety of expert commissions, as well as from traditional just war thinking. To reassure all parties who are understandably concerned about enabling *unwarranted* interventions, the following high standards should be met to justify coercive intervention: (1) a legitimate authority must authorize deployment; (2) there must be a just cause²⁴; (3) intervention must be undertaken with a right intention; (4) intervention should occur only when there is an immediate and evident threat of gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; (5) the means employed must be proportional to and consistent with the ends sought; and (6) a reasonable prospect of success must exist.

The fourth of these guidelines reformulates the traditional standard of “last resort,” which is appropriate for conventional military combat, to fit internationally authorized coercive measures of law enforcement, which reflect less a right to engage in conventional military combat than the international responsibility to protect people under severe threat. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has noted that the requirement of last resort should not be used to delay intervention, including preventive deployments, when justified. “Last resort” needs to be understood as a restraint against *premature* use of international coercion, but “this does not necessarily mean that every . . . option must literally

have been tried and failed: often there will simply not be the time for that process to work itself out.²⁵ When internationally authorized personnel function as much as possible in a police mode of operations to enforce international law against genocide, for example, the goal presumably would be to address the crisis at a moment *early* enough to avoid mass murder. Early deployment of law enforcers and conflict specialists to address an imminent threat of genocide not yet underway can sometimes avoid later need for more large-scale military combat. Requiring international authorization for deployment, eschewing unnecessary violence, and focusing law enforcement on *individual* rather than collective misconduct, insofar as possible, provide some reassurances against abuse of international police power.

While recognizing the wisdom and propriety of avoiding unwarranted coercive interventions, there also is a co-existing *duty* to prevent large-scale loss of life and gross violations of human rights such as genocide²⁶. Because the proposed emergency service would, for the first time in history, enable the international community to discharge its responsibilities at the time when it can do the most good with means that exact the least moral cost — in the early stages of a crisis — it would incur fewer painful ethical dilemmas than less timely interventions which in the past have occasionally divided those emphasizing human rights from those emphasizing peace and nonviolence, thereby impeding effective restraints on the perpetrators of mass violence.

THE COSTS

Although the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service would entail significant financial costs, these almost certainly will be far less than the costs that will occur from conflicts allowed to fester until they spiral out of control in the absence of such a service²⁷. Estimates on the cost of the UN service vary, but start-up expenses could come to \$2 billion, with an annual recurring cost of \$900 million or more, depending on field operations²⁸. Although this cost could be viewed initially as beyond the capacity of UN member states, such a service would reduce the number and size of other UN peace operations, help prevent armed conflicts from escalating or spreading, and reduce the high costs of prolonged operations. It is likely to be a cost-effective instrument, able to reduce the overall costs of UN peace and enforcement operations in the long run²⁹. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict found that the international community “spent approximately \$200 billion on conflict management in seven major interventions in the 1990s (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, and El Salvador).” It could have saved \$130 billion of this amount “through a more effective preventive approach”³⁰ that a UN Emergency Peace Service would help make possible. Additional billions could have been saved by external powers that were involved directly or indirectly in the conflicts³¹. Yet if the proposed emergency service saved only one or two billion “conflict dollars” annually, which it almost certainly would do, it would be a cost-effective investment for saving both lives and financial resources³².

THE BENEFITS

The benefits of a permanent, sophisticated UN Emergency Peace Service are clear. In past crises, the UN has often been unable to assemble personnel and provide assistance in less than three to six months. Even then these *ad hoc* forces were not always well prepared for their demanding tasks. The proposed UN service would directly surmount these difficulties and also lift the burden that now makes governments reluctant to deploy their own national citizens in

conflicts with high risk and low national interest. As a dedicated UN service with personnel recruited from among carefully selected volunteers, it would no longer need to acquire the last-minute approval of or meet the conditions imposed by each member state that participates in a conventional peacekeeping operation. Life-saving decisions for international help would be easier for the Security Council to make. The UN service could also play a constructive preventive role during crises when mass violence might otherwise appear tempting to some. If cynical political leaders in strife-ridden societies knew that a rapid reaction UN service could be deployed quickly to enforce international law, some of those political leaders who otherwise might be tempted to commit misdeeds would be more likely to be deterred. As Secretary General Annan put it, "If states bent on criminal behavior know that frontiers are not the absolute defence; if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereignty impunity."³³

The UN Emergency Peace Service could also help where a government would *consent* to the deployment of UN personnel, rather than be forced to accept them, either as a result of pressure from the Security Council or because a government wanted UN help to prevent its society from sliding into chaos and genocide. The Indonesian government, for example, eventually accepted a multinational force to keep peace in East Timor for two reasons. First, the Security Council pressed for acceptance and the office of the Secretary General let members of the government know that they might face criminal responsibility for their inability to stop violence if it was also accompanied by their continued refusal to accept proffered UN help. Second, an ad hoc UN interventionary force, with Australian help, actually existed and stood at the ready. A permanent UN Emergency Peace Service could play a similar deterring role even earlier and more effectively³⁴, thereby helping to elicit consent for a UN deployment. Such a service would increase the willingness of both the Security Council to deploy and a state to give consent to a UN presence, thereby doubly facilitating UN prevention of mass murder and possibly war.

Of course a UN Emergency Peace Service would be no panacea; it would not have worked well in every one of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Yet even in crises that might turn out to be too large for the proposed service to manage, it could play a vital role in enhancing the effectiveness of other UN and regional capabilities, serving first as a rapid-reaction team to avert a spiral toward social break-down and subsequently as an advance service preparing the way for later deployment of other capabilities.

Moreover, a conflict that in retrospect might appear to have been beyond the capacity of a small emergency service might have been amenable to successful intervention if it had occurred in an early preventive phase of a conflict's life cycle. Increasingly, governments understand that early preventive action is more effective and less costly than later, larger efforts after a conflict has escalated and spread. The capacity to respond rapidly is often crucial for preventing bloodshed that, once begun, may tear the social fabric forever beyond repair. If it had existed in the 1990s, such a capacity could have prevented untold destruction and suffering while reducing or eliminating the high costs of post-conflict reconstruction after a society and its supportive infrastructure have been devastated by violent conflict. Instead of waiting for weeks or even months for national assistance to respond to a UN call, the UN would

have the option to deploy its own discrete service immediately, with highly trained personnel, operating with a clear chain of command responsibility, using the best equipment available, and possessing the highest overall competence and legitimacy to prevent atrocities.

THE CALL TO ACTION

Many leaders from scores of national governments, the United Nations, regional organizations, human rights organizations, religious groups, and surviving members of victimized families around the world are calling for a rapid deployment capability to protect the innocent from further atrocities³⁵. There are encouraging signs of support for developing such a capacity in the African Union, in the European Union, among progressive governments elsewhere, and in public opinion from every corner of the world³⁶. But because governments have not answered this call, responsibility for breathing life into a United Nations Emergency Peace Service now lies with members of civil society, in cooperation with the United Nations, regional organizations, and governments wherever possible. With support from those convinced of the need to end genocide and other crimes, an emergency service *can* be created, and sooner rather than later.

The next step in establishing a UN Emergency Peace Service is to build widespread, well-informed political influence by expanding the network of supportive parties. Help will be needed from diverse sectors of civil society, particularly NGOs, foundations, and academe. Determined efforts by a global constituency are required. Fortunately, such a constituency already has leaders who are experienced in transnational politics, because this proposal builds upon and links the previous work of many people, including efforts such as the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)³⁷, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and the other path-breaking initiatives to enhance UN rapid deployment, to emphasize preventive measures, to de-legitimize and remove anti-personnel land mines, and to establish the permanent International Criminal Court.

To succeed in creating this life-sustaining UN Emergency Peace Service, a growing number of citizens' organizations and leaders of civil society are determined to implement these essential steps:

- (1) Identify interested parties throughout the world to establish a large, diverse, well-organized network of support;
- (2) Draw on expert knowledge to ensure that the growing constituency is well informed and to provide a more detailed vision of how to establish an effective emergency service;
- (3) Secure agreement, after full consultation, on the principles, composition, and financing of a preferred model for the UN Emergency Peace Service;
- (4) Develop a compelling website, well-researched studies on all major issues, solid promotional materials showing the costs and benefits of the proposal, an expanding list of endorsements, and an expert speakers' bureau, coordinated from an agreed institutional home; and

- (5) Encourage wide consultative and networking processes among non-governmental organizations, the UN system, and national governments to shape and implement a successful strategy³⁸.

The creation of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service will produce enough true benefits for all countries to demonstrate that, when it comes to stopping genocide and crimes against humanity, “the collective interest is the national interest.”³⁹ The proposed UN service could curtail violence in divided societies, deflect venomous attacks between those of different identities and religious traditions, end a culture of impunity, encourage the concentration of scarce resources on meeting human needs rather than on harming one’s neighbors, and bring an energizing focus to the meaning of common, human security. It could produce monumental benefits in lives saved, mothers and daughters protected against grievous violations, families still able to live at home, time and money never spent to kill and destroy, tolerance maintained, laws upheld, and communities at peace. By acting together we can enliven that spark of human solidarity that lives, too often hidden, within people everywhere on earth. Finally, we can give genuine meaning to “Never again”.

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: Proposal Update

Dr. Robert Zuber

The preceding essay by then rapporteur Robert Johansen represents a critically important stage in the evolution of the project for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), a standing, individually-recruited, service-integrated, complimentary capacity under a unified command structure that can respond rapidly and effectively to crimes against humanity and other humanitarian disasters. From its inception, UNEPS has been designed as a ‘first-in, first-out’ service that works in tandem with existing UN and regional operations. With its 2006 publication, Johansen’s essay made clear the intent of our core UNEPS secretariat team to provide concrete, feasible, training and operational suggestions to the diplomatic, military and policy communities. Our goal, then as now, is to magnify the potential of UNEPS to compliment, strengthen and even minimize the need for complex, expensive, longer-term UN and regional peacekeeping operations.

Since 2006, the proposal has continued to evolve as early supporters such as Lt. General Satish Nambiar, former UN special advisor for the Prevention of Genocide Juan Mendez, and other prominent individuals have pushed the secretariat to address remaining gaps. At the same time, researchers such as Peter Langille of Canada, Hussein Solomon of South Africa, and Kavitha Suthanthiraraj in New York have sought the best responses to important technical and political challenges posed by diplomats and military and civil society leaders. We welcome such challenges as they help ensure that our proposal is politically and technically feasible.

They also motivate us to reach out to people of diverse backgrounds and expertise to help us identify persistent training and deployment gaps in existing peacekeeping operations that our own proposal must successfully address. And they have helped sharpen our efforts to build political will for UNEPS through international conferences, workshops, publications, UN advocacy and legislative action through the US Congress, the Diet of Japan and other parliamentary bodies.

Based on comments already received, we plan a thorough revision of the Johansen text for publication in 2008, at which time we will be able to update our goals and objectives while providing more detail on projected budgets and expenses as well core training and operational dimensions of UNEPS (including authorization questions). The new volume will also highlight regional and UN 'best practices' and related NGO initiatives in this field as policymakers begin to embrace some forms of standing capacity such as police and civilian peacekeepers. And it will include an implementation timeline and legal justifications for the eventual establishment of an emergency peace service based at the United Nations.

Though our proposal continues to evolve, the concerns that motivate and inspire our partners remain constant:

- The increasing operational burdens on DPKO highlighted by a growing dependence on expensive, late-arriving, inadequately trained peacekeeping operations that are too often being used as a substitute for resolute political engagement.
- The failure of governments and the international community to adequately fulfill their responsibility to protect civilian populations from crimes against humanity and other humanitarian disasters.
- The continued lack of early warning capacity that could mobilize adequate resources and capacities before the onset of severe violence.
- The development of any new peacekeeping capacities that fail to take the security needs and expectations of emerging global regions into account.
- A global public that is growing weary of promises that UN and regional organizations can provide effective multi-lateral security.

UNEPS is the latest incarnation in a long and distinguished line of proposals (beginning with the 'United Nations Legion' in 1948) that have sought to provide robust, permanent capacity at the UN to deal quickly and effectively with outbreaks of genocide and other forms of severe violence. The merits of UNEPS are especially apparent in comparison with the enormous financial and political expense associated with rebuilding failed states after an outbreak of crimes against humanity or related abuses; or with peacekeeping deployments that drag on needlessly and with limited effectiveness either because they are being used as a substitute for a failed political process or because they arrive on the scene too late and with insufficient clarity of mandate to address violence in its most formative stages. In instances where genocide or crimes against humanity are suspected, we know that delays in recruitment, training and deployment can mean death and destruction for far too many civilians and needless risks for peacekeepers.

Despite both stubborn political obstacles and what UNEPS supporter Sir Brian Urquhart has called 'plausible objections,' the vision, structure and sound research embodied in our proposal continue to garner widespread interest and support. We welcome your comments and participation as we push to develop fully and eventually implement a new peacekeeping capacity that can help ensure timely, secure, successful and cost-effective peacekeeping operations.

FOOTNOTES

¹ This essay was written by Robert C. Johansen on behalf of the Working Group for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service. It is based in part on an early draft by H. Peter Langille and on comments from members of the Working Group. This proposal grew out of a symposium on "Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement," co-sponsored by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation; the Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia; Global Action to Prevent War; and the Law and Society Program, University of California, Santa Barbara, December 5-6, 2003. Parts of this essay draw on the initial concept, case, model, and plans for a United Nations Emergency Service developed by H. Peter Langille, and discussed in his *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment* (Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, 2002). This essay also builds on earlier work to develop UN rapid deployment capabilities for preventing armed conflict and protecting civilians in emergencies, including William R. Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957); Robert C. Johansen and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "The Role of Enforcement of Law in the Establishment of a New International Order: A Proposal for a Transnational Police Force," *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy* 6 (1980): 307-338; Robert C. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping and the Changing Utility of Military Force," *Third World Quarterly* 12 (1990): 53-70; Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force," *New York Review of Books* 40 (10 June 1993): 3-4; Howard Peter Langille, James Hammond, and Carleton Hughes, "A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability" in David Cox and Albert Legault (eds.), *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects* (Cornwallis: The Pearson Peacekeeping Press, 1995); Robert C. Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peacekeeping" in Chadwick F. Alger (ed.), *The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for the Twenty-first Century* (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1998), 89-126; Howard Peter Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces," Special Issue of *International Peacekeeping*, Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds.) 7 (2000): 219-253 [reprinted in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (eds.), *Peacekeeping As Conflict Resolution* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000)]; and Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, "A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity," in Neil Reimer (ed.), *Protection Against Genocide: Mission Impossible?* (London: Praeger, 2000), 105-122.

² Kofi Annan said: "We are living through a crisis of the international system" calling into question "whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate . . ." Quoted in Felicity Barringer, "Annan Warns of World 'Crisis,'" *New York Times*, 31 July 2003, A 16.

³ With the UN report on Srebrenica and the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, Kofi Annan acknowledged UN failures, expressed his own deep remorse, and said, "Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter." *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations and Srebrenica: Report of the Fall of Srebrenica*, UN Document A54/549, 15 November, 1999.

⁴ See H. Peter Langille, *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap*. . .; Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, "A UN Constabulary to Enforce the Law . . ."

⁵ Because the UN emergency service is focused on averting widespread loss of life, if deployment were to occur in connection with an environmental disaster, it would occur only after recognition by the appropriate authorizing body that the disaster was so severe as to extend beyond the capacity of a state and other relevant international organizations to address it and likely to result in a state's fundamental failure to protect many of its own people, either because it was unable or unwilling to do so.

⁶ Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and a former Sudanese diplomat, has articulated this concept in reconciling sovereign immunity from external intervention with international responsibility to intervene, by adding to the three traditional attributes of sovereignty (territory, a people, and governmental authority), a fourth characteristic: respect for a minimal

standard of human rights. Francis M. Deng, *Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993); Francis M. Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Francis M. Deng, "Frontiers of Sovereignty," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 8 (1995): 249-286; Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis in Displacement* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998). Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali earlier recognized the changing boundaries of sovereignty when he wrote "The centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands. . . . A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Winter 1992-1993): 98-99. Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that "state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined. . . . States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty — by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties — has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. . . ." He said "we should welcome" the "developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter. . . ." Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist* 352 (18 September 1999): 49-50. Annan earlier said "The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power." See "Reflections on Intervention," Ditchley Foundation Lecture 26 June, 1998, reprinted in *The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 1999), 6. See also Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General's Speech to the 54th Session of the General Assembly," September 20, 1999; and *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, Document A/54/1.

⁷ Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," 49-50.

⁸ Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly," *UN Press Release* 20 September 1999: 2.

⁹ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty observed that "If by its actions and, indeed, crimes, a state destroys the lives and rights of its citizens, it forfeits temporarily its moral claim to be treated as legitimate. Its sovereignty, as well as its right to nonintervention is suspended." International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 136; 5-13. See also Ramesh Thakur, "Global Norms and International Humanitarian Law: An Asian Perspective," *International Review of the Red Cross* 83, no. 841 (March 2001): 35.

¹⁰ See, for example, Government of Canada, *Towards A Rapid Deployment Capability for the United Nations, Report by the Government of Canada* (1995); Robert C. Johansen, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping and Enforcement: A Framework for Policymaking," *Global Governance* 2, no. 3 (September-December 1996): 299-333; Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force," *International Peacekeeping* 3 (Winter 1996); Brian Urquhart and Francois Heisbourg, "Prospects for a Rapid Response Capability: A Dialogue," in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, ed. Olara Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 189-99; William J. Durch, *Discussion of the Report of the Panel On UN Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report* (The Stimson Center, 2000); Howard Peter Langille, "Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate A UN Standing Emergency Capability," Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the DFAIT (June 2000), <http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/langille1.pdf>; United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peaceoperations/docs/a55305.pdf>, A/55/305-S/2000/809; John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport: Praeger, 2001); *Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century Concluding Report* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2002); William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center Report, 2003) <http://www.stimson.org/pubs.cfm?ID=90>

¹¹ See African Union Constitutive Act, Art. 4(h); and G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations, <http://www.g8usa.gov/pdfs/0610ActionPlanPeaceOperations.pdf>.

¹² More than a sufficient number of dedicated, skilled individuals are to likely volunteer for this professional service [See the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 112]. They would be paid on a full-time basis as are other UN civil servants. Applicants would be encouraged from all member states to encourage universal representation.

¹³ Training would focus not only on expertise within a person's primary functional area of responsibility, but also on international human rights law and the laws of war

¹⁴ Although the proposed UN service would not be a large force designed to conduct major military combat, it must

have a sufficient enforcement capability to maintain security and safety for the people within its area of operations. If armed personnel are deployed in sufficient numbers, they often are able to operate more in a police mode than in a combat role even if they are military personnel. In most of the tense incidents in Kosovo following the cease-fire agreement, for example, this was true of the NATO role, where 40,000 soldiers were deployed.

¹⁵ On the unrealized potential of UN civilian police, see Robert C. Johansen, "Enforcing Norms and Normalizing Enforcement for Humane Governance," in *Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations*, edited by Paul Wapner and Lester Edwin J. Ruiz (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 218-227. For a detailed list of required units, see H.P. Langille, *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap* . . . , 128.

¹⁶ For analysis of the SHIRBRIG, see H.P. Langille, "La Brigade multinationale d'intervention rapide des forces en attente des Nations Unies (BIRFA): est-elle perfectible?" in Jocelyn Coulon (ed.), *Guide du maintien de la paix* (Outrement: Athena Publications, 2004), 111-126.

¹⁷ The panel said the Security Council needs "to be prepared to be more proactive in the future, taking decisive action earlier." If a state fails in its "responsibility to protect its civilians from large-scale violence," then "the international community . . . has a further responsibility to act. . . ." See "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," *Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004), 4; A/59/565, 2 December 2004; available at www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf, accessed December 13, 2004. See also the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly, March 21, 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom>.

¹⁸ The Working Group for a UN Emergency Peace Service agrees with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that a higher emphasis should be placed on making the Security Council work better than on developing alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, although the latter may be needed if the Council is paralyzed by a veto. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 49.

¹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly Resolution 377A, November 3, 1950 (V)," in *Charter Review Documents*, 557-61.

²⁰ For discussion of these issues, see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 53-55.

²¹ For comment on this approach, see Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek, "Enforcing the Law on Genocide," *Alternatives* 21(1996): 253.

²² A veto could prevent passage of a withdrawal resolution, thereby leaving the Secretary-General with the right to keep the emergency service in place if he or she chose to do so.

²³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 31-37.

²⁴ "Just cause" is associated with coercive responses to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes specified in the Geneva conventions and protocols, suffering caused by state collapse and resultant starvation, civil war, and gross violations of human rights, and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes where the state is unable or unwilling to prevent severe humanitarian crisis. See *The Responsibility to Protect*, 32.

²⁵ See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 36.

²⁶ The duty to prevent is clearly stated in the Genocide Convention, Article 1. See also *The Responsibility to Protect*, xi-xiii.

²⁷ In the "Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly," Kofi Annan said, "Even the costliest policy of prevention is far cheaper, in lives and in resources, than the least expensive use of armed force." "UN Press Release," September 20, 1999, www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/sg-ga.htm, accessed July 29, 2004.

²⁸ Even if annual expenditures amounted to \$3 billion, for the United States to pay 25 percent of the costs would amount to only about \$2 for each U.S. citizen. Other industrialized countries would pay \$1 to \$2 per capita. The per capita cost for poor countries would be less than 10 cents. These amounts could be placed in the regular UN budget assessments. Alternatively, the emergency force could be funded from small levies on the weapons trade, military budgets, or international currency exchanges if the international community should decide to do so.

²⁹ For further cost-benefit analysis of a UN emergency service, see Langille, *Bridging the Commitment—Capacity Gap* . . . , 75-114.

³⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 20. See also Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* eds. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrane (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

³¹ Secretary-General Annan emphasized the economy of prevention when he noted that the premature withdrawal of UN peacekeepers by the international community, no less than when it unreasonably delays a deployment, "can be costly in both financial and human terms," because dealing with the aftermath of genocide costs much more

than preventing it. The cost of reinforcing UNAMIR in Rwanda, for example, with the 5,000 soldiers that UN commander General Romeo Dallaire “thought were needed to prevent or stop the genocide has been estimated at \$500 million; the cost of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and the region consequent on the genocide was in excess of \$4.5 billion.” See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.” S/2001/394 (April 20, 2001): 5-6. www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2001/0420sgreport.pdf, accessed 13 January 2005

³² Irwin Cotler reported to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide that “trite as it is profound,” the “best protection against mass atrocity is the prevention of the ‘killing fields’ to begin with.” The international community “spent eight times more dealing with the aftermath of conflict and genocide than it invested in the prevention of it.” The full cost of genocide “is incalculable.” See “Address by the Honourable Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada for the Stockholm International Forum,” Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities, Sweden, January 26, 2004, http://www.preventinggenocide.com/files/Canada_eng.pdf, accessed July 27, 2004.

³³ Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly,” *UN Press Release*, 20 September 1999: 5.

³⁴ The Commission on Global Governance concluded that “the very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could be a deterrent in itself. . . . As its skill, experience, and reputation grew, its need to use force would probably decrease. . . . It is high time that this idea – A United Nations Volunteer Force – was made a reality.” The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, 112.

³⁵ See, for example, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, *Towards a More Effective United Nations* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1992); Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*; Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997); Neal Riemer, *Protection Against Genocide* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000); John Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen* (Westport: Praeger, 2001).

³⁶ See, for example, the opinion polling done by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. Data as early as the 1990s showed 79 percent of the U.S. public favored improving UN rapid deployment capabilities. Summary data is reported at the Council for a Livable World Education Fund, <http://www.clw.org/un/unpol96.html>, accessed August 10, 2004.

³⁷ Scholars at the Stimson Center are following these and related reforms. See www.stimson.org/fopo.

³⁸ H. P. Langille, “Overview of Current UN Efforts: Enforcement, Rapid Deployment, Protection of Civilians and the Prevention of Armed Conflict,” paper presented at the “Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement,” University of California, Santa Barbara (December 5, 2003), 19.

³⁹ Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” 49. Emphasis added.

The Future of Peacekeeping¹

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Peace operations continue to be one of the most visible areas of activity of the United Nations, one which the international organization can have a critical impact. Consider, for instance, that peacekeeping operations are growing. In October 2004, the surge in peacekeeping activity raised the number of peacekeepers to 54,200. The number of civilian police also increased to 5,900 and the civilian staff to 11,600. By the fall of 2005, the 18 operations around the world employed 83,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel – a more-or-less fivefold increase in the field personnel since 2000. By the fall of 2006, the deployment number had reached an all-time high of 93,000 men and women.

At the same time, peacekeeping operations are becoming more complex and comprehensive. In particular, with many of their tasks increasingly focusing on peacebuilding in post-conflict transitions, peace operations are now linked to longer-term development approaches, which call for integrated programs both within and outside the UN system. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was created to meet these new needs by strategically coordinating the actions of the different actors involved in peacekeeping.

Although peacekeeping operations are growing in size and complexity, they have not experienced an equivalent increase in political and financial support from member countries. The leading Western powers remain reluctant to take a leading role in expanding UN operations. The current U.S. ambivalence toward the UN is perhaps the most crippling factor. And unfortunately, that ambivalence is not likely to undergo a fundamental shift any time soon.

UPHILL BATTLE

Despite the expansion of operations, the peacekeeping picture is not an entirely rosy one. The challenges are multifold. They entail the limited resources that peacekeeping mobilizes, the way it functions (or not), and how it is being called upon by member states. In fact, peacekeeping is so much of an uphill battle that its capacity to address the security and humanitarian crises associated with failed or failing states is questionable.

In recent years Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the current under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, has repeatedly said that issues of resources and *modus operandi* are critical for peacekeeping and yet so difficult to address in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, getting the right capabilities, including troops, specialized components, and other personnel, on the ground to implement the mandates, making them available not simply over the duration of the missions but also in the early, crucial phase of deployment, can mean the difference between success and failure. But all too often such capabilities are not found, let alone on time. For instance, the UN/African Union “hybrid” mission for Darfur (UNAMID) has been badly hurt

by the refusal of militarily capable nations to provide the two dozens helicopters required, at the least, for operations in Darfur. No NATO country has offered even one helicopter. Equally if not more challenging are the organizing of these capabilities in the field and the integrating and rationalizing of the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

This state of affairs derives from operational difficulties specific to UN peacekeeping, such as the challenge of solving the discrepancy between the financing of different activities for today's complex operations. For example, certain activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions, while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions. Integrating and rationalizing peacekeeping activities is also hampered by the lack of systematically accumulated knowledge of lessons learned. Although the UN has been doing peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, for more than 50 years, its *ad hoc* approach tends to deprive it of time-tested templates on how to proceed to secure success.

But it is the attitude of member states toward peacekeeping that is perhaps the biggest obstacle. First, member states tend to ask the UN to handle security and humanitarian crises that they do not want to tackle themselves. In this regard, UN peacekeeping appears sometimes to be a dumping ground for the most enduring problems. Second, while member states are quick to hand over problems to the UN, they resist giving appropriate resources to address them. Beyond the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council, they are often unwilling to offer sufficient political, financial, logistical, or military support. Against this background, and considering that the crises on which UN peacekeeping operations focus are usually part and parcel of intractable conflicts, it is no surprise that they have mixed results.

The attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council occupies a prime of place in this context. And, more specifically, as Russia and China are still in the back seat when it comes to UN peace operations – although in recent years China has increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping and became in 2006 the 13th-largest contributor of UN peacekeepers – this concerns first and foremost the three Western permanent members of the Council. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, United Kingdom, and France have been the most active in peacekeeping. But they have measured their involvement against a narrowly understood national interest. As a result, their support has been at best tentative and at worst crippled by a reluctance to take much risk.

In this ambiguous commitment of leading Western powers to UN peace operations, the United States has a central role. Indeed, if there is one country that wrestles with the challenge of balancing obligations that the national and international realms entail, it is America.

AMERICAN AMBIVALENCE

In the 1990s, the United States, without a doubt, had a positive impact on the search for solutions to humanitarian crises. In most instances with international involvement, America's role proved to be essential. Although never as decisive as in more traditional types of conflict such as Operation Desert Storm, U.S. participation was decisive enough at least to get the international community engaged in the crises. This was particularly true for Bosnia, Kosovo,

and East Timor. In Bosnia, it took America's commitment to a solution to the conflict, in the spring of 1995, for the war to end. In Kosovo, the U.S. decision to launch a NATO air campaign was central to international involvement there, and it paved the way for the subsequent UN operation. As for East Timor, the political pressure exercised by the American government on Djakarta and the logistical support given to Australian forces were key for the deployment of international forces on the island.

There is however a less inspiring side to this story that concerns American shortcomings and their negative effects on UN peace operations. In this story, the United States oscillated between reluctant leadership and outright refusal to get involved. Rwanda is of course one of the most dramatic examples of how American refusal to get involved in humanitarian crises can have negative consequences. In spring 1994, a few months after the Somalia fiasco and at a time when the Clinton administration was issuing restrictive guidelines on UN peacekeeping, the Rwandan tragedy had little chance of attracting the attention of the White House. This was particularly the case given that the United States had no geopolitical interests strong enough to warrant intervention.

Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration was willing to factor in the emerging complexities of the post-Cold war era and extend the realm of concerns beyond a traditionally defined national interest. Nevertheless it was unwilling to do so more than marginally.

Later, under the Republican administration, the U.S. approach got worst. Radicalizing attitudes that had already existed in American foreign policy toward the UN, its policies and values, President Bush made a unilateral and security-driven conception of international affairs the hallmark of his foreign policy at the outset of his presidency. September 11 and the decision to invade Iraq only further systematized this conception. Consequently, the current administration never viewed UN peacekeeping as a valuable tool in itself. If it dovetailed with America's agenda and interest, as partly happened in Afghanistan, cooperation between the UN and the United States was a possibility. Beyond this, the U.S. government was willing to allocate only the minimal amount of resources to UN peacekeeping.

PAYING THE COSTS

Seven years into Bush's presidency, its handling of international security crises has proved to be far from a success, to say the least. Moreover, failed states and the ethnic tensions often associated with them continue to sprout around the globe. By the mid-2000s, although the number of total of conflicts has declined, the number of internal conflicts has increased to represent 95% of all conflicts worldwide.

Thus the international community now stands at an ominous crossroads. Unless the international community and its principal powers – the United States to begin with – are to ignore failing and failed states altogether, inevitably they will have to address conflicts and humanitarian crises stemming from them.

As such, neither the United States nor the international community will be able to escape the need for peace operations. Financially costly they may be, but not nearly as costly as unsuccessful unilateral interventions. For instance, the estimated total cost of peacekeeping

operations from July 1 2007 to June 30 2008 is \$7 billion. In comparison, the estimated war-related spending for Iraq has risen from \$53 billion in 2003 to \$133 billion in 2007. And these financial costs don't take into account the political costs of such unilateral interventions to the international legitimacy of the United States and other relevant actors, whether states or international organizations. Peace operations are therefore a necessity and a resource that should be used. And now is the time to assess how they can be best effective. Now is the time, also, to examine what it would take for member states and the UN to truly make peace operations part of a comprehensive portfolio of measures, from conflict prevention to post-building reconstruction.

Beyond the specifics of how America can contribute operationally to the success of peacekeeping, the U.S. government can meet its international responsibilities only by fundamentally altering its foreign policy. To take UN peace operations seriously and consequently invest strategically in them, the United States needs to become aware, at the general level of international affairs, of the necessity to link more closely power and legitimacy as well as solidarity and security. In turn, this entails several fundamental changes in the ways American foreign policy is conceptualized and implemented. They include: finding a better balance between national and international interests; coming to terms with the foreign policy implications of U.S. democratic values; exercising leadership within multilateral constraints; and overcoming the parochial characteristics of American foreign policy.

PROSPECTS DIM

What are the chances for these changes to happen as well as for peacekeeping to become a better tool of conflict management in the near future? The chances are, admittedly, rather slim, for three fundamental reasons.

First, the foreign policy of the Bush administration since 2001 departs in practically every respect from the directions advocated here, and this will not change until the end of 2008. Furthermore, it is uncertain that American foreign policy will evolve even beyond the current administration. After all, the Bush administration foreign policy has not been a revolution but rather a radical version of enduring strains in American foreign policy and its conception of the country's place in the world.

Second, there is no serious desire among member states to discuss how to trigger change, followed by real action. This applies to peacekeeping. As such, the gap between rhetoric and reality remains a major issue, unlikely to be solved any time soon at the global level. The mere fact that UN reform is a constant item on the multilateral agenda shows how little progress is being done in this area. Third, and finally, it is difficult to see how the UN secretariat, short of benefiting from a very strong financial and political commitment from member states, can address and redress on its own the systemic shortcomings of peacekeeping operations.

More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, international life is still crippled by conflicts. Peacekeeping operations have expanded to meet some of these challenges. While some of the shortcomings of peacekeeping can be placed on the UN's shoulders, the main problem lies with the strongest member states. In this perspective, only when the United States decides to recognize international constraints and play by the global rules will the

multilateral management of conflict improve. It will be interesting to see if the new U.S. administration scheduled to take charge in Washington in January 2009 will be lucid enough to acknowledge this state of affairs and introduce the necessary changes.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Previously published in *Foreign Policy In Focus*

'Carlsberg Don't Do Peacekeeping'

Memories of Lebanon: October 1982 - May 1983

Lt Col Brendan O'Shea

It seems like an awful long time ago now since the officers of B Company, 52 Irishbatt, UNIFIL, met for the first time in a cold, damp, wooden hut in Collins Barracks, Cork, on the first Monday of September in 1982. Comdt Leo Browne was the Company Commander, Capt Shay Gillen had just returned from a long 'sabbatical' with the FCA to become the 2I/C (he had also been a 'pathfinder' to Lebanon with the 43rd Battalion), and the Lieutenants – Frank Holohan, Joe McDonagh, Paul Murphy, and myself – really hadn't a clue what we were getting into (well I hadn't anyway).

We were all about to embark on a huge adventure into the unknown and the fact that there was fighting going on every day in Lebanon while we were getting to know each other in Cork seemed to have little or no effect on anyone – except probably the boss, but if it did he kept it to himself. Later we were joined by Christy Scott, the Company Sergeant, and Mick Nolan, the Company Quartermaster, and I often wondered what they thought of this motley crew. Twenty-six years later they still keep that secret very much to themselves!

We went to Kilworth to train for operations in the Middle East - but perhaps that was too ambitious. Instead we spent most of our time operating as an enemy force in a Battalion Group Exercise which was running there at the time. "Airport 82" they called it, and the road to No 5 Range had become an international runway capable of taking a Boeing 747 – you certainly needed some imagination for that. The most memorable event by far was the night Cpl Jimmy Campbell and Cpl Gus Dennis attacked and over-whelmed the Battalion Command Post – and the less said about what happened next the better – but it was all training which was badly needed - or so we were led to believe!!

Later in Gormanstown one hundred and thirty of us lined up in single file to receive our jabs from Sgt Billy Cunningham. "Don't be worried sir, no need to be squeamish" he smiled as the guy in front of me dropped to the floor like a sack of spuds – and that before he had even seen a needle. Jab – ouch – God that hurt, but it was all necessary to 'protect us' – from what I was never told, and to this day I still have no idea.

Then, just after midnight one Tuesday morning reality struck home. The long wait was over, and with a light mist blowing in off the Irish Sea we left our billets, and carrying whatever few possessions we had crammed into small shoulder bags, we made our way in darkness to a convoy of busses parked near the main gate. A piper played a tune from each province as the crump of marching boots kept time. The night was still. It was chilly, not cold. No one spoke. Was there an eerie feel to it? Bloody right there was. I sat on the bus with Paul Murphy –

each of us with a lump in our throats as we made the short journey to Dublin Airport. Nothing prepares you for this, and anyone who tells you otherwise is lying.

In the dark we clambered onto an Aer Lingus 747 (perhaps the same one that had been landing on No 5 Range in Kilworth a few weeks previously – who knows!) Count them out of the bus, count them into the terminal, count them out of the terminal, and count them onto the plane. Yes, and while you are at it count them when they are sitting on the plane as well. Unbelievable stuff – but it's the army way! And worse still it's a dry flight so we might as well sleep. Some chance of that with gallons of adrenaline pumping through your veins. But it ends eventually as we strain to get a look at Cyprus, and then we are on final approach.

Beirut. Bright, beautiful, Beirut – well not quite. As we stumbled down the battered steps from the relative luxury of our 747 a searing heat swept up to greet us and we were sweating before we reached the tarmac. Bang! Whoosh! Thump! Explosions high in the Chouf Mountains, and a huge pall of smoke lingering on the skyline and over the city. US helicopters zipping around furiously and the wrecks of MEA aircraft abandoned where they had been shot to pieces. Gun emplacements everywhere you looked and the airport buildings pockmarked and battle damaged. Welcome to Lebanon.

Form up, move away from the plane to a free spot on the tarmac (plenty of those available) and then wait, and wait, and wait, - and wait. Someone from C Coy walked off into the grass at the side of the runway to relieve himself. "Keep away, keep away" screamed an American who had emerged from under some camouflage netting – "it's all mined". "Is it now?" said the Galwegian, "so what are you doing right in the middle of it then"? - and he went about his business.

By now the boss had vanished - allegedly seeking information on our behalf. He had also pulled on an old Blue Beret, which he had kept from previous missions and he looked the part as he strode off across the runway – we were impressed. We were not impressed when two hours later nothing much was happening and the heat became more intense – mad dogs and the Irish baking in the mid-day sun!

Eventually I too wandered off – you can do that when you are a Lieutenant – albeit that I was supposed to stay where I was to facilitate the hourly count. Joe McDonagh slipped off with me and we headed for the terminal building in search of an ice cool coke. Instead all we found was some very bored Lebanese army soldiers sitting on the stairs which led to a trashed airport restaurant. We looked at them and they looked at us. Neither group spoke. No coke for us, and no coke for them – surely there was an opening here somewhere for a Coca Cola franchise!

But no time to plan how I would spend my first million - something was happening outside - and we were missing it. The outgoing Chalk 1 from the 51st Battalion had arrived - all singing, all dancing, and screaming "up your Swiss", they de-bussed on the far side of the tarmac. Forbidden to intermingle we went across anyway and for a while we were all oblivious to the background noise which was still going on around us. "Who won the match on Sunday"? Bang, Whoosh, Thump – "Tipp by five points".

I met Danny O'Sullivan and Billy Harris looking sun-tanned and as good humoured as ever. I had known them for what seemed like a very long time but in army terms it had only been a year or two. I had also trained them both as recruits so there was a special bond as well. Danny handed over a grotty parka jacket and a UN peaker in even worse condition. The parka I would need for the winter, he said, (what winter – the sun is splitting the rocks here) and the peaker, well I could wear that right away if I wanted to – and I did. Later I found 20 Major he had left in a pocket. Knowing Danny he probably had many more stashed away somewhere else which would invariably necessitate deep discussion with a custom's man at Dublin airport!

Then it was time for this group of the 51st to go and the big green bird hurtled itself northwards down the runway, dragged itself painfully into the air, banked to the west, and in minutes was gone. We on the other hand were still standing on the tarmac, bored, tired, hungry, and unable to move until an Israeli Liaison Officer could be found to escort us out of the city – and we were not his priority. Eventually, and in fading light we began our slow sweaty journey to the south in a convoy of trucks and air conditioned busses. (Air-conditioning – what air-conditioning – it might have worked four years ago but it certainly was not working now) With Israelis everywhere, US marines on the airport road, and background noise aplenty most of us just crashed out and fell asleep.

Hours later I awoke in Tibnin, or at least that's where the French driver said we were. It was black dark outside but the transfer of people all seemed to go like clockwork. Guides appeared from the Companys and in minutes the convoy had broken up into smaller packets all going in different directions. We sneaked our way through the darkness to Haddathah village where Comdt Ray Cawley and Capt Hugh O'Donovan were waiting to greet us. They looked like old sweats with their faded uniforms and worn berets, and nothing much seemed to be bothering them.

Hugh said he didn't want to go home. Capt Tom Quirke said somewhere called At Tiri was his home. What? All meaningless to me. Had these guys been spending too much time in the sun? On the way in I noticed a sign over the door, "Ballymaloe House", and inside I found a toilet with running water. Carlsberg didn't do peacekeeping but if they did they would probably set up shop in Haddathah. Now how bad could this be? What were all the war stories about? Well I soon discovered. One week later on 27 October, just after Chalk 2 had arrived on the ground, at about 7.30pm in the evening the radio sprang to life. "Three Irish soldiers shot at Tibnin Bridge". Where the hell was Tibnin Bridge? What had happened? No answers.

Instead, Comdt Cawley (he was still in charge for a few more days) looked straight at me and quietly asked "what are you doing"? "Nothing", I replied (what the hell was I supposed to be doing?) "Right", he said, "round up as many as you can from here and go and re-enforce the checkpoint in the village". "Yes sir" (What, you can't be serious, people are getting shot at check points and you are putting more of us out there!)

Within minutes I was running down the road, stumbling over rocks in the darkness, and soon arrived at the checkpoint which was buzzing with activity. Twenty-five others had also been dragged from various parts of the camp. Sgt Johnny Scott was with me and now coming to the

end of his tour with the 51st he said he had what he called a “feel” for the situation. Well he might have had feel for it but I was seriously afraid, and so were the majority of the newcomers.

I will never forget the sight of Cpl John Cawley locked into the turret of his APC spinning it round and round in continuous circles “searching for targets”, as he said himself. Fortunately he never found any, but I have no illusions that had there been sufficient provocation that night, or had a shot been fired, or had someone thought a shot had been fired, there was every possibility it could have been a different story. Everyone was scared and we were absolutely haunted no one made a mistake - but then again maybe all those hours of boring training do count for something after all. Maybe there really was some point to all the crawling around at night during “Airport 82”?

But it was a long night. Hugh Donovan came and asked if we were hungry. We said yes and he returned later with some very strange looking sandwiches – ‘pita bread’ he called it and said it was a delicacy which I would come to know and love! Comdt Cawley visited regularly and kept asking me if I was nervous – I said I was. “Good”, he said “that will keep you on your toes”. Later on as dawn broke we all calmed down. Johnny Scott was brilliant. Experience gives you the edge in these situations – and that night the novices needed as much experience around them as they could get.

But in real terms we got off easy. Others had far bigger problems to deal with and Billy Cunningham had to call on all his own reserves of strength and experience to keep him going as he worked at the scene of the shooting on Tibnin bridge. Sometimes the medics never get the credit they deserve.

The next few days were dreadful. I didn’t know Greg Morrow, Peter Burke or Thomas Murphy but I felt as if I had just lost three of my best friends. I spent most of that week over in A Coy HQ answering the phone, doing duty and generally helping out - and I watched that company bleed. I served mass for Fr Jim Casey a few times – when all else fails you might as well say a few prayers - but few others attended. The truth was simply beyond comprehension. There was no redemption or mitigation for this. Why, why, why? So many questions - and no answers. Morale hit rock bottom as everyone sought to come to terms with the tragedy, each in his or her own way. It was very painful, but come to terms you do, and you get on with the job - not particularly because you want to it, but simply because you have to - we did after all volunteer to come here in the first place. But the terrible irony of the whole thing was lost on nobody. Before we went to Lebanon very few people outside his own circle had ever heard of Michael MacAleevy. Now he was famous for all the wrong reasons - and three good people were dead. Life simply wasn’t fair - but there was absolutely nothing any of us could do about it.

And after that the rest of the trip seemed almost easy. You grow up fast when you have to and learning on the job concentrates your mind. And we learned other things too. The boss taught us how to roast chestnuts on a Damascus heater, Shay Gillen learned to throw darts, Cpl John Bowen discovered how to acquire food without always relying on the ration scale, Tom Rennicks became adept at managing a bar (more or less), and Cpl John “Knox” O’Donnell kept the peace between all of us when occasionally tempers were frayed.

Then it was Christmas. I made the long tortuous journey from At Tiri on Christmas Eve to attend midnight mass at the Maronite Church beside the gold shop in Tibnin. Fr Dougie Malone and Fr Jim Casey did the honours, and after a few minutes the 'mingy power' (electricity in the real world) failed, which actually made the whole thing so much better. The candles which we had already lit came into their own and we lit a few more for good measure. You didn't have to be religious to know that this was special – so special in fact that twenty-six years later my memory of it is still crystal clear.

After mass – “Happy Christmas” – lots of handshaking and ‘bon homie’ (for about five minutes) and then time to go back to what once upon a time used to be tiled bathroom in someone's house but was now my freezing cold excuse for a bedroom in the platoon headquarters at At Tiri. The journey back seemed endless – a moonlit passage into an unreal life behind the lines. From the sublime to the ridiculous in the space of half an hour.

Christmas Day in At Tiri – no change from any other morning really. Cold, clear, no snow, blue sky, and everyone went about their work in the normal way. The Checkpoint is manned in rotation as always, spuds get peeled, the toilet gets cleaned, tea is drunk by the gallon, and cartons of fags are smoked, as always. These were the days before anyone knew or cared that smoking could damage your health and in any case there were several other phenomena around us which could do you far more damage! And the brave ones ventured outside for a shower which could be had in a contraption resembling a space ship with a rocket attached to heat the water. How nobody was launched into orbit from those things I will never know.

Then the boss arrived mid-morning to wish everyone a happy Christmas. All quiet on the southern front. Late evening it was time for Christmas dinner – no turkey – just whatever was on the ration scale for that particular day. It made such an impression that I have long since forgotten what we had. Later I spent a long time talking to Sgt Willie Scott as fifteen of us huddled around a leaky, fume-belching, kerosene-guzzling Damascus heater trying to stay warm. In the corner a battered TV set was picking up a very weak signal from some Israeli channel while somewhere deep within the building a radio was left-on and every hour on the hour the BBC world service chimed at us reassuringly - “This is London” It was a long way from London, or anywhere else, to here.

From New Year's Day onwards the weather was brutal. Night after night the guys on Observation Post duty could see absolutely nothing. Driving rain, hail, snow, mud, muck, and slush everywhere. Who said hot water bottles were for wimps? Several times as Company Duty Officer I stood them all down. If we could not see beyond our frostbitten noses there was a fair chance even the bravest freedom fighters weren't out and about either. The boss agreed, and those who pulled those ‘graveyard shifts’ in R'shaf and At Tiri were grateful.

Of course there were other times when things were less predictable. Once, a PLO attack was expected (it makes no sense whatsoever now when you think about it) and all our posts had to be re-enforced. I ended up sitting in a galvanized hut on top of Hill 880 for a week with the mortar experts from the weapons platoon. In fear of being over-run (what?) I told Sgt Danny Fitzpatrick to arm all the bombs. He did. Then when the threat was deemed to have passed I suggested he disarm them again. “Sorry sir, no can do” he smiled, and I was left wondering

how I was going to talk my way out of this one especially since no-one had actually told me to arm all this stuff in the first place. Thank you Danny!

I remember other things too now that I come to think about it, like going to Naquora after nearly three months and ringing home from that dark booth near the UNIFIL switch board, forgetting completely the two hour time difference, and waking my mother at 6.30am in the morning. Then there was that 60 hr pass in Israel, going for a swim in the Dead Sea, taking a photo just to prove I was there, risking my life in that terrible cable car ride to the top of Masada only for Sgt Kieran O'Sullivan to utter the immortal words, "looks just like another pile of rocks to me".

But I suppose I was luckier than most for two other reasons. Firstly I was attached to Team Tyre Observer Group Lebanon for 10 days in February 1983, and living in Tyre Barracks with a US Major who was so serious it was frightening - and an Australian Captain who was the direct opposite - I got a glimpse of the "big picture". I saw what had happened to Tyre City during Operation Peace for Galilee and driving thorough the streets I thought I was in a scene from the film *Kelly's Heroes*. The city was completely wrecked, battle damage everywhere, and the ordinary people doing their best to survive in appalling circumstances. I also saw the Israeli army up close - well it was hard not to because they were all over the place with two huge camps right outside the barrack walls. I spent many hours in the sentry tower in the north east corner which had a perfect view into both. Surreal was not the word!

When Cpl Joe Dooley and Sgt Ray Murphy came to take me back to the Hills I tried to explain my new found understanding of the conflict and they listened patiently. I had it all sorted now after 10 days as a pseudo UNMO (Military Observer) in Tyre Bks!!.. When we hit Haddathah however I was brought back to earth with unceremonious haste. During my absence the boss had been inspecting things like ammunition, machine guns, and fire extinguishers in my APCs - and discovered that all was not well. Suffice to say he was not pleased. So much for the big picture!

St Patrick's Day came and Irishbatt dressed up. I went to see the main parade in Camp Shamrock and the Commanding Officer, Lt Col Tony McCarthy, looked the part as he marched past Gen Bill Callaghan the Force Commander leading representative groups from the entire battalion. Sgt Tom Jinks led the pipe band and hurled the staff high into the Lebanese sky. Some begrudgers hoped he would drop it. Disappointment - he never did.

Paddy Cooney, the Minister for Defence, was out and about that day too, and wearing an Irish combat jacket as he went from post to post. It was a nice touch and all bar the extreme cynics (and we had our share) appreciated the gesture.

Later that afternoon B Company got their medals at our own parade in Haddathah just outside the guardroom. The Battalion Commander presented me with mine and I have a fond memory of what he said to me as he pinned the medal on my shirt... "the first of many, Brendan, the first of many". I liked Tony McCarthy a lot. He was a fine officer, a decent human being, and someone who inspired confidence. I'd like to think I learned a lot from him - I hope I have anyway.

I specifically remember that earlier in the trip an issue arose when it was discovered that many people were wearing Israeli parka jackets in order to stave off frostbite - but the problem was we had not been issued with them and therefore they were not official uniform. When the Battalion Commander got wind of the problem we wondered how he would react - but we had nothing to fear. "Draw up a size role", he told the welfare officer, "order one for everyone in the battalion, including me, and subsidize the whole lot of them. Then we will all have one". Practical to the last the CO made the right call and we loved him for it. In a battered locker in Collins Bks Cork I still have a bottle green Israeli parka jacket which gets worn occasionally on the range. It survives as testimony to the application of common sense in adversity and the fact that once upon a time a Commanding Officer put the welfare of his men before the administrative rule book. I learned from Tony McCarthy that if you get the small things right the big ones will take care of themselves - it was an invaluable lesson.

There are other memories too - like doing Radio Scorpion with Sgt Danny Mulcahy until the old ambulance in which it was housed in Norwegian Maintenance Company compound got hit by lightening and we had to negotiate airtime with Radio Dutchbatt. After that "Celtic Radio" went out on 104FM every Sunday afternoon between one and three from Harris - I made a great friend and we had a ball.

Then almost at the end of the trip Joe McDonagh travelled with me all the way to Cairo - the hard way - overland via Sinai - and we got there just in time for a belated St Patrick's day party at the UNTSO-OGE HQ - all I can say is that it must have been the food that made me so ill! Fortunately, Major H J Kafoura (US) took pity on us and provided us with a base from which we got to patrol to the Pyramids, The Souk, and the place where President Sadat was murdered. Thank you Kafouras - where ever you are.

Then it was time to go. Another boring bus journey and we got taken to the cleaners by the Israeli customs at the Rafah border crossing, but then perhaps we asked for it - maybe it would have been better to let them stamp the bloody passports! What were we thinking about?

And then it was over. In a blink six months in Lebanon had come to an end. I nearly fell from the back of the truck that final morning as another French driver weaved his way through Israeli fortifications in Sidon on our way back to Beirut. Had John Cawley not grabbed me I was gone out the back for sure - but the photo was worth the risk - or so I claimed. Now I know it wasn't. John was always there when things started to go wrong - ten times out of ten he also put them right.

At the airport the geography had changed since our last visit six months previously. UNIFIL now had a transit area cordoned off and we changed from our faded bush greens into 'whites' for the final leg of the journey home. All dressed up, UNIFIL ribbon proudly on our chests, but one more time we had to wait. The big green bird was there - we could see the white shamrock on the tail fin as it protruded over the terminal buildings - but all was not yet in order.

So we stood alongside a huge building with an even bigger tarmacked area all fenced off alongside it. Behind the wire we studied the lean mean fighting machines who were putting themselves through a programme of intense physical exercise as the sun scorched down upon

them. Over the building flew the 'Stars and Stripes' and close to the front gate was a big sign in yellow paint which read 'United States Marine Corps'. Little did we know that within a few months, on October 23rd to be exact, a suicide bomber would drive a truck full of explosives straight through that gate, detonate it, and take the lives of 241 Marines - in all probability the very same people we were watching that morning.

And later when I watched reports of the bombing from the comfort of my own home I was stuck by the irony of it all. On that bright sunny morning, 2 May 1983, two groups of peacekeepers had stared at each other through a barbed wire fence. For one group the agony was over, we were going home. For the others their agony had not even yet begun. The common factor was pain and peacekeeping is all about pain in the many guises which it presents itself. The only difference on this occasion was the scale.

And finally touchdown – it was good to be home even if the customs man at Dublin airport could not appreciate the amount of 'kit' I needed to bring back with me. But it was also strange to be back, and we all know it takes a while to re-adjust. However the cold pint of Guinness which Liam Coleman bought me in Mess in McKee Barracks that evening was a very good way to start.

'Here's to 52 Irishbatt, Oct 82 to May 83, - and thank you all for the memories'. You were a unique group of people, in a special place, once upon a time.

Short Biographical Statement

1. **Col Richard E.M. Heaslip (Retd)** was a member of the 37th Cadet class 1962 64 and he retired from the Defence Forces in 2003. Commissioned into the Cavalry Corps he held troop, staff, and command appointments at all levels and was an Instructor at both the Cavalry School and the Military College. He was the first Officer Commanding the Army Ranger Wing (ARW) and held numerous senior staff appointments at DFHQ in Operations Section and Administration Section. His overseas service includes UNFICYP, UNTSO, UNIFIL, EUMM Bosnia 96-97 and OSCE as Chief of the Kosovo Verification Mission and Regional Administrator in the rank of A/Brig Gen in 1989. He concluded his service as Senior Liaison Officer to HQ SHAPE Mons, PCC, and ICC from 2000 to 2003 as a member of the Irish Military Staff Europe.
2. **Declan Power** is a lecturer in communications. He also works as an independent security and defence analyst for the Irish and international media. He served for over 12 years in the Defence Forces and is a graduate of DCU and TCD. His first book 'Siege At Jadotville' was published in 2005. He is currently working with the Irish Rapid Reaction Corps in Darfur, Sudan.
3. **Robert Fisk** was born July 12, 1946 in Maidstone, Kent. He is the Middle East correspondent for *The Independent* and has been described by the *New York Times* as "probably the most famous foreign correspondent in Britain". Robert has over thirty years of experience in international reporting, dating from the 1970s in Belfast, Portugal's 1974 Carnation Revolution, the 1975 - 1990 Lebanese Civil War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is one of the few Western journalists to have interviewed Osama Bin Laden on three occasions between 1994 and 1997. He is also the world's most-decorated foreign correspondent having received numerous awards including the British Press Awards' International Journalist of the Year award seven times. In 1991, Fisk won a Jacob's Award for his RTÉ Radio coverage of the first Gulf War; he received Amnesty International UK Press Awards in 1998 for his reports from Algeria and again in 2000 for his articles on the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. In 2001, he was awarded the David Watt prize for "outstanding contributions towards the clarification of political issues and the promotion of their greater understanding" for his investigation into the Armenian Genocide by the Turks in 1915. More recently, he was awarded the 2006 Lannan Cultural Freedom Prize. He holds a PhD in History from Trinity College Dublin was made an honorary Doctor of Laws by the University of St Andrews on June 24, 2004. The Political and Social Sciences department of Ghent University (Belgium) awarded Fisk an honorary doctorate on March 24, 2006. He was also awarded an honorary doctorate by the

American University of Beirut in June 2006. His literary includes *The Point of No Return: The Strike which Broke the British in Ulster*, London: Times Books/Deutsch; *In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939-1945*, London: Gill & Macmillan; *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* London: Oxford University Press, *The Great War for Civilisation - The Conquest of the Middle East* (2005) London. Fourth Estate; and *The Age of the Warrior: Selected Writings* (2008) London, Fourth Estate.

4. **Kevin Myers** was born 30 March 1947. He is an Irish journalist who currently writes for the *Irish Independent*, having previously contributed to *The Irish Times* newspaper, where he wrote the “An Irishman’s Diary” column several times weekly for many years. Kevin was born and raised in Leicester, England. He attended Ratcliffe College and graduated from University College Dublin with a first class honours degree in History. He began work as a journalist for Radio Telefís Éireann, and reported from Northern Ireland during the height of the Troubles from 1971 to 1978. In the 1980s, he covered on the Lebanese Civil War, and in the 1990s on the Bosnian War. He is based in Dublin and lives in Ballymore Eustace, County Kildare. Over the years Kevin has promoted an awareness of Irish soldiers who served in the British Armed Forces, particularly in World War I, arguing that they believed they were doing their patriotic duty as Irishmen. He has also faulted the official commemoration of the 1916 Easter Rising, and has raised concerns about uncritically celebrating Irish rebellions of former times. During the 1990s he presented the *Challenging Times* television quiz show on RTÉ and in 2000, he published a collection of his *An Irishman’s Diary* columns. He has also published a novel *Banks of Green Willow*, and in 2006, he published *Watching the Door*, about his time as a journalist in Northern Ireland during the 1970s.
5. **Dr. John Moriarty** retired from the Defence Forces in 2002, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was educated at the Christian Brothers School in Dingle and in Rockwell College. He holds degrees in philosophy, psychology and education from University College Dublin. During this time, he also attended the School of Music, Chatham Road under the tutelage of the late Sydney Grieg. He studied medicine at the Royal College of Surgeons and did post graduate work at the Irish College of General Practitioners. John was commissioned into the army in 1977. He holds a degree in law from University College Galway and a post graduate degree from the Honourable Society of Kings Inns in Dublin. He was called to the Irish Bar in 1988. In 2000, he also completed a diploma at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy. He still works in medicine and is particularly interested in preventative medicine. In law, his main interests are public international law, human rights and the law of evidence. He served in the Lebanon with the 44th, 49th, 64th, 65th, 68th, 70th, 74th, 80th, 84th, 87th, 88th and 89th battalions. He also served in East Timor for short periods in January and in April/May of 2002.
6. **Javier Pérez de Cuéllar de la Guerra** (born January 19, 1920, in Lima) is a Peruvian diplomat who served as the fifth Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982 to December 31, 1991. He studied in Colegio San Agustín of Lima, and then at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. In 1995, he ran

unsuccessfully against Alberto Fujimori for President of Peru. He was President of the Council of Ministers, as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs from November 2000 until July 2001, during the turbulent period following Fujimori's resignation over corruption charges. In September 2004, he stepped down from his position as Peru's Ambassador to France, where he formerly resided. He currently resides in Johor Bahru, Malaysia. With the death of Kurt Waldheim in June 2007, he became the oldest former Secretary General of the United Nations. Pérez de Cuéllar joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1940 and the diplomatic service in 1944, serving subsequently as Secretary at Peru's embassies in France, the United Kingdom, Bolivia, and Brazil. He later served as ambassador to Switzerland, the Soviet Union, (concurrently in Poland), and Venezuela. He was a junior member of the Peruvian delegation to the General Assembly at its first session - held in London in 1946-, and a member of the delegations to the 25th through 30th sessions of the Assembly. In 1971, he was appointed permanent representative of Peru to the United Nations, and he led his country's delegation to all sessions of the Assembly from then until 1975. In 1973 and 1974, he represented his country in the Security Council, serving as its President at the time of the events in Cyprus in July 1974. On 18 September 1975, he was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus – a post he held until December 1977-, when he rejoined the Peruvian Foreign Service. On 27 February 1979, he was appointed as United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. From April 1981, while still holding this post, he acted as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative on the situation relating to Afghanistan. In that capacity, he visited Pakistan and Afghanistan in April and August of that year in order to continue the negotiations initiated by the Secretary-General some months earlier. On December 31, 1981, Pérez de Cuéllar succeeded Kurt Waldheim as Secretary-General and was re-elected for a second term in October 1986. During his two terms, he led mediations between Britain and Argentina in the aftermath of the Falklands War and promoted the efforts of the Contadora Group to bring peace and stability to Central America. He also interceded in the negotiations for the independence of Namibia, the conflict in Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and the Cyprus issue. Shortly before the end of his second term, he was unofficially requested by members of the Security Council to reconsider his earlier decision not to run for a third term, albeit shortened to two years, as a search for his successor had not, as of then, yielded a consensus candidate. Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar graciously declined the offer once a candidate was found, in late December of 1991, his second term as Secretary-General concluding, as scheduled, on December 31, 1991.

7. **Dr. Mike Cosgrave** earned his PhD at the Department of History, University College, Cork. His doctoral thesis, *Comparative and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping in Intra-State Conflicts with particular reference to Irish participation in ONUC, 1960-64* drew parallels between ONUC and peace operations of the 1990s in order for the importance of a full 'Lessons learned' process for peacekeeping. He is currently lecturing in History at UCC with particular interests in military and political history, and computer applications in history.

8. **Comdt Rory Finnegan** joined the Defence Forces as a Cadet in 1983 and was commissioned into the Artillery Corps. As a YO he served predominately with 1 Fd Arty Regt, during which time he completed two tours in UNIFIL. Having graduated from UCG with a BA in 1987, he was subsequently awarded an MA from UL in Intl Studies in 1996. In 2000 having completed an MSc in Global Security at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, he was posted to the Infantry School, Military College, to establish a Strategic Studies Cell. He is currently serving as a Military Observer on the Golan Heights with UNTSO, stationed in Tiberias.
9. **Dr. Ray Murphy** is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Galway, Ireland. He completed his B.A. in Political Science and Legal Science in 1979, and then took a Bachelor in Law (LL.B.) degree in 1981. He studied at Kings Inns in Dublin where he completed a B.L. degree and was called to the Irish bar in 1984. He completed a Masters degree in International Law (M.Litt.) at Dublin University (Trinity College) in 1991. In 2001 he completed his Ph.D. in International Law at the University of Nottingham in England. In addition to his position at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, Dr. Murphy is on the faculty of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center, the International Institute for Criminal Investigations and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy. He also lectures on international humanitarian law for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Dr Murphy was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship in 2006 and worked with Human Rights Watch in New York as a resident scholar. He is a former Captain in the Irish Defence Forces and he served as an infantry officer with the Irish contingent of UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1981/82 and again in 1989. He practiced as a barrister for a short period before taking up his current appointment at Galway University. He has field experience with the OSCE in Bosnia in 1996 and 1997. He has also worked on short assignments in west and southern Africa and the Middle East for Amnesty International, the European Union and the Irish Government. A specialist in peace support operations, Dr Murphy founded and directs the master's level programme in the area of peacekeeping, which has been in place at the Centre since September 2002. Dr Murphy lectures in International Peace Support Operations and International Humanitarian Law. He has published widely in these fields. His latest book, *Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice*, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2007.
10. **Anthony Foley** is a barrister and served in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Legal Adviser and Head of Legal Affairs to the European Union in Mostar and subsequently served as Human Rights Officer and Director of Return and Reconstruction with the United Nations Office of the High Representative in Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina. He served with the Department of Defence for twenty seven years and is the author of a number of books. He was co-author of "The Irish Constitution - an Annotated Edition", an examination principally of the referendum process in Ireland and has recently finished a book on Herzegovina and its history and on the position of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is also the author of many articles.

11. **Comdt Mark Hearn**s joined the Defence Forces in 1983 and has served most of his commissioned career in the Eastern Command / Brigade. His overseas service includes two tours of duty with the Irish Battalion in UNIFIL (1990 and 2000), one year with the European Commission Task Force to Russia (1992), fifteen months with the OSCE Mission to Georgia (1995 – 97), four months at the Headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan (2002) and six months with the Irish QRF in UNMIL (2004). His educational qualifications include a BA degree in Italian and Sociology and Political Science at UCG (1986 – 89), a Post Graduate Diploma in Russian Studies at Dublin University (1990 – 93). In 2001 he completed a MA in International Relations at Dublin City University and wrote his dissertation on developments in the Russian media. He has lectured on Ethnicity and Nationalism and on National Security and International Order at Dublin City University.
12. **Comdt Damien Coakley** was commissioned into the Infantry Corps in 1992. He has served in a number of Infantry appointments and currently holds the appointment of Coy Comd Sp Coy 4 Inf Bn. He has previously served for a number of years in the Military Police Corps as a Staff Officer in the Directorate of Military Police in Defence Forces Headquarters. Comdt Coakley served in the Lebanon in 1997 with the 81 Inf Bn UNIFIL and as the Military Police Officer with the 87 Inf Bn in 2000. He also served as the DCO with the International Military Police Coy, SFOR Sarajevo in 2002. He holds a Diploma in Military Studies, a BA (Hons) from University College Galway, a Diploma in Public Relations from the Public Relations Institute of Ireland and an MBS (Hons) from University College Cork. He lives in Cork, is married and has one daughter.
13. **Colonel Colm Doyle** retired from the Defence Forces in 2007 after 42 years service. He holds a MA in International Studies from UL and is currently on the Board of Directors of the Irish Peace Institute. He was a former Bn Comdr with UNIFIL, an UNMO with UNTSO and Head of the ECCM in Bosnia. He was also a Special Representative in Bosnia in 1992 and has appeared as a prosecution witness with the ICTY in The Hague. From 2004 to 2006 he was Chief of Staff of the Military Division, UNDPKO NY. Prior to his retirement Col Doyle was CMC.
14. **Robert C. Johansen**, former rapporteur for the UNEPS project, is Acting Director and Senior Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. He is author of *The National Interest* and *the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton University Press) and numerous articles on normative international relations, the United Nations, the maintenance of peace and security, and global governance. He has held visiting research appointments at Princeton and Harvard. His research focuses on efforts to increase compliance with the prohibitions of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes against the peace.

15. **Dr. Robert Zuber** currently serves as director of the project for a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) as well as Outreach and Organizational Development consultant for Global Action to Prevent War. He also teaches in the doctoral program at New York Theological Seminary and has served as a pastoral associate through All Saints Church in Harlem, New York City. Dr. Zuber has been an executive, founding board member, UN representative and/or senior fundraising and organizational development consultant to dozens of community-based and international organizations, including the Center for International Media Action, Green Map System, World Order Models Project, Center for Community Action (NC), the International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, Ecologies of Learning, and Polluted Places/Blacksmith Institute. He has written and spoken widely on disarmament, human rights education and community environmental issues as well as on capacity building skills for urban ministry.
16. **Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud** heads the UN University Office at the United Nations in New York. He is the author of *Beyond the National Interest: The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Multilateralism in an Era of U.S. Primacy* (Washington, D.C., USIP Press, 20007) among other publications. He has held a variety of positions, with the French diplomatic service, the European Parliament, various universities, and the UN, in Europe, the United States, and Asia. Formerly part of the speechwriting team of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he is a contributor to *Foreign Policy In Focus* (www.fpif.org). He can be reached at: jeanmarc@ony.unu.edu
17. **Lt Col Brendan O'Shea** is a serving professional military officer with thirty years service. He holds a BA in History from UCG, a BCL from UCC, a Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, and a PhD in History from UCC. He is the author of *Crisis at Bihac - Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield* (Sutton Publishing UK 1998), *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995* (Frank Cass UK 2005), editor of *In The Service of Peace - Memories of Lebanon* (Mercier Press 2001) and co-author with Gerry White of *The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913 -1916* (Osprey UK 2003), *Baptised in Blood - The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 -1916* (Mercier Press 2005), and *The Burning of Cork* (Mercier Press 2006).